

THE FORGE OF DOCTRINE

The Academic Year 1330-31 and the
Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris

Studia Sententiarum

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Volume 2

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Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris

William O. Duba



BREPOLS

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Preface

I conceived this book on Nissi Beach, Ayia Napa, Cyprus. I had brought with me to Cyprus my bathing suit, a beach towel, sunscreen – in short, I thought I had everything for the beach. As we were about to get in the car, my host, Chris Schabel, pointed out what I'd forgotten: both he and Monica Brnzei had prints of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl manuscripts, but I'd already gone through my manuscript prints on the flights from Switzerland. No matter, he had just printed out images from a codex in Prague.

Of course, I knew the codex. Six months previously, I had been to Prague to study a manuscript of Francis of Marchia's commentary on book III of the *Sentences* held in the Castle Archive. Chris wanted to edit a future-contingent question from an obscure Franciscan's *Sentences* commentary, but his microfilm of the only manuscript witness was illegible. Could I order a copy? Maybe we'll do a question-list together. So I trudged down to the National Library, found the manuscript room, and ordered digital reproductions.

From Prague, I returned to Switzerland and continued work on the Francis of Marchia project, trying to sort out the redactional mess behind his commentaries on the *Sentences*. To make sense of the complex tradition, I hypothesized what the original must have looked like, uneasily aware of the fantastic peril such reasoning entailed; for countless scholars, especially those involved with Scotus, have been seduced by an attractive manuscript, leading teams of editors deeper in the desert in the pursuit of what turns out to be a mirage.

What I saw on the beach, printed on A3 black-and-white paper, had to be an illusion. It looked exactly like what I believed an original *reportatio* of a Franciscan's lectures on the *Sentences* would look like, and no such thing was known to survive. I tried to pierce the illusion, to find some trait, some correction, some mark that would show that this was not the original. I failed.

I took the imagery back with me to Switzerland, where the study of the manuscript became a priority for the Swiss National Science Foundation *Ambizione* project I was leading. At the beginning, my goals were modest: The *festschrift* we were preparing for William J. Courtenay was delayed, and my article, an edition of a Parisian arts master's promotion speech, seemed rather thin. Lest the *festschrift* be too short, I decided to work this manuscript into a longer article, using as inspiration Courtenay's own "Pastor of Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint-Omer 239". Like Courtenay's classic article, I wanted to present an original witness to *Sentences* lectures. Yet, in confronting Courtenay's results with my own, it became evident that the Saint-Omer MS was also a *reportatio*. At the same time, we identified who the *reportator* was: Steven J. Livesey had just discovered another Saint-Omer manuscript, the notebook of Peter of Allouagne, and Peter's hand matched the one of the note-taker of Pastor. Peter's notebook itself held great riches for understanding the university milieu in which William of Brienne worked. Only in Prague could I put these pieces together. The Czech Academy of Sciences generously financed an extended visit to Prague so that I could examine the codex in detail. On March 21, 2014, I completed a draft of "William of Brienne (fl. 1330) and MS Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14", which contained an early version of the central chapters of this book (now I–V) and most of the appendices (all but D and G). At 180 A4 pages, the "Equinox Edition" proved to be too long for a *festschrift*; I circulated a draft among colleagues, put some of my conclusions on Durand of Aurillac into a note for the *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, and returned to editorial work.

During the next two years, while working at Radboud University Nijmegen as a part of the Radboud Excellence Initiative, I strove not only to write an article for the Courtenay *festschrift*, but also to correct the shortcomings of the Equinox Edition. To complete the picture of William of Brienne as a Scotist, I had to discuss his doctrine of the formal distinction; to present the totality of his known creative work, I needed to edit his inaugural lecture. These changes resulted in the penultimate draft, completed in August, 2016 (the "Assumption Edition"), which, again, circulated informally for comment.

I have also presented parts of this research at various colloquia, notably at the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague, organized by Dr. Pavel Blažek, the Freiburger Forschungskolloquium, organized by Professor Catherine König-Pralong, and the First Meeting of the Society for

the Study of Medieval Thought in the Americas, organized by Professor Katherine Tachau. I owe a great debt to the organizers for giving me the opportunity to discuss the work and to the participants, both for their helpful feedback and their remarkable patience.

This volume represents the culmination of this work. Some might find it rather old-fashioned, building on nineteenth-century attempts to reconstruct the history of universities, debating theses posited before the Second World War, and the average publication date of modern works cited is 1981. Yet, the most recent developments in information technology have made this book possible. The manuscript that serves as the focus of this book was catalogued in the 1950s, and microfilmed in the 1980s, but it is only with the advent of digital photography that its importance became apparent. With the advent of large-scale digitalization projects, this individual case becomes the general rule: as ever more of our shared patrimony becomes available practically instantaneously, the requirements for scholarship have changed. For this study, while the overwhelming majority of scholastic works from the early fourteenth century exist only in manuscript form, I have benefited from having many of these manuscripts available in a way previous generations could not even imagine. Yet, with so much uncharted territory, I know I have overlooked far more than I have found. For this, I beg the reader's indulgence.

I owe thanks to my wife, Trine Wismann, who has accompanied me on the project from the beach onward. She has also graciously traced the watermarks and compiled the index. I am also greatly indebted to the generosity of many institutions, named above, and the kind help of many friends and scholars, too numerous to name. I owe particular thanks to Paul Bakker, Monica Brînzei, Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, William J. Courtenay, Jo Edge, Francesco Fiorentino, Russ Friedman, Roberto Lambertini, Steven J. Livesey, Patrick Nold, Timothy Noone, Chris Schabel, Garrett Smith, Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Edith Sylla, Okihito Utamura, and Ueli Zahnd.

Introduction

William of Brienne (fl. 1330) and MS Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14

From its foundation at the beginning of the thirteenth century until the Black Death arrived in 1348, the University of Paris enjoyed a position of undisputed hegemony over European thought. Its Faculty of Theology claimed to be supreme at the university, and the educational systems of the religious orders supported this claim. The mendicant orders, most famously the Dominicans and Franciscans, set for themselves the mission of preaching across the known world, and that mission required not only a network of convents, but also a sophisticated means of teaching its preachers, while enforcing a doctrinal consistency that maintained not only orthodoxy, but also the shared identity of the particular order.¹ The means of instruction adopted by the mendicant orders foresaw a series of schools, whose teachers had spent some time studying at a *studium generale*, most notably Paris, overseen and guided by those who had achieved the highest degree, the Master of Theology, and the “best” masters acquired such a degree at Paris. For all, religious or secular, who aspired to the glory of Master of Theology in Paris, the most onerous requirement was the famed “Reading of the *Sentences*”, to give an obligatory two-year course (shortened to one year in the fourteenth century) that covered the material in Peter Lombard’s *Four Books of the Sentences*, a theological textbook produced in the twelfth century.² During

¹ N. ŠENOCAK, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209–1310*, Ithaca 2012; B. ROEST, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210–1517)* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 11), Leiden 2000; M.M. MULCHAHEY, “*First the Bow is Bent in Study...*” *Dominican Education Before 1350* (Studies and Texts 132), Toronto 1998.

² For a general introduction to Peter Lombard’s and his *Sentences*, see M.L. COLLISH, *Peter Lombard* (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 41), Leiden 1994; P.W. ROSEMAN, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s Sentences* (Rethinking the Middle Ages 2), Peterborough, ON 2007. On the history

this *Sentences*-lecture, the candidate, now a “bachelor of the *Sentences*” or *sententiarius*, actualized his knowledge, demonstrating his competence to discuss philosophical and theological topics ranging from God to Creation and back. At the end of the lecture, the candidate became known as a “formed bachelor”, and it is this teaching, this masterwork, that more than any other activity qualified him to seek the license and become a master of theology.

The present study focuses on a single artefact, a manuscript codex preserved in Prague, in the National Library of the Czech Republic. It uses this artefact, containing the written account of the *Sentences* lectures of an eminently obscure Franciscan theologian, to expand our knowledge of the careers of theologians at the medieval universities, as well as the institutional and social contexts. From this perspective, it tries to answer the questions: What was the intellectual enterprise of lecturing on the *Sentences* in Fourteenth-Century Paris? How were, mechanically, courses given? What process did a scholar follow to produce what is now known as a “*Sentences* commentary”?³ How did a theologian, over

of *Sentences* commentaries, see R.L. FRIEDMAN, “The *Sentences* Commentary 1250–1320. General Trends, The Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Current Research*, vol. 1, ed. G. EVANS, Leiden 2002, pp. 41–128.

³ C. SCHABEL, “Were There *Sentences* Commentaries?”, in *Commenter au moyen âge*, ed. O. BOULNOIS, forthcoming, finds the earliest mention of a “Commentary on the *Sentences*” of Peter Lombard in the mid-sixteenth century. On the grounds that these texts are not literal commentaries, but usually take the form of questions, and that they have at best a thematic relationship with the Lombard’s text, Schabel argues that they are not *Sentences* commentaries; rather the term should be reserved for the expositions of Peter Lombard’s text. I will concede that the medieval usage of *commentarium* and its variants refers primarily to literal commentaries and that the expression “*Sentences* commentary” tends to fool scholars into thinking the so-named work a debased derivative of a twelfth-century handbook of patristics instead of potentially being a treatise of systematic philosophy and theology with a global scope. Yet the medieval practice of producing a commentary often includes both an *expositio* of the literal text followed by a series of *dubia* or *quaestiones*, and many of these texts (including Schabel’s “extreme example” of a non-commentary, that of Gerald Odonis) have both an *expositio* and questions. Moreover, even Pierre Ceffons, Schabel’s exemplary case “of separation from Peter Lombard’s text”, does make some vestigial effort to relate his questions to the structure of Lombard’s text. Schabel himself in the article in question uses the term “*Sentences* commentary” to refer to the genre. Therefore, in what follows, I follow Schabel in using the term as an anachronistic reference to the genre of works related to classroom teaching on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* and that exhibit explicit structural dependence on that work.

the course of an academic year, forge the doctrine that defined himself and his school?

The method used to answer these questions presents itself: incorporate the results of previous studies on the history of universities, when necessary reconstructing institutional practice from surviving statutes and documents of record, and connect the outcome to the preferred grand narrative in the history of ideas and institutions. Yet the challenge is that the preferred grand narratives of previous generations have not only colored prior syntheses on the history of universities, but they have also influenced the publication and even the survival of the documents of record on which these syntheses depend.

For the University of Paris, the foundational history was provided by Du Boulay's 6-volume *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, stretching from its supposed foundation by Charlemagne to 1500.⁴ By the nineteenth century, advances in archival science and philological rigor led to the collection and publication of university statutes,⁵ as well as the weaving of this material together into the grand histories of universities.⁶ These early historians of universities were well aware of the limitation of using purely prescriptive documents and they sought out documents of record.⁷ Alongside their claims to scientific accuracy and embedded

⁴ E. DU BOULAY, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, 6 vols., Paris 1665–1673.

⁵ Most notably, H. DENIFLE and E. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (=CUP), 5 vols., Paris 1889–1897; M. FOURNIER, *Les statuts et privilèges des universités françaises depuis leur fondation jusqu'en 1789*, 4 vols., Paris 1890–1894; C. THUROT, *De l'organisation de l'enseignement dans l'université de Paris au moyen âge*, Paris 1850; F. EHRLE, *I più antichi statuti della Facoltà teologica dell'Università di Bologna* (Universitatis Bononiensis Monumenta 1), Bologna 1932.

⁶ Chief among which is H. RASHDALL, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, second edition, 3 vols., ed. F.M. POWICKE and A.B. EMDEN, Oxford 1936.

⁷ A. MOLINIER, "Étude sur l'organisation de l'Université de Toulouse, au quatorzième et au quinzième siècle", in *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, eds. C. DE VIC and J. VAISSETTE, second edition, v. 7, Toulouse 1879, pp. 570–571: "Loin d'avoir la prétention de combler une lacune, qui subsistera peut-être longtemps encore, nous avons seulement voulu fournir aux historiens de cette célèbre institution les matériaux les plus indispensables; publiant les statuts de l'Université dont la plupart sont restés inédits jusqu'à ce jour, nous avons cru utile de noter les principales remarques que la lecture de ces textes a pu nous suggérer. Mais les statuts, si importants qu'on les suppose, ne donnent que l'histoire extérieure de l'Université; nous y trouvons pour ainsi dire la théorie des études, les règles qui présidaient aux examens, le but que les législateurs du quatorzième siècle s'étaient proposé. Pour savoir comment ces statuts étaient appliqués, pour apprécier leur influence sur les études, pour connaître la vie des étudiants, la nature

in their monumental contributions, these scholars promoted a specific vision of the history of universities and its relevance for the present. Since the present study builds upon these sources, it would help at the outset to underscore the explicit goal of previous generations of historians of the University of Paris, and, in particular, to focus on how this goal influenced the selection and presentation of material in the single most important edition of source material, the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*.

In 1879, Pope Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, calling for a revival of studies of Thomas Aquinas and scholastic thought in general, citing as the chief reason:

Many of those who, with minds alienated from the faith, hate Catholic institutions, claim reason as their sole mistress and guide. Now, We think that, apart from the supernatural help of God, nothing is better calculated to heal those minds and to bring them into favor with the Catholic faith than the solid doctrine of the Fathers and the Scholastics, who so clearly and forcibly demonstrate the firm foundations of the faith, its divine origin, its certain truth, the arguments that sustain it, the benefits it has conferred on the human race, and its perfect accord with reason, in a manner to satisfy completely minds open to persuasion, however unwilling and repugnant.⁸

de l'enseignement des maîtres, il faudrait joindre aux textes que nous publions des éléments d'information bien plus nombreux et beaucoup plus difficiles à réunir. Pour savoir comment se recrutait la population universitaire de Toulouse au moyen âge, il faudrait parcourir les registres d'inscriptions qui nous sont restés; pour connaître les moeurs des étudiants, il faudrait étudier les statuts des collèges et rechercher les documents littéraires, judiciaires, administratifs, qui parlent de cette turbulente agglomération, qui répriment ses excès ou règlementent sa vie journalière. Enfin, celui qui voudrait se rendre compte du profit que l'on pouvait tirer de l'instruction reçue à l'Université de Toulouse devrait rechercher les écrivains marquants qui y ont fait leurs études, parcourir leurs écrits, étudier leur enseignement. Ce sont là des recherches qu'il nous était impossible de faire."

⁸ LEO PAPA XIII, "Aeterni Patris", http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html (last accessed January 3, 2016; English translation at the same site): "Deinde plurimi ex iis hominibus qui, abalienato a fide animo, instituta catholica oderunt, solam sibi esse magistrum ac ducem rationem profitentur. Ad hos autem sanandos, et in gratiam cum fide catholica restituendos, praeter supernaturale Dei auxilium, nihil esse opportunius arbitramur, quam solidam Patrum et Scholasticorum doctrinam, qui firmissima fidei fundamenta, divinam illius originem, certam veritatem, argumenta quibus suadetur, beneficia in humanum genus collata, perfectamque cum ratione concordiam tanta evidentia et vi commonstrant, quanta nectendis mentibus vel maxime invitis et repugnantias abunde sufficiat."

From such a perspective, the institution that gave rise to the scholastics, the medieval university, merits particular attention. Moreover, as is well-known, *Aeterni Patris* spurred the study of medieval thought and encouraged a particular view of the history of medieval philosophy as the lead-up to grand Thomistic synthesis of faith and reason, followed by a collapse into fourteenth-century skepticism and logic-chopping.⁹ Heinrich Suso Denifle combined these two impulses, bringing the narrative of the triumph and tragedy of St. Thomas Aquinas to the documentary history of the University of Paris.

The year after the promulgation of *Aeterni Patris*, the Dominican Order sent friar Denifle to Rome. Denifle quickly set out to rewrite the history of medieval universities in five volumes, with the last three dedicated to the University of Paris.¹⁰ Marshalling his access to the Vatican

⁹ On the revival of Thomism and medieval studies, see J. INGLIS, *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 81), Leiden 1998.

¹⁰ H. DENIFLE, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400*, Berlin 1885, pp. vii–viii: “Während ich mit der Ausarbeitung einer Geschichte der deutschen Gottesfreunde im 14. Jh. beschäftigt war, wurde ich Herbst 1880 in Ordensangelegenheiten nach Rom berufen. Bei Durchmusterung der römischen Bibliotheken und Archive wurde es mir sofort klar, dass ich an eine Vollendung meiner Arbeit, für die in Rom fast alle Materialien fehlen, vorderhand nicht denken dürfe, wenngleich ich durchaus nicht gewillt bin auf diesem Gebiete einen Mann, dem ich gründliche Quellenkenntniss und wahres Verständniss für die Eigenart germanischer Mystik absprechen muss, nach Herzenlust schalten und walten zu lassen. Zunächst war ich nur bestrebt, den einen Punkt über die Prophezeiungen des 14. Jhs. bezüglich bevorstehender Katastrophen aufzuhellen. Die genetische Entwicklung der Frage führte mich auf ähnliche Erscheinungen im 12. und 13. Jh. Meine Beschäftigung mit Abt Joachim und dem Evangelium aeternum sowie mit den Schicksalen des letzteren an der Universität Paris um die Mitte des 13. Jhs. brachte mich zur Ueberzeugung, dass die Forschungen darüber ganz ungenügend sind. Beim weiteren Studium wurde mir klar, dass auch die bisher bekannte Resultate über den Streit der Universität mit den Bettelorden äusserst problematischer Natur seien. In Folge dessen dachte ich an eine Publication: Die Universität Paris und die Bettelorden in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jhs. mit einem Anhang über das Evangelium aeternum, machte aber in Verlaufe der Arbeit die Beobachtung, dass Du Boulay uns alle hinsichtlich des Entwicklungsganges der Universität Paris in die Irre geführt hat. Ich liess es mich nicht verdrissen, noch einmal von vorne anzufangen, um eine Geschichte der Schulen und der Universität zu Paris bis zum Ende des 13. Jhs., in der naturgemäss meine bisherigen Forschungen verwertet und die bereits studierten Fragen ihre Stelle finden sollen, zu verfassen. Damit jedoch endlich einmal der Grund zu einer Verfassungsgeschichte der mittelalterlichen Universität gelegt werde, unternahm ich es um Paris die übrigen Hochschulen bis zum Ende des 14. Jhs. zu gruppieren.”

Archives, to which he was named sub-archivist in 1883, Denifle set out to provide a positivist history of the medieval university, preferring to treat individual facts rather than make overbroad generalizations, declaring “Poetry is the job of poets and not of historians.”¹¹

Probably owing to this obsession with establishing the details before attempting a grand synthesis, Denifle never got past the first volume of his history of universities. Instead, he produced, with the help of Émile Chatelain, the most ambitious and, to date, most complete collection of documents pertaining to the medieval University of Paris, the *Char-tularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (CUP). Their focus was explicitly on archival sources (namely, those that had *ingenium documentorum*) and statutes that, in their judgment, directly involved the University of Paris, or, for the mendicant orders and the colleges, documents pertaining to their foundation and a selection of those that dealt with the University or mendicant *studia* at Paris.¹²

¹¹ DENIFLE, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten*, pp. xxiii–xxiv: “Die von mir eingeschlagene Methode ist dieselbe, welcher ich bei meinen Untersuchungen über die deutschen Mystiker gefolgt bin, nämlich die analytische. Meiner Ueberzeugung nach gewinnt man mit der synthetischen auf einem Gebiete, wo es noch so viel zu thun gibt und die einzelnen Thatsachen erst eruiert werden müssen, keine unanfechtbaren Resultate. Man läuft Gefahr Einzelheiten zu Allgemeinheiten zu erheben, Schlüsse auf mangelhafte Induction zu bauen, manchmal gerade umgekehrt überall vorkommende Erscheinungen als Eigenthümlichkeiten zu betrachten und endlich die verschiedenen Zeiten durch einander zu mengen. Folgerungen, wie der: so war es an diesem Orte oder in diesem Jahrhundert, darum wird es wohl auch anderswo und in dem früheren und späteren Jahrhundert so gewesen sein, bin ich abhold. Es ist der historischen Wissenschaft weit mehr gedient, wenn man sich lediglich auf den Boden der Thatsachen stellt und sich das Terrain Schritt für Schritt erobert und sichert, als wenn man ‘den Standpunkt hoch genug nimmt, um in einer weit ausgreifenden Umschau die Blicke streifen zu lassen über Völker und über Jahrhunderte’, und sich trotz alles Pochens auf den historischen Sinn keinen Scrupel macht, die Geschichte so darzustellen, wie man sie eben haben will und braucht, und nicht so, wie sie thatsächlich ist. Die Poesie ist Sache der Poeten und nicht der Historiker.”

¹² CUP I, p. xxx: “In praesenti tomo non omnia afferre scripta decuit, in quibus aliqui magistri Parisenses nominantur; sed de rebus ab Universitate alienis agitur. In quo forsitan majorem etiam quam requirebatur materiam congesserimus, quanquam mera chronica et similis generis auxilia mediocris auctoritatis, quae non documentorum ingenium habent, jure omisimus. Raro hanc normam perfregimus, id est quando ea auxilia proprie ad rem faciebant. —De Ordinibus religiosiis qui cum Universitate commercium habebant, instrumenta ad eorum fundationem Parisiis pertinentia semper inseruimus, postea partem eorum quae ad Universitatem sive studia Parisiensia spectant. Eadem ratio in collegiis saecularibus adhibenda esse nobis visa est. Hic delectus omnino necessarius fuit, cum ex. gr. de Sorbona tam multa supersint documenta ut plura volumina de

While not technically a cartulary, the CUP does have a specific rhetorical goal, and in pursuit of that goal, the CUP presents a doubly idealized version of the University of Paris; the editors privileged certain records and excluded others as irrelevant, unimportant, or more commonly, simply inaccessible, and use their data to paint the University of Paris as reaching its moral and intellectual peak in the late thirteenth century, in the period of the great Thomistic synthesis, before slipping into a period of moral and intellectual decay in the fourteenth.

First, the editors' uneven access to, and publication of, surviving documents provide a distorted picture. For example, one of Denifle's stated interests in the history of the University of Paris was the turbulent relationship between the mendicant orders and the university, and the editors' introduction therefore declares their intention to publish the relevant documents pertaining to the mendicant orders. In keeping with the later, uncontested inclusion of these orders in the University of Paris, Denifle and Chatelain published in the CUP records pertaining to these houses. But the survival is uneven: they had extensive access to the records of the Dominican Order, which by the early fourteenth century at their annual General Chapter meeting named the bachelors to read the *Sentences* at Paris for the coming academic year and the one to follow. Denifle and Chatelain systematically printed these names and any other mention of the Parisian *studia* in the acts from the Dominicans. While the other mendicant orders only occasionally named bachelors to Paris in their acts, they did regularly treat matters pertaining to their *studia* at Paris, but their inclusion in the CUP is spotty, especially for the Augustinian Hermits and Carmelites. Let one example suffice: the CUP publishes extracts from the May 1331 Dominican General Chapter meeting, specifically, the act that reiterates a ban on masters and bachelors at Paris, as well as lectors throughout the order, from offering a meal (*pictantia*) to commemorate their promotions and the beginning of their lectures, and the act that names the next two *sententiarii* to Paris.¹³ Yet in May of the previous year, William of Cremona, the prior general of the Augustinian Hermits wrote a letter to his order's Parisian convent, regulating the discipline of the convent, specifically concerning how masters and students were to comport themselves, including the

solo collegio Sorbonensi facile vulgari possint. Nihil vero omittere volumus de collegiorum cum Universitate consuetudine, multis saltem per notas memoratis. —Studiorum generalium seu Universitatum aliarum tantum afferre documenta deuit quantum ea Universitatis Parisiensis interesse videbantur."

¹³ CUP II-1, p. 344, n. 912.

statement that “at the inaugural lectures (*principia*) of masters, bachelors and *biblici*, we command that a meal (*pitantia*) of meat shall not be given.”¹⁴ Denifle and Chatelain did not publish this parallel statute, although they had access to the text, for they publish excerpts from the 1343 Augustinian General Chapter meeting, using Verdun, BM 41, ff. 198v–200v; William’s letter appears on f. 195r.¹⁵ In other words, Denifle and Chatelain applied selection criteria that are not as transparent as they pretended; they were systematic with regards to the Dominican Order, but less so when it came to the other mendicant orders at Paris.

In presenting the second volume of the CUP, on the first half of the Fourteenth Century, Denifle makes explicit the narrative of the University of Paris that he wishes to present. Contrary to the previous generation of scholars, who posited the beginning of the decline of the University of Paris in the Great Schism (1378–1417), Denifle argued:

In fact it is not so: certainly, at the time [of the Schism] the University still had authority, both because of its ancient reputation and because of some of the most famous masters of the University, like Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Gerson, and yet the life and spirit had already gone, as the charters written by the University herself of the time best prove. For the tendency that scholars claim to be born of the Schism was already lurking in the period considered by this volume.¹⁶

¹⁴ “Litterae prioris generalis Fr. Guillelmi de Cremona”, in *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1911–1912), pp. 106–107: “Item, in principiis Magistrorum, Bachelariorum et Biblicorum precipimus ne pitantia de carnibus fiat, et hoc sub pena privationis omnis provisionis, quam ratione dictorum statuim seu graduum ab Ordine, a provinciis, sive conventibus quibuscumque haberent vel habere deberent, quam ipso facto incurrant; multum enim hoc, ut experti sumus, famam nostram deturpat et Ordinis honestatem.”

¹⁵ CUP II-1, pp. 535–536, n. 1067.

¹⁶ CUP II-1, pp. v–vi: “Nomina tot virorum ediscimus postea celeberrimorum, tunc studiis primum incumbentium; nos juvat cursum honorum, dignitatum, munerum iis tributorum percensere. Sic plurimos tempore Schismatis eminentes, in adolescentia initia scientiarum accipientes deprehendimus. Universitatem ipsam Parisiensem in summo gloriae culmine positam videre est, quod vergente saeculo XIII et ineunte saec. XIV conservat, mox deflorescente fama relinquet. Saepe dixerunt Universitatem Parisiensem summum auctoritatis gloriaeque fastigium tempore Schismatis adeptam. Non ita res est: auctoritatem quidem adhuc illa aetate retinuit, tum propter famam antiquam, tum propter quosdam celeberrimos Universitatis magistros, ut Petrum de Alliaco, Johannem Gerson: at jam vigor et spiritus intimus aberat: quod optime probant chartae ab ipsa Universitate temporis praedicti scriptae. Inclinatione quam e Schismate natam putant, jam ab aetate in hoc volumine comprehensa grassatur.”

For Denifle, the fourteenth century marked the decline of the University of Paris, and he blames the moral and intellectual debasement of the office of Master of Theology; for, while the overwhelming majority of masters and students at the University of Paris were in the Arts Faculty, the Faculty of Theology was the supreme subalternating faculty, “all the other sciences had to serve theology.” But, Denifle argues, the title of Master of Theology became so important for an ecclesiastical career, especially under John XXII (1316–1334), that greedy and ambitious students used ecclesiastical favor to circumvent the salutary provisions and stringent requirements of the University of Paris; the religious orders, particularly the Cistercians and Cluniacs, suffered from moral dissolution; finally, the popes permitted theology to be studied elsewhere in Europe.¹⁷ The upshot of all this was doctrinal:

The tainted purity of doctrine also shows the tendency of the University of Paris after the schools replied with the sounds of the sterile battles between Scotists and Thomists. Then a great many held it near and dear to seek new opinions, first seeking to do so in the Arts, and then in Theology, since they reckoned the doctrines taught by the masters to be overly coarse. They seized upon novelties from the first years of their studies, nor did they wait until they had achieved the rank of Master of Theology. We see in this volume that the theological errors of the alumni of the University of Paris generally come from the brains of bachelors or licentiates, and we even observe this after 1350. If one were to look carefully at some of the errors of, say, Nicholas of Autrecourt or John of Mirecourt, he would reckon that the purpose of those authors was to oppose the opinion of all with paradoxes and unheard-of statements. In these circumstances was not opportune the false explanation of the question of the beatific vision proposed by John XXII, who was a doctor of canon and civil law.¹⁸

¹⁷ CUP II-1, pp. vi–x.

¹⁸ CUP II-1, p. xi: “Inclinationem Universitatis Parisiensis probat quoque doctrinae puritas vitiata, postquam scholae sterilium inter Scotistas Thomistasque contentionum sonis responsarunt. Plerique tum curae cordique habuerunt novas sententias quaerere, in artibus primum, deinde in theologia conantes, cum traditas a magistris doctrinas nimium vulgares reputarent. In nova irruerant a primis studiorum annis, neque exspectabant donec magisterium in theologia adepti essent. Videmus in hoc volumine errores theologicos alumnorum Universitatis Parisiensis generaliter e cerebro baccalareorum vel licentiatorum in theologia egressos, illudque etiam post an. 1350 observamus. Si quis quosdam errores utpote Nicolai de Ultricuria, Johannis de Mirecuria diligenter inspexerit, id propositum auctoribus fuisse istis putabit ut paradoxa et nunquam audita contra sententiam

On Denifle and Chatelain's account, the Great Men of the thirteenth century had given way to a great mass of theologians in the fourteenth. As the masters divided into schools of thought, quibbled among themselves, and sought to capitalize on their title, discipline broke down in the ranks, and bachelors of theology started seeking dangerous, unspeakable novelties. At the end, even non-theologians began spinning theological doctrine, with disastrous results.

In brief, while the CUP provides a valuable source of documents, reliably edited, for the University of Paris, the selection of those sources reflects the spirit of a nineteenth-century scholar, seeking to provide a record of, above all, great university masters, and specifically, masters of theology. Moreover, the documents selected and published for the fourteenth century are those that confirm the vision of scholastic thought favored by the contemporary revival of Thomism: the glory of the University of Paris lay precisely in the period when Thomas Aquinas taught, and the turn of the fourteenth century inaugurated a time of sterile fights between debased defenders of competing doctrinal schools. Early fourteenth-century thought, especially Scotism, destroyed that synthesis and led to sterility. Such a narrative has no place for later thinkers, especially the flowering of studies among the Augustinian Hermits, producing such luminaries as Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto, so fundamental for understanding the context of another Augustinian Hermit, Martin Luther.

Yet Denifle and Chatelain's work, while ultimately geared to providing a context for an elitist history, serves as the point of departure for more general histories of universities. Generations of scholars have made great profit in expanding upon lines of investigation opened by the CUP, all the while broadening the scope of history to understand the medieval university not merely as the setting that gave the world Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, nor even as just a juridical corporation of masters and students, but as the center of complementary and conflicting actions of men and women from all sectors of society. To cite just a few recent examples, William J. Courtenay has re-edited the 1329 *computus* of the University, first published by Denifle, and used it to provide a snapshot of the Parisian community in the fourteenth century;¹⁹ Courtenay and

omnium profferrent. In hac ingeniorum conditione falsa explicatio quaestionis de visione beatifica a Johanne XXII proposita, qui doctor utriusque juris erat, nedum magisterium in theologia consecutus esset, non opportuna fuit."

¹⁹ W.J. COURTENAY, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait*, Cambridge 1999.

Eric D. Goddard have pursued Denifle's interest in the *rotuli* containing supplications sent by the University of Paris to the Pope, and, from the papal registers, reconstructed the prosopography of the University in the fourteenth century.²⁰

Reconstructing the teaching of theology at the University of Paris has proven a more difficult task. Very few archival documents mention teaching; many of the key statutes from the University of Paris date from the mid- or late-fourteenth century, and even they are incomplete, so that, to fill the gaps, scholars have traditionally appealed to statutes from other universities, most notably those of Bologna from after 1362, which allegedly are based on now-lost Parisian precedents.²¹ From these statutes, it emerges that there existed two degrees of bachelors – biblical bachelors and bachelors of the *Sentences* – and, above them, the masters. The biblical bachelors gave instruction on the Bible, and the bachelors of the *Sentences* covered Peter Lombard's textbook; the masters gave courses that were somehow linked to the Bible. On uncovering this system, namely, that masters taught Holy Scripture, not the *Sentences*, Denifle challenged the historical bias towards the Lombard:

Until now, historians have been almost exclusively engaged with the *Sentences*, and yet commentaries on the *Sentences* are the most imperfect products of medieval theological literature. Only bachelors read this book, and not *bachalarii formati*, but just simple bachelors. Is it not finally time to give a little more attention to commentaries on the Bible, which are the work of masters? Until now, I repeat, we have neglected those works that are the most important and the most mature.²²

²⁰ W.J. COURTENAY and E.D. GODDARD, *Rotuli Parisienses. Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 14–16), 3 vols., Leiden 2002–2013.

²¹ EHRLE, *I più antichi statuti*. For an example of the usage made of the Bologna statutes, CUP II, n. 1188, pp. 693–695, cites them extensively to complement the pre-1335 Parisian statutes pertaining to the theology faculty.

²² H. DENIFLE, “Quel livre servait de base à l'enseignement des maîtres en théologie dans l'Université de Paris?”, in *Revue Thomiste* 2 (1894), pp. 149–161, at p. 161: “Concluons de cette étude qu'une nouvelle tâche s'impose à l'historien en raison de ce que nous venons de dire. Jusqu'ici on s'est occupé presque uniquement des *Sentences*, et cependant les commentaires sur les *Sentences* sont les produits les plus imparfaits de la littérature théologique du moyen âge. Les bacheliers seuls lisaient ce livre, non pas les *bachalarii formati*, mais bien les simples bacheliers. Ne serait-il pas temps enfin d'accorder un peu plus d'attention aux commentaires sur la Bible, qui sont l'oeuvre des maîtres? Jusqu'ici, je le répète, on a négligé ces travaux qui sont pourtant les plus importants et les plus mûrs. Puisse cet

Denifle's challenge had many problems, as Pierre Mandonnet pointed out. First, masters of theology did not give as many lectures as bachelors of the *Sentences*; at best, they lectured only a few times a week; on the contrary, "the linchpins of the school" who gave most of the lectures were the bachelors. Second, what exactly constitutes the product of a magisterial lecture on the Bible is open to debate.²³ Third, masters of theology had other obligations as well, such as supervising ordinary disputations, and so text-based lecturing was not necessarily their primary goal or purpose.²⁴ In brief, compared to *Sentences* commentaries, comparatively few magisterial biblical commentaries survive; the courses of masters of theology were not necessarily literal commentaries on the Bible (just as bachelor lectures were not literal commentaries on the *Sentences*); and masters of theology had available more important vehicles for communicating their thought than classroom teaching.²⁵ In spite of Denifle's appeal, a main center of interest for medieval philosophy and theology has remained philosophical theology, especially that contained in commentaries on the *Sentences*.

article, que d'autres compléteront et développeront, avoir contribué pour sa part à ce mouvement! Le premier pas est fait."

²³ Indeed, one could add that there was a fundamental difference in methodology. At least some medieval theologians saw the bachelors, with their *quaestiones*, as more dialectical than masters expounding Scripture. Peter Auriol, in his 1317 lectures on the prologue to the *Sentences*, criticizes Scotus' identification of theology with three distinct types of wisdom precisely because then bachelors, who defended the faith in *quaestiones*, would be different kinds of theologians than would be masters: PETRUS AUREOLI, *I Sent.*, prol., q. 2, Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 123, f. 8rb: "Quantum ad tertium articulum, infero quedam. Primo quod opinio que dicit quod habitus theologie est triplex, quia quidem est qui acquiritur per expositionem scripture et dicitur expositivus, quidam qui est defensivus et declarativus eorum que in scriptura divina sunt, quidam qui est deductivus unius ex alio, et quod illo tertio modo accipitur proprie theologia, et quod differt ab utroque primorum. Talis inquam opinio non potest stare, quia tunc magister qui exponit scripturam haberet alium habitum et doceret quam bacallarius qui legit questiones quibus defenditur fides et articuli."

²⁴ P. MANDONNET, "Chronologie des écrits scripturaires de Saint Thomas d'Aquin", in *Revue Thomiste* 33 (1928), pp. 27–46, 116–155, 21–245; 34 (1929), pp. 53–69, 132–145, 489–519; quote on p. 58.

²⁵ See, for example, the observation by W.J. COURTENAY, "The Bible in the Fourteenth Century: Some Observations", in *Church History* 54 (1985), pp. 176–187, at p. 183: "Production and dissemination of biblical commentaries in general (not necessarily biblical teaching or learning) declined among university scholars in the early fourteenth century, even among mendicants."

Denifle also made another dangerous assumption, namely that what survives as a commentary on the *Sentences* is what was given in the classroom. Since at least the 1930s, scholars have tried to bridge the gap; in 1932, for example, Marie-Dominique Chenu studied a codex that contains what appear to be student notes on lectures on the *Sentences* from the 1240s at Paris, most notably containing the inaugural speech, referred to there as *introitus* (and later as the *principium*), for many of the bachelors.²⁶ The scholar who has most advanced our knowledge of teaching in theology at the University of Paris, Palémon Glorieux, drew attention to the importance of distinguishing a bachelor's lectures on the *Sentences* from the written commentary on the *Sentences*; he further emphasized the importance of understanding how the *Sentences* were taught for explaining the organization and importance of *Sentences* commentaries.²⁷ Indeed, in 1939 Glorieux discovered the first known set of lecture notes for an entire theology course at Paris: the notes (*reportationes*) of a student, Richard of Basoches, who attended the *Sentences* lecture of Peter Plaoul in 1392–1393; Glorieux exploited the source to acquire precious details on how a course was taught over an academic year, how students produced notes, how theology was taught, and who the teachers were.²⁸ On the other hand, Glorieux avoided any doctrinal discussion of the content.

Three decades later, Glorieux published a magisterial study of teaching at the Faculty of Theology at Paris, which to this date serves as the reference work on teaching theology in the Middle Ages.²⁹ Not just the synthesis of a lifetime of research on the subject, but also a catalogue of the known sources for constructing the history of the teaching at the University of Paris, this work serves as the point of departure for future

²⁶ M.D. CHENU, "Maîtres et Bacheliers de l'Université de Paris vers 1240. Description du manuscrit Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15652", in *Études d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIII^e siècle. Première Série*, Paris 1932.

²⁷ P. GLORIEUX, "Sentences (Commentaires sur les)", *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, ed. A. VACANT, E. MANGENOT, É. AMANN, v. 14, Paris 1941, pp. 1860–1884.

²⁸ P. GLORIEUX, "L'année universitaire 1392–1393 à la Sorbonne à travers les notes d'un étudiant", in *Revue des sciences religieuses* 19 (1939), pp. 429–482. On Peter Plaoul more generally, see J.C. WITT, "Peter Plaoul's *Lecture Commentary* on the *Sentences*: A Canonical Ordered List of Lectures", in *Manuscripta* 58 (2014), 159–270; "Biography of Peter Plaoul", edition 2013.1, URL = <http://petrusplaoul.org/articles/pp-biography/> (last accessed March 19, 2017).

²⁹ P. GLORIEUX, "L'enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIII^e siècle", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 43 (1968), pp. 65–186.

studies, inspiring work not merely in theology, but in university teaching more generally.³⁰ Yet, in spite of Glorieux's best efforts, it suffers from a certain ahistorical presentation: claiming to present teaching in the thirteenth century, a large portion of its sources are from the mid to late fourteenth century, and so, for example, he presents fourteenth-century developments, such as *sorbonica* and *principia* disputations, alongside a thirteenth-century structure of a *Sentences* commentary (*divisio textus, expositio, dubia*).

Studies on specific authors, often in conjunction with editions of *Sentences* commentaries, have accompanied this general research on teaching the *Sentences*. Philological and doctrinal analyses have pressed from surviving written works details on the authors' activity in the classroom. Most notably, Adriano Oliva's study of the production of Thomas Aquinas' *Scriptum* on the *Sentences* has established the state-of-the-art for our knowledge of teaching the *Sentences* in the thirteenth century.³¹

A new chapter in our understanding of teaching the *Sentences* at the University of Paris in the fourteenth century began with a landmark 1996 article by William J. Courtenay. He announced the discovery among the manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Municipale of Saint-Omer of an original witness to the lectures on the *Sentences* given in Paris in the academic year 1332–33 by a bachelor of theology, Pastor of Serrescuderio, O.F.M. Pastor was not an exceptional thinker, nor a Franciscan particularly remembered for his theological acumen; in fact, Courtenay's original was the only manuscript of any speculative work positively ascribed to Pastor. Yet, Courtenay underscored the central importance of his find: this original is not merely divided into *distinctiones* and *quaestiones*, as *Sentences* commentaries usually are, but also into *lectiones*: that is, it preserves the structure and articulation of the spoken lectures. The manuscript contains a complete, lecture-by-lecture account of a university course (although Pastor's academic year was shortened by papal interference), and brings us closer to the fourteenth-century lecture hall than we had been before.³²

³⁰ See for example, the numerous publications in the *Studia Artistarum* series directed by Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz.

³¹ A. OLIVA, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra Doctrina, avec l'édition du prologue de son Commentaire des Sentences* (Bibliothèque Thomiste 58), Paris 2002. See now W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), forthcoming.

³² W.J. COURTENAY, "Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint-Omer

In spite of its obvious significance and revolutionary potential, Courtenay's discovery has attracted little attention until the last few years, when research connected to the present study has confirmed Courtenay's assessment, and added details: the manuscript is an original *reportatio*, that is, the codex binds together the sexterns of paper that were physically in the classroom and were used to take detailed notes. The note-taker, or *reportator*, was likely a Benedictine student, Peter of Allouagne, who himself lectured on the *Sentences* in 1338–39, and whose original *Sentences* commentary is also preserved in the library of Saint-Omer.³³ Pastor's work joins the very small list of original *reportationes* of theological lectures, and it is the second-oldest such original to be positively identified.³⁴ The oldest surviving complete original known to us is the *reportatio* of the Parisian *Sentences* lectures by Pastor's fellow Franciscan, William of Brienne, in 1330–31, contained in Praha, Národní knihovna České republiky, Ms. VIII. F.14, the subject of the present study.

239", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 63 (1996), pp. 325–356.

³³ W. DUBA, "Rebuilding the Stemma: Understanding the Manuscript Tradition of Francis of Marchia's Commentaries on Book II of the *Sentences*", in *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary: Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues*, ed. A. SPEER, F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE, G. GULDENTOPS (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales. Bibliotheca 9), Leuven 2014, pp. 119–169, at p. 142, n. 49; S. LIVESEY, "Pierre d'Allouagne and Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'agglomération 504", in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. C. ANGOTTI, M. BRINZEI, M. TEEUWEN (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge 65), Turnhout 2013, pp. 381–392.

³⁴ For a list of *reportationes* of Aristotelian commentaries, and the identification of the 1346 *reportatio* of John Buridan's *Metaphysics* lectures as an original, see C. FLÜELER, "From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium: "The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy"*, ed. S. EBBESEN and R.L. FRIEDMAN (Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser 77), Copenhagen 1999, pp. 497–522. For a discussion of other fragmentary *reportationes* from the Arts Faculty, see J. HAMESSE, "La 'reportatio' à la Faculté des Arts", in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIII^e–XV^e siècles). Actes du colloque international*, ed. O. WEIJERS and L. HOLTZ, (Studia Artistarum 4), Turnhout 1997, pp. 405–421; among the oldest identified cases of *reportationes* are the notes taken by Godfrey of Fontaines from the courses of Siger of Brabant (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 16297, ff. 140va–142vb), and the texts ascribed to Siger's hand in München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 9559; on the latter, see the reproduction in J. HAMESSE, "Reportations, graphies et ponctuation" in *Grafia e interpunzione del latino nel Medioevo*, ed. A. MAIERÙ (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 41), Rome 1987, pp. 135–151.

Like Pastor of Serrescuderio, William of Brienne was a Franciscan theologian of relatively minor impact, who until now has hardly generated any interest outside the circle of William J. Courtenay's students and grand-students. William of Brienne was promoted by papal bull to the rank of Master of Theology in July 1331,³⁵ and appears as one of the twenty-nine masters of theology present in Paris in a January 2, 1334 letter to the King of France regarding the Beatific Vision Controversy.³⁶ In addition to the commentary on the *Sentences* in the Prague manuscript, a codex in the Vatican Library contains his inaugural speech (Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 105, ff. 86v–88v). The rest of Brienne's bibliography is entirely speculative; his name *de Brena* is identical to that of the important Champagne baronial family of Brienne, members of which held at various points in the thirteenth century such lofty titles as King of Jerusalem, Queen of Cyprus, Emperor of Constantinople and Duke of Athens. Yet there is no indication that William came from such lofty stock. If he entered the Franciscan Order at a young age, he would have received training in philosophy and theology in the provincial *studia*; as a student with promise, he would have been sent to study theology at the Franciscan convent in Paris, usually for three years. His Parisian studies qualified him to teach in the provincial *studia*, and, owing to a combination of factors that may include intellectual acuity, political savvy, noble birth, and good luck, he received the honor of being named to read the *Sentences* at Paris in preparation for the Franciscan chair in theology at the University of Paris.³⁷

The first modern scholar to study Brienne's thought was Katherine Tachau, who dedicated a few lines of *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham* to observing that, in his "question 5", "utrum scientia intuitiva sit sine obiecto presente", William cites Peter Auriol through a text that does not appear to be the *Scriptum*, Auriol's massive work largely prepared before he went to Paris; but she shies away from saying that

³⁵ CUP II-1, p. 346, n. 914.

³⁶ CUP II-1, pp. 429–432, n. 981.

³⁷ W.J. COURTENAY, "Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconsideration", in *Franciscan Studies* 69 (2011), pp. 175–229, at pp. 176–184. Of course, if William was from Brienne in Champagne, he would have probably entered the Franciscan convent in Troyes, studied in Provins, and then continued in the *studium* of the Province of France. This last *studium* was housed in the Franciscan convent of Paris, alongside the general theological *studium* for the order; ROEST, *A History of Franciscan Education*, p. 73.

Brienne used Auriol's Parisian *reportatio*, rather concluding that "The rough nature of this *reportatio* makes it difficult to gauge the extent to which Guillaume paraphrased some other version(s) directly."³⁸ The rest of William of Brienne's bibliography consists of Tachau's doctoral students: in *Theology at Paris*, Chris Schabel states that William of Brienne also shows the influence of a philosophical distinction defended by Francis of Marchia, the Franciscan lecturing at Paris some ten years earlier:

Lecturing at Paris in 1330–31, the Franciscan William of Brienne has left us a brief *reportatio* on all four books that survives in only one manuscript, in which he also reveals Marchia's impact and appears to react to one of Auriol's *reportationes*, directly or only via Marchia. In his very short question for dd. 38–41 of book I, Brienne adopts Marchia's *de inesse/de possibili* scheme in relation to future contingents. Given that Brienne does not appear to copy, even in its brief form his commentary shows more 'originality' than Gonteri's.³⁹

In his magisterial 1000-page study, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, Russell Friedman dedicates a line to Brienne, quoting Schabel on the matter.⁴⁰ Finally, in the recently published *festschrift* for Olga Weijers, Schabel provides the first biography of Brienne, restating his argument in more detail, and, thanks to a new set of digital photographs, including an edition of the question on foreknowledge (*lectio* 43).⁴¹ On the basis of those digital photographs, I was able to identify the Prague manuscript as an original, official *reportatio*.

With exception of the brief notices mentioned above, William of Brienne has escaped attention. He had no historical legacy: no contemporary cites his thought, no compiler mentions him, no painting of him

³⁸ K. TACHAU, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 22), Leiden 1988, pp. 333–334.

³⁹ C. SCHABEL, *Theology at Paris 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1), Aldershot 2000, p. 210.

⁴⁰ R.L. FRIEDMAN, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 108), v. 2, Leiden 2013, p. 767, "The *Sentences* commentary of William of Brienne (1330–1331), whose treatment of future contingents Schabel has linked to Francis of Marchia, survives in one Prague manuscript."

⁴¹ C. SCHABEL, "William of Brienne", in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, pp. 159–168.

adorns the wall of any Franciscan convent. In the history of medieval philosophy and theology, the vast majority of studies focus on the work of a small number of great thinkers: Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham; William of Brienne has no obvious relevance. If one were to assign him an honorific title, one could do little better than *doctor ignoratus*. Even for specialists who work with manuscript material, William's work is hardly attractive. It survives in a single copy, and an ugly one at that: the script is completely unadorned, and the mise-en-page messy; the sex-terns are unevenly cut with a short blade and cheaply bound together in a parchment wrapper. The author unimportant, the text unreadable, and the codex uninviting, no wonder even generations of scholars passed over the manuscript.

At the very least, the study presented here makes a positive contribution. It adds a name, William of Brienne, to the intellectual history of the fourteenth century and makes his work accessible, with a detailed guide to his major work and even *editiones principes* (which are also in all likelihood the first *copies* ever made) of some lectures. Yet, while serving to "augment the principal of the study of medieval philosophy"⁴² by presenting the work of an unimportant and forgettable scholastic, a study of the Prague Codex risks the worst accusations that can be leveled at precise investigations of historical objects. Does not such work invoke the precious artifact-worship of antiquarianism, the perverse obscurantism beloved by medievalists and the pedantic erudition bloviated by philologists? After all, this manuscript is the intellectual historical analogue to what American coastal elites call "A Flyover State", those parts of the country they see from the window of an airplane. Down here, as the contrails of great histories of medieval thought arch overhead and disappear to the East and West, casting a shadow in the footnotes, and the cornfields fill with the insects rasping the debates among greater minds, we must ask: what are we doing here?

First, William of Brienne's lectures occurred at a pivotal point in the history of ideas. For while the three-act historiography of medieval thought that portrays the history of universities as the triumph and tragedy of Thomas Aquinas is on the wane, another, older model appears to be returning. From the first periodizations given to scholasticism to the most recent, the year 1330 marks a major shift. In the

⁴² K. EMERY, Jr., "Editorial", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 54 (2012), pp. v–xii, at p. x.

foundational history of philosophy, Jacob Brucker laid out the three phases of scholasticism: youth, from the late eleventh century to the middle of the thirteenth, the period of development to “manly vigor”, lasting from 1220–1330, and then, “maturity”, in which form it lasted into the beginning of the sixteenth century.⁴³ This periodization still informs the historiography. More recent analyses differ with respect to the explanations (and valuations), but expressly or implicitly, generally agree that the period of fertile growth stops around 1330. The reasons given vary: for some the doctrine of *translatio studiorum* meant that the torch of learning had already left Paris for Oxford;⁴⁴ for others, the

⁴³ IACOBUS BRUCKER, *Historia critica philosophiae a Christo nato ad repurgatas usque literas*, v. 3, Leipzig, 1743, p. 731: “Solent scholastici in tres aetates dividi, quarum prima a Lanfranco, vel Abaelardo eiusque discipulo Petro Lombardo, usque ad medium seculum XIII, quo vixit Albertus M. extenditur. Hac aetate adolescentiam exegit philosophia, et acquisito iuvenili robore ad virilitatem contendit. Secunda aetas ab anno MCCXX usque ad Durandum a S. Porciano, annumque MCCCXXX limites scholasticae philosophiae prorogat, quo temporis spatio ad virilem vigorem progressa est; tertia ab eo tempore usque ad Gabrielem Biel, theologum Tubingensem, qui circa tempora reformationis vixit, decurrit, et quicquid scholasticorum adulta hac philosophiae illius aetate vixit usque ad initia seculi XVI comprehendit.” On the origin of this scheme see T. RICKLIN, “Die aetas triplex der Scholastik. Zur philosophiehistorischen Genese einer verfeimten Epoche” in *Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte*, ed. E. ANGEHRN and B. BAERTSCHI (*Studia philosophica* 61), pp. 153–175. Ricklin traces Brucker’s tripartite model to Lambertus Danaeus’ *Prolegomena in Petri Lombardi librum primum sententiarum*, Geneva 1580, an introduction to a hostile, Calvinist commentary on the *Sentences*.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., A. DE LIBERA, *La Querelle des Universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age*, Paris 1996, pp. 12–13 “Nous présupposons ici une certaine conception du Moyen Age et de l’histoire de la philosophie médiévale. On peut la résumer d’une formule, *translatio studiorum*, et l’expliciter en quelques phrases. La philosophie n’est pas morte en 529 avec la fermeture de la dernière école philosophique païenne par l’empereur romain d’Orient Justinien, elle a entamé un long transfert, une longue migration (*translatio*) vers l’Orient musulman d’abord, vers l’Occident chrétien ensuite. Dans ces voyages successifs où s’égrenent les capitales du savoir et les centres d’études (*studia*) d’Athènes à Bagdad, de Bagdad à Cordoue, de Cordoue à Tolède, puis à Paris, à Oxford, à Cologne ou à Prague, la philosophie grecque a, de traduction en traduction, parlé arabe et latin; quelque chose a demeuré, beaucoup de choses se sont perdues, d’autres sont venues qui n’avaient jamais été dites. Faire l’histoire d’un problème, c’est donc suivre un trajet épistémique réel, voir se former des réseaux, se distribuer, se recomposer un certain nombre d’éléments, considérer des *glissements*, des *réurrences*, mais aussi des *faits de structure* déterminés par l’état des corpus accessibles.” De Libera refers to the discussion in A. DE LIBERA, *La Philosophie médiévale*, Paris 1993, pp. 4–8. There, he makes explicit that his use of the notion of *translatio*

ecclesiastical condemnations gradually restricted the realm of orthodoxy until the obligation to adopt core metaphysical assumptions such as those contained in the constitutions stemming from the Council of Vienne (1311–12) imposed, a generation later, a sterile Aristotelianism.⁴⁵

For the history of theology at Paris, William of Brienne's lectures occurred at the peak of John XXII's relations with university theologians. John XXII began his papacy by publishing the acts of the Council of Vienne as the Clementine Constitutions. Among these constitutions were declarations of theological doctrine that had to be defended. During his papacy, John made more extensive use of theologians than any previous pope, not only appointing them to ecclesiastical office, but also soliciting their opinions on theological controversies such as Apostolic Poverty and placing them on commissions to evaluate doctrine. In a sense, this led to a 'Golden Age' for theologians.⁴⁶ Yet it also produced considerable turbulence: the doctrines they defended had consequences, not merely for their own well-being, but for the polity to which they belonged. William of Brienne would have been aware of such troubles: two years before he began his lectures, the then-minister general of his order, Michael of Cesena, along with fellow Franciscans, Bonagrazia of Bergamo and the theologians William of Ockham and Francis of Marchia, fled the papal court during the Apostolic Poverty controversy. In February 1329, the pope wrote to Elias of Nabinaux, a Franciscan bachelor of theology at Paris, stating that Francis of Marchia had gone to Paris "to spread the worst errors", and to subvert the people, especially the King and Queen of France, in their devotion towards the Church, and asking that he help his fellow Franciscan authorities in arresting Francis.⁴⁷ A year before William began lecturing, at the pope's behest Gerald Odonis, another Franciscan theologian, was elected minister general of the Order. For

studiorum is to claim legitimacy for the study of philosophy, especially the Aristotelian tradition, in the Byzantine and Arabic worlds. Implicit in the notion of *translatio studiorum*, however, is both the identification of a rightful heir to the tradition and the assertion of the illegitimacy of other contemporary claimants; the rise of new centers of study implies the fall of the old ones.

⁴⁵ R. PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671*, Oxford 2011, pp. 434–435.

⁴⁶ R.W. SOUTHERN, "The Changing Role of Universities in Medieval Europe", in *Historical Research* 60 (1987), pp. 133–146; S. PIRON, "Avignon sous Jean XXII. L'Eldorado des théologiens", in *Jean XXII et le Midi* (Cahiers de Fanjeaux 45), Toulouse 2012, pp. 357–391.

⁴⁷ CUP II-1, no. 886, pp. 320–321. On Elias of Nabinaux, see C. SCHABEL, "Elias of Nabinaux, Archbishop of Nicosia, and the Intellectual History of Later Medieval Cyprus", in *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 68 (1998), pp. 35–52.

William of Brienne and his colleagues, there could be no doubt that theology and theologians had an impact on the affairs of Europe; the doctrines they were developing would not only be preached to the people across Europe, but would also guide the Church to a certain future. The confirmation of this importance, and the collapse, came the autumn after William's lectures (and shortly after the papal bull promoting him to master), when John XXII declared in a sermon his personal view that the souls of the deceased, after Purgatory and before the Last Judgment, do not enjoy the Beatific Vision. This declaration set off the Beatific Vision Controversy, and when, in late 1333, the King of France convoked all the theologians in Paris to determine the issue, William of Brienne was signatory to the document, dated January 1334.⁴⁸ John XXII's successor, Benedict XII, finally resolved the controversy with the 1336 constitution *Benedictus Deus*. John XXII's papacy ended with the Beatific Vision Controversy, and with the controversy died the Papacy's interventionist approach to theology. The next two popes, Benedict XII and Clement VI, were both theologians trained at the University of Paris, and perhaps this training encouraged a more restrained approach to the *magisterium*. Thus, William of Brienne's lectures come at the high-water mark of university theology's influence over world affairs, both in general, and for the University of Paris.

Paris at 1330 marks the end of a period that Chris Schabel has called the "Zenith of Philosophical Theology."⁴⁹ In terms of the number of active scholastic authors, seculars and religious, and the number of distinct contributions to different genres, philosophical theology hit its peak at Paris in the 1320s (and Oxford in the 1330s). Afterwards came a sharp decline; while certainly Paris had major theologians afterwards, in sheer numbers the peak of activity was reached around 1330. William of Brienne's commentary stands at the edge of the cliff, the cairn on the summit of scholastic production.

Brienne's commentary also stands at the beginning of a new direction in the genre of *Sentences* commentaries. For, while Schabel sees

⁴⁸ For the relationship between theologians and papal declarations at this time, see W. DUBA, "Destroying the Text: Contemporary Interpretations of John XXII's 'Constitutiones'", in *Papst Johannes XXII. Konzepte und Verfahren seines Pontifikats*, ed. M. ROHDE and H.-J. SCHMIDT (Scriinium Friburgense 32), Berlin 2014, pp. 37–70, and the literature there.

⁴⁹ C. SCHABEL, "Reshaping the Genre. Literary Trends in Philosophical Theology in the Fourteenth Century", in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. S.E. YOUNG (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 36), Leiden 2011, pp. 51–84.

a general zenith in the 1320s, he makes a single exception to the decline: the number of *Sentences* commentaries remains roughly the same. Yet, even here, a closer look suggests that something has happened, and the genre has shifted again. In his survey of the development of (written) *Sentences* commentaries from 1250 to 1320, Russell Friedman identified a shift in the genre from, in the mid-thirteenth-century, covering the *Sentences* comprehensively with “argument-centered questions”, that is, questions that focus on arguments for and against a thesis, to fourteenth-century commentaries covering the *Sentences* selectively, focusing on the hot topics, and treating questions in a “position-centered” way, that is, by considering for each given question the positions of previous and contemporary colleagues and proceeding dialectically to a resolution.⁵⁰ While the “position-centered” approach seems to have continued in *Sentences* commentaries, at least Franciscan commentaries themselves from the 1330s appear to have been copied and used much less than their predecessors, and, when they were used, they were used for a distinct purpose. For example, Franciscan theologians at Paris in the 1320s who left *Sentences* commentaries include Francis of Marchia (25 surviving manuscripts and fragments),⁵¹ Francis of Meyronnes (at least 64 copies of the *Conflatus* on book I alone, without mentioning his other commentaries),⁵² Aufredo Gonteri Brito (4, not counting fragments),⁵³ and Gerald Odonis (10).⁵⁴ Similar results can be had for the 1310s, when Hugh of Novocastro, Peter Auriol and Landulph Caracciolo were all active. On the other hand, the Franciscans from the 1330s whose *Sentences* commentaries have been identified are William of Brienne (the manuscript under consideration here), Pastor of Serrescuderio (Saint-Omer 239, direct from the classroom), and possibly Peter of Aquila (sometime between 1337 and 1343).⁵⁵ Only the latter

⁵⁰ FRIEDMAN, “The *Sentences* Commentary 1250–1320”, pp. 88–100.

⁵¹ R.L. FRIEDMAN and C. SCHABEL, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the *Sentences*: Question-List and State of Research”, in *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (2001), pp. 31–106, p. 40.

⁵² B. ROTH, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott* (Franziskanische Forschungen 3), Werl-in-Westfalen 1936, pp. 105–114.

⁵³ W. DUBA, R.L. FRIEDMAN and C. SCHABEL, “Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. P.W. ROSEMAN, v. 2, Leiden 2010, pp. 263–368, at p. 282.

⁵⁴ C. SCHABEL, “The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 46 (2004), pp. 115–161, at pp. 128–131.

⁵⁵ Z. KALUZA, “*Serbi un sasso il nome*: un inscription de San Gimignano et la rencontre entre Bernard d’Arezzo et Nicolas d’Autrecourt”, in *Historia philosophia*

saw significant diffusion, with at least 40 manuscripts, and several early printed editions.⁵⁶ Therefore, whereas *Sentences* commentaries from the 1320s survive in many manuscript copies and feature numerous Franciscan thinkers renowned for their unique doctrinal perspectives, the 1330s hold a handful of neglected originals and chance survivals: of the three known Parisian Franciscan *Sentences* commentaries that survive from the 1330s, two were never copied. The only exception to this trend is Peter of Aquila, an author known to future generations as *Scotellus*, the *Doctor sufficiens*, and, as the saying *Si vis intelligere Scotum, lege Scotellum*, implies, valued primarily for the access he gives to Scotus' thought.⁵⁷

Part of the explanation for this difference is the development within the University of Paris of explicit schools of thought. While probably not the first to speak of a Franciscan school, from his inaugural lecture on the *Sentences* in 1320–21 onward, Francis of Meyronnes repeatedly mentions the *schola minor*, opposed to the *schola maior*, or the *schola communis doctorum*, “the common school of doctors”, including those following the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁸ This opposition becomes

medii aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, ed. B. MOJ-SISCH and O. PLUTA, v. 1, Amsterdam 1991, pp. 437–466, at p. 446, n. 18.

⁵⁶ The number comes from the unique manuscripts mentioned by F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1, Würzburg 1947, no. 563, pp. 309–312; V. DOUCET, *Commentaires sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller*, Quaracchi 1954, p. 67; and the database “In principio: Incipit Index of Latin Texts”, <http://apps.brepolis.net/inpr/Main.aspx> (last accessed August 10, 2016).

⁵⁷ The judgment concerning Peter of Aquila embodied by the nickname *Scotellus*, the sobriquet *Doctor sufficiens*, and the dictum *Si vis intelligere Scotum, lege Scotellum*, is not entirely accurate; see F. AMERINI, “La dottrina dell’univocità dell’essere nel commento alle Sentenze di Pietro d’Aquila”, in *Lo scotismo nel mezzogiorno d’Italia*, ed. F. FIORENTINO (Textes et études du Moyen Âge 52), Porto 2010, pp. 303–328; W.J. COURTENAY, “Parisian Theologians in the 1330s”, forthcoming.

⁵⁸ E.g., FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Principium in IV Sententiarum*, in *Pierre Roger – François de Meyronnes. Disputatio (1320–1321)*, ed. J. BARBET (Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge 10), Paris 1961, p. 101: “Primus est quod pax duarum scholarum correlatarum quantum ad istam materiam fuit legitime facta pro eo quod dicebat socius sollers qui in antiquioribus docet quod, secundum doctrinam fratris Thome in primo Sententiarum, ratio accipitur dupliciter. . . Et illud est quod convenit scola nostra, quia per distinctionem formalem quam ponit inter essentiam et relationem non intendit astruere nisi distinctionem definitivam ab anima non fabricatam.”; *Reportatio* I, Prol. q. 1, a. 2: “Tertia difficultas est quia scola communis doctorum non videtur ponere illas formalitates illo modo, aut aliqua ex natura rei esse idem;” cited in W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, “*Ni chose*,

most clear in a joke that Francis tells in his 1322 commentary on the Ps.-Dionysius' *On the Divine Names*:

But a doubt remains: why does the *schola minor* now in general deny the matter that it used to affirm in the angels? It is said, because after the Subtle Doctor enlightened the school, it understood in an immaterial way. But it is told that someone from the *schola maior* said to someone of the *schola minor*: 'I feel very sorry for you, because [your] souls in heaven will have matter.' And he replied: 'And I feel sorry for you, because you will have all your beatitude in your accidents, on account of the accidentality of powers, and your substance will remain essentially wretched.' But now the first taunt has been put to rest, and only the second remains.⁵⁹

This school-consciousness expresses itself to greater and lesser degrees through the works of the 1320s, especially among theologians who had not yet attained the rank of master.⁶⁰ William of Brienne therefore read the *Sentences* at a period when he had an obligation not only to defend his own doctrine, but also to defend the teaching of the entire Franciscan school. He belongs to the first generation of Scotists who explicitly identified themselves with a *schola* (the *schola minor*) and a *doctor*, the *Doctor Subtilis*.

ni non-chose: The *Sentences*-Commentary of Himbertus de Garda, OFM", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232, at p. 191, n. 73.

⁵⁹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *In De divinis nominibus*, punctus 63, Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., Vat. lat. 900, f. 45va: "Sed remanet dubium: quare schola minor negat nunc communiter materiam quam angelis affirmare solebat? Dicitur autem quia, postquam Doctor Subtilis ipsam illustravit, immateriali modo cognovit. —Dicitur autem quod quidam de schola maiori dixit cuidam de minori 'multum vobis compatiar, quia animae nostrae (=vestrae) in patria habebunt materiam. Et ille respondit: 'et ego vobis, quia in accidentibus solis vestris habebitis totam vestram beatitudinem propter accidentalitatem potentiarum, substantia per se misera remanente'. Nunc autem primum opproprium sublatum est, remanente secundo." Cited from W. DUBA, "The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan Theologians' Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330" in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750)* ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER, S.W. DE BOER, C. LEIJENHORST, (History of Science and Medicine Library 33), Leiden 2012, pp. 171–272, at pp. 180–181, n. 15. On the topic of spiritual matter among Franciscans, see M. SULLIVAN, *The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus Hispanus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 2010.

⁶⁰ For case studies of the nascent Franciscan school, see especially DUBA, "The Souls After Vienne" and DUBA and SCHABEL, "Ni chose, ni non-chose".

Nevertheless, the very term ‘school’ admits of overlapping meanings at the fourteenth-century University of Paris. William of Brienne was a bachelor in the Franciscan School, which was presided over by a master of theology. This presidency was an administrative position, and the bachelor apparently was free to establish his own theological system. At the same time, in certain university events, most notably the *principia* disputations (discussed in Chapter II, below), the bachelors defended their honor and the honor of their school. Moreover, as William J. Courtenay has recently underscored, we can no longer assume the existence of schools of thought and group thinkers accordingly; for, if we do not understand the pedagogical and social mechanisms by which those schools are propagated, we risk understanding the fourteenth century as a period in which systematic speculation dwindled, schools of thought declined, and individualism triumphed.⁶¹ Viewed in this perspective, this little codex gives us a glance into how a member of a doctrinal school engaged his contemporaries and consciously propagated that school’s teaching to the next generation.

William of Brienne is also a member of the greatest generation of Scotists. In the works of the next three centuries, the overwhelming majority of names cited as supporting the teaching of the Subtle Doctor were of Franciscans from the 1310s-1330s: John of Bassol, William of Alnwick, James of Ascoli, Hugh of Novocastro, Landulph Caracciolo, Francis of Marchia, Francis of Meyronnes, Peter Thomae, Gerald Odonis, Francesc Marbres (John the Canon), Nicholas Bonetus, Antonius Andreae, and Peter of Aquila. By William’s time, most of them had already produced their major works. This was the period in which the textbooks for the *via Scoti* (and the *via Mayronis*, for that matter) were being written. How William relates to Scotus and his contemporaries provides direct information not only on how fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians understood Scotus, and what they thought the core doctrines of Scotism were (and which ones could be adjusted), but also on the Scotist way of teaching.

Viewed in the perspective of medieval philosophical genres, and especially the genre of the *Sentences* commentary, William of Brienne’s work is an important witness at a turning point. Considered in terms of bibliogony, however, its value cannot be overstated. The life of the medieval university finds its fullest expression in the *reportationes*, texts

⁶¹ W.J. COURTENAY, *Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought* (The Etienne Gilson Series 29), Toronto 2007.

having their genesis in notes taken from oral performances. The material traces of university debates themselves built up through several agents and at distinct moments: the person identified as the ‘author’ would gather together source materials for a performance; he would then give the sermon or lecture; one or more *reportatores* would take detailed notes during the performance, and afterwards complete their notes; the text might be read back to the author (or to someone else), and further corrections might be made. Finally, the author or his secretaries (or both) would often rewrite the work from the corrected notes and possibly other written sources, sometimes revising several times. In such a complex system – which, in fact, continues as the text is diffused via manuscript copies – the distinctions between author and reader, master and secretary, disappear and medieval university texts become the tangible result of a team of agents, each seeking to understand and to communicate meaning, to defeat and to uphold doctrine, and to achieve these opposite motions, passive and active, aggressive and defensive, in one and the same act. An original *reportatio* of an early-fourteenth-century *Sentences* commentary would provide a revolutionary view of this process, but before this study began, no such thing was known to exist.

The Prague Codex therefore not only contains William of Brienne’s teaching, it holds the evidence for exactly how an entire university course was structured. The subsequent revisions reveal how *reportatores* transcribed lectures, how they corrected and completed those transcriptions, and how the teachers themselves made revisions to the text. The philosophical consequences likewise extend beyond the genre of *Sentences* commentaries to texts that share the *reportatio* mode of genesis. Since many major medieval texts, especially in the fourteenth century, began as lectures or sermons, a study of the earliest known original *reportatio* of a lecture series can only clarify the mechanisms and artefacts involved in moving a text from spoken word to the definitive written version.

The study that follows articulates into several parts. Chapter I demonstrates that the Prague Codex contains an original *reportatio* of William’s *Sentences* commentary and provides a description of the codex. Chapter II details the practical circumstances pertaining to lecturing on the *Sentences* at Paris, using the Prague Codex to clarify and to add to our understanding of the *principia* exercises. In the process, it demonstrates that the Prague Codex contains the quires that were circulated among the *sententiarii*, showing that it is the official version of William’s

lectures. Chapter III focuses on William's debate with the other *sententiarii* as witnessed in the *principia* disputations as an opportunity to understand the doctrinal issues debated among the cohort; an extensive doctrinal analysis argues that William's primary opponent was the Dominican Durand of Aurillac, who most likely was also the author of the *Evidentiae contra Durandum*. Chapter IV examines the *lectiones* as the evidence for William of Brienne's teaching on the *Sentences* during the academic year 1330–31, reconstructing how classes were taught. Chapter V analyzes three lectures to achieve an understanding of William of Brienne's method as a teacher and as a Scotist, from his choice of source material to his presentation in class, showing how, to achieve his objective, William marshalled Scotus' *Ordinatio* and the works of subsequent authors, notably Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, and Francis Meyronnes. Chapter VI concludes with a look at Brienne's work after his *Sentences* lectures, in particular his inaugural speech on becoming a master of theology. The methodology employed adapts to the material of each chapter; the circumstances of teaching the *Sentences* need to be demonstrated from sources rather than cited on authority, and in particular, the doctrinal analyses can be rather detailed; to help the reader through the digressions, I have tried to provide ample summaries.

Appendices present a comprehensive list of all *lectiones* contained in the Prague Codex (Appendix A), followed by William of Brienne's *principia* (Appendix B), a selection of his *lectiones* (Appendices C–F), his inaugural speech as master of theology (Appendix G), and an edition of one of Brienne's sources, Francis of Marchia's commentary on book IV of the *Sentences*, q. 23 (Appendix H).

Since the precise arrangement of the text on the page is essential for the argument, whenever possible, images from the manuscript are used. The National Library of the Czech Republic has generously permitted the reproduction of images from their manuscript; all otherwise unspecified references to manuscript folia can be assumed to refer to the Prague Codex. Likewise, citations to William's work omit the title, *Super primum (secundum, tertium, or quartum) librum Sententiarum* and simply refer to the *lectio* within the work. I have tried to maintain the orthography of the codex, but the astute reader will note some biases: I distinguish between vocalic *us* and consonantal *vs*, but not *is* and *js*; owing to graphical similarity, I follow classical orthography in treating ambiguous readings that could be rendered with either a *c* or

a *t*; without doubt, other classicizing tendencies persist as well. Classical orthography occurs when citing editions using classical orthography, or when twenty-first-century Latin is being used. Transcriptions (and sometimes translations) use the following conventions to indicate changes to the text: ~~striketrough~~ signals deleted, expunged or vacated text. Interlinear and marginal additions are noted by \slashes/, and multiple additions can occur. {Curly brackets} indicate marginal annotations without a clear point in which they are to be inserted in the text. As usual with philosophical texts, <angle brackets> mark editorial additions to the Latin, and [square brackets] signal expunctions (and, in keeping with the confusing convention, editorial additions to translations). Corrections (that are not made by deleting and inserting entire words) are sometimes indicated via an in-text parenthetical remark at the lemma (] llama *corr.*).

Unless otherwise mentioned, all English translations are my own; the original Latin text is provided whenever appropriate, and, in many cases, beyond the necessity of demonstrating the theses advanced, in the hope that the reader will benefit as much from the journey as the destination. While the texts cited support a coherent argument, detail is provided in the hope that, if some readers find this work, *in recto*, of secondary utility, *in obliquo*, they might find something relevant.

Chapter I

The Prague Codex

The manuscript collection of the National Library of the Czech Republic contains many medieval treasures, beautiful books bound of the finest parchment, carefully and skillfully copied, rubricated, and illuminated. Such magnificent works make the codex bearing the shelfmark VIII.F.14 look rather ugly: thirteen gatherings of unevenly-cut paper covered in hastily written script, a functional table of contents of sorts written on parchment and attached to the front, all covered in a rough parchment wrapper. The contents announce themselves to be one of thousands of commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, this one from a bachelor named William who lectured at the Franciscan convent in Paris in 1330: William of Brienne. The codex is a *reportatio*: a piece of parchment serving as the title, long unglued from the cover, survives hidden in the binding, announcing the text as “*Quaestiones* reported at Paris on the First and Fourth book of the *Sentences*, on paper and covered.” In fact, the quires contained in the codex are the original, official classroom *reportatio* of William’s lectures on all four books of the *Sentences*. They are the *viva-voce* record of the classroom performance, taken down by a designated note-taker, and subsequently corrected to serve as an official account, ideally in preparation for a revised, written version. The claim that the Prague Codex is an official *reportatio* depends on a claim concerning what a *reportatio* is, one that needs to be substantiated from medieval accounts.

The *Reportatio*

The explosion of formal education in the twelfth century that led to the rise of the universities also inspired the development of a unique

manner of text production, the *reportatio*.¹ In a scholastic context, the verbs *reporto* and *recolligo* refer to the practice of taking notes from an oral performance, such as a lecture, disputation or sermon. After the performance, the note-taker (the *reportator*) would revise the notes, often with the aid of his fellow students. The text could subsequently be revised by the author or by someone else. In some cases, the same *reportatio* could circulate in different revisions.

The most detailed account of a *reportatio* in the thirteenth century arose because, in fact, the text did circulate in different revisions. Specifically, Bonaventure's *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* survives in at least two redactions. According to scholarly consensus, Bonaventure's *collationes* were given in Paris, in twenty-three parts between Easter and Pentecost in 1273, and there exist at least two versions of it, *Reportatio A* and *Reportatio B*.² Both versions reflect the same structure: the first three *collationes* constitute the *principium*, in this case the introductory speech, and the third *collatio* announces seven *visiones* corresponding

¹ On the development of the *reportatio* and the challenges posed, see also J. HAMESSE, "«Reportatio» et transmission de textes", in *The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages. Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, University of Stockholm, 29–31 August 1984*, ed. M. ASZTALOS (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Latina Stockholmiensia 30), Stockholm 1986, pp. 11–29; "«Collatio» et «reportatio»: deux vocables spécifiques de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge", in *Actes du colloque 'Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge' Leyde-La Haye 20–21 septembre 1985* (CIVICIMA 1), Turnhout 1988, pp. 78–87; "La 'reportatio' à la Faculté des Arts", in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–XVe siècles). Actes du colloque international*, ed. O. WELJERS and L. HOLTZ, (Studia Artistarum 4), Turnhout 1997, pp. 405–421. For an example using the *reportationes* of William of Brienne and Pastor of Serrescuderio to explain the textual genesis of a Franciscan *Sentences* commentary, see W. DUBA, "Rebuilding the Stemma: Understanding the Manuscript Tradition of Francis of Marchia's Commentaries on Book II of the *Sentences*", in *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary: Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues*, ed. A. SPEER, F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE, G. GULDENTOPS, (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales. Bibliotheca 9), Leuven 2014, pp. 119–169, at pp. 139–155.

² The designation *Reportatio A* and *B* comes from BONAVENTURA (A BAGNOREA), *Collationes in Hexaëmeron et bonaventuriana quaedam selecta* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi 8) (= *Reportatio A*), ed. F. DELORME, Quaracchi 1934. *Reportatio B* appears as BONAVENTURA (A BAGNOREA), *Collationes in Hexaëmeron in Opuscula Varia. Theologica* (Opera Omnia 5), Quaracchi 1891, pp. 327–454, and those editors argued that *Reportatio A* was inauthentic, yet published (p. 450) *Reportatio A*'s colophon, cited below, as an *additio*. J.G. BOUGEROL, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure*, Paris 1988, p. 235, claims: "On sait maintenant qu'il existe deux autres recensions non encore

to the six days of creation and the day of rest. The remaining twenty *collationes* are grouped into the first four *visiones*.³ The surviving text does not have the last three *visiones*. The shorter version, *Reportatio A*, survives in two manuscripts, both of which include an explanatory text at the end that recapitulates what should have been in the last three *visiones*, and then explains why they are not recorded, and in so doing, explains the *reportatio* origin of the text:

But these last three visions would have contained even more than the four aforesaid. But woe! woe! woe! The lord and master of this work's higher station and his departure from this life intervened,⁴ and the things to be continued never had their continuation.

These things, however, that I have noted concerning the four visions, are just as I was able to take them down in a quire from the mouth of the speaker. Indeed, two other colleagues took notes with me, but, because of their excessive confusion and illegibility, their little notes were of use to nobody except perhaps to themselves. My exemplar had the opportunity to be read by some of the other listeners, and when it was corrected, the one teaching the work and many others rewrote it, and they owe me thanks for that.

Many days later, however, the reverend father, brother Conrad, provincial minister of Upper Germany, granted me plenty of free time. So I reviewed again what I wrote with a fast hand and endeavored to reassemble it in order. The faculty of hearing, by which I heard the speaker's voice, and the faculty of sight, by which I recalled the speaker's gestures, worked with my memory, just as they usually work with the memory according to the Philosopher, in *De memoria et reminiscencia*. But I did not add anything that he did not say, except where I distinguished the distinction of the logical books of Aristotle more than he had said. But I did not add any other things except that I also indicated the places of some of the authoritative passages.

bien reconnues et identifiées, dont l'une se trouve dans le manuscrit récemment retrouvé à Leningrad." For an introduction to the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, see R. IMBACH, "Bonaventura: *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*", in *Interpretation. Hauptwerke der Philosophie. Mittelalter*, ed. K. FLASCH, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 270–291.

³ On the structure of the *Collationes* see K.L. HUGHES, "St. Bonaventure's *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*: Fractured Sermons and Protreptic Discourse", in *Franciscan Studies* 63 (2005), pp. 107–129, esp. 109–110, and the literature cited there.

⁴ Bonaventure was elevated to cardinal on May 28 (Pentecost), 1273, and died on July 15, 1274.

This little work was read and composed at Paris, in the year of the Lord 1274⁵, from Easter to Pentecost, in the presence of some masters and bachelors of theology and nearly 160 friars.⁶

The anonymous editor clearly intends to argue for his redaction as being authoritative. He must however let the reader understand that Bonaventure, as well as numerous secretaries, used the notes from all three of the friars as the basis for their text. Therefore, he denigrates the work

⁵ Delorme argues that the date here is given in the relatively rare Pisan Annunciation style. Like the vastly more common Florentine Annunciation style, the Pisan style's new year begins on March 25, but the first year started the March 25 *preceding* the birth of Christ (March 25, 1 B.C.E., according to our calendar), while the Florentine style first year started the March 25 *following*. Therefore, a date according to the Pisan style will always be one year after the Florentine style. This is an elegant conjecture, based in part on the fact that Delorme's main manuscript witness is a fifteenth-century Siena manuscript prepared for and annotated by Bernardino of Siena, and in part on a statement in A. GIRY, *Manuel de Diplomatique*, Paris 1894, in his description of the Pisan style, that "Ce mode tout à fait exceptionnel de compter les années a cependant été employé en dehors de Pise, dans quelques villes de la Toscane, à Pistoia, à Sienne, etc. . ." (p. 108). Unfortunately, the Pisan style was not employed in Upper Germany, where the anonymous author was writing, nor, apparently, even at Siena: Giry himself, in listing which regions, towns and chanceries employed which styles of starting the calendar new year, assigns to Siena the Florentine style (p. 127), and this appears to be the common opinion on the matter.

⁶ BONAVENTURA (A BAGNOREA), *Collationes in Hexaëmeron (Reportatio A)*, ed. F. DELORME, Quaracchi 1934, p. 275: "Istae autem tres ultimae visiones adhuc magis continerent quam quatuor praedictae. Sed heu! heu! heu! superveniente statu excelsiori et vitae excessu domini et magistri huius operis, prosecutionem prosecuturi non acceperunt. —Haec autem, quae de quatuor visionibus notavi, talia sunt qualia de ore loquentis rapere potui in quaternum. Alii quidem duo socii mecum notabant, sed eorum notulae prae nimia confusione et illegibilitate nulli fuerunt utiles nisi forte sibi. Correcto autem exemplari meo, quod legi poterat ab auditorum aliquibus, ipse doctor operis de ipso meo exemplari et quamplures alii rescripserunt, qui pro eo mihi debent grates. —Elapsis autem diebus multis, concedente mihi copiam temporis et libri reverendo patre fratre Ch[unrado], ministro Alemaniae superioris, rursum respexi quae scripseram veloci manu et nisus sum recolligere ordinate, cooperante mihi memoria, quo loquentis vocem audieram, auditu et visu, quo recordabar gestuum loquentis, quae solent memoriae cooperari, secundum Philosophum, in libro *De memoria et reminiscentia*. Nec tamen apposui quidquam quod ipse non dixerat, nisi ubi distinctionem librorum Aristotelis logicalium amplius quam ipse dixerat, distinxi. Alia autem non apposui, nisi quod etiam loca auctoritatum aliquarum signavi. —Legebatur et componebatur hoc opusculum Parysius, anno Domini millesimo ducentesimo septuagesimo quarto, a Pascha usque ad Pentecosten, praesentibus aliquibus magistris et baccalariis theologiae et aliis fratribus fere centum sexaginta."

of the other *reportatores*, implying that, if any *reportatio* was the basis for the other, it was his, and thus his revision is both a more faithful guide to what Bonaventure actually said and a more accurate account.⁷

⁷ DELORME, Preface to BONAVENTURA (A BAGNOREA), *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* (*Reportatio A*), pp. x–xviii, provides an excellent analysis of the two redactions and their methods. Incidentally, as n. 5, above, implies, the statements made by the *reportator* about the context of the *collationes* cannot all be true. Specifically, the *reportator* states that A) Bonaventure's *collationes* were interrupted by the intervention of his higher station and then his death (*superveniente statu excelsiori et vitae excessu*); B) they were read and composed in the Franciscan Convent of Paris, C) in the year 1274, D) from Easter to Pentecost; and E) that he revised the text “many days” afterwards (*Elapsis autem diebus multis*). The common interpretation is that A) Bonaventure interrupted his *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* upon receiving the news of being elected cardinal – indeed, BOUGEROL, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure*, p. 120, translates the key passage paraphrastically “le maître de cette oeuvre a été élevé au cardinalat et vient de quitter cette vie”, and that B) they were read and composed in the Franciscan Convent of Paris, C) in the year 1273, not 1274, D) from Easter to Pentecost; therefore by E) “many days” one must understand “several years.” This interpretation relies on the facts that Bonaventure was made cardinal probably on Pentecost (May 28), 1273; he subsequently left Paris, joined the pope at Mugello outside Florence in July, and then travelled with the pope to Lyon, where he was consecrated, likely on November 11, and where, in December, he gave several sermons (A. CALLEBAUT, “Le Chapitre général de 1272, célébré à Lyon”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 13 (1920), pp. 305–317; IDEM, “La date du cardinalat de S. Bonaventure (28 mai 1273)”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 14 (1921), pp. 401–414; “Le Voyage du B. Grégoire X et de S. Bonaventure au Concile de Lyon et la date du sacre de S. Bonaventure”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 18 (1925), pp. 169–180; P. GLORIEUX, “Essai sur la chronologie de Saint Bonaventure”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19 (1926), pp. 145–168; IDEM, “La date des ‘Collationes’ de S. Bonaventure”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 22 (1929), pp. 257–272). Bonaventure would have remained in Lyon, preparing for the council, and was present at its first session, May 7. Therefore, it is “indiscutable” (GLORIEUX, “La date des ‘Collationes’”, 260) that Bonaventure gave the *Collationes* in 1274. In addition to reading the date against the manuscripts and exchanging days for years, this interpretation also fails to posit any interruption: the preceding *collationes* (*de decem praeceptis* in 1267 and *de septem donis* in 1268) both began on the first Sunday in Advent and ran until Easter; Bonaventure in Paris would not have received from the Papal Curia in Orvieto word of his election until well after Pentecost; therefore, we would either expect the *reportator* to have stated that Bonaventure continued past Pentecost or that the text was complete. On the other hand, if one were to defend the literal account of the passage, namely that it occurred in 1274, then the Easter-to-Pentecost (April 1–May 20) period would have been the planned term for the *Collationes*, which Bonaventure had to interrupt to return to Lyon. In that case, however, one would need to explain why he left Lyon to go back to Paris, and why he would even attempt a series of *collationes*, given that he would have been

This account of the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* shows that already in the thirteenth century, *reportationes* were being taken down in quires. The support they were written on is assumed to have been inexpensive; one of the foundational studies on *reportationes* furnished a colorful description:

The material that [our *reportatores*] used to write were scraps of parchment in different dimensions, of lesser quality, what could be found inexpensively, because students are poor. Paper (called *papyrus*) also appears in use: grey and rough, which should have cost even less than parchment, when it could be found. The pages were either loose (*cedula*) or gathered in quires (*quaternus*). They should not, however, have been bound in volumes, since writing in volumes had its disadvantages: the volume took up a lot of space, it opened with difficulty such that one could not write on all of the page, and ... the binding was expensive.⁸

By 1320, references to paper *reportationes* appear. The scribe of the questions attributed to Guy Terrena in Vatican City, BAV, Vat. lat. 901 (ca. 1320) ends the question “Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita in vigore” with the note (f. 140vb): “De ista materia plus habeo in papiro meo quod reportavi in scolis.”⁹ At this point, paper would have been imported to Paris; its relative fragility with respect to more durable (and more expensive) parchment made it suitable for such ephemeral uses, although its use in codices (outside of registers) was extremely limited.¹⁰

aware of the Council’s announced beginning of May 1. As it stands, the easiest solution to these problems is that the account in *Reportatio* A is just wrong.

⁸ G.P. MÜLLER, “La ‘reportatio’”, in *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp. 647–659, at p. 652: “Il materiale che [i nostri *reportatores*] usano per scrivere sono ritagli di pergamena, di formato diverso, di qualità scadente, quello che si può trovare a minor prezzo, perché gli studenti sono poveri. Appare in uso anche la carta (chiamata *papyrus*), grigiastra e ruvida, la quale doveva costare ancora meno della pergamena, quando poi si poteva trovarla. I fogli sono o sciolti (*cedula*), o riuniti in quaderni (*quaternus*). Non dovevano però essere legati in volume, perché scrivere in un volume comportava degli inconvenienti: il volume occupava molto spazio, si apriva difficilmente, di modo che non si poteva scrivere su tutto lo spazio del foglio, e... la legatura costava cara.

⁹ A. PELZER, “Le premier livre des Reportata Parisiensia de Jean Duns Scot”, in *Annales de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie* 5 (1924), pp. 448–491, at p. 452. Guy’s question is edited by J.P. ETZWILER, “Six Questions of Guido Terreni, O.Carm. (†1342). Vat. lat. 901, ff. 140r–145v”, in *Carmelus* 35 (1988), pp. 138–77; the line in question is incorporated in the edition, p. 147, without commentary.

¹⁰ On the diffusion of paper codices, see U. NEDDERMEYER, *Von der Handschrift zum gedruckten Buch. Schriftlichkeit und Leseinteresse im Mittelalter und in*

The Prague Codex as a *Reportatio*

Very few original *reportationes* from the fourteenth century survive. Christoph Flüeler has collected information on original *reportationes* of lectures on Aristotelian texts, and his research has cast light on the classrooms of the arts faculties.¹¹ In a celebrated study of a *reportatio* of John Buridan's lectures on the *Metaphysics*, Flüeler identified a trait diagnostic of an original *reportatio*: at the beginning of each class, the *reportator* writes in a compact script, which, over the course of the lecture, becomes larger.¹² The William of Brienne manuscript in Prague exhibits this very same characteristic, to the degree that it is possible to identify the beginning of each *lectio* with the sudden return of a compact script (e.g., figure 4). This phenomenon was used to reconstruct William's *Sentences* lectures *lectio* by *lectio*, for all 126 *lectiones* and 4 *principia* lectures (Appendix A).

Although this paleographical characteristic by itself is sufficient to identify the manuscript as an original, numerous other elements confirm this assessment. For the most part, the text is full of corrections, but a miniscule number of the corrections correlate to an omission *per homoioteleuton*, and such omissions constitute the classic sign of a

der frühen Neuzeit. Quantitative und qualitative Aspekte (Buchwissenschaftliche Beiträge aus dem Deutschen Bucharchiv München 61), v. 1, Wiesbaden 1998, pp. 256–267. Collecting the data from manuscripts carrying information about the place and date of production, Neddermeyer shows that relatively few paper codices survive; for the period 1330–1339, 38 parchment codices are known to have been produced in France, while only 3 paper ones (p. 262). To my knowledge, these three do not include the *reportatio* of Pastor of Serrescuderio's 1332–33 lectures discovered by Courtenay (Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'Agglomération, 239), the *reportationes* and notes prepared by the then-bachelor Pierre of Allouagne (see below), and the Prague Codex, all of which can be positively ascribed to the University of Paris in this decade.

¹¹ C. FLÜELER, "Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna: The Making of a Commentary at the Faculty of Arts (A Case Study)", in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, 1200–1500*, ed. I. BEJCYZ (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 160), Leiden 2008, pp. 277–346.

¹² C. FLÜELER, "From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium: "The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy"*, ed. S. EBBESEN and R.L. FRIEDMAN, Copenhagen 1999, pp. 497–522; cf. B. MICHAEL, *Johannes Buridan. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken, und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin 1985, v. 2, pp. 792–794, 811–813.

manuscript copied from another, an apograph; a copyist, in moving the eyes between the model and the copy, skips from one instance of a word in the model to the next, omitting the text in-between. For a manuscript copied from another, such omissions are expected, and corrections to the text should also involve filling in these omissions. Here, to the contrary, many of the corrections complete or fill out the arguments. For example, at the beginning of many *lectiones*, William enumerates the questions to be considered, typically four. The *reportator* would often note down the question titles in an over-abbreviated form, as in *lectio* 5 (f. 8v), where the third question on *scientia intuitiva* originally read “utrum sit tertia neutra”, to which was added in the margin “id est aliqua scientia que sit nec intuitiva nec abstractiva.” Often, the *reportator* left a blank space for the question-titles and returned after the lecture to fill them in; these blank spaces often correlate with the cases where, later in the lecture, when the bachelor comes to treat the question that was skipped, the *reportator* gives the question title in full. Thus, at the beginning of *lectio* 10 (f. 16r) (figure 5a), three questions were originally announced: a blank space was left for the title of question 2, which was later filled in (and into the margin), and a fourth question title was added in the margin. William treated questions 2 and 3 together, and, at that point, the *reportator* originally wrote (f. 16v) (figure 5b):

De secunda questione et ~~contra~~ tertia: secunda est utrum voluntas
possit essentia divina non fruendo persona, et tertia posita est in
principio.

The *reportator* gives in full the title of the second question, which was skipped at the beginning, and states that the third question “was given at the beginning.” A subsequent correction added the infinitive *frui* to the title of question 2 and put in the margin the entirety of the title of q. 3 (“scilicet utrum voluntas possit frui una persona non fruendo alia”). Finally, at the end of the *lectio* (f. 17v) (figure 5c), the hand changes from the loose script characteristic of the end of a *lectio* to a more composed one. An abortive “quarta conclusio utrum fruimur” is written and crossed out, and on the following line the fourth question is written: “Quarta questio est utrum omnia quibus fruimur convenient sub una ratione fruibilis”, which matches substantially the fourth question title added in the margin at the beginning of the *lectio*. The question titles missed at the beginning are recorded in full later and those recorded in full at the beginning are recorded in an abbreviated form later; subsequently the missing or shortened text was expanded.

These phenomena are caused by a *reportator* trying to follow a spoken lecture and therefore leaving question-titles blank, to be filled in later. One case, where the question-title was never filled in, shows this clearly. In *lectio* 84, William announces four questions (f. 108v), but the *reportator* has left a blank space for the third question. *Lectio* 84 is dedicated to the fourth question, and William treated the remaining three in the next lecture, *lectio* 85, ending with the third question (which has been transcribed in its entirety in the *lectio* list, Appendix A, *lectio* 85). The *reportator* did not record in *lectio* 85 the title of the third question and never filled in the blank spot at the beginning of *lectio* 84, leaving us with a *quaestio* whose title will never be known.

Some of the corrections reveal that the scribe's source was oral. At the end of *lectio* 57 (f. 79v, figure 6a), the scribe began writing *quodd* before realizing that the word was *cottidie*. Similarly, *lectiones* often end with *et sic de illo*, but at the end of *lectio* 60, the scribe had written *sed de* before he realized that the speaker was ending the class (figure 6b). At times the scribe got ahead of the speaker, writing out the words that he expected to hear, and, when the speaker went a different direction, the scribe had to delete those words. For example, after giving the titles of the questions and initial arguments for and against the first question, William would usually address the first question, and the scribe would be fairly safe in writing "Ad primam questionem", necessitating a hasty correction when this was not the case, as in *lectio* 80 (f. 102b^{isr}, figure 6c). Since the lectures often began *Consequenter queritur circa (primam, secundam, tertiam. . .) distinctionem*, the scribe would occasionally have to delete these words when the lecture began differently, as with *lectio* 94, the *lectio* following the one that announced book II, distinction 8. The scribe originally wrote "Consequenter queritur circa nonam distinctionem", then, realizing that the previous *lectio* announced questions on distinction 8, but treated questions left over from distinction 7, corrected the *nonam* to an *octavam*; subsequently, he deleted the entire line and began "Ad primam questionem octave distinctionis superius motam." Even some of the corrections appear to have been dictated. In *lectio* 40, the title of the second question was before correction (f. 60r): "utrum principium dicatur ad intra vel extra in divinis"; when the question is treated, its title is given (before correction) as (f. 61r): "utrum principium dicatur univoce ad intra et extra." In fact, the question addresses whether the notion of principle is univocal when applied within the Godhead and when applied between God and creation. The

title at the beginning (f. 60r, figure 7) was subsequently corrected to “*utrum principium dicatur ad intra et extra in divinis*”; the word *univoce*, essential to the sense of the question, appears in the margin, but without any signs connecting it to the question title; rather, it appears as a note “univoce ad principium.” This note strongly evokes the suspicion that someone dictated *scribe ‘univoce’ ad ‘principium’*, “write *univoce* after *principium*”, and the writer heard *scribe ‘univoce ad principium’*, “write ‘*univoce ad principium*’.”

Sometimes, at the bottom of pages where a *lectio* begins, there are marks that may have a connection to the *reportatio* process. I have put in a table form the number of the *lectio* that begins on the page with the mark, the folio where the mark appears, and my attempt at transcribing what those marks looked like, along with the number of the figure where its image can be seen (when available).

Table 1: Marks at the bottom of pages correlated with beginnings of *lectio*.

<i>Lectio</i>	Folio	Text (italics indicates abbreviated letters)
2	4r	manus
17	28r	aue au
19	32r	au
25	39r	D Dd mi A da
26	40v	-orum -orum
28	43v	mda
28	44r	-orumom
31	47v	m
32	49r	m Auoduo
40	60r	m Aud
41	61v	mi auditum Audiverint Audiverit (figure 8)
44	65v	m datum
54	75v	audiret
64	86v	m datum
75	97r	md
76	98r	m
77	99v	dato datum
PIIa	105r	lux ^(a)
108	135v	m data autem potestate
109	136r	non datum
110	137r	m. d.
111	138r	m. d.
113	140r	iiii

115	144r	m datum audivit
116	145r	m datum
125	152r	c da

^(a) What appears to be *lux* is written in the bottom-right corner, perpendicular to the text.

In all but two cases, the marks appear on the same page as the beginning of a *lectio*; in those two exceptions, the notations show up on a recto page where the facing verso has the beginning of a *lectio*: in one case (*lectio* 28), that verso page also has similar marks; in the other (*lectio* 110), the new *lectio* only occupies the last four lines of the verso page. It is likely that these marks were entered as part of the *reportatio* process. Their meaning is uncertain. They could be indications concerning the next class. As will be discussed below, bachelors of *Sentences* lectured immediately after the hour of prime, except when the master lectured, in which case they lectured after terce; perhaps the ‘m’ actually is a *iii*, stating that the next lecture will be at the third hour. Alternatively, they could be indications of what day the next lecture would be. These marks could also indicate something about the correction process, whether the text was given to the bachelor to correct or read to him, or whether the *reportator* was simply authorized to make the corrections by himself (*mihi*). The only definite statement that I can make is that these indications correlate to the beginning of a *lectio*.

Finally, two *lectiones* are definitely not original *reportationes*, and they show clearly the difference between apograph and original. Specifically, *lectio* 92 (ff. 117r, 118v–119rv) (figure 9) and *lectio* 122 (f. 150r–v) are both written in an even hand that sharply contrasts with the pattern found in the other *lectiones*, where an initially compact script becomes more open. That is, they are apographs, copies made from a written exemplar¹³. One of the few corrections in *lectio* 122 involves a transcription error. In support of the conclusion that there can be acquired faith concerning the object of fruition, we read (f. 150r):

Secunda conclusio probatur ~~quia dicit Augustinus non credam~~
~~Ewangelio nisi ecclesie crederem; sed quod credam ecclesie, hoc~~
~~est ex auditu~~, et ponitur illa conclusio propter ponentes opposi-
 tum. Ratio prima eorum est illa: nullus actus elicited ab habitu

¹³ How these apographs came to be in an original *reportatio* is a matter for conjecture. The case of *lectio* 92 is explained in the next chapter to be the result of William’s two-part *principium* on book II being copied at the end of two sexterns.

naturali potest attingere ad obiectum fruibile; sed fides acquisita, si esset, esset habitus naturalis; ideo suus actus non posset attingere obiectum fruibile. Ideo, etc. Item, si esset eam dare, vel esset eiusdem rationis cum fide infusa, vel alterius rationis. Non primum, quia tunc duo accidentia eiusdem rationis essent in eodem subiecto, quod est falsum; nec secundum, quia sunt de eodem obiecto. Ideo non possunt esse alterius et alterius rationis. Item, si sic, in nobis simpliciter esset caritas acquisita, quod est falsum, et consequentia, quia non est maior questio de fide quam de caritate.

Oppositum probo, quia dicit beatus Augustinus ‘non crederem ewangelio nisi ecclesie crederem’; sed quod credam ecclesie, hoc est per auditum vel per testimonium hominum; talis autem fides non est nisi acquisita; ideo etc.

The copyist probably skipped from *probatur* to *probo*, realized the mistake in the minor premise, and, cancelling out the premature text, returned to the proper order. Admittedly, the perturbation does not exclude other explanations, such as the lecturer fumbling his notes and missing the *opinio* before the proof. Nevertheless, it does show how the type of corrections and errors correlates to the appearance of the text. Where script has an even appearance, corrections consistent with fixing copying errors show up. Everywhere else, such corrections (and errors) are generally absent.

The identification of the manuscript as an original *reportatio* helps explain many other features of text. For example, the abbreviations for *iste/ista/istud* (i^{te}/i^{ta}/i^d) almost never appear; instead the *reportator* uses extensively the abbreviations for *ille/illa/illud* (i^e/i^a/i^d). Likewise, the manuscript makes extensive use of another abbreviation, one that, while more rare than its synonyms, has the virtue of being faster to write. For William of Brienne, as for every other fourteenth-century scholastic, the primary weapon in his philosophical arsenal is the syllogism, a logical instrument composed of three propositions: a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion. Traditionally, scholastics introduce the conclusion of a syllogism with either *ergo* (abbreviated g^o) or *igitur* (g’); often the entire conclusion is reduced to *ergo*, etc. In many cases in the Prague manuscript, especially where one would expect to encounter the almost idiomatic *ergo*, etc., one reads *ideo* (abbreviation iō) instead of *ergo* or *igitur*. For a *reportator*, the advantages of using *ideo* instead of *ergo* are clear: the abbreviation takes at least one less stroke to execute, the pen moves in a constant direction and there are no descenders or loops to worry about; *ideo* is faster to write.

In summary, the commentary on the *Sentences* contained in the Prague manuscript is (except for two lectures) the original *reportatio* of William of Brienne's lectures in the Franciscan convent at Paris in 1330–31. The very quires of the codex shared the classroom with William, and may even have been corrected under his direction.

Description of the Prague Codex

Praha, Národní knihovna České republiky, Ms. VIII.F.14 (olim 1568).

Catalogues: Victorin Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller*, Quaracchi 1954, n. 286a, pp. 37–38.

URI: http://www.manuscriptorium.com/apps/index.php?direct=record&pid=RTRTR2-set20100113_73_236897

22x15 cm; ii parchment + 156 paper leaves (in-IVo, four chainlines per page), foliation contemporary with the text (corrections go around the folio numbers) repeats folios 89 and 102 (hence 89bis and 102bis). 1 parchment bifolio and 13 paper sexterns:

Watermarks:

- A. Pear 65x16 mm, distance between the chains: 52 mm, similar to Briquet 7326 (Bologna 1323), Moshin 4222 (Avignon 1317, Le Puy 1319–31, Bologna 1322–25, Provence 1325–34, Genoa 1325–51, Dijon 1325–27, Torcello 1326, Grenoble 1327, Palermo 1329, Montpellier 1329, Pistoia 1327–34, Lucca 1331–42, Sion 1336, Bordeaux 1345).
- B. Arbalest 46x65 mm, similar to Briquet 703 (Bologna 1334), Moshin 201 (Bologna 1329).
- C. Bell with clapper 37x47mm, distance between chains: 52mm, similar to Briquet 3922 (Reggio Emilia 1335), Moshin 2794 (Bergamo 1329).
- D. Person? 76x35mm, distance between chains: 52mm

Collation:

0, ff. i–ii

I: ff. 1–12 (Watermark A 1–12, 5–8, 9–4), II: ff. 13–24 (Watermark A 15–22, 17–20, 23–14); III: ff. 25–36 (Watermark A 32–29, 34–27, 36–25); IV: ff. 37–48 (Watermark B 43–42, 45–40, 48–37); V: ff. 49–60 (Watermark B 53–56, 57–52, 59–50); VI: ff. 61–72 (Watermark B 67–66, 69–64, 71–62); VII: ff. 73–84 (Watermark B 80–77, 82–75, 83–74); VIII: ff. 85–89, 89bis–95 (Watermark B

86–94, 88–91, 93–87); IX: ff. 96–102, 102bis–106 (Watermark C 97–105, 98–104, 102–101); X: ff. 107–118 (Watermark C 108–117, 109–116, 114–111); XI: ff. 119–130 (Watermark C 119–130, 123–126, 127–122); XII: ff. 131–142 (Watermark D 134–139, 136–137, 141–132); XIII: ff. 143–154 (Watermark D 143–154, 145–152, 148–149).

Signatures: I (12v): “*primus sexternus*”; II (24v): “*secundus*”; III (36v): “*tercius*”; IV (48v): “*4us*”; V (60v): “*5us*”; VI (72v): “*6us*”; VII (84v): “*7us*”; VIII (95v): “*8us*”; IX (106v): “*nonus sexternus in quo continetur finis 4i libri*”; X (118v): “*Xus*”; XI (130v): “*XIus*”; XII: bottom half of f. 142 (which would have had catchword and signature) has been torn off; XIII (154v): “*13*.”

On the verso of the last folio in sexterns I–VIII and X–XI, catchwords in bottom right; the catchword on V (f. 60v) refers to text after correction.

The pages have been roughly cut with a short strokes, and there is some variation in the size of the quires, which have been bound so that the top of the page is flush. The writing is in two columns on ff. i–ii, and single column throughout ff. 1–154, between 40–46 lines per page on sexterns I–VIII, sexterns IX–XIII (which are also slightly longer than the previous eight sexterns) have around 48 lines per page. Simple, four-line ruling (occasionally repeated, as f. 77v), no pricks. Capitals: f. 1r “*Circa*” and the word “*Consequenter*” used at the beginning of *lectiones* feature a C roughly one-and-a-half lines high (sometimes occupying two lines of text, sometimes just one). Rubrication: ff. ira–iivb, in the *tituli quaestionum*, the word *utrum* is given a rubric highlight, the folio numbers are crossed through in rubric, and the title of the books are set off (1ra: “*Super primo sententiarum questiones*” is underscored; irb: “*Super secundo sententiarum*”, ivb: “*Super tertio sententiarum*”, iira: “*Super quarto sententiarum*” are all crossed through). The Cs of the incipit “*Circa*” and “*Consequenter*” used at the beginning of *lectiones* have rubric emphasis up to and including f. 46r (*lectio* 30).

The text is written in three main hands: one on the first bifolio (ira–iivb), one for the main text (ff. 1–106r, 107r–154r) (figure 1), and the last appearing on f. 106v and f. 154v (figure 3). Extensive corrections have been made to the main text.

Binding: a contemporary parchment wrapper, with a parchment flyleaf. On the front cover is written 2^a C^a / 2 M. C. Directly above these two lines, a discolored rectangle, with the trace of the word *sententiarum* marks where a small, parchment label was affixed. During the *in situ* inspection (September 2013), this label was found loose in the binding, and read “*qnes parisius reportate super primum/quartum sententiarum in papiro et cooperto*.”

Front flyleaf, recto, on stub: “*In nomine Domini amen. Anno ##12**.”

On outside margin: “*Hoc est memoriale pro domino Ulr. de Const. pro tribus floren. de Florentia boni ponderis*”

Along top: “*super primum et quartum Sententiarum questiones*.”

Along bottom, upside down: ij Flor.

Front flyleaf, verso: blank

Rear flyleaf, recto: blank

Rear flyleaf, verso, at top, crossed out: “Iste regis filia et contemptibilia.”
 Responsory from the office of St. Elisabeth of Hungary.¹⁴

Contents:

1. ff. ira–ivb: *tituli quaestionum*.

As explained in Chapter IV, the *quaestiones* of William of Brienne’s commentary are announced at least twice, once (and sometimes more often) at the beginning of a lecture (*lectio*), and again when William’s lecture begins concretely to discuss the *quaestio*. There can therefore be a gap of several folios between when a question is announced and when it is finally treated, and the titles can differ. The *tituli quaestionum* refers to the titles of *quaestiones* and to their location according to the beginning of the *lectio* where they are announced. For example, *lectio* 28 announces the question (f. 43v): “Utrum divina generatio sit eterna”, but the treatment of the question does not occur until *lectio* 29 (f. 45r), where its title is repeated as “utrum generatio Filii Dei sit eterna.” The *tituli quaestionum* reports the same question as (f. ira): “utrum divina generatio sit eterna: 43”, that is, with the title and the foliation corresponding to the beginning of *lectio* 28. Similarly, *lectio* 36 lists four questions, but never treats the last two (f. 54v: “tertia questio est utrum persona dicat substantiam vel suppositum; quarta utrum persona sit nomen intentionis prime vel secunde.”), yet these question titles appear in the *tituli questionum* (f. ivb: “utrum persona dicat substantiam vel suppositum; utrum persona sit nomen prime intentionis vel secunde 54”). The titles arrange the books of the *Sentences* in order I-II-III-IV, as opposed to I-IV-II-III, which the codex actually follows. The titles are also not complete; for example, there are no titles to the questions on dd. 6 and 7 treated in *lectiones* 19–21.

¹⁴ Edited as *Responsorium III* of the office *Letare Germania*, in B. HAGGH, *Two Offices for St. Elizabeth of Hungary*. Gaudeat Hungaria and Letare Germania. *Introduction and Edition* (Musicological Studies 55/1), Ottawa 1995, p. 32; CANTUS 601236, “Ista regis filia haec”, <http://cantusdatabase.org/id/601236> (last accessed August 10, 2016); also printed in the Münster Antiphoner 1537, f. 474v.

2. ff. 1r–106r, 107r–154r, Guilelmus de Brena, *Reportationes super libros Sententiarum*.

a. ff. 1r–68v, *super I Sententiarum*. Incipit (figure 1): “Circa primum Sententiarum queritur utrum summe simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius cognitionis scientifice. Et arguitur quod sic.” Explicit (f. 68v): “et sic de hiis et in hoc terminatur sententia primi libri \ad honorem Dei gloriosi qui est benedictus in secula seculorum amen/.” On f. 1r, along top of page: “Iste reportaciones sunt a fratre legente Sententias in scola minorum Parisius anno Domini 1330.”

b. ff. 69r–105r, *super IV Sententiarum*. Incipit: “Circa quartum Sententiarum primo queritur utrum sacramentum possit diffiniri.” Explicit (f. 105r): “sed non formaliter in omnibus hominibus secundum eundem gradum attingentie; ideo etc. Et sic de illo. \Explicitiunt questiones quarti libri sententiarum/.” On f. 69r, along top of page “hec sunt reportaciones super quarto re ab eodem fratre eodem anno.”

c. ff. 105r–141r, *super II Sententiarum*. Incipit (figure 2): “Circa secundum librum queritur primo utrum divina voluntas aliquo modo ab essentia divina distincta sit immediatum principium alicuius productivum. Et arguitur quod non.” Explicit: “Sed illa potestas est ~~hi~~ ~~pre~~ inquantum est defectibilitas vel posse deficere nichil est formaliter; ideo non est a Deo. Et sic de illo. \Explicit super secundo libro Sententiarum/.” On f. 105r, in the right (outside) margin, next to the incipit: “Principium bacularii minorum super secundum librum.”

d. ff. 141r–154r, *super III Sententiarum*. Incipit: “Questio est utrum incarnacio-actio sit distincta ab incarnante et incarnato. Quod ~~non~~ sic” Explicit (f. 154r): “et circa illa potest papa vel prelatus dispensare. Et sic dictum sit de illo. \Explicit reportatio super tertio libro Sententiarum a fratre Gwilliermo minore apud minores/.” On f. 141r, in the right (outside) margin, next to the incipit: “Principium minoris de tertio libro Sententiarum.” On f. 143r, above the text beginning “Circa primam distinctionem tertii libri Sententiarum”: “Questiones tertii libri Sententiarum.”

3. f. 106v: Anonymus, “Nota: casus in quibus peccantes mittendi sunt ad episcopum.”

a. *Casus episcopales*. Incipit: “Coiens cum moniali, consecrata vel non, virgine vel non; vel mulier cum religioso; verberans patrem vel matrem; deflorator virginis, vel oppresse vel seducte; qui in mortem coniungis machinat; abutens crismate seu eucharistia vel re sacra.” Explicit: “ut in multis casis de premissis.”¹⁵

b. (continuation of a?) Incipit: “Scire modum penitentie pro hoc et aliis criminibus.” Explicit: “sacrilegus vel crisma seu calicem sacram polvens: septem annis, in duobus non intrabit ecclesiam et usque ad quartum non officiat et in singulis septimanis tribus diebus a vino et carne ieiunabit et alia quedam, 12. 42. de viro.”

4. f. 154v, *Sphaera vitae et mortis* (figure 3).¹⁶

Figure with four concentric circles, text and verse below. Between the first and second circles are written the 23 letters of the Roman alphabet; between the second and the third rings are Roman numerals between i and xxvii; between the third and fourth rings is written: “Argumentum de egrotis. Utrum convalescant de infirmitate sua an non et est probatum pluries et expertum quod sic*.” The innermost circle is divided horizontally (labeled “divisio vite et mortis”), with the top part

¹⁵ Cf. “Statuta synodalia Wratislaviensis 1446” in *Das Teutsche Reichs-Archiv*, [20], *Continuatio II: Spicilegii Ecclesiastici Des Teutschen Reichs-Archivs, oder Codex Statutorum Synodaliū Et Capitularium Ecclesiae Germanicae*, ed. J.C. LÜNIG, Leipzig 1721, pp. 1199a–1200b; cf. *Statuta synodalia a Wenceslao episcopo Wratislaviensi a. MCCCX publicata*, ed. J.C. FRIEDRICH, Hannover 1827, pp. 16–18; see also Innsbruck, Universitätsbibliothek, 364, ff. 235v–236v (I have not seen this manuscript); Köln, Historische Archiv, GB 8° 60, f. 121r–v.

¹⁶ Also known as the *Sphaera Apulei* or the *Sphaera Pythagorae*, see B. LÁNG, *Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the Medieval Libraries of Central Europe*, University Park, Pennsylvania 2008, pp. 130–135; H. SIGERIST, “The ‘Sphere of Life and Death’ in Early Mediaeval Manuscripts”, in *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 11 (1942), pp. 292–303; L. THORNDIKE, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, v. 1, New York 1949, pp. 683–85 and Mss. list on pp. 692–694; taxonomy and editions in L.S. CHARDONNENS, *Anglo-Saxon Prognostics, 900–1100* (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 153), Leiden 2007, pp. 181–195 (description), 195–222; J. EDGE, “Licit Medicine or Pythagorean Necromancy? The ‘Sphere of Life and Death’ in late medieval England”, in *Historical Research* 87 (2014), pp. 611–632; EADEM, “Sophisticated Prognosis or Simple Divination?: The ‘Sphere of Life and Death in England, 1100–1500’”, in *Science and the Occult from the Middle Ages through the Early Modern Period*, ed. A.C. GHIONE, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, forthcoming.

divided into “Cito surget” and “Diu infirmabitur sed ultimo surget”, while the bottom (“mors inferius”) has “Cito moritur” (*sic*) and “Diu infirmabitur sed ultimo morietur”, respectively. Between the labels are three columns of numbers, ranging from 1 to 30. The text reads:

De quacumque re scire volueris et potissime de egrotis an de infirmitate sua debeant convalescere hoc modo cognoscere poteris: primo scire debes quo die eger decubuerit et quotta sit luna illa die. Deinde coniunge numerum litterarum nominis egri numero lune. Et quociens iste numerus coniunctus excedit 30 reice et sume residuum quod excedit 30. Et si iste numerus fuerit in superiori parte spere, vivet; et si fuerit in inferiori parte spere, morietur. Collige per numerum quidquid vis esse probandum Iunge simul nomen suum lunamque diei Collectamque simul summam partire trigene Quidquid superfuerit rotulus discernit uterque Quod retinet vite necnon et mortis ymago Sique suprafuerit vivet, moritur et infra Sicut Apulicus bene sanxit in ordine rectus dum propter Iudam studuit revelavit Mathyam.

Observation on Provenance and Origin

The content of texts 3–4, when taken together with the owner’s mark ascribing it to Ulric of Constance and the fragment from the office for St. Elizabeth of Hungary, point to the codex being in Central Europe already by the mid-fourteenth century. The commentary on the *Sentences*, however, had to have been composed in Paris, as it is an original *reportatio* of the lectures on the *Sentences* at the Franciscan convent in 1330–31.

Chapter II

Bachelor of the *Sentences* in Paris

The Prague Codex witnesses lectures on the *Sentences* at the University of Paris, a major milestone in university study achieved by only the top theologians of the Middle Ages. As noted in the introduction, bachelors of the *Sentences* were responsible for the bulk of lectures given in systematic theology at the University of Paris, and so the Prague Codex provides a glimpse of medieval teaching at the highest level.

According to a custom in use at Paris since at least the beginning of the fourteenth century, William of Brienne lectured on the four books of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in the order I-IV-II-III over a single academic year.¹ For each book, the bachelor would hold a ceremonial first class, the *principium*, followed by lectures covering that book of the *Sentences*, distinction by distinction. The statutes of the University of Paris promulgated in the years following William's year as *sententiarius* (and which to some degree reflect earlier practices) provide some evidence on how the *principia* and the lectures functioned. The beginning of the term, between the feasts of the Exaltation of the Cross (September 14) and St. Denis (October 9), was reserved for the *principia* of the bachelors in theology; only one bachelor would hold a *principium* on a given day, and it would begin when the bells of St.-Jacques tolled the hour of prime.² With the exception of the first bachelor, who seems to have

¹ W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris", in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), forthcoming.

² CUP II:1, n. 1188, pp. 691–693 (post 1335), p. 692, "Item, nota, quod bachalarii in theologia qui debent legere Sententias, et illi qui habent legere Bibliam in quatuor Ordinibus Mendicantium, debent facere *principia* sua infra festum Exaltationis Sancte Crucis et festum beati Dionysii. Et presupposito quod tot sint quod non possint complere, tamen non sit in quolibet die nisi unum principium, et

always been a Carmelite, the order of the bachelors was probably a subject of negotiation.³ After October 9, the bachelors would read, that is, give lectures (*lectiones*) on ‘legible’ days, specifically, days that were not feast days, Sundays (in both cases, there would have been a university sermon), or when a promotion or disputation in the theology faculty or a solemn university event caused the suspension of normal teaching. The *lectiones* on the *Sentences* would usually be held at the hour of prime (again, as sounded by the church of St.-Jacques), unless the master of the school was lecturing that day, in which case the master would read at prime, and the *Sentences* lectures took place at terce. The lectures continued through the last legible day before the feast of Saints Peter and Paul (June 29).⁴ Another set of statutes from the late fourteenth century further specifies that the bachelors, in their lectures, should not

semper in primis Sancti Jacobi; immediate post predictum festum beati Dionysii illi qui non fecerunt faciunt, nec legitur aliqua hora in ipsa facultate, quousque omnia predicta principia sint facta totaliter et completa. Tamen si pauciora essent principia, ita quod finita essent ante festum beati Dionysii, nichilominus non legitur in ipsa facultate a crastino Exaltationis Sancte Crucis usque ad crastinum sancti Dionysii in aliqua ora.”

³ Heinrich Denifle appeals to a statute from Toulouse to assert that the Dominican always went last; see CUP II-1, n. 1189, p. 704, n. 37: “Carmelitae incipiebant, quia erant ultimo admissi. Praedicatores, utpote primi, post omnes alios principia faciebant. Similis ordo, qui in Universitate Paris. ad usum antiquum reducebatur, in Universitate etiam Tolosana servabatur.” Denifle refers to an item from the 1366 statutes of the Faculty of Theology published in M. FOURNIER, *Les statuts et privilèges des universités françaises depuis leur fondation jusqu’en 1789*, v. 1, Paris 1890, n. 670, p. 615. In fact, the dates Fournier gives are neither consistent across the two manuscript witnesses used by his source (Molinier); nor is the text unproblematic, since it has numerous obvious errors. In any case, both sequences of dates seem to place a significant gap between the Franciscan and Dominican bachelors, who would hold their *principia* on or around October 18, and the others, who would all go in September, starting with September 10. This gap may be the result of an error, but in any case, since the academic year started in Toulouse with the feast of St. Luke (October 18), and not, as in Paris, with the Exaltation of the Cross (September 14), the sequence clearly does not reflect Parisian practice. This dissimilarity finds confirmation in the fact that the Franciscans and Dominicans at Toulouse had the honor of teaching theology in their conventual *studia* well before the founding of the Theology faculty in 1360, and so the Toulouse statutes would need to account for their practice. Moreover, what evidence we have for Dominicans at the University of Paris does not suggest that they usually went last. In 1344, 1348, and 1369, a Dominican held his *principium* in a position definitely other than last in the sequence, see Z. KALUZA “La nature des écrits de Jean de Ripa”, in *Traditio* 43 (1987), pp. 257–298, at pp. 271–273.

⁴ CUP II-1, n. 1188, pp. 691–693 (post 1335), p. 692.

linger on the prologue and first book of the *Sentences*, lest they not be able to treat material pertaining to the other three books. At the same time, it states that the second, third and fourth *principia* are to be held on the first legible days of January, March and May, respectively, and that the first bachelor to hold a *principium* shall be a Carmelite.⁵ The statutes of the University of Bologna, modeled on those of Paris, make clear that the *principia* during the academic year were uncoupled from the *lectiones*; a *sententiarius* might still be lecturing on the preceding book when the *principium* was held, or conceivably might even have already begun the next book. Whether attendance of the other bachelors was required or not, provision was made for the other *sententiarii* to give their lectures on the days of these subsequent *principia*.⁶

⁵ CUP II-1, n. 1189, pp. 697–704 (fifteenth-century copy of late-fourteenth-century statutes), p. 700: “Rursus statuimus ne sic super prologum et primum Sententiarum instant, quin possint debite tractare materias secundi, tertii et quarti Sententiarum ad distinctiones pertinentes. —Item, quod carmelita faciat suum secundum principium prima die Januarii legibili, et alii bacalarii consequenter. Tertium faciat carmelita prima Martii, et alii consequenter. Quartum faciat ipse carmelita prima Maii, et alii consequenter.”

⁶ Statutes of the University of Bologna, in F. EHRLE, *I più antichi statuti della Facoltà teologica dell'Università di Bologna* (Universitatis Bononiensis Monumenta I), Bologna 1932, pp. 22–23: “Quilibet bachalarius continue tenetur legere omnes quattuor librorum Sententiarum distinctiones complete, et facere tria principia super tribus libris, completo libro primo. Et in quolibet trium principiorum facit, sicut in primo principio, similem collationem, protestationem et questionem. Verum die, quo unus eorum facit principium suum de tribus, nullus alius bachalarius principiat, sed utique omnes legunt eadem hora principy. Teneant igitur precedendi modum in principiis tribus sicut in primis, et semper prenuntietur ante per dies vel diem cuiuslibet eorum principium.” So reads the Vienna manuscript, the older of the two copies; the fifteenth-century Bologna codex adds a later series of specifications after *completo libro primo* (ibid., p. 22, n. 13): “hoc ordine, scilicet quod post festum nativitatis Domini debet legisse primum librum et secundum facere principium et non ante. Post kalendas aprilis debet legisse secundum librum et facere tertium principium et non ante. Et post medietatem mensis maii debet legisse tertium librum et quartum facere principium. Die autem quo aliquis bachalariorum facit aliquod principiorum suorum, teneantur omnes bachalarii interesse eis aut concedere quod die eodem legere possint ante vel post, si eis videbitur expedire. —Et tenere debet in tribus ultimis ordinem in primo principiis assignatum supra in capitulo primo. Et semper debet pronuntiari per bidellum per dies ante vel per diem cuiuslibet ipsorum principium.” From these two versions, it is clear that subsequent *principia* had to follow the same order as the first, that they did not interrupt the lectures, and that they were not necessarily in lockstep with the lectures.

The *Principia*

At medieval universities and in the *studia* of the mendicant orders, *principia* were ceremonial events at the beginning of each course. The teacher would present the material of the course by means of a speech modeled on the structure of a thematic sermon. Among theologians, the most celebrated *principia* were the *principia in aula*, the speech on the Bible given as part of the inception ceremony marking the creation and entry into service of a new master of theology;⁷ William of Brienne's 'inaugural speech' preserved in Ms. Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., Borgh. 105, is such a *principium* and will be discussed in Chapter VI. In all cases, *principia* were solemn occasions for celebrations to such a degree that, towards the end of the academic year in which William of Brienne lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris, the General Chapter of the Dominican Order passed a restriction on expenses to made on the occasion of such *principia*.⁸

Since the thirteenth century, *principia* on the *Sentences* included a speech modeled on a scholastic sermon; the bachelor was free to pick the biblical passage that would serve as the theme and often chose one that involved some sort of play on his name. In the speech, the bachelor would praise Peter Lombard and the *Four Books of the Sentences*, eventually focusing on the book to be treated in the lecture. At some point, *principia* came to include a *protestatio*, where the bachelor would make an oath to teach right doctrine. By the second decade of the fourteenth

⁷ N. SPATZ, *Principia: A Study and Edition of Inception Speeches Delivered before the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, ca. 1180–1286*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1992; A. SULAVIK, "Principia and Introitus in Thirteenth-Century Christian Biblical Exegesis with Related Texts", in *La Bibbia del XIII secolo. Storia del testo, storia dell'esegesi*, ed. G. CREMASCOLI and F. SANTI, Firenze 2004, pp. 269–321; T. PRÜGL, "Medieval Biblical Principia as Reflections on the Nature of Theology", in *What is "Theology" in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th centuries) as Reflected in their Self-Understanding*, ed. M. OLSZEWSKI, (Archa verbi. Subsidia 1), Münster 2007, pp. 253–276.

⁸ CUP II-1, p. 344, n. 912 (after mid-May, 1331): "Cum ex eo quod magistri et bacellarii Parisienses expensas faciunt in suis principiis notabiliter excessivas graventur ipsimet facientes, et paupertas nostra non sine gravi scandalo difformetur, precipit magister Ordinis in virtute sancte obedientie de diffinitorum consilio et assensu, quod supradicti magistri et bacellarii nullas pictantias faciant in die aule sue, nec in diebus in quibus incipiunt lectiones, et volumus quod priores provinciales in suis provinciis consimiles excessus lectorum quorumcumque in suis principiis studeant refrenare."

century, a new element appears: a disputation, sometimes referred to as a *disputatio collativa*; in what follows, unless otherwise noted, the term ‘*principium*’ will be used to refer to the disputation.⁹

There were thus four *principia* disputations, one for each book of the *Sentences*, and each one began with a question whose title concerned the topic of the book to be read. In the beginning of his *Sentences* commentary, Peter Auriol makes clear that, in 1317 at least, the bachelors reading the *Sentences* selected a question with an eye towards the debate:

It was asked therefore by my colleagues (*socii*) concerning theology, whether it is a science, whether it is necessary, whether it is speculative or practical, and in what way is it one, and what is its subject. But these investigations would be fruitless, if the matter of divine things were not to have scientific certitude in itself and from its nature. For this reason, this inquiry shall first be advanced in our *principium*. Therefore it is asked whether the divine nature can in itself and from its description (*ratio*) undergo scientific examination.¹⁰

⁹ On *principia* in general see: W.J. COURTENAY, “Theological Bachelors at Paris on the Eve of the Papal Schism”, in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, ed. K. EMERY, JR., R.L. FRIEDMAN, A. SPEER (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105), Leiden 2011, pp. 921–952; V. MARCOLINO, “Der Augustinertheologe an der Universität Paris”, in *Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, ed. H.A. OBERMAN (Spätmittelalter und Reformation. Texte und Untersuchungen 20), Berlin 1981, pp. 127–194, at pp. 174–183. In 2015, Monica Brînzei and I organized a colloquium at the Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes – Paris on the genre of *principia* on the *Sentences*, and we are currently preparing a collective volume, tentatively entitled *Principia on the Sentences: Institutional Exercise, Academic Debate, and Literary Genre*, which will appear in this series. So far, the earliest identified written evidence for a *principium* disputation is the text that survives as Walter Burley’s *Tractatus primus* (ca. 1314–1316), see T. SUAREZ-NANI and W. DUBA, “Introduction”, in FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA (Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum)*, q. 13–27 (Opera Philosophica et Theologica II,2), Leuven 2010, p. lxiv, n. 70. On the medieval practice of disputation in general, see O. WEIJERS, *In Search of the Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times* (Studies on the Faculty of Arts. History and Influence 1), Turnhout 2013, pp. 117–176.

¹⁰ L.O. NIELSEN, “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words: The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s First and Fourth Books of the *Sentences*”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G. EVANS, Leiden 2002, pp. 149–219, at p. 202: “Quaesito igitur a sociis de theologia, an sit scientia, an sit necessaria, et an sit speculativa vel practica, et quomodo sit una, et quid sit subiectum in ea, frustratoriae autem essent inquisitiones istae, si

The point Auriol makes is that the topic of his *principium* is fundamental to the topics investigated by his colleagues. He begins his *principium* by enumerating the subjects already addressed by his colleagues in their *principia*, probably by naming the question titles. Aside from implying that Auriol was the sixth bachelor to give a *principium* in 1317, this listing shows that, in the first *principium*, each bachelor defended a distinct thesis, one related to the prologue or (in other years, at least) the first book of the *Sentences*.

The bachelors' task at the *principia* did not end with disputing a question and holding a thesis; they were also obliged to reply to their colleagues' theses, and these criticisms were known as *replicationes*. These *replicationes* in turn required responses, *responsiones*.¹¹ Such *replicationes* and *responsiones* could appear as part of subsequent *principia* or in the bachelor's *lectiones* on the *Sentences*; or they could have circulated separately. While the bachelors may have been physically present at each other's *principia* – indeed the Faculty of Theology dedicated the first three weeks of the academic year to *principia* and forbade concurrent exercises, so they probably had to attend the first *principium* –, presence was not required for the system to function, especially for the subsequent *principia*;¹² the written record was sufficient. Thus, the shape and content of the *replicationes* and *responsiones* suggest that the *principia* disputations constituted a 'paper debate'. In 1321, for example, the Benedictine *sententiarius*, Pierre Roger (the future Pope Clement VI), produced a series of *replicationes* against his Franciscan *socius*, Francis of Meyronnes, and these are each assigned to be the first question on a given book of the *Sentences*. Well into the text that begins "Incipit replicatio dicti prioris contra dictum fratrem Franciscum, et est questio prima super tertium Sententiarum", Pierre Roger underscores the written nature of their exchange, while appealing to the principle

materia divinorum certitudinem scientificam non compateretur in se et ex natura sui, idcirco haec inquisitio in nostro principio proponatur. Queritur ergo utrum natura divina compatiatur in se et ex sui ratione scientificam perscrutationem."

¹¹ The terminology appears fixed by the time of Peter of Allouagne (1338–39, see below), but it may have been fluid before; all but one exchange between Pierre Roger and Francis of Meyronnes contained in Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 39, for example, is labeled *replicatio*, and the last case (f. 311r) is merely entitled "Questio prima quam feci super quartum *Sententiarum* anno domini M° CCC° XX°, in die Sancte Agnetis contra fratrem Franciscum bacallarium minorum."

¹² At least as one can conclude from the statutes of the Theology Faculty of Bologna; see n. 6, above.

of charity in discussing a matter of importance for their respective doctrines of the Trinity:

Seventh, he tries to escape my examples. For he says that my first example is to the opposite case, because the essence is not compared to the person as a man to an animal, but rather the other way around, insofar as the essence is more common than the person, even by a real commonality. And therefore, just as, when an animal is seen, it is not necessary that a man is seen, so, conversely, when a person is seen, the essence will be seen, and not conversely. It is true that his quire has it thus: ‘So, when the essence is seen a person will be seen, but not conversely’, but I believe that he wants to take it as I have taken it, because, concluding as the text has it, he would concede the whole argument. But I also want the text in accordance with the meaning (*volo ut ad mentem*) and so our colleague wants to make it, because, since he is very intelligent, we could then advance by conferring, and certainly, it would be a greater honor for him in the sight of intelligent men.¹³

Pierre Roger may have been present at Francis of Meyronnes’ *principia*, but he bases his response on what is written in the *quaternus*, Meyronnes’ own quire that Pierre had in front of him.¹⁴

A recent discovery shows how the four *principia* and the *replicationes* and *responsiones* fit together. Steven Livesey has identified a codex (Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l’agglomération, 504) belonging to the relatively-unknown Benedictine theologian Peter of Allouagne, and

¹³ PETRUS ROGERII (=CLEMENS PAPA VI), *Replicatio III*, in: *François de Meyronnes – Pierre Roger. Disputatio*, ed. J. BARBET, Paris 1961, p. 259: “Septimo, conatur evadere exempla mea. Dicit enim quod primum exemplum meum est ad oppositum, quia essentia non comparatur ad personam sicut homo ad animal, sed magis e converso, eo quod essentia est magis communis quam persona, etiam communitate reali, et ideo, sicut viso animali non est necessarium quod videatur homo, sed e converso, ita visa persona videbitur essentia, et non e converso. Verum est quod quaternus suus habet sic: ‘ita visa essentia videbitur persona, sed non e converso’, sed credo quod vult accipere sicut ego accepi, quia, sic concludendo, concederet totum propositum principale. Ego autem semper volo ut ad mentem et vult ita facere socius noster, quia, cum ipse sit valde intelligens, tunc possemus proficere in conferendo, et, pro certo, esset sibi maior honor in conspectu intelligentium virorum.”

¹⁴ See also the discussion in A. MAIER, “Der literarische Nachlass des Petrus Rogerii (Clemens VI.) in der Borghesiana”, in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter II. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 105), Rome 1967, pp. 255–315, at pp. 281–282.

containing Peter's working texts from his period as a bachelor.¹⁵ This discovery constitutes a major advance in our understanding of the history of the medieval university, as the codex contains many unparalleled elements from the life of a bachelor of theology, from when he started reading the *Sentences* through to his period as a formed bachelor. From the latter period, the notebook contains his sermon (f. Iva–vb, “Collatio facta in receptione bullarum”, *Sicut Domino placuit ita factum est. Sit nomen Domini benedictum. Iob 1[:21]*) on the occasion of receiving the 1341 bull from Benedict XII promoting him to abbot of St.-Bavon of Flanders (at which point he left Paris without achieving the rank of master), his account of serving as *respondens* to the *disputatio de quolibet* (as opposed to the *determinatio*) held under Master John of Ydderghem (f. 6r, 20r), and as *respondens* to the *disputatio in aula* of an unnamed Dean of Cassel, whom Courtenay has identified as Johannes Warnierrua (f. 115r–v, 120vb–121ra).¹⁶ For Peter's year as *Sententiarius* (1338–1339), the codex has Peter's lecture notes as well as his *principia*, including his *principium* speech (“Principium fratris Petri de Alewaigne monachi sancti Bertini de sancto Audemaro super sententias factum anno domini Millesimo ccc^o xxxviii^o in die sanctorum Mauricii et sociorum eius [September 22]”, *Lex sapientis fons vitae* Prov. 13[:14]) (f. 1ra–vb), his *principium* disputations on book I (ff. 2r–3r), book IV (ff. 43rb–va) and book II (ff. 75va–76rb),¹⁷ and his *replicationes* to the first three bachelors (ff. 3r–5v).¹⁸ Finally, the end of the codex boasts five

¹⁵ S. LIVESEY, “Pierre d’Allouagne and Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l’agglomération 504”, in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. C. ANGOTTI, M. BRÎNZEI, M. TEEUWEN, (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge 65), Turnhout 2013, pp. 381–392. Livesey’s article and his help with the manuscript have been fundamental in the following reconstruction.

¹⁶ W.J. COURTENAY, “Parisian Theologians in the 1330s”, forthcoming.

¹⁷ Book III begins on f. 89vb with “prima questio tercii”; in the series of *replicationes* there is a very brief *Questio in principio tercii* (f. 114vb). Moreover, in addition to the questioned labeled *principium secundi* on f. 75va (“Utrum creatio sit possibilis; secunda utrum possit demonstrari; tertia, utrum Deus sit causa effectus omnium aliorum a se; quarta utrum productio extrinseca creaturarum necessario presupponat productionem personarum divinarum.”), Peter’s response to the second *replicatio* of the Franciscan is also labeled a *principium secundi* and has the form of a question (f. 107ra: “Utrum creatura ad ymaginem Dei facta sit perfectissima creaturarum”). Since, as will be seen below, the four-question structure resembles a classroom lecture, this might mean that Peter’s *principia* properly speaking are composed of at least some of his responses to the *replicationes*.

¹⁸ To be precise, Peter gives a *replicatio* to the first bachelor, including a mention of the second; then a *replicatio* to the third (the Franciscan), and the third’s

exchanges between other bachelors and Peter; in each case, the exchange consists of the other bachelor's *replicatio*, followed by Peter's *responsio*, followed by a second *replicatio* and a second *responsio*.

The sheets containing the five exchanges reveal that the texts in the codex were the originals that circulated among the bachelors. The secular bachelor and Sorbonne student, James of Padua,¹⁹ makes this clear in his second *replicatio* to Peter, in raising a *dubium*:

But here there is a doubt, because you will say, 'For what purpose do you cite Saint Thomas, since, as was proven, those things that you say appear to be against his doctrine?'

I reply and say that I cite his sayings because that reverend father who began [lecturing on the *Sentences*] in fourth place, wrote to me in the margin of his quire: see Thomas *De Malo*, q. 26, and Hervaeus on II *Sentences*, d. 5.²⁰

Peter of Allouagne is the reverend father James mentions, and in the same manuscript, in Peter's response to James of Padua's first *replicatio*, the marginal indication appears (f. 103rb): "Vide Th. q. 26 *De malo* et Herveum, 5 d. secundi ~~in~~ respondens ad primum." At the end of his reply to James' second *replicatio*, therefore, Peter wrote in his own hand:

Forgive my excessively obscure brevity, because there was scarcely any time available for me to organize so much; in addition, my scribe afterwards set out less completely what I had indicated,

replicatio to him, and his response; then a summary of the *replicatio* of the second bachelor and his reply).

¹⁹ On James of Padua, see LIVESEY, "Pierre d'Allouagne", p. 383, n. 9; W. DUBA, "The Authenticity of Francis of Marchia's *Quodlibet*: The Testimony of Paris, BNF, Ms. Lat. 16110", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 49 (2007), pp. 91–102, p. 97, n. 26.

²⁰ IACOBUS DE PADUA, *Secunda replicatio contra Petrum*, Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'Agglomération, 504, f. 111rb: "Et ista videtur esse intentio Sancti Thome in prima parte *Summe*, q. 94, articulo 4, et q. 96, articulo 2. Sed hic est unum dubium, quia dices tu: 'quare allegas sanctum Thomam, nam ut probatur ea que dicis videtur esse contra doctrinam ipsius?' —Respondeo et dico quod pro tanto allego dicta sua quia iste reverendus pater qui quarto loco incepit in margine quaterni sui scripsit mihi sic: vide Thomam *De malo*, q. 26, et Herveum in 2o *Sententiarum*, d. 5. Ego vidi Herveum qui recitat ibidem duas opiniones et non videtur multum dispensare alteram earum, immo multum dubie se habet. Dicta etiam Thome in illa questione ostendi et ideo reddo sibi auctoritates Thome magis autenticas pro auctoritate quales sunt que videntur in summis."

and had books in which I had indicated to him the authorities that he left truncated.²¹

This exchange reveals not just that bachelors of the *Sentences* were very busy, but also that Peter of Allouagne was the fourth bachelor of theology to start, and that he employed a secretary, who, apparently, did not copy out every passage he should have. The fact that James of Padua refers to a marginal indication in the same quire, and that Peter replies in his own hand confirms that much of the *principium* debate was conducted on paper.

Peter is quite polite in addressing James' ribbing for obscure citation, and the two conduct the debate in a friendly manner; James calls Peter "my friend" and makes objections "purely for the sake of argument." On the other hand, the relationship between Peter and the Scotists is less civil. With one of them, the Cistercian bachelor named William, whom Courtenay suggests is William Heleny,²² he gets into a fight over the age-old problem of how Augustine's *De Trinitate* is divided into chapters. In his *Prima replicatio*, William asserts against Peter the formal distinction of the powers of the soul, citing Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, chapter 8.²³ In his response, Peter cites the passage, but challenges the attribution of the chapter, beginning "To the authority of Augustine, which he says is in chapter eight, but which I found in five."²⁴ This comment provokes the Cistercian to dispense some advice on the care of books: "When he says that he found in chapter five what I cited in chapter eight, I say here that I believe I have a very well marked and corrected book; if he should have a deceitful book, he should correct it or wash it with water."²⁵ To this remark, the aristocratic Benedictine

²¹ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 114v: "Parcatis brevitati mee nimis obscure, quia vere vix vacavit mihi tantum ordinare; cum hoc tamen scriptor meus postea minus complete posuit que signaveram et libros habebat in quibus signaveram sibi auctoritates quas dimisit truncatas."

²² COURTENAY, "Parisian Theologians in the 1330s", forthcoming.

²³ GUILIELMUS HELENY(?), *Prima replicatio ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 116ra: "Ista patet secundum beatum Augustinum, XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo octavo, 'quamvis mens humana non sit eius nature cuius Deus est; ymago tamen nature illius qua melior nulla est inquirenda est et invenienda est in nobis quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius'."

²⁴ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Prima responsio ad Guilelmum Heleny(?)*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 116va: "Ad auctoritatem Augustini quam dicit esse capitulo 8° quam inveni in 5°, 'quamvis mens humana', etc."

²⁵ GUILIELMUS HELENY(?), *Secunda replicatio ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 117vb: "Quando ipse dicit quod ipse invenit capitulo quinto illud quod

cannot resist engaging in speculation at the Cistercian's expense: "He reproaches me concerning the marking of chapters. Maybe he has small chapters and I have big ones; maybe he calls chapters like a peasant calls his apples as he pleases."²⁶

Besides their hostility, the exchange reveals the bachelors' shared concern for the accuracy of citations. Perhaps inspired by the discussion, in his own second *replicatio* James of Padua took care to indicate the precise manuscript he took his reference from.²⁷ Moreover, it also shows that the written form was the authoritative version of the debate. The primacy of paper becomes evident from the fight Peter had with the other Scotist, the Franciscan. Apparently, Peter's debate with the Cistercian brought him into conflict with the Franciscan on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, when Peter said that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father and the Son:

Replying to this he attacked me more strongly, saying, not writing – and if he wrote it, he erased it afterwards – that this was the error of the Greeks. He called Heaven and Earth against me, and he wanted the masters to judge on this matter.

And so I asked the masters on this subject, and they all said that there was no error. Indeed, because they have been slow to publish their judgment, making me seem to support error – Heaven forfend – I say against the aforesaid venerable colleague that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father and the Son, and I will hold this against him until it should be judged and defined otherwise by his and my superiors.²⁸

ego allegam capitulo octavo, dico hic quod ego credo habere librum valde bene signatum et correctum; si ipse habeat librum mendacem, corrigat ipsum vel lavet cum aqua."

²⁶ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Secunda responsio ad Guilelmum Heleny(?)*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 119vb: "Reprehendit me de capitulorum signatione. Forte habet parva capitula et ego magna; forte vocat capitula sicut rusticus pomos suas vocat ad placitum suum."

²⁷ IACOBUS DE PADUA, *Secunda replicatio ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 108ra, referring to the Ps.-Anselm *Liber de similitudinibus*: "Unde in rubrica 37 in libro Sorbone concludit sic: 'hec autem regina propria est voluntas omnium inobedientium domina', scilicet potentiarum, 'que ideo vocatur adultera, quia separatur a Deo'" In fact, the manuscript James cites survives as Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, latin 15686; the passage appears on f. 4rb, from line 8 to line 10. Technically, the passage belongs to rubric 36, which begins on 4ra, but the rubric on the same column (halfway down the page, around line 31) is rubric 37. I thank Tobias Hoffmann for his help in checking this detail.

²⁸ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Secunda responsio ad bachalarium minorum*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 107ra–rb: "Restringo tamen questionem ad humanam de qua

The Franciscan voiced strong objections, but he did not put them in writing. Peter therefore felt it important to register this conflict on paper. He also states that he has appealed the matter to the judgment of the masters of theology of the University of Paris; the masters, on Peter's account, told him he was not in error but were reluctant to make an official pronouncement of the sort that would have a written record.

As this last example underscores, the *principia* and *replicationes* took the form of a *collatio*, a term that in this context means a discussion among bachelors. The written form of that discussion was authoritative, and the bachelors composed their debate and assessed the merits and weaknesses of each other's writings with reference to the *quaterni* that contained them. On the other hand, they only mentioned oral disputes as cases where the written record was uncomplete. While the dispute was supposed to remain civil, tensions did surface, and the bachelors were ultimately under the authority of the masters of theology, to whom they could and did appeal.

Peter of Allouagne's dossier also shows how the bachelors selected the topics for their debate. In particular, paleographical evidence shows how Peter positioned the topic of his first *principium* with respect to his colleagues. While Peter's secretary copied most of the text from somewhere else, at least some corrections were made in the bachelor's own hand. In the first section, containing Peter's *replicationes* against the

dictum est Gen. 2, *faciamus hominem ad ymaginem* etc., de quesito nichil pronunc, sed circa suppositum, scilicet circa ymaginem, primo dixi in principio meo quod partes istius ymaginis, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, et cetera potentie, distinguuntur ab essentia anime, deinde tres alias, contra quas arguit reverendus socius de Sancto Bernardo. *Verumtamen* quia *in ymagine pertransit homo* [Ps. 39:7], scilicet venerabilis socius de domo minorum, contra quem agebam incidenter de processu Spiritus Sancti, dicendo quod Spiritus Sanctus ita naturaliter procedit sicut Filius comparando ipsum ad principium productivum, quo quidem ego posui esse essentiam etc., contra quod arguit sic: Filius ex vi sue processus est ymago Patris; sed Spiritus Sanctus ex vi sue processus non est ymago; ergo etc. — Respondi quod Spiritus Sanctus est ymago Patris et Filii, quia ymago dicitur ratione essentie, que est una in tribus connotans, etc., ut patet in solutione data ad illud. Ex ista respondens fortius invehitur contra me, dicens ~~quod~~ non scribens, et si scripsit, postea rasit, quod error erat Grecorum, invocavit celum et terram contra me, et voluit quod Magistri super hoc iudicarent, quos et ego super hoc requisivi, qui omnes dixerunt quod nullus error est. Verum, quia tardaverunt suum iudicium publicando, ut videar errorem sustinere, quod absit, dico contra predictum venerabilem socium quod Spiritus Sanctus est ymago Patris et Filii, et hanc tenebo contra eum quousque per superiores suos et meos aliter fuerit iudicatum et diffinitum."

first three bachelors (called the *primus*, *secundus* and *tertius socius*, respectively), an accident reveals that Peter's *replicatio* to the first *socius* went through two stages of revision, and shows that it was begun before defending his own question. Peter's *principium*, "Utrum viator per voluntatem tamquam per partem liberi arbitrii possit non frui obiecto beatifico sibi per intellectum presentato", runs from f. 2r to the middle of f. 3r. It is followed by a corrected version of the first *replicatio* (against the first *socius*) (ff. 3r–4r). Then, the first part of the first *replicatio* appears again and is deleted under *va-cat*. As this manuscript contains Peter's personal copy, substantial corrections were made to the text, but the vacated text shows the earlier version, and this version reveals that Peter intended to dispute a slightly different question. Before correction, his *replicatio* began (f. 3r): "Expeditis dictis propriis vado ad dicta venerabilium sociorum, et quia nunc dictum est de obiecto scibili, huius gratia intendo arguere primo contra dicta primi socii loquentis de sciente(=scientia) obiectiva." That is, the *replicatio* begins with a transition based on the premise that Peter's own *principium* concerns the object of knowledge. In fact, Peter's *principium* concerns the object of *willing* (the *obiectum* 'volubile'), and so Peter revised the text (f. 2r): "Expeditis dictis propriis vado ad dicta venerabilium sociorum, et quia nunc dictum est de obiecto ~~scibili~~ \volubili/, huius gratia ~~idee~~ intendo arguere \de obiecto scibili/, primo contra dicta primi socii loquentis de sciente electiva(=scientia obiectiva)." A previously clear and simple transition became an awkward one, and the likely explanation is that, between the first *principium* and Peter's, that is, in the week September 15 – September 22, Peter changed his mind what question he would defend. At the start, one of his colleagues (probably the Carmelite bachelor) gave the first *principium*, and Peter drafted his *replicatio* to this *principium*. Only after writing some of the *replicationes* did he prepare his own *principium*, which he gave fourth, on September 22.

Judging from Peter of Allouagne's *replicationes*, *socii* reading the *Sentences* in 1338–1339 discussed a range of philosophical topics: the first debated in his *principium* on book I the object of scientific knowledge,²⁹

²⁹ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Replicatio ad primum (Carmelitanum?) socium*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 3r: "Circa quam posuit quatuor conclusiones: prima fuit quod res ut extra non sunt scibiles precise; secunda quod de conceptibus in anima et de rebus existentibus precise in ea non est scientia; tertia quod res denominate ab intellectu non etc., quarta quod res relucentes in fantasia illustrate et irradiate per intellectum agentem representantes res actualiter vel possibiliter sunt scibiles."

the second discussed the unity of composites,³⁰ and the third treated specific unity, that is, that there is on the part of reality something that corresponds to natural kinds such that a natural kind can be said to be one.³¹ Their *principia* were based on different topics that, given the change in Peter's own question, were not irrevocably fixed until the event itself.

In the remaining three *principia*, the bachelors continued the debate, responding to the *replicationes* and further defending their views. This latter activity gives the subsequent *principia* their characteristic structure: first, a question pertaining to the book of the *Sentences* to be analyzed is proposed; a transition then relates the topic to something discussed in the preceding *principium*, and next the bulk of the *principium* addresses the previous topic. In addressing the previous debate, the bachelor summarizes the arguments he made previously; then he introduces the criticism of one or more of the other bachelors reading the *Sentences*, often indicating them with the technical term '*socius*'; next he responds to their criticism. The rounds of criticism and responses can accrue over the year, so that the last *principium*, on book III, can feature up to three rounds of back-and-forth.³²

The case of Peter of Allouagne shows that the participants in the debates considered it in the form of a *quaestio* followed by *replicationes* and *responsiones*. While these *replicationes* might be associated with a *principium*, it was essential that they circulated in written form. Indeed, as Livesey notes, at least five bachelors produced *replicationes* against Peter's position: James of Padua (whom we learn is neither the second, fourth or sixth bachelor),³³ the Franciscan (the third bachelor, and

³⁰ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Replicatio ad secundum socium*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 5v: "Contra secundum venerabilem socium ponentem quod nulla res composita est una."

³¹ PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Replicatio ad tertium (Franciscanum) socium*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 4v: "Contra tercium socium qui ponit quod unitas specifica est unitas realis vel dicit unitatem realem preter omnem operationem intellectus et hoc probat multipliciter."

³² A good example of a *principium* cycle is that held by Francis of Marchia in 1319–20, R.L. FRIEDMAN, "Principia and Prologue in Francesco d'Appignano's *Sentences* Commentary", in *Atti del II Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d'Appignano*, ed. D. PRIORI and M. BALENA, Appignano del Tronto 2004, pp. 123–149; W. DUBA, "Francesco d'Appignano alla ricerca del realismo", in *Atti del V Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d'Appignano*, ed. D. PRIORI, Appignano del Tronto 2011, pp. 61–76.

³³ IACOBUS DE PADUA, *Prima replicatio ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 101ra: "Iterum dico quod ille reverendus pater et magister meus qui quarto

whose *replicatio* was apparently part of his *principium* on book II),³⁴ the Cistercian William Heleny,³⁵ as well as a Dominican,³⁶ and a “Brother Matthew”, who went eleventh.³⁷ In addition, to these references, the codex contains a fragmentary *principium* on book III that mentions a bachelor who went sixth and one who went twelfth).³⁸ Therefore, there were at least twelve *sententiarii* in 1338–39, and we can expect similar numbers for William of Brienne’s year, 1330–31.³⁹ Moreover, only

loco incipit non bene impugnavit illum qui secundo loco incipit. Impugnavit enim eum in virtute huius consequentie ‘in lumine fidei convincitur esse aliquod compositum, ergo in lumine naturali sive in statu gratie convincitur esse aliquod compositum.’”; (f. 101va): “et ex his elicio unum correlativum quod conclusio quam posuit ille reverendus pater et magister meus qui sexto loco incepit non videtur mihi esse vera.”

³⁴ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 106r: “Replicatio fratris minoris in principio secundi libri quem(=qui) legit tertio loco.” The *quem* could be taken to mean “who read book II third in order”, but everyone, even Peter of Allouagne, read book II third, that is, after book IV and before book III. On the other hand, throughout the *principia* and the *replicationes* in the codex, bachelors are identified according to the order in which they started reading the *Sentences*, and Peter elsewhere criticizes the third bachelor for holding a typically Scotist doctrine of specific unity, so the passage could mean that he was the third of the bachelors to hold a *principium* on book II. Furthermore, *quem* could be an error for *qui* committed by Peter’s fallible *scriptor*.

³⁵ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 116r: “Prima replicatio bach. de sancto Bernardo.” The second *replicatio* begins (f. 117va) “Contra Dominum Petrum de sancto Bertino”, and Peter’s reply begins (f. 119rb): “Responsio ad dicta domini Guillelmi de Sancto Bernardo.” Saint Bernard likely refers to the Cistercian Collège Saint-Bernard in Paris.

³⁶ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 122ra: “Prima replicatio predicatoris”; f. 123ra: “Secunda replicatio predicatoris.” The CUP does not record the assignment of the Dominican bachelor in 1338; in 1337, however (CUP II-1, p. 473, n. 1009), brother “P. Gotas” of the province of France was assigned to read the *Sentences* in 1338–39, although Denifle notes “non erat magister theologiae”, which, if true, would mean that his career was interrupted, possibly before reading the *Sentences*.

³⁷ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 122va: “Rationes fratris Mathei xi loco incipientis”; f. 126ra: “secunda replicatio domini Mathei.”

³⁸ Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 114vb: “Et quod ea[m]dem patet per dicta duorum sociorum eius qui 6o et 12o loco inceperunt.”

³⁹ In addition to James of Padua, the Cistercian William, the Franciscan, the Dominican, and Peter himself, the Cistercian mentions a Carmelite, GUILIELMUS HELENY(?), *Secunda replicatio bachelarii ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 118ra: “Tenui enim contra Bachalarium de Carmelo quod propria passio et subiectum distinguuntur quidditative et non realiter.” The reference matches an argument in PETRUS DE ALEWAIGNE, *Replicatio ad primum (Carmelitanum?) socium*, punctum 2, ratio 3, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 3v: “Passiones distinguuntur

some of the debate surfaced in the classroom, as part of the *principia* disputation proper, or as *replicationes* and *responsiones* incorporated into lectures. Finally, spoken exchanges did occur, and they were not all recorded, but, likewise, much of the debate was never spoken; it happened on paper quires that circulated among the bachelors.

Principia in the Prague Codex

Whereas Saint-Omer 504 has Peter of Allouagne's preparatory notes, as well as *principia* and *replicationes* copied by his scribe (and corrected with his help), the Prague Codex has the original *reportationes* of William of Brienne's principal disputations on books I, II and III of the *Sentences*, henceforth referred to as P1, P2 and P3. William's discussion in P2 makes it clear that he held a *principium* on book IV, but that it was recorded elsewhere. Marginal indications and the position of P2 and P3 relative to the *lectiones* show that the quires of the Prague Codex were the ones used by William's *socii*, that is, the Prague Codex contains the official *reportatio* of William's lectures.

The first sextern (I) of the Prague Codex begins with P1, bearing the annotation above the text: "Iste reportationes sunt a fratre legente sententias in scola minorum Par(isi)us anno domini 1330" (figure 1). William's P2 is given in two parts, corresponding to two days. The first part, P2a, occupies the last two folios (105r–v and 106r) of sextern IX, while the second part, P2b, appears at the end of sextern X (ff. 117v–118v). The final *principium*, P3, is the last written text in sextern XII (ff. 141r–142r). P2a and P3 follow immediately the last question on the preceding book of the *Sentences* (books IV and II, respectively),

realiter a subiectis, ut dicit iste socius, quarta conclusione tertie difficultatis; sed predicata secundi modi sunt passiones subiectorum, ut apparet per Philosophum et Lincolnensem, I *Posteriorum*; ergo distinguuntur realiter a subiectis. Sed in Deo nichil distinguitur realiter ab eo. Ergo nichil predicatur de ipso in secundo modo." Therefore, as the later tradition confirms, the Carmelite went first (and, in this case, held that proper passions were really distinct from their subjects). As noted, the Franciscan went third, Peter went fourth and James of Padua went sixth. The second bachelor could be the Dominican, but cannot be the Cistercian, since the second bachelor defends in his *principium* the thesis "nulla res composita est una", and the Cistercian defends the formal distinction, even citing Scotus verbatim (Guilelmus Heleny(?), *Secunda replicatio*, f. 118va: "Ista est solutio quam dat Scotus ad istum argumentum de verbo ad verbum"); it is difficult to imagine how a theologian with such subtle tools designed to resolve the problem of unity in multiplicity would deny that compounds are one.

and have a marginal annotation identifying each as a *principium*, for P2a: “Principium bacalarii minorum super 2m librum” (figure 2); for P3: “Principium minoris de 3o libro sententiarum.” P3 is fragmentary; after announcing three articles, William only gets to the second article. There, he first expounds the position of his *socius* as a *casus* and a *confirmatio*, and then criticizes the *confirmatio*. Addressing the *casus*, the text ends abruptly in the middle of a minor premise [§3.18–21].

Table 2: Thematic outline of P1, P2 and P3

n.	ff.	Question	Articulation	Positions defended
P1	1r–2r	Utrum summe simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius cognitionis scientifice.	1. Quid est summe simplex	Summe simplex est Deus, quia est quidquid habet formaliter, excepto eo quod relative dicitur.
			2. De ratione subiecti in scientia	Materia scientiae est omne cadens sub consideratione scientiae.
				Obiectum in scientia est conclusio demonstrata.
				Subiectum in scientia est pars conclusionis.
			3. Summe simplex potest esse subiectum in theologia.	
P4	N/A	Not present		
P2	105r–106r (P2a), 117v–118v (P2b)	Utrum divina voluntas aliquo modo ab essentia divina distincta sit immediate principium alicuius productivum.	1. (P2a) Quomodo divina voluntas se habet ad essentiam divinam	Conclusio prima erat quod voluntas omnis aliquo modo distinguitur ab essentia.
			2. (P2b) De principali* (not actually treated)	Humana voluntas distincta est ex natura rei ab essentia animae in creaturis.
				Secunda conclusio fuit quod illa distinctio ex natura rei sufficit ad rationem scientiae.
				Tertia conclusio erat quod Deo non repugnat esse subiectum scientie.

P3	141r– 142r	Utrum incarnatio-actio sit distincta ab incarnante et incarnato.	1. Voluntas distinguitur aliquo modo ex natura rei ab eo cuius est.
			2. Contra socium qui dixit quod nulla relatio est res distincta a fundamento, quod aliqua est.
			3. De principali (<i>deest</i>)

The division between P2a and P2b deserves particular attention. First, the split into P2a and P2b superficially corresponds to the articles of the question: P2a claims to end with the end of article 1, and P2b claims to address article 2. In fact, P2a enumerates three *conclusiones* (theses) to defend and focuses on the first. P2b resumes the defense of the first *conclusio* and then presents the next two. The connection between P2a and P2b is made in three moments at the end of P2a. First, the *reportator* wrote in the same size hand as the preceding text, “Quantum ad secundum, scilicet quod humana voluntas est aliquo modo non-idem cum essentia anime.” Second, finishing out that line, written in a smaller script (that is, not reported), is “videbitur alias.” Third, the next line, the last on the page, has in a non-reported script a *signum* of a circle with a horizontal line through it, somewhat resembling a majuscule theta (Θ), and the text: “Vide residuum in sequenti sexterno in penultimo et ultimo folio ubi simile signum ponitur.” In the next sextern, on the penultimate folio, P2b starts at the top of the page (f. 117v); a correction was made to the first line, and, above the text, added after the correction, is the annotation “Ista questio continuatur cum questione precedentis sexterni in ultimo folio ubi ponitur tale signum”, and again the *siglum* in the form of a circle with a horizontal line. Unlike the other *principia*, P2b interrupts the *lectio* surrounding it. This *lectio*, number 92, was one of the two *lectiones* to be copied (apograph) instead of reported directly, and it was copied after P2b, and, for that matter, after *lectio* 93. To be precise, *lectio* 92 begins towards the bottom of 117r, stops at the bottom of the page, and resumes towards the top of f. 118v (the last page of sextern X, figure 9), after P2b ends; it then continues, ending halfway down f. 119v; the remaining half-page is blank with the annotation “hic nichil deficit.” Yet, in spite of being copied after *lectio* 93, *lectio* 92 is, in terms of content, contiguous with *lectiones* 91 and 93. Specifically, *lectio* 92 addresses a question announced but not treated in *lectio* 91 (“Utrum primum peccatum angeli fuerit superbia”), and it itself announces two questions that are only treated in *lectio* 93. To summarize, P2a announces two articles (On how the divine will is

related to the divine essence, and on whether that will is the immediate productive principle of something), and P2b begins by addressing “the second article”, but the content is, in fact, an extension of the first article of P2a; the second article as announced is never treated. P2b is an original *reportatio*, but, in the sextern, it interrupts *lectio* 92, which is an apograph. *Lectio* 92 was given in sequence but transcribed somewhere else, then copied into the quire around P2b.

On the account of P2, William gave his *principium* on book II sometime after his last lecture on book IV; on f. 105r, P2a follows the last *lectio* of book IV immediately, with two lines separating the last reported words from book IV and the first reported words for P2a (and on one of the lines is written “Expliciunt questiones quarti libri Sententiarium”) (figure 2). The end of P2a might have caught William by surprise, as implied by the hasty reference to a second article, although, as will be seen in the next chapter, the content of the two parts might also explain the difference. Regardless, the abrupt end of P3 implies that William was caught off-guard. Perhaps the *principia* were time-limited. The break between P2a and P2b’s placement also evokes speculation. When it was his turn to hold a *principium* on book II, could William have already been lecturing on book II, so when P2 spanned more than one day, the *reportator* had to place it out of order? Yet P2a ends at the bottom of f. 106r, and f. 106v, the last in the sextern, was probably blank until after the codex left Paris (as discussed in the previous chapter). Why not continue the *reportatio* on the next page? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that P2a, P2b and P3 all appear at the end of a sextern. If this were the official *reportatio* of William’s *principia*, then these sexterns would be the ones that William’s *socii* would use to reconstruct William’s position. That would explain the marginal titles to P2a and P3, identifying the text as the *principium minoris*; the other bachelors could find the text easily and would know whose sextern it was. The *principia* appear on the last pages of the sextern so that they can circulate without depriving the *reportator* of the sextern he was then using in the classroom. If this is the case, since P1 was given in the weeks before the beginning of classes, the first sextern moved between the *socii* before William gave his first *lectio*; book IV begins in the middle of a sextern, so P4 was recorded on a separate quire and was subsequently lost; after P2a and P3, the *reportator* started a new sextern, so the old one could circulate without interrupting the *reportatio*; P2b, the continuation of P2a, was placed at the end of the next sextern, but the requirement that

it circulate meant that the *reportator* had to record *lectio* 92 separately and later copy it into the original document.

The other elements of a *principium* on the *Sentences*, namely the speeches and the oaths, do not survive for William of Brienne. Three of the four disputations exist, and one of them was given across two sessions. The codicological and paleographical evidence supports the claim that the sexterns bound in the Prague Codex containing the *principia* circulated among the bachelors and served as the basis for the debate. But who were these bachelors? How can the Prague Codex illustrate William of Brienne interacting with his cohort of bachelors?

Chapter III

Disputatio Collativa

The Prague Codex contains most of William of Brienne's *principia* disputations, missing only the second *principium*, on book IV; from William's own comments, we can infer that contents of the missing *principium* and reconstruct the topics of the debate, God as the subject of a science and the intellective powers, namely the intellect and the will, being really identical with and formally distinct from their subject, whether the divine essence or a rational soul. Throughout the codex, William mentions his *socii*, other bachelors of theology, nine times. To these nine references correspond a minimum of two distinct *socii*. William's *replisatio* to one *socius*, identified in the margin as the Dominican Durand of Aurillac, appears as part of *lectiones* 3 and 4 (edited in Appendix C). Moreover, William's statements concerning the position of this *socius* support the identification of Durand with the author of the *correctorium* of Durand of Saint-Pourçain known as Durandellus.

The Topics of the Disputation

As discussed in the preceding chapter, William of Brienne held principal disputations on the books of the *Sentences* in the order I-IV-II-III, and the Prague Codex preserves the original *reportatio* of his *principia* on book I (P1), II (P2a and P2b) and III (P3) (all edited in Appendix B). The *principium* on book IV (P4) is missing, but William's own references reveal that in P4 he defended applying the formal distinction to the powers of the soul. William may have been moved to this topic by the criticism of his *socii*.

P1 investigates whether God, understood as the most simple thing, can be the subject of scientific knowledge, leading William to set out theses on the simplicity of God (with reference to the formal distinction),

and on what constitutes the matter, object and subject of scientific knowledge, specifically concluding that the subject of a science virtually contains the entire habit of that science, that it is evident in the whole science, and that it is what principally pertains to the science, and everything else pertains to the science in relation to it [§1.27]. By P2, William is defending against his *socii* theses on the formal distinction, specifically: (*conclusio* 1) on the formal distinction between the will and the essence, in God (a. 1/P2a) and in creation (a. 2/P2b); (*conclusio* 2) on the sufficiency of the formal distinction for the basis of a science; and (*conclusio* 3) that God can be the subject of a science, because having quidditative and qualitative concepts of God (e.g., what God is and God's being wise, respectively) are not incompatible with God. In spite of announcing that the second article will be dedicated to the question topic, namely whether the divine will is the immediate productive principle of something, William never explicitly addresses it. P3 returns to the formal distinction between the will and that of which it is the will and ends while refuting a colleague's view on relations.

On closer examination of the back-and-forth structure typical of *principium* disputations, these references show that, after William's initial *principium*, the *replicationes* went straight to discussing the formal distinction, and already in P4, William was defending three *conclusiones* touching on this major division in scholastic thought. As with many other Franciscans at Paris, William of Brienne saw his disputation with his colleagues fast become a debate on the possibility of a less-than-real distinction with a basis in reality. The doctrine of the formal distinction, that two things that are really the same can be distinct (or at least non-identical) not merely according to an operation of reason, but in accordance with something in external reality ("from the nature of the thing", *ex natura rei*), is arguably the core teaching associated with Scotus and Scotists in the early fourteenth century. At the University of Paris, the debate concerning the various formulations of the theories quickly turned into a controversy, and the ensuing polemics generated a trove of arguments for and against such a distinction.¹ Therefore, in a *principium* debate between the schools, a Scotist's allusion to the formal distinction would present his adversaries with an evident and accessible attack surface.

¹ See for example, W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*. The *Sentences-Commentary* of Himbertus de Garda, OFM", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232.

In P1, William defends the thesis that the most simple being can be the subject of a science. He quickly makes clear that the most simple being is God, and this incurs the classic problem of the Trinity: God is one, but the persons of the Trinity – the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost – are really distinct; how, then, can God be the most simple being? William appeals to Augustine’s explanation, summarized in the *auctoritas* that God is simple, “because He is whatever He has, except for that which is said relatively.” The *auctoritas* in question appears at the end of book I, distinction 8 of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*:² God is whatever He has, except for the relations of the Trinity to each other, which God has but is not identical to [§1.3]. The divine essence is really identical to the persons, but the persons are distinct from each other by their personal properties: the Father by paternity and active spiration, the Son by filiation and active spiration, and the Holy Spirit by passive spiration. For Scotists, each divine person can be understood to comprise the divine essence and the personal properties. By the divine essence, each person is identical with the divine essence; by the personal properties, the persons are really different from each other. This doctrine also requires that, in a divine person (e.g., the Father), essence and personal property (paternity) play distinct roles, yet they cannot be really distinct; they are formally not-identical, or formally distinct. Thus, some of the most spirited defenses of the formal distinction by Scotists occur in their discussions of the relations between the personal properties and the divine essence.³

It appears that William’s adversaries pounced on the allusion to the formal distinction in P1, and, for this reason, William defends the formal

² PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 8, c. 8, ed. I. BRADY (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5), v. 1:2, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 102.

³ See, e.g., R.L. FRIEDMAN, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 108), v. 1, Leiden 2013, p. 383. Writing around 1322, Francis of Meyronnes recalls the debates of his own year as *Sententiarius* (1320–21) in FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *In De summa Trinitate et fide catholica*, Sankt-Florian, Stiftsbibliothek, IX 138, f. 70ra: “Quoniam autem circa medium istius capituli est unum verbum magnificum, cum loquens de beatissima Trinitate princeps universalis ecclesie (dicit) quod hec sancta Trinitas secundum communem naturam est individua et secundum personales proprietates distincta. Ex qua radice consurgit fortissima controversia inter doctores catholicos, utrum personales proprietates sint aliquo modo distincte a divina natura distinctione que non sit ab anima fabricata vel non idem, et ista disceptatio fuit Parisius intensissima anno domini M. CCC. 20.”

distinction in the context of these powers across the remaining *principia*. Although the second *principium*, that on book IV (P4), does not survive, what happened can be inferred from the discussion in the third *principium*, on book II (P2). Specifically, P2 discusses topics that were raised in previous *principia*, listing three theses (*conclusiones*) in the past tense (in P2a: *conclusio prima erat* [§2a.4]; in P2b: *secunda conclusio fuit* [§2b.25] and *tertia conclusio erat* [§2b.33]). These *conclusiones*, particularly the second and third, support the position taken in P1, that God, as the most simple thing, can be the subject of a science (theology), but the debate has turned to the formal distinction (see Table 2, in the previous chapter).

In P2, the second half of the first *conclusio* appears to refer to a thesis held and criticized before P4, and this passage shows how the debate turned. The first *conclusio* is split into two parts that correspond to the scope of P2's question. The *conclusio* states that "every will is distinguished in some way (*aliquo modo*) from its essence"; it is the thesis that relates directly P2's question title, namely "Whether the divine will, distinct in some way (*aliquo modo*) from the divine essence, is immediately the productive principle of something." The *conclusio*, therefore, embraces both the wills of creatures and of God, while the question title is limited to God. Moreover, the *conclusio* shifts the focus from the will's being the productive principle to being distinct. Yet, the entire first lecture, that is, all of P2a, focuses on the will being formally distinct from the divine essence; the second lecture, that is, P2b, begins with the second part of the *conclusio*, concerning the case of creatures. So, while the *conclusio* exceeds the scope of the question title in discussing both divine and human wills, the part of the *conclusio* contained in P2a does not, as it is merely concerned with the divine will.⁴ The part in P2b, on the other hand, contains the scope-busting half of the first *conclusio* and the remaining two *conclusiones*, which relate to God's ability to serve as a subject of a science. When William pretends [§2a.27 and §2b.1] that the second part of the first *conclusio* is the "second article", he is actually grouping together material that saw an extensive treatment earlier, but that fell out of the bounds of the question title. Nowhere in P2 does William address the notion of being the productive principle of something; probably, the mention of

⁴ There was even some confusion in the revision process, as the declaration of the first *conclusio* was initially corrected, changing *essentia* into *essentia divina*, and then the correction itself was deleted [§2a.4].

productive principle in the question title served to relate the *principium* formally to creation, the topic of second book of the *Sentences*.

More significantly, the second part of the first *conclusio* has a different structure from the other parts of P2. The first part of the first *conclusio* and the second and third *conclusiones* all follow the same structure: William states his thesis (in the past tense), gives a reason for it, cites the objections of his *socii*, and then (in the present tense) replies to it. In other words, William takes a position, summarizes a *replicatio*, and gives his *responsio*. Yet the second half of the first *conclusio* has two *replicationes* and two *responsiones*. At the beginning of P2b, William states that the will is distinct *ex natura rei* from the essence of the soul [§2b.1], then summarizes three objections of a *socius* [§2b.2–4], follows with the statement: “to those arguments I responded” (*ad illas respondi*), and gives three arguments in the past tense [§2b.5–7], which most likely were the arguments he made in P4. This response is followed by a fresh round of objections [§2b.8–15], which William then refutes in the present tense [§2b.16–24].

On this reconstruction, the oldest statement referred to in P2 is the argument made for the distinction of the created will from the soul:

Operations having a mutual essential order that, from their principles, serve as principles in opposite ways cannot be reduced to the same principle; but understanding and willing in us are such; therefore etc. [§2b.1]

William’s argument moves from the observation that the acts of understanding and of willing have an essential order – we cannot will what we do not understand – and yet the acts work in opposite directions. Presumably, the intellect is a receptive principle, and the will is a productive principle, as understanding moves from the extramental to the mental, and willing from the mental to the extramental. Therefore, such acts cannot share a principle that is really the same, and thus the will and the intellect are themselves the principles of the operation, and not the soul with which they are identical.

Since there are two *replicationes* by a *socius*, it is unlikely that William set out this thesis in P4. Two more probable possibilities present themselves. First, given the obvious thematic relation between the formal distinction and the material discussed in P1 noted above, William could have made this argument in his first *principium*, around the section marked (derisively by a *socius*?) in the margin “inostendatio”, but the *reportator* failed to record it. Second, and more likely, William made

the claim in a *replicatio* to another bachelor's *principium*; that bachelor gave a *responsio*, and William then made that discussion the centerpiece of P4. This latter solution would explain William's own reference in P3, the last *principium* he held. Continuing to defend the application of the formal distinction, William refers explicitly to the thesis that appears in this section [§2b.1]: "With respect to the first article, I said elsewhere that [the will] is distinguished in some way by the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*) from that of which it is" [§3.4]. Since the reference in P2b is also in the past tense, it is possible that the *alibi* mentioned in P3 is not in either his *principia* or his *lectiones*, but in his *replicationes* to someone else's thesis.

On this reading, William objected to a *socius*, as above, that the human will is formally distinct from the essence of the soul, because they are essentially ordered acts that work in different directions. The *socius* responded in his own *principium* (on book IV?) that the will and intellect were really distinct, because otherwise the same thing would be both active and passive at the same time [§2b.2]. Similarly, if the will and intellect were not really distinct, the same thing would move to contrary ends at the same time, since, as Aristotle argues in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, the soul has an irrational principle that fights against our good intentions, and this can be seen in incontinent people, whose impulses move in contrary directions;⁵ but this is only if the will moves contrary to the intellect [§2b.3]. Finally, the powers of the soul are proper passions, and proper passions are really distinct from their subjects [§2b.4].

In P4, William replied to the three arguments. Indeed, the same thing can have formally distinct active and passive elements that act upon each other; for angels can act upon themselves [§2b.5]. To the argument based on the *Ethics*, he builds his reply on the assumption that incontinence is due to the rebellion of the sensory soul against the dictates of the rational soul. If the rational and the sensory souls constitute a single form, then the simultaneous motion to opposite directions would not be effective (*executive*), resulting in an actual motion, but rather attractive (*allicitive*), merely applying pressure in a certain direction. If, on the other hand, the rational and sensory souls are distinct, then they certainly can have contrary motions [§2b.6]. Finally, he denied outright that proper passions are distinct from their subject of inherence [§2b.7].

William's *socius*, possibly in his *principium* on book II, now responds.

⁵ ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nichomachea* I, c. 13 (1102b21; AL 26.3, p. 394).

To the first argument's reply, that the same thing can be active and passive according to a formal distinction, he counters that a case of self-action establishes a relation between agent and patient, and this relation serves as the middle term that establishes identity, and is itself identical to the terms of the relation; yet in a tautology, there can be no such middle term [§2b.8]. Moreover, this relation of a thing to itself would be a real relation [§2b.9]. In addition, the same thing passively and actively considered is either entirely the same, and then a contradiction holds, or it is not entirely the same. If it is not the same, then what makes them not-the-same either is something absolute, in which case there are two absolute things that are distinct, and therefore really distinct, or is relative, meaning two relative things, which simply restates the problem [§2b.10]. To the second argument's reply, that the rational and sensory souls either act as contrary influences, but not motions, on a single form, or move as distinct souls, first the *socius* counters that, when William replied earlier that the same thing can be active and passive, he conceded the absurdity of the soul having contrary motions, since these are abilities (*habilitates*) of the soul [§2b.11]. Moreover, if one shifts the argument from the sensory and rational souls back to the will and intellect, then it is clear that both those powers are effective, and William has not resolved the argument [§2b.12]. The will determines the intellect, and therefore the two are really distinct [§2b.13]. Finally, to the third argument's reply, the *socius* claims that, indeed, proper passions are distinct from their subjects, since they do not indicate the definition of the subject [§2b.14] and they are different from that definition by the addition of something [§2b.15].

All this back-and-forth sets the stage for William's reply in P2. To the claim that, in self-action, the relation serves as a middle term that establishes identity, William distinguishes the types of middle terms and says that the middle term can be of a different type than the extremes [§2b.16]. To the argument that the relation between active and passive aspects would be real, William introduces the distinction, popular among Scotists, between an intrinsically-arising relation (*respectus intrinsecus adveniens*), which comes into being when its terms are posited, and an extrinsically-arising relation (*respectus extrinsecus adveniens*), which needs something else. Action and passion are extrinsically-arising relations, but, William maintains, Aristotle's claim that the same thing cannot relate to itself refers only to intrinsically-arising relations [§2b.17]. Alternatively, one could say that a real relation needs a real

extreme, but not a distinction of real extremes; or that it is not absurd for a real relation to refer to itself [§2b.18]. Challenging his *socius*' objection that if something active and something passive were entirely the same, a contradiction would ensue, William proposes two solutions:

In one way, I say that it would be entirely the same. And when it is said 'a contradiction would follow', I deny it. And when it is proven 'because it would be in actuality and not in actuality', I say that affirmation and negation only contradict as they refer to the same thing. Now, it would not be so in the case at hand. Since it would be the same thing in virtual actuality and not in formal actuality, there would not be a contradiction. But if it were said that it would not be entirely the same, and that this 'not entirely' is absolute and is a thing that is the essence of the soul, it could be said in another way that a contradiction must be of the same thing, with respect to the same thing, according to the same thing, in the same way, etc. But here the same thing is not taken in the same way when it is taken in virtual actuality and in formal potency [§2b.19].

William says that the soul, considered as intellect, and the soul, considered as the will, are entirely the same, and that, in an act of willing, the will is in actuality and the intellect is not. Yet, as I understand him, this does not involve a contradiction, because, although only the will formally acts, the soul acts in virtue of the will, and so the intellect, as it is entirely the soul, also has this virtual act. This leads to the second solution: if one says that, in fact, the intellect and the will are not entirely identical, then the part that is identical is the soul, and the part that is not-identical is the formal actuality of the will (in the course of acting) and the formal potency of the intellect. In that case, a contradiction only holds in something in the same way, and the intellect, while having formal potency, would have an actuality that is only virtual, not formal.

William then quickly rejects his *socius*' objections to his replies to his second and third points. Concerning the objection that the soul has contrary inclinations and making the powers of the soul really the same would amount to making the soul possess simultaneous contraries, William claims that the abilities of the soul do not constitute something distinct from the soul, and that the soul is drawn to act by extramental objects, not by intramental inclinations [§2b.20]. "Even if the intellect and the will could move by opposite motions, they would not be really distinct" [§2b.21]. To the claim that the will determines the intellect, he

replies that, indeed, the will determines itself, so all the more could it determine something from which it is formally distinct [§2b.22]. Finally, to the argument that proper passions are distinct from their essences, since they do not figure in the definitions, he replies that not all proper passions are really distinct [§2b.23], and that the addition by which they are different from the essence is the addition of a concept, not a thing [§2b.24].

This brief exposition shows how William of Brienne replied to a position held by his colleague denying that the will and the intellect are formally distinct, but rather they are really distinct. His *socius* reacted, and in P4 William almost certainly included his reply. His adversary countered, and William made a final reply in P2. Yet the debate was not over. William's statement that the will "is in some way from the nature of the thing distinct from that to which it belongs" [§3.4] attracted the attention of another *socius*, who argued for a distinction between the will and the intellect on the basis of the acts of willing and understanding. The first article of P3 summarizes that debate, and it is not necessary to recount it here.

The formal distinction between the intellect and the will is central to Scotus' legacy; indeed, Scotus uses it to argue that the productions of the persons of the Trinity are formally distinct: the act of intellection that generates the Word, the Son, is formally distinct from the act of willing that spirates the Holy Spirit.⁶ William, however, in the debate with his *socius*, does not venture much further than asserting that these powers can be formally distinct, and his *socius* deploys arguments to collapse the formal distinction into a distinction of reason. None of these arguments on either side is groundbreaking; they would be quite familiar to the Parisian university milieu.

In his *principia*, William of Brienne discusses a range of topics, such as God as the subject of a science and the doctrine of relations. After P1, however, William's adversaries focused on the formal distinction, and he found himself defending the viability of the distinction. The argumentation turns on the validity of positing a basis in reality for distinguishing different aspects of absolutely one and the same thing. In this sense, the *principia* remain on a superficial level. The formal distinction is central to Scotism, and the texts of contemporary Scotists show how they explored its subtleties and differentiated their views. Here, on the other hand, William must defend its existence in a classic

⁶ FRIEDMAN, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University*, pp. 392–395.

case: the distinction between the will, the intellect, and the soul. In this way, William concentrates on showing that there is a formal distinction more than how it works; this is the moment when the Franciscan School faces the other schools at the university. Yet the *responsio-replicatio* structure gives his adversaries the chance to push to the core of the problem, forcing him to admit that the formal distinction provides a way to work around the principle of non-contradiction.

William of Brienne and Durand of Aurillac⁷

William of Brienne's *principia* and related texts provide an insight into the doctrines of the other bachelors reading the *Sentences*. Unfortunately, with a single exception, William's mentions of the opinions or criticisms of his colleagues are not associated with a name. That exception occurs not in the *principia*, but in two *lectiones*, namely *lectiones* 3–4, where William attacks the opinion of a *socius* identified in the margin as the Dominican Durand of Aurillac.

Not much is known about the career of Durand of Aurillac. Presumably from the town of Aurillac in Auvergne, he entered the Dominican Order and would have pursued education and teaching within the Dominican province of France. The Dominican General Chapters of 1329 and 1330 assigned Durand of Aurillac to read the *Sentences* in 1330–31;⁸ he appears to have followed the Dominican practice of incepting the third year after reading the *Sentences*, that is, in late 1333.⁹ He allegedly attended the Dominican General Chapter at Clermont in 1339, although

⁷ The material in this section builds on a version that has been published separately as part of W. DUBA, "Aristotle in Hell and Aquinas in Heaven: Hugo de Novocastro, OFM and Durandus de Aureliaco, OP", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 (2014), pp. 183–194.

⁸ CUP II-1, n. 894, p. 330; n. 905, p. 339.

⁹ Specifically, King Philip VI Valois convoked all masters of theology in Paris to his palace in the Bois de Vincennes on December 27, 1333, to make a determination concerning the beatific vision; on January 2, 1334, the masters of theology wrote a letter to the king determining the issue (CUP II-1, no. 981, pp. 429–432), the so-called "Letter of the twenty-nine masters of Paris." The twenty-three masters who were present are listed in order of rank: patriarch, archbishop, chancellor, and archdeacon, followed by nineteen masters of theology, listed in order of inceptation. William of Brienne, who incepted after John XXII promoted him via papal bull in July 1331, appears midway through the list (#11). The last (#19) on the list is Durand of Aurillac; the third-to-last is Petrus Horle, whose promotion John XXII requested via a bull dated April 16, 1333 (CUP II-I, no. 953, p. 405).

no mention of his presence is made in the printed acts.¹⁰ ‘Durandus’ was evidently a popular Auvergnat name; although he is rarely mistaken for his more famous Dominican confrère, Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Durand of Aurillac risks confusion with several other Durands. First, he is not the same as Durand of Auvergne, the translator of a version of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Yconomica*, whom the colophon to the work names as *Magister* and procurator of the University of Paris at Anagni in August 1295; to this author have been ascribed a series of Aristotelian question-commentaries, including a now-lost *Physics* commentary. In cataloguing this information, Charles Lohr apparently associated this Durand with the *Durandus de Auvernia* in the University of Paris *computus* of 1329–30; although, since the *computus* does not give him the title *magister*, the two *Durandi* are likely non-identical.¹¹ This confusion probably led the editors of the *Personennamen des Mittelalters* to further identify *Durandus* <de Aureliaco> and *Durandus* <de Aureliaco> with the same Durand of Auvergne.¹² In brief, Durand of Aurillac is not the Durand of Auvergne of 1295, who is probably not the Durand of Auvergne of 1329–30. To avoid future confusion, I will add that none of these Durands are identical with the *Durandus de Auriaco* who in 1326 complained to John XXII about being thrown into a Périgord dungeon and tortured.¹³

See W. DUBA, “Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andree, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet”, in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, ed. F. AMERINI and G. GALLUZZO (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 43), Leiden 2014, pp. 413–493, at pp. 467–469.

¹⁰ T. KAEPELLI, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, v. 1, Rome 1974, p. 338: “In capitulo gen. Claromontensi a. 1339 celebrato simul cum aliis magistris et baccalareis determinavit de forma et modo correctionis criminum fratrum in ordine delinquentium.” Cf. *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. REICHERT, vol. 2, Rome 1898, pp. 252–260.

¹¹ C.H. LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries I.1: Medieval Authors A-L*, Florence 2013, p. 111; for the *computus*, see the edition in W.J. COURTENAY, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait*, Cambridge 1999, p. 218.

¹² Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, *Personennamen des Mittelalters. Nomina Scriptorum Medii Aevi*, second edition, Munich 2000, p. 160. This erroneous entry is undoubtedly the source for the GND authority file for Durandus de Alvernia (URL = <http://d-nb.info/gnd/102441367> Last accessed November 25, 2016).

¹³ IOANNES PAPA XXII, *Lettres communes analysées d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. G. MOLLAT, v. 6, Paris 1912, p. 140, n. 24771: “Mag. Andree Rufi, can. Petragoricen., mand. ut summarie inquirat de eo quod

The only written work explicitly ascribed to Durand of Aurillac is a question on time, which will be discussed below.

In *lectiones* 3 and 4, William of Brienne attacks the position of Durand of Aurillac on faith and scientific knowledge, even criticizing him for contradicting what he said elsewhere (*alibi*). Unless by *alibi* William meant “elsewhere in the same *principium*”, which is highly unlikely, William’s comment reveals that some other text by Durand was present and available to William of Brienne and to other bachelors. Moreover, William’s discussion implies that Durand of Aurillac’s *principium* disputation focused on whether it was possible to have faith and scientific knowledge of the same object. If this is so, Durand would have first addressed a question on faith and scientific knowledge, and followed with a criticism of William’s question on the subject of theology.

This specific sequence of questions matches the first two *evidentiae* of the systematic refutation of the teaching of Durand of Saint-Pourçain known as the *Evidentiae contra Durandum*, which follows the order of Durand’s commentary on the *Sentences*; the author of this work is generally known as Durandellus and, for most of the last century, identified with an otherwise unknown Nicolaus Medensis. In truth, some scholars identified Durandellus with Durand of Aurillac, at least until Joseph Koch, in his magisterial study of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, “demonstrated that this identification is unlikely”.¹⁴ The editor of Durandellus, Prospero Stella, accepted Koch’s exclusion of Durand of Aurillac as conclusive.¹⁵ Even the historical record has been corrected; in reprinting a

Geraldus de Lacolre, officialis Petragoricens., mag. Durandum de Auriaco, cler. Tutellen. di., rectorem scholarum Petragoricens., ad S. A. appellanem, in profundo turris carceri fecit indebite mancipari, et Petrum Resterii, cler. Lemovicen. di., procuratorem eiusdem Durandi, occasione huiusmodi appellationum in eiusdem profundo turris fecit etiam carceri mancipari, et nocturno tempore a quaestionibus inchoans, absque culpa dicti Petri, nullo habito processu, tamdiu inhumaniter torqueri mandavit donec crederetur spiritum exalasse; cum citatione utriusque partis.”

¹⁴ M. LANCZOWSKI and R. WITTWER, “Les Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus. Remarques Introductives”, in *Revue Thomiste* 97 (1997), pp. 143–156, at p. 148, “Ou bien, première hypothèse, l’auteur des *Evidentiae* s’appelle lui-même aussi *Durandus*; on l’a appelé *Durandellus* pour le distinguer du Durand plus âgé qu’il critique. . . une explication du premier type a semblé prometteuse aux chercheurs qui ont proposé d’identifier Durandellus avec Durand d’Aurillac. Koch a montré que cette identification est peu probable.”

¹⁵ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae contra Durandum*, ed. P.T. STELLA (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi. Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 3), v. 1., Tübingen 2003, p. 20*.

classic 1913 article by Franz Ehrle, Franz Pelster added (in 1970) a note to Ehrle's mention of "Durand d'Aurillac (Durandellus)", "J. Koch has shown that Durandus de Aureliaco is not identical with the Durandellus under whose name go the so-called *Evidentiae contra Durandum*."¹⁶ In fact, the only hint of an argument since Koch that Durand of Aurillac *could* be Durandellus was given by Anneliese Maier in 1970, and that was primarily a weakening of Koch's thesis, as will be seen below.

This superficial similarity between what was likely the subject of Durand of Aurillac's *principium* on book I and his subsequent *replicatio* and the beginning of the *Evidentiae contra Durandum* raises a doubt about the attribution, and William of Brienne's mention of his colleague reopens the investigation. As the analysis conducted below reaches the conclusion that there is good reason to identify Durand of Aurillac with Durandellus, Joseph Koch's argument excluding Aurillac's authorship must be analyzed in detail. Then, the major points of doctrine that the literature has identified as unique to Durandellus will be presented. Finally, all of William of Brienne's statements about doctrines held by his *socii* that can be found in his *principia* and *lectiones* will be catalogued; among those doctrines are all the points where contemporary scholars have argued that Durandellus departs from the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, and some of these positions are explicitly assigned to Durand of Aurillac. This evidence supports the conclusion that, on the testimony of William of Brienne, Durand of Aurillac composed the *Evidentiae contra Durandum* prior to lecturing on the *Sentences*, and that William of Brienne used both Aurillac's *principia* and the *Evidentiae* in criticizing his view.

1. Koch on Durandellus

The most thorough investigation of the identity of Durandellus remains that of Joseph Koch in his 1927 study on Durand of Saint-Pourçain:¹⁷

¹⁶ F. EHRLE, "Der Kampf um die Lehre des Hl. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fünfzig Jahren nach seinem Tod", in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 37 (1913), pp. 266–318, reprinted, with notes, in F. EHRLE, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur englischen Scholastik*, ed. F. PELSTER, (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 50), Rome 1970, pp. 183–250, at pp. 241–242.

¹⁷ J. KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 1927, pp. 340–369.

The usual view is that Durandus de Aureliaco is Durandellus. Since he read the *Sentences* in 1330–31 and, in 1334¹⁸ as a master of theology, participated in the controversy over the beatific vision, for him the fact that Thomas in the *Evidentiae* is called *sanctus* poses no problems. Accordingly, the younger Durandus could very well be the author of the *Evidentiae*. In addition, this is supported by the fact that in Cod. 198 of the library of the University of Paris, on f. 150r, one reads: *Incipit prohemium Durandi*. Therefore, the question needs closer examination.¹⁹

Koch puts the major weight of his analysis on an examination of the only writing then attributed with certitude to Durand of Aurillac: a question preserved in a single manuscript copy, currently in El Escorial, *Utrum tempus sit aliquid reale extra animam*.²⁰ Koch makes fundamentally three claims. First, in this question, Aurillac criticizes Peter Auriol, Robert Grosseteste and even Hervaeus Natalis, but he does not mention Durand of Saint-Pourçain's unique view. Second, topically, this work shows a great interest for what Koch calls "mathematical-physical questions (tempus, motus, continuum, etc.)", and Durandellus seems to have little interest in such issues. Finally, Koch identifies a doctrinal contradiction. In Durand of Aurillac's question on time, he seems to argue that, if the motion of the heavens were to stop, other motions could logically continue. On the other hand, in his critique of Durand of Saint-Pourçain's doctrine of the punishment of the damned, Durandellus argues that if the motion of the heavens were to cease, all other motions would cease as well.²¹

The first two objections are basically negative results and are thus

¹⁸ A printing error gave the year 1332; the document indicated, however, is the famous letter of the 29 masters of theology in Paris dated January 1334.

¹⁹ KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, pp. 359–360: "Die gewöhnliche Ansicht geht dahin, daß Durandus de Aureliaco = Durandellus ist. Da er 1330/31 die *Sentenzen* gelesen und 1332 als Magister am Streit um die visio beatifica teilgenommen hat, so macht bei ihm der Umstand, daß Thomas in den *evidentiae* als *sanctus* bezeichnet wird, keine Schwierigkeiten. Außerdem spricht viel dafür, daß die *evidentiae* um 1330 entstanden sind. Demnach könnte der jüngere Durandus recht wohl der Verfasser der *evidentiae* sein. Hinzu kommt, daß in Cod. 198 der Pariser Universitätsbibliothek f. 150r zu lesen ist: *Incipit prohemium Durandi*. Die Frage bedarf also genauer Prüfung."

²⁰ KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, p. 360; specifically, the question appears El Escorial, Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, R-II-4, ff. 145va–147vb.

²¹ Incidentally, the only discussion that William of Brienne has of time occurs in

insufficient to deny an attribution. The question on time concerns primarily time, not Durand of Saint-Pourçain's doctrine, and a lack of similarity does not prove difference; likewise, Durandellus may have had an interest in mathematical-physical questions, but may not have felt that Durand of Saint-Pourçain's opinions on the matter merited attention in the *Evidentiae*. In short, there are numerous explanations for why a single question on a subject related to book IV of the *Physics* does not match a polemic based around a commentary on the *Sentences*, and the absence of a citation of Durand of Saint-Pourçain or the presence of interest in questions related to physics does not call into doubt the attribution.

Koch's last objection points to a serious doctrinal divergence. While, if need be, any internal contradiction can always be overcome by appealing to the author changing his mind, questioning the authority of the source, or providing a subversive gloss, this conflict is by far Koch's strongest evidence for Durand of Aurillac not being the same as Durandellus. Koch points to a passage in Aurillac's question on time that appears to contradict what Durandellus says. Specifically, the question on time resolves a difficulty without arguing that, if the motion of the first mobile were to cease, all other motion would cease:

The eighth difficulty is: if it is said that time follows the motion of the first mobile, then, supposing that the first mobile were to stand still and something else were to move, then something else would move in non-time, which seems impossible.

To this the Commentator, IV *Physics*, replies that, supposing the first mobile were to stand still, so too would every other motion, and consequently there would not be time in any way. But because his consequence does not hold from something intrinsic – for one motion does not pertain to the essence of another such that, when one exists, the other is not able not to exist – but holds from something extrinsic, considering the order of the universe that now holds, therefore it should be said otherwise, namely that, if the motion of the first mobile were to cease and the motion of another mobile were to remain, there would not be time in the most proper sense, but there would however be some other time, which would be the duration of that motion.²²

lectio 88, and it does not seem to be related to the topic at hand. For a contemporary Franciscan's view, see M. SOROKINA and C. SCHABEL, "Le feu brûlerait-il l'étoile? Guiral Ot sur l'influence céleste à la fin des temps", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 83 (2016), pp. 211–250.

²² KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, p. 364, n. 43; see Table 4, below.

In apparent contradiction to what Durand of Aurillac says about the first mobile, Durandellus argues that, once the heavens stop, every other natural motion will cease:

To the evidence of these things it should be known that, since, according to the position of the Doctor, there are two types of passion, one natural and the other animal, the bodies of the damned will suffer from fire not by a natural passion, but by an intentional or animal passion. And the cause why they will not suffer by a natural passion is because, when the motion of the heavens ceases, every other alteration here below will cease. For this reason, first should be seen about the cause, and then about the conclusion.

That, when the motion of the heavens ceases, every other alteration would cease, the Doctor proves in the *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 4, a. 8, in two ways. First: nothing acts without being moved, except the first agent; but the heavens are not the first agent; therefore they do not act without being moved. Second: when the action of the first cause is removed, the actions of all the other causes must be removed. But the heavens are, by their motion, the cause of all other natural alterations, because the first in each genus is the cause of all the others. But local motion, and especially the first, which is the motion of the heavens, is first with respect to all other motions. Therefore, when this motion is destroyed or ceases, every other natural motion will cease.²³

Durandellus even considers an objection that seems to echo Durand of Aurillac's position:

Against the second argument one could object, saying that the motion of the heavens is the first of motions in nobility, not in

²³ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia IV, 48, ed. STELLA, pp. 1344–1345: “Ad evidentiam istorum sciendum est quod, cum, secundum sententiam Doctoris, duplex sit passio, una naturalis et alia animalis, corpora damnatorum patientur ab igne non passione naturali, sed intentionali sive animali. Et causa, quare non patientur passione naturali, est quia cessante motu caeli cessabit omnis alteratio in istis inferioribus. Idcirco, primo videndum est de causa, secundo de conclusionem. —Quod igitur cessante motu caeli cesset omnis alteratio, probat Doctor, Quaestionibus disputatis de potentia, q. IV a. 8, dupliciter. Primo: Nihil agit non motum, nisi primum. Sed caelum non est agens primum. Ergo non agit non motum. Secundo: Remota actione primae causae, oportet actiones omnium aliarum causarum removeri. Sed caelum est causa omnium aliarum alterationum naturalium per suum motum, quia primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium aliorum. Motus autem localis et maxime primus, qui est motus caeli, est primus respectu omnium aliorum. Ergo isto motu destructo vel cessante cessabit omnis alius motus naturalis.”

causality, or according to the present course of things, and therefore it is not necessary that, when it ceases, every other motion ceases, since it is not the cause without restriction (*simpliciter*) of every motion. But this does not hold, because what is first in nature in each and every genus and is different from all the others is the cause of all the others. Just as God is prior by nature to every creature, but also differs really from every creature, and so for that reason is the cause of every creature. But the local motion of those heavens is so; for it is prior by nature to every motion, since it is included in every motion, and not the converse, as is proven in *Physics* VIII. It also really differs from all the others. Therefore, it is the cause of all the others. But what is prior by nature and as a cause is not prior in a certain respect, say according to the present order, but without restriction.²⁴

The arguments appear contradictory, but, in fact, they are addressing entirely different situations and the conclusions they reach are not incompatible.

The question on time raises a logical difficulty: if the first mobile were to cease and there were some other motion, would there be time? This situation is not impossible, because causality is extrinsic to the essence of motion. For example, if one baseball is thrown by a human and the other is propelled through the air directly by God Himself, both would be said to be in motion, and what it means for each baseball to “be in motion” is independent of whether it was willfully thrown by a human or supernaturally propelled by God. Therefore, “it would not happen”, is not a convincing argument.

On the other hand, the article from Durandellus refers to *natural* causality: the heavens are the cause of all natural motion; they are not the cause of voluntary motion or of supernatural motion. Consequently, the suffering caused by hellfire has to be an intentional or an

²⁴ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia IV, 48, ed. STELLA, pp. 1348–1349: “Contra etiam secundam rationem posset instari dicendo quod motus caeli est primus motuum dignitate, non causalitate; vel secundum praesentem cursum; et ideo non oportet quod ipso deficiente deficiat omnis motus, cum non sit causa simpliciter omnis motus. Sed hoc non valet, quia quod est primum in natura in unoquoque genere et differt ab omnibus aliis realiter, est causa omnium aliorum. Sicut Deus est prior natura omni creatura, differt etiam realiter ab omni creatura, et ideo est causa omnis creaturae. Sed motus localis ipsius caeli est huiusmodi; est enim prior natura omni motu, cum in omni motu includatur, et non e converso, ut probatur VIII Physicorum. Differt etiam realiter ab omnibus aliis. Ergo est causa omnium aliorum. Quod autem est prius natura et sicut causa, non est prius secundum quid, puta secundum praesentem cursum, sed simpliciter.”

“animal” suffering, not a real one; for, after the heavens stop, the chain of natural causality fails; thus, any motion or action that persists must be due to voluntary or supernatural causes. The motions of the heavens are prior without restriction to all subsequent motions, and are their causes. Nevertheless, such statements do not conclude anything concerning non-natural motions, and once these are allowed, the contradiction disappears.

The passage cited from Thomas Aquinas’ *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia* supports this understanding. Indeed, in q. 5, a. 8, Thomas does argue that when the heavens cease, all other motion ceases. But in the response to q. 5, a. 10, on “Whether human bodies remain when the motion of the heavens ceases”, Thomas explicitly excludes humans from celestial causality:

It is also clear that the arguments brought in above concerning bodies that are mixtures of the elements do not hold for human beings, since human beings are ordered to the perfection of the universe as a part essential to it, because in human beings there is something that is not contained virtually either in the elements or in the heavenly bodies, namely the rational soul. The human body is also ordered to the human being, not according to the animal life alone, but for the perfection of its nature. And although the human body is composed from contraries, nevertheless there is in it an incorruptible principle that could keep it from corruption, and do so without violence, since it is intrinsic. And this could be a sufficient principle of motion, if the motion of the heavens were to cease, since it does not depend on the motion of the heavens.²⁵

Thomas even clarifies that, if the motion of the heavens ceases, the motion of our hearts will not.²⁶ As a result, the authority of Thomas

²⁵ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Quaestiones disputatae*, t. 2: *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 5, a. 10, ed. P.M. PESSON (Marietti), Turin 1965, p. 156: “Patet etiam quod rationes supra inductae de corporibus mixtis, non habent locum in homine, nam homo ordinatur ad perfectionem universi ut essentialis pars ipsius, cum in homine sit aliquid quod non continetur virtute nec in elementis nec in caelestibus corporibus, scilicet anima rationalis. Corpus etiam hominis ordinatur ad hominem, non secundum animalem vitam tantum, sed ad perfectionem naturae ipsius. Et quamvis corpus hominis sit ex contrariis compositum, inerat tamen principium incorruptibile, quod poterit praeservare a corruptione absque violentia, cum sit intrinsecum. Et hoc poterit esse sufficiens principium motus, motu caeli cessante, cum a motu caeli non dependeat.”

²⁶ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 10, ed. MARIETTI, p. 156: “Ad octavum dicendum, quod motus cordis in homine causabitur ex natura animae rationalis,

Aquinas that Durandellus refers to explicitly states that when the motion of the heavens ceases, there will still be motion, for human beings have their own intrinsic principle of motion. The question on time cannot therefore be resolved by saying, with Averroes, that, if the motion of the heavens were to cease, so would all other motions. Therefore, Durand of Aurillac does not contradict Durandellus on whether motion will cease with the motion of the heavens.

Nevertheless, Koch does demonstrate that the two passages are not doctrinally coherent. Durandellus says that the motion of the heavens is included in every natural motion, and therefore is prior (“est enim prior natura omni motu, cum in omni motu includatur”); Durand of Aurillac argues that there is nothing intrinsic in every motion such that ‘being-caused-by-the-heavens’ pertains to its essence (“unus enim motus non est de essentia alterius”). Rather, this causality is due to the current order of the universe. But, Durandellus argues, “what is prior by nature and as a cause is not prior in a certain respect, say according to the present order, but without restriction.” This is the substance of Koch’s objection. Durand of Aurillac seems to say that being caused is extrinsic to what a thing is, while Durandellus holds that a prior, causal motion is included in every terrestrial motion.²⁷ If, as will be shown below, both thinkers hold that a relation of causality has no reality outside of its foundation, then being prior by nature would be identical with (and rationally distinct from) the cause, the heavens, and extrinsic to the caused, terrestrial motion. Thus, even according to Durandellus, terrestrial motion does not include essentially the motion of the heavens.

In summary, Koch’s exclusion of the hypothesis that Durandellus was Durand of Aurillac is based on the analysis of the only other scholastic text solidly attributed to Aurillac, namely, a question on the reality of

quae a motu caeli non dependet; et ideo motus ille non cessabit, motu caeli cessante.”

²⁷ KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, p. 364: “Es läßt sich wenigstens an einem Punkte ein Widerspruch zwischen Durandellus und Durandus de Aureliaco feststellen. Beide haben die Ansicht, daß alle irdischen Bewegungen abhängig sind von der Bewegung des Himmels. Nach Durandus de Aureliaco beruht das aber nicht auf einer innern Notwendigkeit, sondern nur auf einem in der jetzigen Weltordnung gegebenen Zusammenhang. Durandellus führt nun gerade diese Ansicht als möglichen Einwand gegen die Lehre des hl. Thomas (de pot. q. 4 a. 8) an und lehnt sie mit der Begründung, daß die Himmelsbewegung in jeder andern Bewegung eingeschlossen sei. Beide Denker stehen hier also auf entgegengesetztem Standpunkt.”

time. He found it to differ from Durandellus in its citation of contemporary positions and in the subject of inquiry. While he also believed he found a doctrinal contradiction, the two texts are merely divergent. Still, nothing in the question on time supports the belief that Durandellus is Durand of Aurillac.

It would be sophistic to stop with the claim that the texts are compatible and are merely divergent. After all, Durandellus specifically goes against an opinion that posits a distinction between the heavens as being first in nobility, not in causality “or according to the present course of things.” As will be seen in Chapter V below, in the discussion on accidental causality, the distinction between nobility and causality is characteristic of Walter Burley’s doctrine, among others. On the other hand, the question on time attributed to Durand of Aurillac seems to evoke strong similarities to Walter Burley’s doctrine on time as contained in the last version of his *Physics* commentary. In fact, a closer look at the El Escorial manuscript reveals that the connection is so strong that Aurillac had to have Burley’s text in front of him.

Durand of Aurillac articulates the *quaestio* “*utrum tempus sit aliquid reale extra animam*” in three parts: whether time exists (*an tempus sit*), what it is (*quid sit*), and then whether its being is brought about by the soul (*utrum esse suum sit per animam*). The entire question is a paraphrase of the last redaction of Walter Burley’s *Questions on the Physics*, book IV, tractatus 3, chapters 1–2, concerning precisely *an tempus sit* and *quid sit tempus*.²⁸ The parallels begin practically with the beginning of the treatise, summarizing the dialectical arguments of Aristotle and Averroes for why time does not exist. The relation between the two texts can best be seen by comparing Burley’s discussion of the senses in which ‘time’ is taken to the matching passage in Durand of Aurillac’s question. Burley enumerates two major senses of time and divides the second sense into four sub-senses:

²⁸ GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, *In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones* IV, tract. 3, c. 2, ed. Venetiis 1589 (Repr. Hildesheim 1972), col. 535. On Walter Burley’s doctrine of time, see C. TRIFOGLI, “Motion and Time”, in *A Companion to Walter Burley. Late-Medieval Logician and Metaphysician*, ed. A. CONTI (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 41), Leiden 2013, pp. 267–299; A. MAIER, *Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 52), Rome 1955, pp. 86–89. See also M. VITTORINI, “Life and Works”, in *A Companion to Walter Burley*, pp. 17–47. On the redactions of Burley’s *Physics* commentaries, see R. WOOD, “Walter Burley’s *Physics* Commentaries”, in *Franciscan Studies* 44 (1984), pp. 275–327. I did not find any parallels with the previous redactions of Burley’s *Physics* commentaries.

Concerning the second doubt, when it is asked whether time is consequent upon motion, speaking of that which is time, it should be understood that time is taken in two ways. In the first way, time is taken for duration that lacks before and after in the sense stated above, namely, taking before and after in the sense in which they cannot be simultaneously in motion, such as ‘if it is before, it is not after’, and vice versa. Time is taken in another way for duration that has before and after according to the sense already given.

If we speak of time in the first way, then the duration of the first cause is said to be time. Plato called this duration the ‘age’, which age indeed was before the generation of the world, as Plato set out. According to what the Commentator says of him I *De caelo* [comm. 100], Plato did not call that age ‘time’, because, according to Plato, time is something new [i.e., that comes to be], and the age is not something new. And that time is taken for something new is clear from the following, namely that otherwise, this statement would be false: ‘God existed before the creation of the world’, because, according to the grammarians, ‘before’ consignifies time. If therefore time can only be taken for a duration having before and after, this proposition would be absolutely false: ‘God existed before the creation of the world’; but this [consequence] is false, because it is certain according to faith and the truth that God existed before the creation of the world; and therefore it remains that time can be taken for a duration lacking before and after. And this time or age, namely the duration of the first cause, which duration is all at once, theologians call ‘eternity’. And the investigation of time taken in this sense belongs more to the first philosopher, who has to consider the quiddities of things. Yet time said in this way is neither motion, nor is mobile, nor something having an attribution to or suitability for motion.

But it belongs to the natural philosopher to investigate time said in the other way, which time indeed signifies duration having before and after, since before and after according to the aforesaid understanding – according to which understanding the before cannot be with the after, nor vice versa – neither are nor can be without motion and change. The reason for this is that, when the after receives being and is generated, the prior is corrupted and receives non-being; but now generation and corruption are not without motion and change; therefore generation is either motion or the term of motion. Therefore taking time in that way, I say that time can be further understood in four ways, namely commonly, properly, more properly, and most properly.²⁹

²⁹ GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, *In Physicam Aristotelis* IV, tract. 3, c. 2, ed. Venetiis

Burley states that time is taken in two major ways, according to whether it signifies duration without before and after (sense 1), or with them; in the latter case, he names four further ways of understanding time: commonly (sense 2), properly (sense 3), more properly (sense 4), and most properly (sense 5). In the passage above, he focuses on sense 1, which he identifies with first philosophy (metaphysics), as opposed to the other senses (2–5), the investigation of which, he argues, “belongs to the natural philosopher,” that is, to physics. In this passage, his language clearly identifies a series of scientific roles: grammarians, theologians, first philosophers, and natural philosophers, and he makes it clear that he, Burley, speaks as a natural philosopher.

In a more compact passage, Durand of Aurillac presents the same division, but taking the voice of a theologian:

1589, col. 535: “Circa secundam dubitationem, cum quaeritur utrum tempus sit consequens motum, loquendo de eo quod est tempus, est intelligendum quod tempus accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro duratione carente priori et posteriori secundum intellectum superius dictum, scilicet accipiendo prius et posterius quibus repugnat esse simul in motu, ut ‘si prius est, posterius non est’ et e converso. Alio modo accipitur tempus pro duratione habente prius et posterius secundum intellectum iam expositum. — Si loquamur de tempore primo modo, sic duratio primae causae dicitur esse tempus, quam durationem Plato vocavit seculum, quod quidem seculum fuit ante mundi generationem, ut Plato posuit. Sicut recitat Commentator de eo, I *De caelo*, illud seculum Plato non vocavit tempus, quia secundum Platonem tempus est novum et illud seculum non est novum. Et quod tempus accipiat pro tali duratione carente priori et posteriori patet ex hoc, quia aliter ista esset falsa: ‘Deus fuit ante creationem mundi’, quia secundum grammaticos ‘ante’ consignificat tempus. — Si igitur tempus non potest accipi nisi pro duratione habente prius et posterius, illa esset simpliciter falsa: ‘Deus fuit ante creationem mundi’; sed hoc est falsum, quia certum est secundum fidem et veritatem quod Deus fuit ante creationem mundi; et sic relinquitur quod tempus potest accipi pro duratione carente priori et posteriori. Et illud tempus vel seculum, scilicet quod est duratio primae causae, quae duratio est tota simul, vocant theologi aeternitatem. Et consideratio de tempore sic accepto magis pertinet ad primum philosophum, qui habet considerare quidditates rerum. Tamen tempus hoc modo dictum non est motus, nec mobile, nec habens attributionem nec habitudinem ad motum. — Sed de tempore alio modo dicto, quod quidem tempus importat durationem habentem prius et posterius, pertinet ad naturalem philosophum considerare, quoniam prius et posterius secundum intellectum predictum – secundum quem intellectum prius non potest esse cum posteriori, nec e converso – nec sunt, nec esse possunt sine motu et transmutatione. Quoniam, cum posterius accipit esse et generatur, prius corrumpitur et accipit non-esse; nunc autem generatio et corruptio non sunt sine motu et transmutatione; ergo generatio vel est motus vel terminus motus. Unde illo modo accipiendo tempus, dico quod tempus accipitur quadrupliciter, videlicet communiter, proprie, magis proprie, et maxime proprie.”

Concerning the second statement, namely that, since time is not quidditatively motion, it must therefore be consequent upon motion like an accident is consequent upon its subject. To understand this it should be known that time seems to be taken by the philosophers and doctors in five ways, namely, extraneously, commonly, properly, more properly, and most properly.

In the first way, extraneously, according to modern usage duration without before and after is called time. And the Philosopher called time in this way the ‘age’, as the Commentator says of him, on *De caelo* I; but we call it ‘eternity’. According to this way of understanding we call time improperly and extraneously inasmuch as, by reason and reference to our time we form of duration those propositions with words that signify parts of our time, such as ‘God was’, ‘God is’, ‘God will be’.³⁰

Durand of Aurillac uses the exact same division as Walter Burley. Time in the first sense is a duration without before and after, that is, an eternal instant. For Durand, this sense of time is “extraneously and improperly” said. Where Burley says that “theologians call ‘eternity’” time in this sense, Durand says, “*we* call it ‘eternity’.” The major difference between the two authors is that Durand is consciously speaking as a theologian. In addition, the surviving manuscript of Durand reports “the Philosopher” (i.e., Aristotle) where Burley (and Burley’s source, Averroes) have “Plato.”

For the remaining four senses of time, the ones suited to natural philosophers, Durand of Aurillac’s dependence on Burley is evident:

³⁰ DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, *Quaestio de tempore*, El Escorial, R-II-4, f. 146ra: “Quantum ad secundum istorum, scilicet ex quo tempus non est quidditative motus, oportet igitur quod sit consequens motum sicut accidens suum subiectum. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod tempus videtur acceptum a philosophis {quod tempus sumitur quinque modis} et doctoribus quinque modis, scilicet extranee, communiter, proprie, et magis proprie, et proprissime. —Primo modo, extranee, secundum usum modernum tempus dicitur duracio sine priori et posteriori. Et tempus sic dictum Philosophus vocavit seculum, ut recitat Commentator supra I *De celo*; nos vero dicimus eternitatem [vel celum]. Secundum quem modum intelligendi improprie et extranee pro tanto dicimus tempus quia sub ratione et applicatione ad tempus nostrum formamus de duratione illas propositiones per verba inportancia partes temporis nostri sicut ‘Deus fuit’, ‘Deus est’, ‘Deus erit.’”

Table 3: Burley and Aurillac on the physical senses of time

GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, <i>In IV Physicorum</i> , tractatus tertius, cap. 2, ed. Venetiis 1589, col. 535–536.	DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, <i>Quaestio de tempore</i> , El Escorial, R-II-4, f. 146ra.
<p>Unde tempus communiter acceptum est duratio habens prius et posterius, et sic est commune ad durationes omnium motuum, ut ad durationem motus localis, alterationis, augmentationis, et diminutionis.</p> <p>Sed tempus proprie loquendo accipitur pro duratione motus localis tantum, quoniam de ratione temporis et motus quem tempus consequitur est mensurare omnes alios motus. Nunc autem condiciones appropriatae motui quem tempus consequitur secundum quas mensurat alios motus magis reperiuntur in motu locali quam in aliis motibus, quoniam, ut dicit Commentator versus finem tractatus de tempore, condiciones motus quem tempus primo consequitur sunt quod percipitur a sensu nostro, et sit manifestior in mensurando quam alii motus, et quod eius uniformitas magis possit cognosci apud nos. Cuius ratio est illa: quia per motum habentem illas condiciones melius potest quantitas temporis terminari et per consequens quantitas durationis aliorum motuum; sed motus localis habet illas condiciones, quia melius percipitur a sensu quam aliquis alius motus, et etiam magis potest cognosci eius uniformitas apud nos quam uniformitas aliorum motuum, scilicet alterationis, augmenti et diminutionis.</p>	<p>Secundo modo communiter dicitur quantitas duracionis secundum prius et posterius, et homo sic se habet in communicando omnem motum non solum localem, sed etiam motum alterationis et augmenti et detrimenti.</p> <p>Tertio modo dicitur proprie tempus <i>⟨esse⟩</i> duracionem motus secundum prius et posterius, non cuiuscumque motus, sed localis, <i>sed</i> et ratio est quia condicio motus et temporis consequentis motus est mensurare alios motus; condiciones vero secundum quas motus quem tempus consequitur mensurat alios motus magis reperiuntur in motu locali quam in aliis motibus. Sunt autem alie condiciones motus quas primo tempus consequitur. Prima, scilicet quod percipitur a sensu nostro et per consequens manifestior sit in mensurando quam alii motus; secunda est quod eius uniformitas magis pateat nobis; sic enim quantitas duracionis aliorum motuum magis potest terminari per modum measure; sed motus localis habet istas condiciones, quia magis percipitur sensu et manifestior est sensui* in mensurando et magis percipitur a nobis eius uniformitas quam uniformitas aliorum motuum.</p>
Magis vero proprie accipitur tempus pro duratione motus localis	Quarto magis proprie dicitur tempus <i>⟨esse⟩</i> duracionem motus localis

<p>circularis tantum circa centrum mundi, quoniam per durationem talis motus possunt quantitates omnium motuum hic inferius terminari ab intellectu humano secundum cursum naturalem melius quam per aliquem alium motum. Quod patet, quia duratio aliorum motuum non est eadem apud omnes habitatores terrae, et etiam mutabilitas aliorum motuum non potest cognosci per sensum, nec sciri per durationem, quod tamen scitur de motu circulari corporis caelestis, et etiam quia motus circularis est primus omnium motuum, ut declarat Philosophus VIII huius. Et has tres causas innuit Commentator, tractatu de tempore.</p>	<p>circularis circa centrum mundi, quia per duracionem talis motus possunt quantitates omnium motuum hic inferius terminari a nostro intellectu secundum naturalem cursum melius quam per aliquem alium motum. Quod patet, quia duracio aliorum motuum <non est eadem apud omnes habitatores terre, et etiam mutabilitas aliorum motuum> non potest sciri per duracionem nec cognosci per sensum, sicut uniformitas corporis caelestis. Preterea, quia et iste motus est primus omnium, ut habetur VIII <i>Physicorum</i>.</p>
<p>Maxime vero proprie accipitur tempus pro duratione primi mobilis, quia motus primi mobilis est primus inter omnes motus et maxime uniformis. Et illae sunt condiciones essentielles motus quem tempus primo consequitur. Motus etiam primi mobilis est velocissimus, et ideo maxime habet rationem mensurae, quoniam illa duratio primi mobilis est primum tempus, sicut motus primi mobilis est primus inter omnes motus.</p>	<p>Quinto, maxime proprie accipitur pro duracione motus primi mobilis, qui est primus inter omnes et maxime uniformis. Et iste sunt condiciones essentielles motus quem tempus consequitur. Et ille motus est velocissimus. Unde duratio successiva istius motus vere et proprie dicitur tempus.</p>

The difference between the two texts is mostly superficial. The four ways are largely identical, and often in passages that are verbatim the same, to the degree that one might suspect Aurillac's text is a *reportatio* of someone reading Burley's question. In comparing Durand's fourth way (*magis proprie*) to Burley's text, one could even repair an omission per *homoioteleuton* from *aliorum motuum* to *aliorum motuum*.

The famous passage where Koch identified a contradiction between Durandellus and Durandus of Aurillac also derives from Burley:

Table 4: Walter Burley's *Physics* and Durand de Aureliaco's eighth difficulty

GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, <i>Physica</i> , Tractatus 3, cap. 2. (P 539; V 132va–vb).	DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, <i>Quaestio de tempore</i> , El Escorial R-II-4, f. 146va.
Iterum ad secundam rationem, quando dicitur quod, si tempus sequitur motum, maxime sequitur primum motum, dico quod primum tempus sequitur primum motum, et ideo si primum celum staret, non esset primum tempus, nec esset tempus maxime proprie dictum, et hoc concedit Commentator.	
Tamen, si esset aliquis alius motus, esset aliquid aliud tempus naturale. Unde posito per possibile vel impossibile quod primum celum staret et duo mobilia moveantur, unum velocius et aliud tardius, cum velocius transeat plus de spatio in equali tempore, oporteret tempus necessario esse. Unde, posito quocumque motu, necesse est tempus poni; sed non est necesse quod, posito quocumque motu, ponatur tempus maxime proprie dictum.	Octava difficultas est quia si dicatur quod tempus est consequens motum primi mobilis, quod tunc posito quod staret et aliquid aliud moveretur, quod illud moveretur in non-tempore, quod videtur impossibile.
Et, si dicitur quod Commentator dicit quod, si celum staret, nos non essemus in esse transmutabili, quod tamen non sequitur, si stante celo, posset esse aliquis alius motus, unde secundum Commentatorem sequitur: 'non est motus celi, ergo nullus alius motus',	Ad istam respondet Commentator IV <i>Physicorum</i> quod, posito quod primum mobile staret, pariter(<i>scripsit</i> Koch] parum <i>cod.</i>) omnis alius motus, et per consequens non esset aliquo modo tempus.
dicendum quod non sequitur per consequentiam tenentem per locum intrinsecum 'motus celi non est, ergo nullus alius motus est', sicut etiam non sequitur e converso per locum intrinsecum 'alius motus est a motu celi, ergo motus celi est et ita ad illam celum stat'. Non sequitur quod	Sed quia consequentia sua non tenet ab intrinseco – unus enim motus non est de essentia alterius quin uno existente, alius possit non esse –

nullus motus est tanquam aliquid quod est de intellectu antecedentis.	
Attamen sequitur per locum extrinsecum, non sequitur ratione ordinis naturalis universi, quoniam secundum ordinem naturalem universi quilibet alius motus dependet in esse a primo motu.	sed tenet ab extrinseco, considerato ordine universi qui nunc est, ideo dicendo aliter, scilicet quod, cessante motu primi mobilis, et remanente motu alterius mobilis, non esset tempus propriissime dictum; esset tamen aliud tempus quod esset duratio illius motus.
Vel potest dici quod Commentator arguit cum modo possibilitatis sic, ut ‘si esset possibile celum quiescere, esset possibile nos esse in esse non transmutabili’ et hec consequentia est necessaria, et tamen cum hoc verbo est non sequitur, quia non sequitur necessario ‘celum quiescit, ergo non sumus in esse transmutabili’, sic quod consequens sit de intellectu antecedentis.	

The parallel is not strictly literal, but the argumentation and vocabulary correlate enough to support the conclusion that Aurillac’s commentary paraphrases that of Burley. Viewed next to its source, Aurillac’s meaning becomes clearer, especially in what sense Aurillac means that “according to the order of the universe”: the Dominican excludes supernatural and voluntary motion from depending on the heavens; every natural movement depends on the first movement of the heavens, and time in the strictest sense does not exist without the movement of the heavens. The context of Aurillac’s source confirms the sense above in which Durandellus’ passage, concerning purely natural motion, does not logically contradict Durand of Aurillac’s question on time.

The fact that most of Durand of Aurillac’s question on time derives from Walter Burley’s *Physics* commentary raises more questions than it resolves. To what degree was Durand dependent on Burley? Durand’s question exists in a sole manuscript, with the colophon: “And so will be ended the question determined by Master Durand of Aurillac, whose soul may rest in peace. Amen.”³¹ Does this mean that Durand determined

³¹ El Escorial, R-II-4, f. 147vb: “Et terminetur questio determinata a magistro Durando de Aureliaco cuius anima in pace requiescit.”

the question as a master of theology (and therefore after 1333), or could it have been an earlier work that was copied after he died? The subtle differences between Durand's question and Burley's commentary imply that Durand is acting as a theologian and not a commentator on the *Physics*, while Burley is playing the opposite role. The only material found in Durand's text without a counterpart in Burley's commentary are discussions of the positions of his fellow theologians Peter Auriol and Hervaeus Natalis, who are identified either in the text or in the margin.³²

In truth, therefore, the relationship between Durand of Aurillac and Durandellus is more complex than Koch imagined. The thematic differences that Koch saw can be entirely ascribed to different sources; for Durandellus, those sources are Durand of Saint-Pourçain's *Sentences* commentary and Thomas Aquinas' writings; for Durand of Aurillac, Walter Burley's *Physics* commentary. In addition, such thematic differences provide Aurillac with a perfectly good excuse not to discuss the opinion of Durand of Saint-Pourçain. While Aurillac's passage on time does not contradict Durandellus' refutation of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, it does show that Durand of Aurillac was not a simple Thomist; probably several years after the *Evidentiae* were written, he also showed an interest at least the physical work of Walter Burley.

Thinking that the author of the question on time could not have written the *Evidentiae*, Koch saw no positive reason to associate Durand of Aurillac with Durandellus beyond a list of *tituli* in a Paris manuscript that attributed the *Evidentiae* to someone named Durand.³³ He therefore set out to find an author who was not Durand of Aurillac. Koch

³² DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, *Quaestio de tempore*, El Escorial R-II-4, f. 146rb: "Tertia difficultas est, cum in motu videatur esse duplex successio, una que est ex parte spacii, alia que est ex parte motus in se, que istarum duarum dicitur tempus? Quod autem ibi sit duplex successio ita quod una non est alia, quidam {Aureolus} probant per hoc quod illa successio que est motus secundum se variatur non variata illa que est ex parte spacii, verbi gratia: successio motus eundi usque ad sanctum Dyonisium ex parte spacii semper est una quia duarum leucarum, illa vero que est ipsius motus secundum se variatur, quia quandoque est duarum horarum, quandoque plurium, scilicet quod vadens movetur velocius vel tardius. Et sic dubium est: que istarum successionum est tempus primo modo?" Cf. PETRUS AUREOLI, *II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1 in *Commentariorum in secundum, tertium, quartum librum Sententiarum*, Romae 1605, p. 34b; DURANDUS DE AURELIACO, *Quaestio de tempore*, El Escorial R-II-4, f. 147va: "De tertio principali, scilicet an esse temporis seu ipsum tempus sit per animam, dicit Hervaeus quod tempus habet esse reale actuale extra animam preter ipsam animam."

³³ KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, p. 344, 360.

noted that several early copies of Durandellus came from Italy; a similarity in the themes addressed suggested someone from the circle of John of Naples; the colophons call Durandellus a *frater*, and not a *magister* or *sacrae theologiae professor*.³⁴ In two manuscripts, Koch found an attribution to a certain Nicolaus; one of those turned out to be a misreading of a fifteenth-century H(ervaeus), for N(icholaus).³⁵ The other, a manuscript currently in Naples (Biblioteca Nazionale, VII.C.51), begins: “Incipiunt soluciones, responsiones et reprobaciones rationum et oppositionum domini Durandi, que fecit contra sanctum Thomam, fratris Nicolai Medensis.”³⁶ Koch therefore suggested the identification with a certain Nicholas of S. Vittore, who was present at the 1344 chapter-general of Le Puy as the *definitor* of the province of the Kingdom of Sicily, and concludes “In any case, one should follow this trail further, starting with a more precise investigation into Ms. VII.C.51 in Naples. Only archival research *in situ* can cast light on the question.”³⁷

Following Koch’s lead, Stella raised the hypothesis that this Nicholas of S. Vittore could come from a house of Benedictine women named S. Vittore in the town of Meda near Milan.³⁸ He identified the copy of the *Evidentiae* in the Naples manuscript as a fragment, ending shortly after starting book III, and, at least for one section, appears to have found a case of contamination.³⁹

Koch’s alternative identification, therefore, depends on the impossibility that the man who paraphrased Walter Burley’s *Physics* commentary could also be the Durandellus who paraphrased Thomas Aquinas. Since he thought this was impossible, he rejected a Parisian reference to the author as someone named Durand and held to the colophon of a fragmentary copy that awkwardly refers to an otherwise-unknown person

³⁴ As Koch notes, the codex Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l’Agglomération, 129, does, in fact call the author *Sacre theologie professor*, but, as Maier pointed out (in the following note), this fifteenth-century manuscript also calls the author Hervaeus Natalis.

³⁵ A. MAIER, “Zur Textüberlieferung einiger Gutachten des Johannes de Neapoli”, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter III. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 138), Rome 1977, pp. 481–504, at p. 504.

³⁶ STELLA, introduction to DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, v. 1, p. 62*; cf. KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, p. 368, who reads *quas facit* instead of Stella’s *que fecit*.

³⁷ KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, pp. 365–369. Unfortunately, I was not successful in acquiring images of this manuscript.

³⁸ STELLA, introduction to DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, v. 1, p. 21*.

³⁹ STELLA, introduction to DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, v. 1, p. 191*.

named Nicholaus Medensis. Since Durandellus' doctrine has otherwise-unspecified similarities with that of a Dominican who was active at Paris and Naples, Nicholaus probably came from Naples. The only Nicholaus who shows up in the records with a Neapolitan association is this Nicholas of S. Vittore. Prospero Stella then found a town Meda with a church named S. Vittore. On its own terms, the sheer improbability of this conjecture should be apparent. Since there is no compelling reason why the author of the question on time could not have also written the *Evidentiae*, a much stronger case persists for Durand of Aurillac.

2. Evidence for Durand: parallels between Durand of Aurillac, socius of William of Brienne, and Durandellus

William of Brienne's *principia* can help establish whether Durand of Aurillac was indeed Durandellus. Contemporary scholarship has identified points in Durandellus' *Evidentiae* where the author appears to break with Thomas Aquinas and to defend a relatively unique view. These points should not have escaped Durandellus' contemporaries, either. Therefore, by cataloguing all the theses that William of Brienne ascribes to his *socii*, we might see if some of these unique positions surface. In fact, not only do they appear, but some of them are ascribed explicitly to Durand of Aurillac.

In a special volume of *Revue Thomiste* dedicated to Saint Thomas in the fourteenth century, a pair of studies underscore characteristic aspects of Durandellus' thought. Examining Durand of Saint-Pourçain's and Durandellus' doctrine on faith and scientific knowledge, Henry Donneaud concludes that Durandellus diverges from Thomas in arguing the impossibility of having faith and scientific knowledge of the same object in the same way. He claims that Durandellus departs precisely from Thomas in confusing the medium that causes assent (demonstration in scientific knowledge and authority in faith) with the (in)evidence of what is assented to: faith does not make the believed conclusion evident, but only makes assent by authority; scientific knowledge makes the demonstrated conclusion evident, making assent by reason. When a conclusion is known by demonstration, it is no longer believed. Does that mean that scientific knowledge excludes faith? For Durandellus, Donneaud argues, it does; one cannot have faith concerning an object of scientific knowledge because the intellect cannot assent to a demonstrated conclusion by authority, since authority causes a believed conclusion instead.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ H. DONNEAUD, "Durand et Durandellus sur les rapports de la foi et de la science",

Concerning Durandellus' doctrine, Donneaud concludes:

In his refutation of Durand's thesis on the compatibility of science and faith, Durandellus keeps to the letter of the Thomist thesis, to a contrary effect. Believing himself to defend Saint Thomas, he clearly exceeds the positions of his master. The reason for this distortion seems to us to lie in the ignorance of the precise formal reason that Saint Thomas attributed to faith and, consequently, the ignorance of the distinction between the order of the means and that of the object. As formal reason, Durandellus ascribes indiscriminately to faith sometimes inevidence, sometimes authority. He confuses these two formalities, chaining authority to inevidence and demonstration to evidence. Contrary to Saint Thomas, who placed the formal reason of faith precisely in inevidence, Durandellus does not hesitate to place it likewise in the medium that is authority: "It pertains to the definition of the act of faith to assent to some conclusion merely because of the authority of the speaker." Because he appears not to know the distinction between the two orders, although set forth by Saint Thomas himself, the disciple ends up almost contradicting the master. He affirms the impossibility that these two means work together for a single act of assenting, "It is impossible that someone at the same time assent to some conclusion on account of authority and on account of demonstration, not only because of the incompatibility of two acts of understanding in the same intellect, but also because of another formal repugnance: that which exists between the two acts, because the definition of one excludes that of the other." Saint Thomas, however, makes a contrary affirmation: "one and the same man can know one and the same conclusion by a probable means and by a demonstrative means." Beginning with this period, the Thomist school therefore did not avoid instances of unfaithfulness to its source. Believing to defend the master, through inattention to the nuances of his thought, it arrived at inflecting him. A direct consequence of this reductionist interpretation consists in the impossibility for the Christian philosopher to continue

in *Revue Thomiste* 97 (1997), pp. 157–172, p. 163: "Or Durandellus confond lui aussi le plan des médiums et celui du résultat subjectif de la connaissance. Il est vrai que l'inevidence – le moins connu – ne peut pas produire l'évidence – le plus connu. Et une fois que l'évidence est là, l'inevidence, concernant ce même objet, ne peut que disparaître. S'ensuit-il que, dans l'ordre des médiums, la démonstration soit exclusive de l'autorité? L'impossibilité de l'évidence et de l'inevidence, qualités de l'objet connu, entraîne-t-elle nécessairement celle de l'autorité et de la démonstration? Durandellus l'affirme sans le prouver. Nous verrons même qu'il contredit saint Thomas précisément sur ce point, faute de relever la différence entre l'ordre des médiums et celui de l'objet."

to rely on the authority of revelation from the moment that he knows demonstratively a revealed truth, such as the existence of God.⁴¹

Durandellus' position therefore asserts not merely that one cannot have faith and scientific knowledge of the same object, but that this cannot come about because, once something is known demonstratively, one cannot believe it on authority. Donneaud raises a serious objection to this position: if scientific knowledge occurs via demonstration, and such knowledge is incompatible with faith, then, insofar as theology is a demonstrable science, it would appear to exclude faith.

In a study on Durandellus' trinitarian theology, Gilles Emery also identifies a major point where Durandellus' interpretation of Thomas Aquinas departs from Thomas in a distinctive manner. Specifically, Emery shows that Durandellus repeatedly insists that a relation has no reality apart from those of its foundation and its term, and that a

⁴¹ DONNEAUD, "Durand et Durandellus", pp. 170–171: "Dans sa réfutation de la thèse Durand sur la compatibilité de la science et de la foi, Durandellus s'en tient à la lettre de la thèse thomiste, en effet contraire. Croyant défendre saint Thomas, il outrepassa nettement les positions du maître. La raison de cette déformation nous a semblé résider dans l'ignorance tant de la raison formelle précise que saint Thomas attribue à la foi que, conséquemment, de la distinction entre l'ordre des médiums et celui de l'objet. Durandellus assigne indifféremment comme raison formelle à la foi tantôt l'inévidence, tantôt l'autorité. Il confond ces deux formalités, en bloquant l'autorité sur l'inévidence et la démonstration sur l'évidence. Contrairement à saint Thomas, qui situe précisément la raison formelle de la foi dans l'inévidence, Durandellus n'hésite pas à la placer également dans ce médium qu'est l'autorité: «Il est de la définition de la foi de donner assentiment à une conclusion en vertu de l'autorité de celui qui parle.» Parce qu'il semble ignorer la distinction entre les deux ordres, pourtant posée par saint Thomas lui-même, le disciple en vient quasiment à contredire le maître. Il affirme l'impossibilité du concours de ces deux médiums que sont l'autorité et la démonstration au profit d'un unique assentiment: « Personne ne peut donner assentiment à une conclusion en vertu, simultanément, de l'autorité et de la démonstration; non seulement à la cause de l'incompatibilité de deux actes d'intellection en un même intellect, mais aussi à cause d'une autre incompatibilité formelle: celle qui existe entre les deux actes, car la définition de l'un exclut celle de l'autre.» Saint Thomas pose pourtant une affirmation contraire: « le même homme peut connaître une même conclusion par un médium probable et par un médium démonstratif.» Dès cette époque, l'école thomiste n'évite donc pas certaines infidélités par rapport à sa source. Croyant défendre le maître, elle en vient à l'infléchir, par inattention aux nuances de sa pensée. Une conséquence directe de cette interprétation réductrice consiste dans l'impossibilité, pour le philosophe chrétien, de continuer à s'appuyer sur l'autorité de la révélation dès lors qu'il connaît démonstrativement une vérité révélée, comme l'existence de Dieu."

relation only has a distinction of reason from its foundation.⁴² Moreover, in discussing the procession of the Holy Spirit, Durandellus argues that the Son, as what is generated (and without considering the Son as the Word), does not spirate the Holy Spirit actually, but only virtually.⁴³

Of these three characteristic doctrines associated with Durandellus, two appear directly in William of Brienne's discussion of his *socii*, and a third has close parallels. Moreover, in the discussion of one of them, Durand of Aurillac is even named in the margin. A study of the Prague Codex, therefore, supports the association of Durand of Aurillac with Durandellus. Over the course of his *principia* and once in the *lectiones*, William mentions eight times his *socii*, that is, his fellow bachelors reading the *Sentences*:

Table 5: William of Brienne's references to *socii* in the Prague Codex

#	Location	Text
1	P1 [§1.18]	Ad illa respondet unus socius exponendo: unumquodque, scilicet, obiectum quod est universale, quod non est res extra neque conceptus, \sed est aggregatum ex re et conceptu/, quia in hiis terminatur demonstratio. Et patet \exemplum/, quia in processu vocali vox significativa est aggregata ex ipsa \voce/ et signata \re/. Et ideo sic in conceptibili ex re et conceptu.
2	<i>lectio</i> 3 [§34]	{Illa est opinio fratris Turandi, iam legentis <i>Sententias</i> apud Predicatores} Sed contra hoc dicit unus socius. Dicit quod theologia est scientia in nobis, sed non nobis; sed est nobis fides. Et ratio sua prima erat illa: sicut se habet \de/ noto et notitia, sic in scito et scientia; sed idem numero potest in se esse maxime notum et non nobis; ideo etc. Maior patet de se, quia quod dicitur de superiori dicitur et de inferiori. Minor patet de se de divina essentia; \illa enim est maxime nota de qua est theologia nostra, et tamen non nota nobis/.

⁴² G. EMERY, "La théologie trinitaire des *Evidentiae contra Durandum* de Durandellus", in *Revue Thomiste* 97 (1997), pp. 173–218, at pp. 182–188.

⁴³ EMERY, "La théologie trinitaire", pp. 212–213: "Durandellus concède à Durand que ce n'est pas en tant qu'Engendré que le Fils spire *actuellement* le Saint-Esprit. Le coeur de sa réponse tient ici dans la distinction entre *principe actuel* et *principe virtuel*: l'Esprit (le *Spiratus*) ne procède pas par soi de l'Engendré (comme tel) comme de son principe actuel, mais bien comme de son principe virtuel. Autrement dit, quoique la spiration (actuelle) ne fasse pas partie du concept de génération ou d'Engendré, la puissance de spire (*virtus spirativa*) appartient à la raison d'«Engendré». La distinction entre principe actuel et principe virtuel ne se trouve pas chez Thomas en ce contexte."

3	P2a [§2a.7–8]	<p>Sed contra illam conclusionem (<i>scil.</i> quod voluntas omnis aliquo modo distinguitur ab essentia) arguit unus socius sic: primo, quia, si intelligere et velle distinguerentur ex natura rei, hoc esset quia presupponuntur distinctioni emanationi (emanationum <i>cod.</i>) personarum; sed hoc non, quia nulla distinctio ex natura rei presupponitur emanationi personarum. Probatio, quia \essentia divina/ habens eminenter illa duo potest producere Filium et Spiritum Sanctum ita bene sicut si essent distincta, quia illa continentia virtualis et eminentie non diminuit(dimittit <i>cod.</i>) de ratione principiorum istorum. Item, quia sufficit quod effectus sit virtualiter in causa, et sic est hic; ideo etc.</p> <p>Secundo sic: quaecumque habent indistinctionem ex suo formali completivo \non/ habent aliquam distinctionem formalem; sed intelligere et velle sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet, et minor per Anselmum 16 <i>Monologion</i> dicit quod illa summa natura, quando dicitur bona, non quale sed quid sit monstratur; ideo etc. rationes formales ibi non manent \distincte/.</p>
4	P2a [§2a.9–11]	<p>Contra illam conclusionem (<i>ut in</i> #3, <i>supra</i>) arguit \etiam/ alter socius: nullum infinitum simpliciter \et formaliter/ patitur distinctionem alicuius a se formalem distinctionem; sed essentia divina est huiusmodi. Maior patet, et minor q similiter, ideo etc.</p> <p>Secundo sic: natura que formaliter sumpta est universaliter perfecta includit in sua ratione formali omnem perfectionem simpliciter; sed divina essentia est huiusmodi; ideo nulla perfectio formaliter est ab ea distincta formaliter. Maior patet; et minor, quia, si non, nulla natura esset simpliciter et formaliter perfecta. Et confirmatur, quia, si non, Deus non esset quo maius cogitari non posset, quod est falsum; ideo etc. Et confirmatur, quia propter hoc omnis creatura dicitur imperfecta, quia caret omni aliqua perfectione simpliciter; ideo etc.</p> <p>Et per hoc patet ad rationes meas. Ad primam dicit quod in minori accipitur falsum, scilicet quod distinctioni emanationum personarum dis presupponatur distinctio formalis, quod non. Nec secunda ratio valet, quia omnia attributa sunt una ratio formalis que est summe perfecta et infinita.</p>
5	P2b [§2b2–15]	<p>Sed contra illam conclusionem (<i>scil.</i> quod humana voluntas est aliquo modo non idem cum essentia anime) arguit unus socius, \probando quod potentie anime distinguantur ab essentia anime, non solum ex natura rei, sed etiam realiter/, primo sic: quia, si potentie anime distinguerentur ab</p>

essentia anime solum ex natura rei et non realiter, sequeretur \quod/ ~~tunc~~ idem esset simul activum et passivum; hoc falsum, V *Metaphysice*, et consequentia, quia idem esset agens et patiens, quia intellectus agens et possibilis.

Secundo, idem moveretur motibus oppositis, et probatur, quia motus incontinentis sunt ad contraria; ideo etc.

Tertio sic: propria passio distinguitur realiter a subiecto; sed potentie anime sunt huiusmodi.

[Ad illas respondi. Ad primam dixi quod non est inconveniens idem realiter diversum formaliter, quia idem potest in se agere, ut angelus.

Ad secundam respondi quod & sensitiva et intellectiva, si sunt una forma, tunc moveri motibus oppositis est vel executive vel allicitive. Primum non convenit, secundum bene, quia allicitive non est inconveniens aliquid simul moveri ad opposita; sic hic. Si autem distincte, tunc non est inconveniens, quia tunc appetitus sunt distincti realiter.

Ad tertiam negavi assumptum.]

Sed contra illa arguitur. Contra primam solutionem primo sic: si sic, tunc sequeretur quod idem esset magis idem sibi quam ipsummet; hoc est falsum {V *Metaphysice*, quia non est media propositio huius: ‘homo est homo’, neque causa}, et consequentia, quia activum \in actu/ respicit passivum in actu mediante ~~passione~~ \actione/, sed medium \magis/ est idem extremis quam extremum extremo.

Secundo, quia tunc idem referretur ad se relatione reali.

Tertio, quia vel ut omnino idem – et tunc contradictio – vel non ut omnino idem – et tunc quero de illo: vel est absolutum – et sic habetur intentum; si respectivum – hoc non; nec valet dicere quod hoc est quia est virtualiter in actu et in potentia formali, quia quero de illo esse virtuali: vel est idem, etc., et sic idem quod prius.

Contra secundam solutionem arguitur, quia secundum primam solutionem conceditur propositum, quia ille habilitates sunt potentie anime, et sic habetur intentum.

Sed secundum secundam solutionem adhuc est contra me capiendum intellectum et voluntatem, \quia/ moventur motibus oppositis.

Item, quod distinguitur realiter probatur, quia unum determinat alterum, ut voluntas intellectum.

Contra tertiam solutionem, illud quod non indicat quid est esse subiecti est distinctum realiter a subiecto; sed propria passio est huiusmodi, V *Thopicorum*.

Secundo sic: illud quod differt diffinitione data per

		additamentum per alterum non est idem sibi realiter; sed propria passio est huiusmodi ad subiectum; ideo etc.
6	P2b [§2b.27–29, 34–37]	<p>Contra istam conclusionem (<i>scil.</i> distinctio ex natura rei sufficit ad rationem scientie) arguit unus socius: illa distinctio non sufficit ad rationem scientie que non ponit predicatum extra primum modum dicendi per se; sed distinctio ex natura rei est huiusmodi; maior patet, et minor probatur per me, quia dixi quod diffinitio et diffinitum distinguuntur ex natura rei, \et tamen distinctio inter diffinitionem et diffinitum est in primo modo dicendi per se/; ideo etc.</p> <p>Et confirmatur, quia illa distinctio non ponit predicatum extra primum modum dicendi per se que p̄e semper concomitatur modum primum dicendi per se; sed ita est in proposito; ideo etc.</p> <p>Tertio: illa distinctio que non ponit predicatum in esse \subiectivo/, sed solum in \idem/ non sufficit ad rationem scientie; sed distinctio ex natura rei est huiusmodi. . .</p> <p>Contra arguitur: cui repugnat talis distinctio que sufficit ad rationem scientie, illi etc. \repugnat esse subiectum in scientia; sed Deo hoc repugnat, quia conceptus qualitativus/. Secundo sic: cui repugnat esse conceptus quidditativus et qualitativus, ei repugnat esse subiectum in scientia; sed Deus est huiusmodi. Probatio, quia illa attributa que dicunt quid. Et ostendit iste socius primo quid sit conceptus quidditativus. Et est quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per ‘quid’. Et qualitativus, quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per ‘quale’. Ex hoc probatur: de eo de quo non potest attingi aliquid quod de eo dicat diminutum vel imperfectiorem, non potest esse subiectum (attingi) conceptus qualitativus; sed Deus est huiusmodi. Item, quia in Deo non potest esse resolutio conceptus qualitativi, ideo etc.</p> <p>Tertio, quia de Deo non potest esse conceptus differens realiter ab ipso; ideo etc.</p> <p>Quarto, ¶ ille conceptus vel erat accidentalis, quod non, vel substantialis, quod non, quia illud non est demonstrabile de Deo.</p>
7	P3 [§3.2]	Oppositum: incarnatio-actio est relatio; sed nulla relatio est distincta res a fundamento et termino; ideo etc. Minor per unum socium hoc dicentem.
8	P3 [§3.7, 9, 12]	Ad rationem istam (<i>scil.</i> quod voluntas distinguitur aliquo modo ex natura rei ab eo cuius est, quia operationes circa idem obiectum ordinem habentes requirentes oppositum modum principiandi non requirunt principium totaliter

		<p>indistinctum; sed ita se habet de operationibus voluntatis et intellectus) respondet unus socius dicens quod non probat intentum, quia eadem anima cum specie causat actum intelligendi, et similiter \ipsa cum specie et actu intelligendi causat/ actum volendi, et ideo bene concurrentia ad unum distinguuntur a concurrentibus ad aliud sed \hoc/ bene: idem indistinctum potest esse naturale et liberum, \ut patet de voluntate/ [de voluntate]; ideo et hic similiter. Secundo probat conclusionem oppositam, arguendo sic: omnis inte voluntas est indistincta formaliter a voluntate; essentia est voluntas; ideo est indistincta a voluntate; ideo etc. . .</p> <p>Uterius dicit ipse quod, ex eo quod operationes habent modum oppositum, non arguitur distinctio in principiis, quia eadem voluntas potest esse principium liberum et naturale, et sic negando maiorem meam. Sed non respondet ad probationem, que erat quod idem ageret naturaliter et non naturaliter. . .</p> <p>Et quando argui quod idem est esse in primo modo dicendi per se et formaliter esse idem sunt, arguit sic: 'homo est animal' est vera in primo modo dicendi per se; ergo res que est animal est idem formaliter homini, illa patet. \Ex hoc ultra:/ homo animal est idem formaliter homini; sed non in primo modo dicendi per se, quia non de omni, et tamen per se presupponit de omni. Ex hoc sic: si animal non est idem formaliter homini, ergo nec homo idem formaliter animali, et tamen idem in primo modo dicendi per se. Ideo non sunt idem esse idem formaliter alicui et esse in primo modo dicendi per se.</p>
9	P3 [§3.18–19]	<p>Quantum ad secundum articulum, et dixit socius quod nulla relatio est res distincta a fundamento; sed ego dixi oppositum contradictoria(<i>leg.</i> contradictorie?) quod aliqua sit. Ego ostendam primo quod rationes socii nihil valent contra me facte pro nunc. Ipse enim ponit talem casum: ponamus quod Deus suspendat actionem solis per unum instans et tunc si, etc., idem erit et non, arguendo sic: illa res erit, scilicet illuminatio solis, quia nonnisi per unum instans, et numquam erit, quia pro nullo instanti. Probatio: actio non erit post quam lux generata est; sed pro omni instanti \futuro accepto/ lux est generata. Probatio, quia pro quocumque futuro et accepto erit instans medium; ideo etc. Et confirmat rationem suam, et primo suppositum quod Deus solem(<i>solum cod.</i>) suspendat per solum instans, quia nulla creatura eam cogit ad oppositum, ideo etc. Et confirmat, quia lux est res nata tota fieri simul; ideo</p>

		Deus potest eam suspendere uno solo instanti; ideo erit et numquam erit.
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While one might expect the Franciscan bachelor to spar with the Dominican, William of Brienne had more debating partners than just Durand of Aurillac, and the *alter socius* mentioned in #4 should not lead to the conclusion that there were only three *sententiarii* in 1330–31; after all, in 1338, Peter of Allouagne’s Cistercian *socius*, William, refers to an *alter socius*, and, as noted in Chapter II, there were at least twelve *socii*.⁴⁴ Therefore, all that *alter socius* means is that the *socius* in #4 is not the *socius* of #3. With the exception of #2 (which occurs in *lectiones* 3–4 and not in the *principia*), we cannot be certain that any given mention of a *socius* refers to Durand of Aurillac and not to some other bachelor. Moreover, many of the opinions cited by William are fairly common among theologians inspired by Thomas Aquinas, both within and outside of the Dominican Order. Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction, the argument that the powers of the soul are really distinct from the soul (#5, discussed in the previous section) was sufficiently common among Dominicans that it was used as the punchline of a scholastic joke.⁴⁵ Likewise, as also discussed in the previous section, most of William’s mentions of *socii* concern their criticism of the doctrine of the formal distinction (#3–6, #8), a doctrine that made the Franciscans notorious, that produced a stockpile of standard arguments for and against, and that also served as fodder for jokes.⁴⁶ In addition, the opinions given are twice filtered: they are given not necessarily the way the *sententiarius* formulated them, but as William of Brienne understood them and as his *reportator* wrote them down.

Keeping in account these reservations, the three positions associated with Durandellus by Emery and Donneaud can be shown to have resonances among the views held by William’s debating partners, and this

⁴⁴ GUILDMUS HELENY(?), *Prima replicatio ad Petrum de Alewaigne*, Saint-Omer, BA, 504, f. 116ra: “et inferius probabo contra alterum socium quod potentie distinguuntur formaliter inter se.” For the other *socii*, see above, p. 61, n. 39.

⁴⁵ See Introduction, p. 24. Durandellus, like many others, held that the intellectual powers are really distinct from the soul, see DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia II.38, ed. STELLA, p. 601: “Quod non est, nisi essentia animae, quae est prior omni potentia animae, ut substantia prior est accidente.”

⁴⁶ W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, “Ni chose, ni non-chose: The *Sentences*-Commentary of Himbertus de Garda, OFM”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232, pp. 185–190.

in spite of the fact that the *Evidentiae contra Durandum* attacks Durand of Saint-Pourçain and therefore does not address characteristically Scotist doctrines, such as the formal distinction and the role of the will. As mentioned above, Gilles Emery has shown that Durandellus held the doctrine that a relation has no reality distinct from its foundation and term,⁴⁷ and in P3 such a thesis is defended by one of the *socii* as well, as in #7 and #9, although there is nothing in Durandellus that resembles the example given at the end of P3, the hypothetical case of God suspending the Sun's action of illumination for an instant.

Likewise, while William does not discuss an opinion holding that the person of the Son, qua generated, has virtually but not actually the power to actively spirate the Holy Spirit, he does mention a view holding that virtual containment suffices for the distinction among divine powers. In particular, in P2b, a *socius* criticizes the formal distinction between willing and understanding by claiming that such a distinction would only be needed if it were required for the emanation of persons, but that virtual containment makes this unnecessary (#3). If virtual containment is sufficient for the emanation of persons of the Trinity, then it presumably is sufficient their distinction as well. Moreover, this matches Durandellus' arguments in the *Evidentiae*, where he defends the virtual derivation of the emanations from the divine essence.⁴⁸

The most spectacular case of an opinion in the Prague Codex matching the doctrine of Durandellus is the second mention of a *socius* (#2), which is the only time in the *lectiones* (as opposed to the *principia*) that William of Brienne refers to one of the other *sententiarii*. It concerns precisely the accusation that Donneaud made, that of confusing, in the case of faith, inevidence with authority, and, in the case of scientific knowledge, evidence with demonstration. Not only does William of Brienne specifically attack Durand of Aurillac on the distinction between faith and scientific knowledge, he does so in a passage explicitly identified with Durand, and his attack expressly refers to some prior work of Durand's. In *lectio* 3 (edited together with *lectio* 4 in Appendix C), William of Brienne sets out four questions: 1. Whether theology is a

⁴⁷ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia I, 9, ed. Stella, p. 126: "...quia relatio nullam entitatem propriam habet ultra realitatem fundamenti et termini, ut infra manifestius ostendetur.", I:19, pp. 133–134: "Verum quia relatio nullam entitatem habet nisi illam quae est extremorum, ut infra patebit, ista duo competunt relationi ratione suorum extremorum." Durandellus is referring to I:27, pp. 218–226.

⁴⁸ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia 1, 7, ed. STELLA, pp. 110–113.

subalternating science or a subalternate science, 2. Whether it is a single science, 3. Whether scientific knowledge and faith with respect to the same thing can coexist, and 4. Whether scientific knowledge and opinion concerning the same thing can coexist [§1–2]. The center of the discussion is q. 3: while, as will be discussed below, William of Brienne’s initial arguments at the beginning of a *lectio*, in favor and against a question, usually address the first question, here they concern the third. Moreover, q. 4 is entirely subsumed into q. 3 as a *conclusio*. Finally, William works through the first two questions in *lectio* 3, then begins q. 3, which question carries over to constitute the entirety of *lectio* 4.

Question 3 defends four *conclusiones*, that is, theses: 1. It is impossible for a numerically one habit to be both faith and scientific knowledge; 2. It is possible for faith and scientific knowledge to be held concerning the same thing; 3. Scientific knowledge and opinion can exist with respect to the same object at the same time and in the same subject; 4. It is possible for faith and opinion to be present in the same subject at the same time [§31]. William dedicates the larger part of his discussion to the first two theses. For the first *conclusio* he argues that, as scientific knowledge produces the act of knowing via demonstration, it is specifically different from faith, which produces the act of believing via cognition from hearing [§32–33]. At this point, William says that his *socius*, identified in the margin as Durand of Aurillac, argues against this that “theology is a science in us, but to us, it is not a science, but faith” [§34].

Brienne objects that his colleague contradicts himself:

But on the other hand, it is said first that his statement contradicts those that he says elsewhere. For he says that theology is cognition in us, but a cognition that is not through the cause. Against this: no cognition is scientific knowledge properly speaking if it is not cognition through the cause; but theology in us is not such a cognition; therefore etc. But this contradicts his statements, because he says that there is no scientific cognition that does not receive the cause in being, but the minor premise is his own; for if he says that theology is cognition through the cause, I argue to the contrary: where there is no cognition that is *a priori* on the part of reality, there is no deduction by the cause; but this is so in theology, therefore, etc. And even he concedes this [§35].

On Brienne’s account, Durand held in his *principium* that theology is a type of scientific knowledge, and humans have the cognition of it,⁴⁹

⁴⁹ This position could very well be the source of the objection in William’s first

although not through the cause; but elsewhere he argued that the only direct scientific knowledge is what comes via apodictic proof, and there he argued that theology is not scientific knowledge *a priori*. Brienne has found a contradiction in his *socius*' works, and he has done so already by the second week of class the year they both read the *Sentences*. The reference to the *socius* indicates that his opponent's position derives from the *principium* disputation that just finished; William's lecture likely constitutes his *replicatio* to Durand. Yet he accuses Durand of self-contradiction of statements he made elsewhere, *alibi*. While *alibi* could refer to the same disputation text, more likely it refers to a different work entirely. And, indeed, there is a passage in Durandellus that fits precisely William of Brienne's words, one that also addresses one of the major difficulties contemporary scholars have found with Durandellus' epistemology. In his analysis of Durandellus' position above, Donneaud remarked that Durandellus' doctrine of the incompatibility of faith and scientific knowledge threatens the theological enterprise; for once one has demonstrated, say, God's existence, one can no longer believe, and theology would seem to make people less faithful. In fact, Durandellus seems to address this objection. In *Evidentia* III, 32, he defends against the argument that scientific knowledge of God is more certain than faith by distinguishing between being more certain of something because its cause is more certain, and more certain of something because the intellect more fully follows and apprehends it.⁵⁰ Turning to Durand of Saint-Pourçain's statements, Durandellus argues:

But that Durand concludes that the scientific knowledge that we have that God is one is more certain than the faith by which we believe that He is three, I say that, comparing just the faith that is had by divine authority to human scientific knowledge, faith is always more certain in that way that was said. But comparing the faith that is had by divine authority and the scientific knowledge

principium, §1.29, that science of the reasoned fact (*scientia* 'quia') is truly a science, although its propositions come from effects.

⁵⁰ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia III, 32, ed. STELLA, p. 920: "Ad evidentiam istorum est sciendum quod, sicut docet Doctor IIa IIae, q. V., a. 8, unus habitus intellectivus potest esse alio certior dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte causae, puta quia causa est certior. Et isto modo fides est certior scientia, quia causa certitudinis eius est veritas divina, ut dictum est. Alio modo potest esse certior ex parte intellectus, puta quia est eorum quae plenius consequitur et apprehendit intellectus. Verumtamen, quia unumquodque iudicatur simpliciter secundum suam causam, secundum quid autem secundum subiectum, ideo fides simpliciter certior est scientia."

had by human reason – and speaking here of scientific knowledge that is *a posteriori*, which perhaps is not incompatible with faith –, comparing therefore these two to faith alone, that which we cognize or to which we assent because of these two is more certain than that to which we assent by one of these alone, just as in the example given. For by faith and demonstration *a posteriori* together we hold that God is one, but by faith alone we hold that He is three. But it would be differently, if faith alone were compared to human scientific knowledge.”⁵¹

Durandellus has to concede that there is some sort of scientific knowledge that is compatible with faith, and this knowledge is *a posteriori*. If Durandellus and Durand of Aurillac are the same person, than William of Brienne could very well be referring to this passage when he says that “elsewhere” Durand of Aurillac contradicts himself, conceding that theology is not cognition *a priori* on the part of reality.

Brienne then claims that Durand’s argument that theology is a science in us but not for us makes no sense, since we have the nature to know things and we cannot have scientific knowledge formally in us without being formally knowing [§36]. He raises a hypothetical response [§37], which itself reflects a statement in Durandellus,⁵² and then refutes it [§38].

⁵¹ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia III, 32, ed. STELLA, p. 924: “Quod autem concludit quod scientia quam habemus quod Deus est unus certior est fide qua credimus quod est trinus, dico quod comparando fidem tantum, quae habetur per auctoritatem divinam, ad scientiam humanam, fides semper est certior eo modo quo dictum est. Sed comparando fidem, quae habetur per auctoritatem divinam, et scientiam humana ratione habitam – et hoc loquendo de scientia quae est a posteriori, quae forsitan fidei non repugnat –, comparando igitur ista duo ad fidem tantum, illud quod cognoscimus vel cui assentimus propter ista duo certius est quam illud cui assentimus propter alterum tantum, sicut est in exemplo posito. Fide enim simul et demonstratione a posteriori tenemus quod Deus est unus, sed solum fide tenemus quod est trinus. Secus autem esset, si sola fides ad scientiam humanam comparetur.”

⁵² DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia I, 1, ed. STELLA, p. 8: “Illa enim dicuntur praesentia intellectui quae capacitatem intellectus non excedunt, et in quibus figitur intuitus intellectus; et per oppositum illa dicuntur absentia intellectui quae capacitatem intellectus excedunt, et in quibus non figitur intuitus intellectus. Ex quo patet quod omnis scientia proprie in visione rei praesentis perficitur; quae visio rei tollit ab ipsa re non esse visum, et non esse apparens, quae est ratio formalis obiecti actus fidei.” The passage is Durandellus’ paraphrase of THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, (Opera Omnia 22), Rome 1972, p. 463.

William of Brienne's refutation of Durand continues into the next day (*lectio* 4): after dispatching Durand's last argument, Brienne dedicates most of the lecture to arguing for the compatibility of faith and scientific knowledge; like that of Durandellus, the opposing position bases the incompatibility of faith and scientific knowledge on the fact that inevidence is essential to faith and evidence central to science [§43–47]. Brienne rejects those arguments largely by claiming that faith too involves some kind of evidence and not inevidence [§48–52].

In 1927, Koch excluded the identification of Durandellus with Durand of Aurillac on the basis of contextual dissonance and a single apparently contradictory statement. The original *reportatio* of William of Brienne's lectures on the *Sentences*, especially his *principia*, show that the small group of colleagues to which Durand of Aurillac belonged included one or more persons who held the same characteristic doctrines as Durandellus, most notably his doctrine of relations having no reality outside of their foundations and of the incompatibility of faith, based on inevidence and held on authority, with scientific knowledge, based on evidence and held via demonstration. Moreover, William attacks Durand's position on faith and scientific knowledge as held in Durand's now-lost *principium*, and accuses Durand of contradicting himself, particularly his statements elsewhere, and the opinion is clearly ascribed to Durand of Aurillac. Contemporary scholars have identified these positions as distinctive of Durandellus, and William of Brienne finds them distinctive of his colleague Durand.

Durand of Aurillac has more of a claim to being Durandellus than anyone else; by the time of his commentary on the *Sentences* in 1330, he had already composed the polemic against Durand of Saint-Pourçain.⁵³ His *socii*, including William of Brienne, were aware of this work and likely used it to try to catch Durand in a contradiction. Whether he actually succeeded, William of Brienne believed that had done so. Thus, Brienne is the first scholar in a series that includes Koch and Donneaud to find contradictions in Durand(ellus) of Aurillac's work. Durandellus is indeed the junior Durand, so named to avoid the confusion caused by the homonymy, to distinguish the junior and senior among two colleagues from the same school, and to separate the investigator from the object of investigation. The nickname might even have been a case of simple

⁵³ STELLA, introduction to DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, v. 1, p. 23*: "Se gli indici così raccolti riuscissero espedienti, la composizione delle Evidentiae dovrebbe cadere lungo gli anni 1325–1326."

haplography: in the sole surviving *explicit*, Aurillac's name is written in one continuous line: Durandusdeaurelhiaco.⁵⁴

William of Brienne's Other *socii*

It is therefore evident that Franciscan William of Brienne's main opponent among his *socii* was the Dominican bachelor, Durand of Aurillac. Of the nine mentions William makes of *socii* listed in Table 5 above, one concerns a position explicitly ascribed to Durand (#2), two address a specific position of Durandellus (#7 and #9), and one more could be construed to relate to another position (#5). Moreover, four of the five remaining cases (#3–6, #8) refer to criticisms of William's defense of the formal distinction, making it difficult to identify them with any specific philosophical trend. But, as the reference to the *alter socius* in #4 suggests, William surely debated with many of the other *Sententiarii*. Unfortunately, their identities are unknown to us.⁵⁵ Thanks to William of Brienne, however, at least one of their teachings survives. Namely, in the first case (#1), in P1 Brienne cites a *socius*' account whereby the universal is an aggregate of the thing and the concept, and this position matches one held in a treatise ascribed to John Buridan. The citation of the *socius* arises while Brienne defends the thesis that the object of

⁵⁴ El Escorial, R-II-4, f. 147vb.

⁵⁵ A tradition in the literature suggests that John Vogolon was the Carmelite *sententiaris* for 1330–31, but this comes from a misreading. The 1330 General Chapter of the Carmelite Order, held at Valenciennes on May 27, which, uniquely among the accounts contained in the single manuscript witness (London, British Library, Additional 16372), assigns *sententarii* to Paris (B. ZIMMERMANN, *Monumenta historica Carmelitana*, v.1, Îles de Lérins 1907, v. 1, p. 119: "Sententias anno sequenti Parysius legat frater Joannes Vogolo, alio anno sequenti frater Joannes de Monte Esquilio, de aliis legentibus ordinet prior generalis.") B. XIBERTA (*De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931, p. 3), translates this phrase into "1330 sententarius Parisiensis pro 1^o anno." The usage in the contemporary General Chapters of other orders suggests that, in fact, the Carmelites assigned John Vogolon to read in 1331–32, not 1330–31; the Dominicans, for example, each spring usually assigned two friars to read the *Sentences* at Paris, one *isto anno*, that is, beginning in September of the same calendar year, and the other *pro anno sequenti*, for the academic year beginning in September of the following year. The Carmelite General Chapter of 1330, moreover, would have to consider three calendar years at a minimum: 1330–31, 1331–1332, and 1332–33. Hence *anno sequenti* and *alio anno sequenti* most likely refer to 1331–32 and 1332–33.

scientific knowledge is the conclusion of a demonstration. Brienne objects to himself that such a conclusion does not have existence, real or mental:

Against the second statement, the one about the object, it is argued: by ‘the conclusion’ one means either the utterance, the writing, the thing, or the concept. The thing is not meant, because things are not conclusions; nor the utterance or the writing, because a scientific conclusion is true without these things, because it is mental; nor the concept, because then the same thing would be the object of itself. Proof: because the conclusion as such is nothing but scientific cognition [§15].

The objection claims that conclusions, as objects of scientific knowledge, cannot be spoken, written or physical things. Nor can they be concepts, because concepts are cognitions. Therefore, the act of knowing something scientifically would be the act of cognizing a cognition. Here William introduces his *socius*, replying in the present tense:⁵⁶

One *socius* replies to these, setting forth that each and every object of scientific knowledge, which is universal, is neither a thing nor a concept, but is an aggregate of the thing and the concept, because demonstration ends with these two. And an example makes this clear, because in the process of uttering, the signifying utterance is an aggregate of the utterance and the signified thing itself. And thus so it is in [the process of conceiving, the conceiving act is an aggregate] of the thing and the concept [§18 also #1 on Table 5].

Although the first phrase (“*unumquodque, scilicet, obiectum quod est universale*”) does not aid the clarity of the passage,⁵⁷ William’s account makes clear that the *socius* holds that the object of scientific knowledge is indeed the act of cognition, but that the act of cognition is different from the concept, as the act brings together the concept and the thing signified. That his *socius* holds such a distinction between concept and act of cognition is clear from William’s criticism of the doctrine:

⁵⁶ The present-tense reference (“he responds”) signifies that the *socius* is not explicitly answering William (in the way the past-tense references in subsequent *principia* refer to an explicit debate), but rather that he gives such a response to the same problem.

⁵⁷ One possibility is that the *unumquodque* could be a shorthand reference to one of Thomas Aquinas’ favorite theses from *Metaphysics* IX, namely “*Unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu*” (see, for example, J. HAMESSE, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique* (Philosophes médiévaux XVII), Louvain 1974, p. 135, n. 234); William could be taking this statement from his adversary and then parsing it to refer to universals.

But against this position two arguments are made. First: the object of scientific knowledge is what is the truthmaker in scientific knowledge; but such a truthmaker is not the aggregate of the thing and the concept, rather it is the thing alone. The major premise is clear, because scientific knowledge is a veridical habit; the minor premise is in the *Categories*: by what a thing is or is not, a statement (*oratio*) is true or false.

Second: I ask how a concept is taken, whether for itself or for the act of understanding; but in neither way does it help constitute the entirety of the object; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear by sufficient division; I prove the first part of the minor premise (i.e., the concept, as concept, does not form part of the object of scientific knowledge): nothing that is presupposed in the intellect for the act of understanding is attained by the act of understanding; but everything that completes the object is attained by the act of understanding, and the intelligible *species* is not attained; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear, because the act of understanding stands between the object and the power, and the minor premise is clear for you, because the intelligible *species* is the efficient cause of the act of understanding, therefore it is presupposed in that act. Nor in the second way (i.e., the concept, as act of understanding, does not form part of the object of scientific knowledge), because it is impossible for the same thing to be the object of itself in the same way; but this would follow [if the concept were the object of scientific knowledge]; therefore, etc.

Third: what can only be understood by a reflexive act cannot be the object of a direct act; but a concept is this sort of thing; therefore etc. [§19–21]

The key is the second argument. William states that the concept can be taken in two ways, either as an intelligible *species* or the act of understanding. His adversary holds that the intelligible *species* is that by which the act of understanding comes about, and therefore, William argues, it itself cannot be the object of science; it is that by which something is known, not what is known. Similarly, the act of knowing cannot be its own object. If the concept can only be the intelligible *species* expressed in this way or the act of understanding, then it cannot be the object of knowledge. Since his adversary holds that the object of scientific knowledge is the aggregate of the concept and the thing, and since William has just shown that the concept cannot be part of scientific knowledge, then the object of scientific knowledge must be the thing alone.

One might be tempted also to identify the *socius* holding this doctrine with Durand of Aurillac and present the position as a distortion of Durandellus' doctrine of concepts. Durandellus holds that the concept can be the object of knowledge, since the concept is what the mind produces when the intellect is actualized with respect to something by an intelligible *species*. He argues that mental words are concepts, distinct from the thing and from the act of understanding, because in the imposition of names, the mind's act is distinct from both the name and the thing.⁵⁸ Durandellus concludes:

It remains therefore that the [external utterance or name] signifies the thing as something other than the act of understanding or the thing itself, which thing can only be some concept, which we call a 'word'. And this is reasonably said. For the exterior utterance, which is attributed to the thing, must signify what the intellect internally attributes to the understood thing. But this is the same concept that the intellect attributes to the understood thing, not through identity, but through expression. For this reason, just as when we say 'This is wood', the sense is not that this thing is this word by identity, but rather by signification; so, when the intellect says this thing is the concept that it conceives of that thing, it does not say this by identity, but by expression. Therefore the sense is: this thing is expressed by such a concept, just as when we say with a spoken voice: 'This thing is wood', the sense is: This thing is signified by this utterance, which is 'wood'...

But the way by which an intellect forms a concept is the following: because the intellect, actualized by the *species* and the act

⁵⁸ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia I, 23, ed. STELLA, pp. 193–194: "Secundum igitur hunc processum, ostendo quod oportet necessario dicere quod verbum mentis sit aliquid differens ab ipsa re intellecta et actu intelligendi sive specie. Quod sic apparet: Omni propositioni affirmativae dicenti «Hoc est hoc», oportet quod praecedat aliqua compositio affirmativa in intellectu dicens «Hoc est hoc». Et hoc statim patet ex immediate dictis, quia voces sunt signa earum passionum quae sunt in anima. Sed intellectus sive intelligens non potest alicui rei exteriori nomen imponere, nisi per aliquam propositionem dicentem «Hoc est hoc». Ergo intelligens non potest vocetenus alicui rei exteriori nomen imponere nisi prius apud intellectum dicat ipsam rem intellectam aliquid esse. Est ergo haec propositio manifesta, quod intellectus non potest alicui rei exteriori nomen imponere vocetenus, nisi prius apud intellectum suum dixerit ipsam rem intellectam aliquid esse. —Hac ergo propositione probata, sic ulterius procedo: Intellectus sive intelligens, volens alicui rei nomen imponere, necesse est, ut ipsam rem intellectam dicat, aliquid esse apud intellectum. Aut ergo dicit eam esse ipsammet, aut actum intelligendi, aut aliquid differens ab utroque. Non potest dici quod intellectus dicat eam esse seipsam... —Nec potest dici quod intellectus dicat ipsam rem esse actum intelligendi."

of understanding, expresses of this understood thing this concept representing the thing. Therefore, just as to say some thing by an external utterance is nothing other than to signify that thing with some name, so to say the understood thing is nothing other than to express the thing with a concept of the mind.⁵⁹

Durandellus' explanation of concept formation looks surprisingly close to William of Brienne's description of his *socius'* explanation the formation of "a universal object of scientific knowledge." According to Durandellus, the act of intellection associates the thing as present to the intellect with a mental word, a concept, just as an act of imposing names involves associating an utterance with a thing. The intelligible *species* makes the extramental thing present to the intellect in actuality, and, together with the act of understanding, it actualizes the intellect such that the intellect expresses the concept, which is a mental representation of the thing. If

⁵⁹ DURANDELLUS, *Evidentiae*, Evidentia I, 23, ed. STELLA, pp. 195–196: "Relinquitur ergo quod dicat eam esse aliquid aliud ab actu et a seipsa, quod non potest esse nisi quidam conceptus, quem verbum vocamus. Et hoc dicitur rationabiliter. Nam oportet quod vox exterior, quae rei attribuitur, significet illud quod intellectus intra rei intellectae attribuit. Hoc autem est ipse conceptus, quem intellectus rei intellectae attribuit, non per identitatem, sed per expressionem. Unde, sicut quando dicimus «Hoc est lignum», non est sensus quod ipsa res sit ipsa vox identitate, sed magis significatione; ita, cum intellectus dicit ipsam rem esse conceptum quem de ipsa concipit, hoc non dicitur identitate, sed expressione. Unde est sensus: Res ista exprimitur per talem conceptum; sicut cum dicimus exteriori voce «Haec res est lignum», sensus est: Haec res significatur per hanc vocem, quae est «Lignum». . . . —Modus autem per quem intellectus format conceptum est iste: Quia intellectus, factus in actu per speciem et actum intelligendi, exprimit de ipsa re intellecta ipsum conceptum repraesentativum rei. Ipsum autem exprimere dicitur «Dicere», quod differt ab ipso intelligere sicut actus a forma a qua egreditur. Ipse autem conceptus dicitur ipsum verbum. Unde sicut dicere aliquam rem voce exteriori nihil aliud est quam ipsam aliquo nomine significare, ita dicere rem intellectam nihil aliud est quam ipsam mentis conceptu exprimere." The implied subject of the first sentence is *ipsa vox exterior sive ipsum nomen*. Incidentally, Durandellus describes the first object of faith later, and in compatible terms, see Evidentia III, 35, ed. STELLA, p. 940: "Sed si quaeritur quid est illud quod creditur tamquam illud in quo includitur primum obiectum formale et materiale, sic dicendum est quod est Deus a se ipso Ecclesiae per Scripturam revelatus. Unde sicut in visione primum obiectum formale est lux, quia est illud ratione cuius omnia alia videntur; primum obiectum materiale est color, quia est illud quod primo videtur; primum obiectum utrumque includens est color illuminatus; sic in proposito, primum obiectum formale est veritas prima, ratione cuius et propter quam omnia alia creduntur; primum obiectum materiale est ipse Deus tamquam illud quod primo et principaliter creditur, primum obiectum utrumque includens est ipse Deus a se ipso, qui est veritas prima, revelatus. Et hoc apparet unica rationem. Idem enim est obiectum fidei Ecclesiae et fidei absolutae."

this position is what William of Brienne is criticizing, then his objection is that the understood thing (*res intellecta*) plays a double role: on the one hand, it is a precondition for the act of concept formation (*intellectus exprimit de ipsa re intellecta ipsum conceptum repraesentativum rei*), and on the other, it is what is actually formed (*dicere rem intellectam nihil aliud est quam ipsam mentis conceptu exprimere*). On Brienne's understanding, a concept is either the intelligible *species*, in which case a model like that of Durandellus amounts to taking a representation of the object and producing the same representation of the object, or it is the act of understanding itself, in which case it is an aggregate of the intelligible *species* and the object.

Brienne might have had Durandellus' doctrine present. But, unlike the cases above, here Brienne could be criticizing any number of doctrines of universals. Indeed, while, as far as I know, no named theologian has been expressly associated with a doctrine holding that the universal is an aggregate of a concept and the thing, the opinion has been ascribed to at least one fourteenth-century Parisian thinker: John Buridan.

Specifically, another manuscript at the National Library in Prague, VIII.E.11, contains the sole witness to a text that its colophon calls "*Questiones Magistri Iohannis Buridan de universali*" and dates the copy to 1419.⁶⁰ Buridan, or whoever the author was, raises the question "Whether a universal exists in actuality beyond the soul", and assembles authoritative arguments from Aristotle and Averroes to both sides; moreover, at least for the arguments for extramental existence of universals, the author draws explicitly and extensively on Walter Burley's *Physics* commentary.⁶¹ In concluding, the author asserts that second-intention terms are true or false for an aggregate of an extramental thing

⁶⁰ IOANNES BURIDAN(?), *Quaestiones de universali*, Praha, Národní knihovna České republiky, VIII.E.11, ff. 232r–243v; incipit, f. 232r: "Due questiones de universali pertractabuntur. Prima erit: utrum universale sit actu preter animam; secunda erit utrum universale sit preter animam unum unitate alia ab unitate numerali. Et erunt iste questiones intelligende de universalibus entium extra animam existentium, non de universalibus entium anime, cum de illis nulla sit dubitatio."; f. 243v: "Expliciunt questiones Magistri Iohannis Buridan de universali finite anno domini M° CCCC° XIX° ante festum nescio cuius, etc."

⁶¹ e.g., IOANNES BURIDAN(?), *Quaestiones de universali*, Praha, NKCR, VIII.E.11, f. 232r–v, where, for the third argument in favor of the extramental existence of universal species independent of their instantiations, the author refers to "Galtherus in sua expositione super primo *Physicorum*"; the third through the ninth arguments are taken verbatim from GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, *In I Physicorum*, ed. Venetiis 1589, cols. 15–18, followed by another borrowing from Burley: "Decimo arguit sic ille ad idem probando."

and a concept, and that such an aggregate is itself a concept.

Therefore, from these things clearly appears the solution to the second problem, when it was asked what of this universal-as-subject is made by the soul and what is independent of the soul. For I say that the universal-as-subject is an aggregate of the thing and the concept, or of the thing and the way of conceiving. Therefore, with respect to the thing, it is independent of the soul, and, with respect to the concept or way of conceiving, it is made by the soul. And because in such an aggregate the thing is like the subject of the concept, and the second intention is more properly and more formally attributed to that aggregate by reason of the concept, as if by reason of the thing, we therefore declare that concept to be the proximate subject of a second intention and we declare the thing to be the remote subject, and the aggregate to be the total subject. And then there will be three theses to our position stated above: first, that the universal-as-form is not independent of the soul; second, nor is the universal-as-immediate-subject [independent of the soul]; third, the universal-as-remote-subject is independent of the soul, always speaking of the universals of things that exist independently of the soul. And so it is also clear that neither is the universal-as-total-subject independent of the soul, but it is partially made-by-the-soul and partially independent of the soul. And it should be known that the universal-as-remote-subject is not distinct from individuals independent of the soul, as was clear when it was said to be in potency. And then that being in potency should be understood thus: that it is possible to understand in a universal way that thing that exists individually independently of the soul, namely as an indifferent concept, yet that thing is actually a thing independent of the soul having matter and form.⁶²

⁶² IOANNES BURIDAN(?), *Quaestiones de universalibus*, Praha, NKCR, VIII.E.11, f. 238v: “Ex hiis igitur clare apparet solutio ad secundum dubium, quando querebatur quid ipsius universalis pro subiecto sit ab anima et quid preter animam. Dico enim quod universale pro subiecto est aggregatum ex re et conceptu sive ex re et modo concipiendi. Est igitur quantum ad rem preter animam, et quantum ad conceptum vel modum concipiendi est ab anima. Et quia in tali aggregato res est sicut subiecta conceptui et quod intentio secunda magis proprie et magis formaliter attribuitur illi aggregato ([congregato *cod.*) ratione conceptus quasi ratione rei, ideo illum conceptum ponimus subiectum propinquum secunde intentionis et rem subiectum remotum, et aggregatum subiectum totale. Et tunc erunt tres conclusiones nostre positionis superius posite: prima, quod universale pro forma non est preter animam; secunda quod nec pro subiecto immediato; tertia, quod pro subiecto remoto est preter animam, loquendo semper de universalibus rerum preter animam existentium. Et sic etiam patet quod nec universale

John Buridan, or whoever authored the *Questions on the Universal*, maintains that the universal, in the sense of the total subject, is an aggregate of the extramental thing and the concept, precisely the same opinion that William of Brienne attributes to one of the *sententiarii* of 1330–31. William of Brienne’s *principia* debate corroborates the currency of such a doctrine among bachelors of theology at a time when Buridan was beginning his lengthy career as arts master. William’s adversary remains anonymous, but he now has a philosophical doctrine associated with him, and, in turn, that doctrine has a pedigree.

In his *principia*, William of Brienne proposed to show how God can serve as the subject of a science; very quickly, he found himself engaged in a vigorous defense of the formal distinction. Across the debate, William’s primary opponent was his Dominican *socius*, Durand of Aurillac, also known as Durandellus. Yet even the original record of these debates has some gaps. Most notably, the second *principium*, P4, is missing; moreover, while some of William’s *replicationes* survive, particularly in *lectiones* 3–4 and in P3, he likely wrote and submitted others independently of his *principia* and *Sentences* lectures.

William’s *principia* are, to date, the earliest surviving originals of the first formal university debate on paper. They reveal the *sententiarius*’ obligation to engage his colleagues on the core assumptions and doctrines that ground his philosophical and theological system. They also represent the exoteric aspect of the bachelor’s work: defending the school from the outside. The esoteric aspect, on the other hand, was constituted by the *lectiones*, given inside the school.

pro subiecto totali est preter animam, sed partim ab anima et partim preter animam. Et sciendum est quod illud universale pro subiecto remoto non est preter animam distinctum ab individujs, sicut apparuit cum* dicatur in potentia, et tunc debet illud in potentia sic intelligi: quod possibile est rem illam que est singulariter preter animam existens intelligere modo universali, scilicet pro conceptum indifferentem, tamen illa res est actu res preter animam habens materiam et formam.”

Chapter IV

Lectiones on the *Sentences*

The *principia* disputations provided a bachelor with the opportunity and the obligation to debate the members of other schools. Inside the school, however, the *sententiarius* had the task of lecturing on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard; the *lectiones* consumed the majority of the bachelor's attention. These *lectiones* comprised the bachelor's major teaching task, and indeed, probably constituted the most involved (if not always the most advanced) lectures on theology at the university. The *Sentences* lectures were the opportunity for a bachelor to present in detail his philosophical-theological system, and for some theologians, especially those in the religious orders, the revision of their lectures into a written *Sentences* commentary served as the moment to diffuse to the larger world such a system. Yet the first and most important audience of *Sentences* lectures was always the students in the classroom, and *Sentences* commentaries thus reflect the tension of these two audiences, one reflected in the conventions of the classroom and the other in the aspirations of the *sententiarius*. First, therefore, William of Brienne's lectures need to be assessed in terms of their conventional structure – and this is the focus of the current chapter. When the structure of William's lectures is established, an analysis of their sources and philosophical content in the following chapter will show how William uses the classroom to communicate a classroom understanding of the challenges facing the Franciscan School ca. 1330, as well as to express his own philosophical acumen.

Did Parisian *sententarii* recite, explain, and analyze the content of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*? That is, did "reading the *Sentences*" at Paris actually involve reading the *Sentences*? After all, the mendicants sent from the other provinces to Paris would have already been familiar with the Lombard's text from the lectures they had previously attended

in the provincial *studia*.¹ Moreover, while the mendicant orders used the expression “to read the *Sentences* cursorily” (*legere Sententias cursorie*), where the adverb *cursorie* signifies a direct, literal reading of the text, such a usage does not seem to have been applied to theologians reading the *Sentences* at Paris; among theologians, only bachelors reading the Bible (a task preliminary to reading the *Sentences*) are said to read *cursorie*.² Furthermore, many surviving fourteenth-century *Sentences* commentaries have very few references to Peter Lombard. In the words of Chris Schabel, “For a top Parisian bachelor of theology who was revising his *Sentences* lectures into written form, giving actual citations of Lombard’s opinion could be an exceedingly rare occurrence, often confined to the opening and closing arguments or even just a perfunctory *divisio textus* tacked on to the beginning of questions.”³ On the other hand, the bachelors were assigned *read* the *Sentences*, and presumably that involved some connection to the text. Schabel implicitly acknowledges that his sources are removed from the classroom, filtered through a process of revision. Moreover, the fact that references to Peter Lombard’s text routinely survive in *Sentences* commentaries suggests that the lectures were indeed connected to the text.

William of Brienne’s lectures show a concern for following the structure and opinions of Peter Lombard. In the text, there are frequent references to the position of *Magister in littera*, that is, “the Master of the *Sentences*, Peter Lombard, in the passage to which this commentary refers.” For example, *lectio* 49, on book IV, d. 2, poses the initial arguments *sic et non* on the first question: “Whether the sacraments have their efficacy from Christ’s passion”, first with an argument *quod non*,

¹ M.M. MULCHAHEY, “The Dominican *Studium* System and the Universities of Europe in the Thirteenth Century. A Relationship Redefined”, in *Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales*, ed. J. HAMESSE (Publications de l’Institut d’études médiévales, Textes, Études, Congrès 16), Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 277–314, 302–317; B. ROEST, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210–1517)* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 11), Leiden 2000, pp. 123–126; IDEM, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission c. 1220–1650. Cum scientia sit donum Dei, armatura ad defendendam sanctam fidem catholicam* (The Medieval Franciscans 10), Leiden 2015, pp. 55–57.

² M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages* (Études sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen âge 10), Turnhout 2003, pp. 242–244.

³ C. SCHABEL, “Were There *Sentences* Commentaries?”, in *Commenter au moyen âge*, ed. O. BOULNOIS et al., forthcoming.

that Christ's passion is not at the moment actually happening and therefore cannot exercise causality, and then, *quod sic*: "The opposite is Augustine, *The City of God*, book XXII, chapter 15," to which a marginal annotation states "The Master recites this *in littera*," although it is not clear what passage is meant, either in Augustine or the Lombard.⁴ While references to the *Magister in littera* are quite common, there are no explicit references to an exposition or to a *sententialiter* reading of the Lombard's text. That is, if he read the Lombard, explained the positions held in the *Sentences*, or expounded on its structure and meaning, the *reportator* did not record that information.

Practically all the *lectiones* follow the same structure. Most of them (98 out of 126) begin with an introductory section that starts with a transition, announces the questions to be treated and provides one argument for and one against one of the questions, usually the first. The transition announces the distinction or distinctions to be treated. The first *lectio* on a book usually begins with *Circa* (e.g., *lectio* 47: "Circa quantum *Sententiarum* primo queritur"; *lectio* 82: "Circa primam distinctionem secundi libri *Sententiarum*, primo queritur"; *lectio* 114: "Circa primam distinctionem tertii libri *Sententiarum*, primo queritur"). Some of the other *lectiones* start with *Circa*, but more often the formula *Consequenter queritur circa n. distinctionem* is used; if the questions address the same distinction as the preceding *lectio*, the word *adhuc* is added.⁵ The transition introduces the titles of the questions, and, with the exception of *lectiones* 1–2 (with one question), William aims to treat four questions per *lectio*; therefore, when there are questions remaining from the previous *lectio*, he will often introduce exactly enough new questions to bring the number to be treated to four. For example, *lectio* 96 introduces four questions, but, in spite of treating the first two together, it

⁴ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 49, f. 71r: "Circa secundam distinctionem primo queritur utrum sacramenta habeant efficaciam a passione Christi. Secundo, utrum a Deo immediate sint instaurata. Tertia, utrum baptizati & \baptismo/ Iohannis tenebantur ad baptismum Christi. Quarta utrum ille baptismus auferebat culpam \et conferebat gratiam/. De primo arguitur quod non, quia passio Christi non est in actu modo igitur neque modo potest esse ab eo sacramenti effectus qui modo est. Oppositum est Augustini 22 *De civitate Dei*, capitulo 15 {recitat Magister in littera}."

⁵ This pattern appears to match that found in the *reportatio* of Pastor of Serrescuderio's *Sentences* lectures in Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'Agglomération, 239, where *lectiones* typically begin with *Consequenter queritur*; W.J. COURTENAY, "Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356) and MS Saint-Omer 239", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 63 (1996), pp. 325–356.

does not address the third and fourth questions. Consequently, *lectio* 97 only introduces two questions. After the question titles, William makes preliminary arguments *sic et non* for one of the questions, usually the first,⁶ and usually introduced with a variant on the formula *De prima arguitur quod non*.

There are three groups of exceptions to this model of an introductory section. First, as just mentioned, the first two *lectiones* only treat a single question. Second, 25 *lectiones* continue the previous day's discussion without the introductory section, and usually a break between articles or questions serves as the division between *lectiones*; sometimes the *reportator* would stop at the beginning of a new section and start again at the next *lectio*, such as is the case at the end of *lectio* 36, where the last words written that day were (f. 56r) "tertia conclusio probatur." Third, the introductory section of *lectio* 32 (on book I, d. 17) is missing the list of questions; two questions are actually treated in *lectio* 32, and *lectio* 33 (on d. 18) moves from the arguments *sic et non* to the text by announcing "the third question of distinction 17 was whether the habit of charity can be essentially increased; the fourth, whether it can be diminished."⁷ Therefore, in this last case, William had four questions in mind; they just were not recorded.

This regularity meant that the *reportator* could often anticipate how the *lectio* would begin, and the *reportator*'s own corrections (that is, in line with the script) show the times he guessed wrongly. Many of these cases provide the examples used above in Chapter I to prove that the Prague Codex contains the original *reportatio*. Nevertheless, not every case can be explained by the oral nature of the *reportatio*. In particular, the lecture after book II, d. 13, *lectio* 101, begins (f. 127v):

Consequenter queritur circa dictam materiam primo utrum celum sit substantia simplex vel \com/posita, secundo utrum \sit compositum ex corpore et anima/ ex corpore et anima; tertio circa 15 distinctionem utrum elementa maneant in mixto formaliter; quarto, dato quod non, utrum aliquo modo maneant ibi.

⁶ The few exceptions to this rule indicate topics of particular significance; for example, the preliminary arguments in *lectio* 3 are on the third question, precisely the topic where William engages Durand of Aurillac, as discussed in the preceding chapter.

⁷ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 33, f. 50v: "Ad 3a questio distinctionis 17 \erat/ utrum habitus caritatis augeatur secundum suam essentiam. Quarta utrum possit diminui."

The text has been corrected after being written, notably by bringing in the fundamental notion of a compound (correcting *po^a* to *9po^a*, and adding *sit compositum*) that was apparently missed. Yet an evident error remains: in the Lombard's *Sentences*, and in the commentaries, book II, d. 14 is dedicated to the heavens, and d. 15 to the elements. Instead of having the expected *distinctionem 14am* here, the manuscript reads *dictam materiam*. This mistake is difficult to attribute to a mishearing – even a world-class mumblor would have trouble reducing *di-stinctio-nem qua-tor-de-cim-am* to *dic-tam ma-ter-i-am* – but easy to see how it could arise from a misreading: one is abbreviated *di^{em} 14^{am}*, the other *di^{am} m^{am}*, and, '14' written in fourteenth-century Arabic numerals could easily be mistaken for an *m*. This apographical phenomenon is particularly difficult to explain, given that the rest of the *lectio* shows extensive corrections reflecting an oral transcription. Could William have misread his own lecture notes? Or, given that *lectio* 112 begins *Circa dicta*, and 125 *Circa materiam*, did he actually mean *Circa dictam materiam*?

After the introductory section, William addresses the questions themselves. His investigation follows fourteenth-century conventions, occasionally breaking questions into articles, or stating and proving *conclusiones*. Usually, William considers questions in sequence, but sometimes he treats several together or changes the order of the questions. Often he lingers on the first or second question and rushes through the rest at the end of the class; in the *lectio*-list (Appendix A), some of these last questions are short enough to be included in their entirety as the *explicit* for a given lecture. As noted above, if William did not get to a question, he would return to it in the next lecture; sometimes even referring to "the question left over from yesterday" (*lectiones* 80, 101). In only two cases does the body of a *lectio* treat a question whose title was never announced nor implied in an introductory section, the four questions treated in *lectiones* 32 and 33 mentioned above, where the list of questions was missing, and *lectio* 86; there, William enumerates four question titles and then dedicates his lecture to the question of the eternity of the world, which corresponds to none of the questions.

In the text, William never mentions contemporaries by name, or even university theologians of previous generations, except for John Duns Scotus, who is the *doctor* (*lectiones* 18, 25, 27, 42, 96, 98), sometimes *doctor noster* (53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 110, 113, with *noster* being added later in many cases), *doctor quem ego sequor* (6), *doctor quem magis intelligo* (96), and even *Doctor Subtilis* (106). In three cases (23, 47, 49) *Schotus*

or *Scotus* has been added after the lecture. The margins likewise do not add many names: the mention of the *opinio fratris Turandi* (3) discussed above as indicating Durand of Aurillac; an *opinio Aureoli* (26) for Peter Auriol; and a *Nota rationes Scoti* (106).

As noted, the lectures would sometimes end with the discussion unfinished, and this would usually be the topic of the next day's lecture. If William did finish his discussion of the topic, however, he would often announce this by stating at the end *et sic de illo*, "so much for that."

The Prague Codex contains 126 *lectiones*, which raises the question whether the series is complete, and the answer appears to be that it is. William of Brienne takes pains to cover every distinction of the Lombard's text, and, as will be seen below, at the only place where a *lectio* seems to be missing (*lectio* 39), a marginal annotation implies that it is not. On the other hand, William's coverage is uneven, as he races through some sections and lingers on others. This unevenness raises the further question of what a complete *reportatio* on the *Sentences* should look like. As noted in the Introduction, Russell Friedman provides a narrative of the development of *Sentences* commentaries from 1250–1320 as moving from argument-based texts that covered the entirety of the Lombard's work to position-based treatments of a selected number of questions pertaining to certain parts of the *Sentences*.⁸ William of Brienne's approximately 360 questions on the *Sentences* nuance this account. While, contrary to Friedman's general observation, the argument-centered questions do persist, they tend to be much shorter and much more summary than the position-centered ones; of Brienne's questions, the bulk concerns parts of the *Sentences* that address key points of Scotistic doctrine. Finally, an analysis of a position-centered *lectio* reveals the textual substrate to Brienne's work.

Tables 6–10 render the relationship between William of Brienne's *lectiones*, the questions he asks in them, and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In the column "questions announced" are enumerated the question titles formally introduced at the beginning of that *lectio*. The column "questions treated" lists those questions that William actually discusses in the *lectio*; if a question is announced in a prior *lectio*, it is indicated in the format *x.y*, where *x* is the number of the *lectio* and *y* is the number of the *questio* in the order it is announced. Questions that are continued in the next *lectio* end with a +; those that are continuations from the previous *lectio* begin with a +, and questions that are treated together

⁸ See Introduction, pp. 21–22.

are connected by a -. So, for example, in *lectio* 31, the order of questions treated is 1,2,30.4,3, that is, first the two questions that *lectio* (31) announced are treated, followed by the fourth question announced during *lectio* 30, and finally the third question announced during *lectio* 30. The entirety of *lectio* 4 is signified by 3.+3, which means that it continues the third question announced in *lectio* 3. As *lectio* 23 has 22.2-4, that means that it treats together the second, third and fourth questions announced in *lectio* 22.

Table 6: Correspondence of *lectiones*, *distinctiones* and *quaestiones* in the Prologue

<i>Lectio</i>	Questions announced	Questions treated
1	1	1
2	1	1
3	1-4 (Replicatio)	1,2,3+
4		3.+3 (includes topic of 3.4)
5	1-4	1
6		5.2,3,4
7	1-4	1,2
8		7.3+
9		7.+3,4

Table 7: Correspondence of *lectiones*, *distinctiones* and *quaestiones* in book I

<i>Lectio</i>	Distinction	Questions announced	Questions Treated
10	I	1-4	1,2,3,4
11		1-4	1,2,3,4
12	II	1-4	1
13			12.2,3
14			12.4
15	III	1-4	1,2,3 (4 is not treated)
16	III (1-2), IV (3-4)	1-4	1
17			16.2+
18			16.+2,3,4 (3-4 labeled as 2-3)
19	VI-VII	1-4	1
20			19.1
21			19.2,3
22	VII	1-4	1

23			22.2–4
24	VIII	1–4	1,2,3,4
25	VIII	1–4	1,2
26			25.3,4
27	VIII	1–4	1,2
28	IX	1*	27.3,4
29			28.1
30	X–XIII	1–4	1,2
31	XIV–XVI	1–2	1,2,30.4,3
32	XVII	(none announced)	1,2
33	XVIII	1	32.3,4
34	XIX–XX	1–2	33.1; 34.1,4 (34.2 not treated, 34.4 not announced)
35	XXI–XXII	1–4	1,2,3–4
36	XXIII–XXV	1–4	1+ (questions 3–4 never treated, q. 2 as art of q. 1)
37			36.+1,2+
38			36.+2
39	XXVI–XXVII	1–4	1
40	XXVIII–XXIX	3 (from d.28), 2	39.3–4; 40.1,2 (as 3,4)
41	XXX–XXXII	1–4	1,2,3,4
42	XXXV–XXXVII (dimissis XXXIII et XXXIV)	1–4	1–4
43	XXXVIII–XLI	1–4	1–4
44	XLII–XLIV	1–4	1–4
45	XLV	1–4	1,2,3,4
46	XLVI–XLVIII	1–4	1,2,3,4

Table 8: Correspondence of *lectiones*, *distinctiones* and *quaestiones* in book IV

<i>Lectio</i>	Distinction	Questions announced	Questions Treated
47		1–4	1,2
48		1–2	47.3,4; 48.1,2
49	II	1–4	1,2,3–4
50	III	1–4	1,2,3,4
51	IV–V	1–4	1,2,3,4
52	VI	1–4	1,2,3,4

53	VII	1-4	1,2,3,4
54	VIII	1-4	1,2,3
55	IX	1-3	54.4;55.1,2,3 (as 2-4)
56	X	1-4	1,2,3 (4 not treated)
57	X	1-4	1,2,3(dimittitur),4
58	X	1-4	1,2,3,4
59	XI	1-4	1,2,3,4
60	XI	1-4	1,2,3,4
61	XII	1-4	1,2,3,4
62	XII	1-4	1,2,4 (including 3's topic)
63	XII(1), XIII(2-4)	1-4	1,2,3,4
64	XII-XIII	1-4	1-2,3-4
65	XIV	1-4	1,2,3-4
66	XV	1-4	1,2,3,4
67	XVI-XVII	1-4	1,2,3,4
68	XVI-XVII	1-4	1,2,3,4
69	XVIII-XIX	1-4	1,2,3,4
70	XX-XXII	1-4	1,2,3,4
71	XXIII-XXV	1-4	1,2,3,4
72	XXVI	1-4	1,2,3,4
73	XXVI	1-4	1,2,3,4
74	XXVI-(XLII)	1-4	1,2,3,4
75	XLIII	1-4	1,2
76	XLIV	1-2	75.3,4;76.1,2
77	XLV-XLVI	1-4	1,2-4
78	XLVII-XLVIII	1-4	1,2,3,4
79	XLIX	1-4	1,2,3
80	XLIX	1-4	79.4; 80.1,2
81	L	1-2	80.3,4; 81.1-2

Table 9: Correspondence of *lectiones*, *distinctiones* and *quaestiones* in book II

<i>Lectio</i>	Distinction	Questions announced	Questions Treated
82	I	1-4	1,2,3
83	II	1-4	82.4(=83.4); 83.1-2 (q. 3 not treated)
84	II	1-4 (q. 3 title left blank, never filled in)	4

85			84.1,2,3
86	II	1-4	(Questions not explicitly treated; rather discusses the eternity of the world)
87	III	1-4	1,2,3
88	III		87.4
89	IV	1-4	1,2
90			89.3-4
91	V-VI	1-4	1,2,4
92	VII	1-3	91.3; 92.1
93	VIII	1-2	92.2-3
94	VIII		93.1-2
95	IX	1-4	1-2,3-4
96	IX	1-4	1-2
97	X-XII	1-2	96.3,4; 97.1,2
98	XII	1-4	1
99			98.2-4
100	XIII-XIV	1-4	1,2,3-4
101	(XIV,1-2); XV,3-4	1-4	1,2
102			101.3-4+
103	XVI-XVIII	1-4	101.+3-4
104			103.1,2
105	XIX-XX	1-4	1
106			105.3-4; 103.4
107	XXI-XXIII	1-4	1,2,3,4
108	XXIV-XXIX	1-4	1,2
109	XXX-XXXIII	1-4	108.3,4; 109.1-2,3,4
110	XXXIV et seqq.	1-4	1,2,3,4
111	circa peccatum actuale	1-4	1,2,3-4
112	circa dicta	1-4	1
113	XXXIV	1	112.2,3,4; 113.1

Table 10: Correspondence of *lectiones*, *distinctiones* and *quaestiones* in book III

<i>Lectio</i>	Distinction	Questions announced	Questions Treated
114	I	1-4	1,2,3,4
115	II	1-4	1,2,3,4
116	III-IV	1-4	1,2

117	V	1–2	116.3,4; 117.1,2
118	VI–XII	1–4	1,2,3,4
119	XIII–XVI	1–4	1,2
120	XVII–XVIII	1–2	119.3,4; 120.1,2
121	XIX–XXII	1–4	1,2,3,4
122	XXIII	1–3	1,2,3
123		1–3	122.4 (not announced); 123.1,2,3 (as 2–4)
124	XXXIII et seqq.	1–4	1–4
125	circa materiam de virtutibus moral- ibus	1–4	1,2
126	XXXVII	1–2	125.3–4; 126.1–2

William of Brienne made an effort to cover the entire *Sentences*. He explicitly addresses each distinction (except book I, d. 5); in many cases where the beginning of the *lectio* announces that it will address more than one distinction, one or more distinction numbers are added after the lecture. For example, in *lectio* 30 the *reportator* recorded that the lecture addressed book I, dd. 10 and 11; subsequently, dd. 12 and 13 were added. The most extreme such case of addition occurs in *lectio* 74. Like the preceding two *lectiones*, this *lectio* begins by announcing questions pertaining to book IV, d. 26, but an after-lecture addition extends the scope: “and concerning the entire subject-matter of marriage,”⁹ that is, dd. 26–42. In a similar fashion, a notice stating that book I, dd. 33–34 were skipped was added subsequently.¹⁰ The ends of book II and book III receive a summary treatment: William covers book II, dd. 34–44 (on sin) in four lectures (110–113), and book III, dd. 24–40 (on the virtues) in part of one *lectio* (123) and three full *lectiones* at the end of the year.

The series of *lectiones* appears to be complete, with one possible exception. At the start of *lectio* 39, William announces four questions on book I, dd. 26–27, but only treats the first one. The next *lectio* begins: “The third question pertained to the previous distinction, when it is asked concerning d. 28 whether being not-generated is constituent of the Father. The second question, concerning d. 29, is whether ‘principle’ is said [univocally] about God within and without.”¹¹ William then

⁹ GUILMUS DE BENA, *lectio* 74, f. 96v: “Consequenter 26 di. \et circa totam materiam de matrimonio/ adhuc queritur primo.”

¹⁰ GUILMUS DE BENA, *lectio* 42, f. 62v: “\dimissis 33 et 34/ Consequenter queritur circa 35[33 corr.] et 36am distinctionem et 37, primo.”

¹¹ GUILMUS DE BENA, *lectio* 40, f. 60r: “Tertia questio erat de distinctione

addresses together the last two questions of *lectio* 39 before treating the new questions. Therefore, the second question of *lectio* 39 seems not to have been treated, and *lectio* 40 begins by referring to the distinction *after* the one treated in *lectio* 39 as “previous.” In fact, a closer look resolves the difficulty. First, the second question in *lectio* 39 is implicitly treated with the first: the first two questions of *lectio* 39 are “Whether personal properties are formally in God” and “Whether paternity and filiation are distinguished.”¹² Paternity and filiation are such personal properties, and the question treated in *lectio* 39 begins by posing two theses (*conclusiones*), first, that paternity and filiation in creatures are real, and second, they are formally in God.¹³ The second *conclusio* echoes William’s statement in the first article of his first *principium* (P1), and very quickly the bulk of the *lectio* is occupied by objections to the second conclusion, and defenses of it, possibly a reflection of a *replicatio* and *responsio* exchange. Whatever the reason, many of the arguments raised concern how paternity and filiation are distinguished.¹⁴

precedente, cum ~~que~~ queritur circa 28am utrum ingenitum sit constitutivum Patris. Secunda questio \circa 29am/ {univoce ad principium} utrum principium dicatur ad intra ~~vel~~ \et/ extra in divinis.”

¹² GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 39, f. 59r: “Circa 26 distinctionem et 27am queritur primo utrum personales proprietates sint formaliter in Deo; secunda: utrum paternitas et filiatio distinguantur.”

¹³ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 39, f. 59r: “Ad primam questionem ponam duas conclusiones. Prima est quod paternitas et filiatio in creaturis sunt reales; secundo quod in Deo ille relationes sint (*sic*) formaliter.”

¹⁴ The arguments against the second conclusion are: 1. (f. 59r): “Ubi non sunt formaliter fundamenta aliquarum relationum, nec ille formaliter; sed in divina natura non sunt fundamenta formaliter paternitatis et filiationis”, 2. (f. 59v): “Ubi distinctis correspondet in re una ratio indistincta, ita non est ibi formaliter; sed in Deo rationi Verbi et Filii correspondet una ratio indistincta”, 3. “Ubi est paternitas formaliter est habita per generationem – illa patet; sed paternitas in divinis non est huiusmodi”, 4. “In divinis non est \generatio/ passiva formaliter, ergo neque filiatio”, 5. “Prima persona ponit in esse secundam, omni alio circumscripto quod est extra \formaliter/ eam; sed Pater ponit secundam personam aliquo circumscripto quod non est de ratione Patris”, 6. “Paternitas et filiatio in Deo attribuantur Deo accepta a creatura; sed nihil repertur in creatura formaliter, repertur in Deo formaliter”, 7. “Illud quod se toto distinguitur a duobus non est plus unum illorum quam reliquum; sed proprietates Patris dicitur simpliciter a Patre et Filio \se toto/ <distinguitur>”, 8. “Filius non est realius genitus a Deo quam mundus creatus a Deo; sed creatio-passio non est aliquid formaliter in creatura, quia neque posterius neque prius.” “Et ideo ille relationes in divinis non sunt formaliter sed eminenter, et hoc voluerunt dicere antiqui doctores et Beatus Ioannes in principio Ewangelii sui, *In principio erat Verbum*, et non ‘In principium Pater genuit Filium’, et hoc est dignificare naturam divinam.”

The second question becomes subsumed in the first. For this reason, the *reportator* expected the next *lectio* to address the third question, and had written the words *Tertia questio erat* before the *lectio* began. When William started the lecture with an introductory section, bringing in new questions on a new distinction, the scribe wrote *de distinctione precedente* to dispatch that third question. He then transcribed the beginning of the *lectio*, but instead of writing, as expected, *Consequenter queritur*, he wrote *Cum que queritur*, and deleted the *que*; perhaps he misheard *consequenter*. The solution remained confusing, which explains the marginal annotation *lectio sequens*, “The next lecture”, indicating that nothing is missing (figure 7).

A comparison with the *reportatio* of Pastor of Serrescuderio discovered by Courtenay shows that the two Franciscans proceeded through the *Sentences* at roughly the same pace. As Courtenay explains, Pastor was supposed to read the *Sentences* over the academic year 1332–1333, but he had to end his lectures early to make way for the papal favorite, Arnaud of Clermont, who was to read the *Sentences* in the late spring and over the summer.¹⁵ Pastor’s lectures on book I, on Courtenay’s reading, correspond precisely to the time available for the first term; midway through book IV, Pastor received the papal encouragement to finish his lectures as soon as possible, and therefore his commentary ends early. Of Pastor’s *lectiones*, Courtenay counts 47 on book I and 25 on book IV up to d. 15. At that point, Pastor had to hurry through the rest of his lectures, which he did in no more than 23, for a total of 95 *lectiones*. By comparison, William of Brienne gave 46 lectures on book I and 20 on book IV up to d. 15. Therefore, Pastor and William read at roughly the same rate. To this assessment can be added Peter of Allouagne, who claims to have given 47 *lectiones* on book I.¹⁶ These numbers cohere with Chris Schabel’s calculations for Landulph Caracciolo, whom he estimates at 50 lectures on book I, 37 each for books IV and II, and 7 on book III, for a total of 131 lectures.¹⁷

When in the year were these lectures given? A late fourteenth-century statute for the University of Paris set the second, third, and fourth

¹⁵ W.J. COURTENAY, “Pastor de Serrescuderio (d. 1356)”, pp. 336–338.

¹⁶ S. LIVESEY, “Pierre d’Allouagne and Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l’agglomération 504”, in *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. C. ANGOTTI, M. BRINZEI, M. TEEUWEN, (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge 65), Turnhout 2013, pp. 381–392, at p. 383.

¹⁷ C. SCHABEL, “The Commentary on the *Sentences* by Landulphus Caraccioli, OFM”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 51 (2009), pp. 145–219, at p. 159.

principia to start at the beginning of January, March and May, respectively, and one might assume that a bachelor would hold a *principium* before beginning the lectures. Yet, on this measure, after lecturing on book I in the autumn, at least William, Pastor, and Landulph would end the year behind the pace.¹⁸ After 10 *lectiones* on the Prologue, 37 on book I, 35 on book IV and 32 on book II, William holds just thirteen lectures on book III, and it is highly unlikely that he gave those thirteen lectures over the course of practically two full months. It could be that, like his contemporaries, whose commentaries on book III of the *Sentences* are inevitably the shortest of all four, and like teachers in general, William got behind in the curriculum and had to catch up late in the year. This pattern gives credence to the statute, published together with the one fixing the dates of the *principia*, requiring that bachelors not linger on the prologue and book I of the *Sentences* to the detriment of the other books.¹⁹ On the other hand, given that Landulph Caracciolo, William of Brienne, Pastor of Serrescuderio and Peter of Alouagne all lectured at roughly the same pace through the *Sentences*, they could have been following a set syllabus with broad requirements, such as finishing book I by the Christmas break, or specific ones, such as lecturing on a given distinction on a given day. Regardless, the sequence of lectures seems to confirm that a bachelor did not always hold a *principium* immediately before beginning lectures on that book. That would also explain why William of Brienne's two-part *principium* on book II appears to have been given after he started lecturing on the book; as noted in Chapter II, the last three *principia* were apparently held on days when the other *sententiarum* could give their own lectures, but only one could be given per day, and respecting the same order as before.

Although his commentary covers the entirety of the *Sentences*, William of Brienne dedicates nearly half his lectures to a handful of passages in the *Sentences* that correspond to some of the most hotly contested issues in Franciscan philosophical theology. This can be seen by tabulating the cases where William spends at least two *lectiones* discussing topics of the same distinction or distinctions (counting cases where the question runs

¹⁸ CUP II-1, n. 1189, pp. 697–704 (above, Chapter II, n. 5).

¹⁹ See the previous note. By the 1390s at the latest, as the *reportatio* of Peter Plaoul attests, bachelors focused their lectures on the prologue and book I and satisfied the statute by ending the lecture with a series of summary *distinctiones textuales*; see P. GLORIEUX, “L’année universitaire 1392–1393 à la Sorbonne à travers les notes d’un étudiant”, in *Revue des sciences religieuses* 19 (1939), pp. 429–482, at pp. 464–466.

over into another *lectio* on a different distinction as half), and indicating the themes discussed in those *lectiones*:

Table 11: Distinctions with more than one *lectio*

Prologue: 9 (Theology, science and cognition)

Book I,

- d. 1: 2 (the will's relation to the divine essence)
- d. 2: 3 (the *per se* knowability and demonstrability of God and the Trinity)
- d. 3: 4 (how God and the Trinity can be known by creatures)
- dd. 6–7: 5 (the generation of the Son)
- d. 8: 5.5 (the divine attributes, formal distinction and univocity of being)
- dd. 23–25: 3 (the divine attributes and discrete quantities [*numerus*])

Book IV

- d. 1: 2 (the sacraments in general)
- d. 10: 3 (the body of Christ in the Eucharist)
- d. 11: 2 (the Eucharist, soul as form of the body, transubstantiation)
- d. 12: 2.5 (accidents without subjects, entity and action of accidents)
- d. 26: 2.5 (marriage)
- d. 49: 2 (beatitude)

Book II

- d. 2: 4 (creation and conservation, production of angels)
- d. 3: 2 (the specific difference of angels and rational souls, the nature of time)
- d. 4: 2 (place, individual and specific difference of angels)
- d. 9: 2.5 (the corporeity of angels, hierarchy of angels, angelic speech)
- d. 12: 2 (matter)
- dd. 14–15: 3 (the substance of the heavens, elements in mixtures)

Book III: none

This chart reveals the battle-worn visage of the early Scotist school. With the possible exception of marriage (where distinction 26 is the only one of the seventeen distinctions on the subject to be explicitly cited), these topics are all dear to the Franciscan school: the relationship between the will and the intellect, the formal distinction, univocity of being, the Eucharist, time, and place, to name a few. While aiming for a systematic coverage of the 182 distinctions of the *Sentences*, William dedicates 61 of the 126 *lectiones* to the prologue and to 22 distinctions of books I, II and IV of the *Sentences*.

Looking at a *Sentences* commentary in terms of *lectiones* produces several conclusions. First, *quaestiones* are a variable measure. William of Brienne tries to address four *quaestiones* a day, and averages just under three. He often combines *quaestiones* together, explicitly or implicitly. A single *quaestio* can last three days, absorbing other questions as articles (as with *lectiones* 36–38), or it can be dispatched in two lines at the end of a lecture (as in *lectio* 114, q. 4, Appendix A). Second, for the fourteenth century at least, it does not make sense to speak of ‘*lectio*-commentaries’ as distinct from ‘*quaestio*-commentaries’; *lectiones* are the units of classroom teaching and are to some degree content-agnostic.²⁰ Third, in his bachelor lectures on the *Sentences*, William of Brienne at least made an effort to cover the *Sentences*; yet as a Franciscan, for whom Scotus was *Doctor quem ego sequor*, Brienne dedicated his energy to those parts of the *Sentences* that addressed topics going to the heart of Scotus’ doctrine and serving as the focal point for debate at the University of Paris. Peter Lombard provided the framework for William’s teaching, and Scotism comprised its superstructure.

²⁰ On *lectio*-commentaries in the thirteenth century, see O. WEIJERS, *Le maniement du savoir: pratiques intellectuelles à l’époque des premières universités (XIII^e–XIV^e siècles)* (Studia artistarum. Subsidia 1), Turnhout 1996, pp. 42–44.

Chapter V

William of Brienne's Scotism

The original *reportatio* of William of Brienne's *Sentences* lectures provides an unparalleled opportunity to see exactly how theology was taught in the medieval classroom. William Brienne was a Scotist, and in preparing his teaching, he had alongside him Scotus' work, most probably the *Ordinatio*. Even if he used Scotus extensively, he did explicitly, if discreetly, disagree with the Subtle Doctor on some points of doctrine. Brienne developed his exposition of controversial themes by bringing in other authors, most notably Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia. The detail that survives through the *reportatio* suggests that, if Brienne did not have the texts in front of him while lecturing, he at least had extensive notes, whether written or mental. Each step in the development, from preparation to lecture to revision, moved the commentary further from the words of his sources.

Three examples, two taken from book IV and one from book I, reveal how William of Brienne's lectures relate to Scotus and portray the nascent Scotist movement at Paris. One lecture (*lectio* 71), presents a case where Brienne, hurrying through questions pertaining to three distinctions (dd. 23–25), does not dally in developing details, but simply sets forth the arguments, mostly derived from Scotus, in the same order, and with the same expressions as in the *Ordinatio*. The only time Brienne mentions an opinion he disagrees with is when he differs with Scotus. The other lecture from book IV (*lectio* 64) involves an issue where Peter Auriol caused controversy among the Franciscans by a sharp criticism of Scotus' doctrine. Brienne's treatment incorporates Auriol's material, models its presentation of the positions on that of Francis of Marchia, and finishes by asserting Scotus' view from the *Ordinatio*. Finally, in a lecture on book I (*lectio* 26), William treats the classic doctrine of the formal distinction, but from a perspective internal to the Scotist tradition, in particular drawing upon and criticizing Francis of Meyronnes' reception of the doctrine.

Lectio 71: Unction, Ordo and Ordination

The quantitative analysis in the previous chapter showed that William of Brienne spent considerably more time on some subjects than others, yet tried to cover the entirety of the *Sentences*. A study seeking to understand William's positive contribution to scholastic debate would rightly concentrate on those subjects that he spends the most time on in class; the topics that he hurried through between the centers of Scotistic debate serve primarily as an image in negative, revealing those philosophical and (above all) theological issues that, at least to William, were of secondary importance. For a study of William's method, however, these lectures on "flyover issues" are critical; they reveal without distortion the bachelor's basic teaching methodology underlying his entire course, how he acquired an initial orientation on the subject matter and communicated it to his class. In *Lectio 71* (edited in Appendix F), William of Brienne presents the heart of Duns Scotus' *Ordinatio IV*, distinctions 23–25, stripped of dialectic and focusing on the position to be defended. Nevertheless, Brienne does not just simplify and report Scotus; he also synthesizes the Subtle Doctor's position and even disagrees with him. Finally, Brienne appears to be using Scotus directly, as his citations of Scotus differ from those of other theologians who could have served as intermediaries.

In the course of a single lecture, William of Brienne addresses the topics of the sacrament of extreme unction, the sacrament of holy orders and the ordination of women and underage males. His presentation of extreme unction follows Scotus in positing a definition of the sacrament and analyzing the parts of that definition; the specific definition used and the order of analysis follow the *Ordinatio* version of Scotus' commentary rather than the *Reportatio*. On the issue of holy orders, Brienne combines Scotus' comments on the sense of *ordo* to arrive at three senses. Finally, on underage ordination, Brienne disagrees with Scotus, arguing that *de facto* such ordination is invalid.

William of Brienne announces four questions pertaining to distinctions 23–25: 1. Whether the sacrament of extreme unction is necessary for salvation, 2. Whether there are seven orders in the Church, 3. Whether a deposed bishop can confer orders, and 4. Whether age impedes the undertaking of orders. In fact, his treatment follows Scotus more than the questions themselves. Therefore, Brienne ends the first question with a simple appeal to the classic distinction between sacraments for which the intention is required (*in voto*) and those that are really necessary (*in*

re); extreme unction is necessary for salvation *in voto*, but not *in re*.¹ The focus of the question, however, falls on the definition of extreme unction taken from *Ordinatio IV*.²

Table 12: The derivation of *Lectio 71*'s discussion of extreme unction from the *Ordinatio*

IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, <i>Ordinatio IV</i> , d. 23, q. un. (ed. Vaticana, pp. 294–295)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio 71</i> , q. 1, a. 1 (Appendix F)
[11] De secunda conclusione principali dicendum quod illud sacramentum vocatur 'extrema unctio' [12] cuius potest talis assignari ratio: 'Extrema unctio est unctio hominis infirmi poenitentis, in determinatis partibus corporis, cum oleo consecrato ab episcopo, ministrata a sacerdote, simul verba certa cum intentione debita proferente, ex institutione divina efficaciter significans curationem finalem venialem.'	[4] Quantum ad primum describitur sic: quod est unctio hominis infirmi penitentis facta in determinatis partibus cum oleo \sanctificato(\sanctidificato <i>corr.</i>) ab episcopo, per sacerdotem cum intentione debita certa verba \proferente efficaciter signans ex institutione divina purgationem peccatorum venialium//.
[13] Ista ratio apparet bona, quia non est in se falsa, ex V <i>Metaphysicae</i> cap. ultimo, quia nulla pars eius repugnat alteri.	
[14] Exponendo ergo partes, primo ponitur quod est 'unctio'. Cuius congruentia est quia istud sensibile signum congruit effectui, scilicet interiori unctioni in curatione hominis.	Dicitur enim quod est 'unctio
[15] Subditur 'hominis infirmi'; ideo non debet conferri sano nec qualitercumque exposito periculo mortis, quia non ei cui imminet mors ex periculo extrinsecae violentiae (ut armorum, submersionis, vel huiusmodi), nec qualitercumque infirmo, sed periculose, ita quod	\infirmi/'. Ex hoc debet solum dari infirmis, et non sanis, et hii sunt materia susceptiva eius, nec in eadem infirmitate debet dari bis, licet in pluribus infirmitatibus.

¹ On the distinction between salvation *in voto* and *in re* in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see A. LANDGRAF, "Das Sacramentum in voto in der Früh-scholastik", in *Melanges Mandonnet. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Age* (Bibliothèque Thomiste 14), v. 2, Paris 1930, pp. 97–143.

² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 23, q. un., in *Ordinatio, Liber Quartus – a distinctione decima quarta ad quadragesimam secundam*, ed. B. HECHICH (Opera Omnia XIII), Vatican City 2011, pp. 294–295.

probabiliter immineat sibi exitus de statu viatoris ad terminum.	
[16] Quod additur ‘poenitentis’, patet, quia nullus est capax istius sacramenti digne nisi	Et dicitur ‘penitentis’, quia supponit quod homo sit in gratia.
sit in gratia; istud enim sacramentum non est remedium acquirendi gratiam, quia ad hoc sunt tantum baptismus et poenitentia. Et ex hoc excluduntur non utentes ratione (ut parvuli) et qui non habent materiam poenitentiae, saltem qui non habent poenitentiam de venialibus (ut perfecte innocentes); quia etiam qui non utuntur ratione, non possunt esse poenitentes, excluduntur furiosi et amentes, et hoc nisi per voluntatem praecedentem expressam praesumantur illud velle.	Unde poenitentia debet precedere; neque pueris debet dari, quia non sunt penitentes, neque furiosis, nisi prius apparentibus signis poenitentiae in eis.
[17] Quod additur ‘in determinatis partibus’, istae partes sunt organa potentiarum, per quarum actus peccatur frequenter venialiter, utpote organa quinque sensuum et potentiae motivae. Et hoc aliquando respectu eiusdem sensus et potentiae generativae, ut organa potentiae visivae (duo oculi), organa potentiae auditivae (duae aures), organa potentiae olfactivae (nares), organa potentiae tactivae (manus). Et in istis praedictis, sicut geminantur organa, ita geminantur et unctiones. Organum gustus est lingua, in qua non fit unctio propter abominationem tollendam, sed exterius super os. Propter organum potentiae generativae fit unctio ad lumbos, iuxta illud Gregorii super illud Luc. <i>Sint lumbi vestri precincti</i> etc.: “Viris (inquit) luxuria in lumbis est”...	Et dicitur ‘facta in determinatis partibus corporis’. Illud enim sacramentum datur in remedium peccatorum venialium; per quas \istas autem partes/ homo peccat venialiter, et sunt extremitates organorum exteriorum(\exteriores <i>corr.</i>), ut sunt oculi, aures et manibus(\ <i>corr.</i>). Secundum enim Gregorium “luxuria in lumbis est virorum, in umbilico in mulieribus.”
[18] Sequitur ‘cum oleo’. Nec oportet ibi esse aliquid confectum ex oleo et balsamo, ut in materia confirmationis, quia confirmatio est ad confirmationem fidei; et ideo in confirmato requiritur non	Et additur s ‘per episcopum sanctificato’, et est materia, et est oleum olivarum, sine tamen balsamo. Oleum enim designat odorem \nitorem/ consciencie,

<p>tantum puritas conscientiae, significata per oleum, sed odor bonae famae significatus per balsamum; sed huic, qui habet exire de via ad terminum, sufficit conscientia pura. Consecratio autem episcopalis est necessaria ad hoc ut sit materia apta, quia communiter in sacramentis consistentibus in usu, solus baptismum non requirit materiam specialiter consecratam, quia Christus tactu mundissimae carnis suae, quando voluit a Ioanne baptizari, totam aquam consecravit, hoc est in usum istum dedicavit.</p>	<p>sed balsamus odorem bone fame quo homo de cetero non indiget sicut in confirmatione sanctificato per episcopum, quia requiritur materia benedicta in omnibus sacramentis preterquam in baptismo.</p>
<p>[19] Quod sequitur, ‘ministrata a sacerdote’, exprimit ministrum idoneum, non solum qui licite exerceat, sed qui solus sacramentum istud ministret; quod si alius attentet, nihil facit, – sicut si non-sacerdos attentaret conficere, nihil faceret. Determinatio autem huius ministri habetur per illud Iac. 5: <i>Inducat presbyteros</i>.</p>	<p>Et debet ministrari ‘per sacerdotem’, qui est eius minister.</p>
<p>[20] Quod sequitur, ‘verba certa simul cum intentione debita proferente’, pertinet ad formam huius sacramenti, et simultatem eius cum materia et intentione ministri. Simultas et intentio exposita sunt satis supra, in materia de baptismo. Forma autem haec sextuplex ad septem unctiones principales est: “Per istam sanctam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam, parcat tibi Dominus quidquid – narium, linguae, tactus, vel huiusmodi – vitio deliquisti.”</p>	<p>Et additur ‘cum intentione debita verba certa proferente’, et forma eius est q ‘per istam sanctam’, etc. \‘unctionem deleat \dimittat/ tibi dominus peccata qui commisisti per visum vel auditum vel olfactum’, etc./ pareat tibi dominus quod in oculis commisisti, etc.</p>
	<p>Et additur ‘efficaciter signans ex institutione divina purgationem peccatorum venialium’. Et est finis huius sacramenti, quod conferatur contra desperationem.</p>
<p>[22] Et haec colliguntur Iac. 5 (ut dictum est) et Marc. 6: ‘ungentes eos oleo sancto’.</p>	<p>[5] Et illud sacramentum constitutum est a Christo, March. 6, ubi discipuli inungebant infirmos quod nonnisi de auctoritate Christi.</p>

The *reportatio* of Brienne's lecture not only follows Duns Scotus' model of defining extreme unction and analyzing the parts of that definition, it follows the exact formulation contained in the *Ordinatio*.³ Moreover, some of Brienne's statements in his *reportatio* are not clear without reference to Scotus' text. For example, in introducing the parts of the body that are to be anointed, Brienne's *reportatio* literally reads: "And it is said, 'performed on specific parts of the body', for that sacrament is given as a remedy of venial sins; but by these parts man sins venially, that is, the extremities of the exterior organs, as are the eyes, ears and hands. For, according to Gregory, 'lust is in the loins of men, and in the navel of women.'" What is missing, of course, is that the loins are also anointed, as Scotus explains (and as would have been evident to Brienne's audience). Yet Brienne's text goes beyond Scotus' *Ordinatio*, at least as the editors have produced it: Brienne has a more full citation of Gregory, one that mentions the navels of women as well. Similarly, Scotus gets from the decretals his description of the role of balsam in the sacrament of confirmation (the *odor bonae famae*) and oil in both confirmation and unction (the *nitor conscientiae*),⁴ but his description of the role of oil refers to a *puritas conscientiae* instead of a *nitor*. On the other hand, Brienne's explanation of the significance of the oil ("Oleum enim designat ~~odorem~~ \nitorem/ consciencie") actually corrects from an error towards the wording of the decretal.

³ Cf. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Reportatio IV*, d. 23, q. un., in *Reportata Parisiensia. Liber quartus a distinctione septima usque ad quadragesimam novam* ed. L. VIVÈS, (Opera Omnia 24), Paris 1894, p. 344: "Tertio pono rationem nominis, et quid intelligo per unctionem extremam, vel per sacramentum unctionis extremae, et dico quod sacramentum istud est unctio septena hominis infirmi poenitentis cum oleo sanctificato per episcopum, facta in determinatis et certis partibus corporis, ministrata a sacerdote, simul certa verba cum intentione debita proferente, significans efficaciter ex institutione divina remissionem vel curationem spiritualem finalem omnium peccatorum venialium." This version switches the position of *in determinatis partibus* and *per sacerdotem*, both in the definition and in the analysis.

⁴ *Decretalium d. Gregorii Papae IX compilatio* (=Liber Extra) I, tit. XV, "De sacra unctione", cap. 1, in *Corpus Iuris Canonici, Pars Secunda: Decretalium Collectiones*, ed. E. FRIEDBERG, E.L. RICHTER, E.L., Leipzig 1879 (Repr. Graz 1959), col. 132: "Per oleum enim nitor conscientiae designatur, iuxta quod legitur *Prudentes virgines acceperunt oleum in vasis suis cum lampadibus*; per balsamum autem odor famae exprimitur, propter quod dicitur *Sicut balsamum aromatizans, odorem dedi*."

The correction from *odorem* to *nitorem* reveals that Brienne's *lectiones* were not corrected by someone comparing the text to Scotus. This raises the question whether Brienne was actually using an intermediary to the Subtle Doctor's works. A summary glance at the editions and manuscripts of the works of the most likely intermediaries shows that this is not the case. Many Franciscans between Scotus and Brienne – Hugh of Novocastro,⁵ Peter Auriol,⁶ Francis of Marchia,⁷ Francis of Meyronnes⁸ – do not discuss extreme unction (to the extent they discuss it at all) by means of a definition distributed into its parts. Gerald Odonis, in his *Sentences* commentary, does apply a definition somewhat related to that of Scotus, but he explains the sacrament according to the four types of causes.⁹ In fact, I have only found one possible intermediary who follows Scotus in expounding a definition: Landulph Caracciolo, and his account lacks certain details found in Brienne, such as the Gregory the Great reference, and contains others lacking in Brienne.¹⁰ In

⁵ HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, *IV Sent.*, d. 23, Lüneburg, Ratsbücherei, Theol. 2° 21, f. 47va–vb.

⁶ PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 23 in *Commentariorum in secundum, tertium, quartum librum Sententiarum*, Romae 1605, pp. 158a–160b.

⁷ FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *IV Sent.*, d. 23, Praha, Metropolitni Kapituly, C 99, ff. 227va–229va.

⁸ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *IV Sent.*, d. 23, q. un., in *Preclarissima ac multum subtilia egregiaque scripta illuminati doctoris fratris Francisci de Mayronis ordinis Minorum In quatuor libros Sententiarum...*, Venetiis 1520, ff. 211rb–212va.

⁹ GERALDUS ODONIS, *IV Sent.*, d. 23, q. un., Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 3068, f. 55rb–vb: “Pro solutione huius questionis, primo diffinienda est extrema unctio. Et sacramentum extreme unctionis est unctio hominis christiani graviter infirmantis, aliquantulum consensientis facta super organis quinque sensuum et super eminentiis plantarum et lumborum cum oleo per episcopum benedicto, ministrata (ministracio *cod.*) a sacerdote intencionem habente et verba proferente sacramentaliter signans remissionem plenariam in homine inuncto ven[en]alium peccatorum. —Ad cuius evidentiam distinguende sunt 4 cause, scilicet materialis, formalis, efficiens, et finalis.”

¹⁰ LANDULPHUS CARACCIOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1–2, Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Sopp. B.7.642, f. 57rb–va: “Tertia conclusio est dare descriptionem extreme unctionis: extrema unctio est unctio hominis infirmi penitentis facta in determinatis partibus corporis cum oleo consecrato ab episcopo, ministrata a sacerdote simul certa (trisa *cod.*) verba cum intentione debita proferente ex institutione divina signans remissionem finalem venialium peccatorum. Quarta conclusio est exponere omnes particulas huius diffinitionis... Quarta spectat ad locum certum in quo suscipitur, ideo dicitur ‘in partibus determinatis’, que sunt 7: duo oculi, \duo aures/, due nares, due manus, os, utraque pars lumborum, pedes ambo, et in omnibus istis partibus geminatur; sed quod sunt geminate partes, excepto ore, quod supplet vicem lingue in qua dicitur fieri unctio propter peccata gustus et loquere, sed propter abhominacionem suppletur in ore.”

this lecture, therefore, Brienne had the text of the *Ordinatio* present, but his exposition was not a simple recitation of Scotus, but rather an informed account of Scotus' argumentation.

Brienne's second question, on whether there are seven orders in the Church, synthesizes, simplifies and extends *Ordinatio* IV, e. 24, q. un. In that question, "Whether in the Church there are seven orders in that way in which order or ordination is held to be a sacrament." Scotus moves across several definitions of *ordo*, first to argue for how the rank of bishop is an *ordo* and how it is not, then to equate the sacrament of holy orders with ordination. While holding that the bishopric is an *ordo*, and arguing at some length for that purpose, Scotus' language implies that the issue holds secondary importance for him when compared to what exactly constitutes the sacrament, which he identifies as the act of ordination. In lecturing at Paris in early 1331, William of Brienne removes the dialectical elements from Scotus' presentation, shows even less concern about whether the episcopate is an *ordo*, and to Scotus' definitions of *ordo*, Brienne adds one where *ordo* means *ordinatio*.

In *Ordinatio* IV, d. 24, q. un, John Duns Scotus touches upon three senses of *ordo*: first, he considers and rejects the opinion that the sacrament of holy orders is "the spiritual power to execute some act in the ecclesiastical hierarchy" (*ordo*^p), an opinion apparently held by those who want to exclude the bishopric from being an order. According to Scotus, the problem with *ordo*^p becomes evident by inference from acts to power: if someone attempts to do something, and succeeds, than that person has the (spiritual) power; if not, that person does not. Therefore, *ordo*^p actually leads to the position that the bishopric is an *ordo*, as the bishop has the power to execute the acts of confirmation and conferring holy orders, since non-bishops cannot succeed in these acts. Moreover, this position would exclude any order below the *ordo* of priest, for anything a deacon or subdeacon does, a layperson could also do.¹¹

¹¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 300–301: "De primo dicitur quod sacramentum ordinis 'est potestas spiritualis ad aliquem actum exsequendum in ecclesiastica hierarchia'; et per consequens, secundum ordinem diversitatis ad tales actus, in ecclesia essent ordines distinguendi. —Contra: Ex ista descriptione sequitur quod episcopatus sit ordo, quod est contra eos: patet enim quod episcopatus est potestas spiritualis ad aliquem actum specialem in ecclesia, utpote ad actum confirmandi et conferendi ordines sacros, — et non tantum potestas congrue exercendi, sed simpliciter exercendi, quia non-episcopus, si attentet istos facere, ut videtur, nihil facit. —Secundo sequitur quod sub ordine sacerdotali non sit aliquis ordo in ecclesia, quod est contra omnes. Probatio consequentiae: nam potestatem spiritualem, loquendo de potestate simpliciter,

Rejecting this interpretation of the sacrament (*ordo*^p), Scotus sets out two senses of the term *ordo*. The first sense of *ordo* (*ordo*^a) is according to the usage in Augustine and Aristotle, namely the arrangement of things in their appropriate places, such as the organization of persons in a polity. The second sense of *ordo* (*ordo*^b) refers to a person of higher rank in such a polity. The Church is an organization of persons into a polity, an *ordo*^a, and certain persons have a higher rank in the Church and therefore can be said to have *ordo*^b. This rank is not, as the first opinion claimed, a power to bring about an act, but rather it disposes the person to executing some sacramental act.¹²

On such a scheme, bishops are clearly part of the order of the church (*ordo*^a), but so too are all believers. What matters is whether their rank pertains to the sacrament, and therefore Scotus specifies that the discussion hinges on the second sense (*ordo*^b). Whether they have *ordo*^b, however, depends on which sacramental acts one identifies as central to *ordo*^b, namely, whether just the Eucharist counts, in which case the episcopate would not qualify as an *ordo*^b distinct from the priesthood, or also the other sacraments, that is, not just the sacramental acts pertaining to the rank of priests, but also those of confirmation and ordination, specific to the rank of bishops. In the latter case, the rank of bishop would constitute an *ordo*^b. Scotus gives two inflections of this position, one according to which the episcopate is superior to the priesthood, and the other according to which it is inferior, presenting them both in a hypothetical imperfect subjunctive.¹³ To the other side, Scotus simply states:

non habet diaconus vel subdiaconus, quia etsi aliquid possit congrue facere quod non faceret congrue laicus, tamen si laicus attentaret illud facere, simpliciter faceret. —Tertio sequitur quod sacerdotium sit duo ordines, quia sacerdoti competit duplex potestas spiritualis, scilicet conficiendi corpus Christi et absolvendi poenitentem, quae non sunt una potestas, quia una videtur prior fuisse altera, quia in coena contulit Dominus potentiam primam, secundam autem nonnisi post resurrectionem, Ioan. 20.”

¹² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 303: “Ulterius, gradus eminens in ecclesia dicitur in ordine ad actum ecclesiasticum eminentem, non sic quidem quod gradus sit potestas exsequendi illum actum, ut prior opinio improbata dixit, sed quod gradus sit disponens de congruo vel simpliciter ad exsequendum debite illum actum, ut sic possit ordo – ut hic loquimur de ordine – dici gradus praeeminens in ecclesia, disponens ad aliquem actum praeeminentem; et quia specialiter actus praeeminentes in ecclesia sunt actus respicientes sacramenta, ideo potest specialius dici quod est gradus disponens ad aliquem actum sacramentalem.”

¹³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 305–306.

Others speak against the conclusion held by these two ways, because they deny that the episcopate is an order properly speaking; and therefore, they place it neither as an order above the priesthood (as the first way says) nor below it (as the second says). Nor do they say that the character [of the episcopate] is impressed. But they disagree among themselves whether the character can be removed by the pope in deposing a bishop, or cannot be removed because of the consecration with which it is conferred. But this disagreement seems pointless in denying that the episcopate is an order; for any jurisdiction whatsoever in the Church can be suspended by a superior (such that, if during the time of the suspension he tried to do something, he would not succeed), or removed entirely for all time.¹⁴

Scotus does not explicitly defend a position in this passage; for him, the key is the consecration of the Eucharist, the most noble act of the Church, and the organizing principle (in the sense of *ordo*^a) for the seven ecclesiastical orders; indeed, he explains the seven orders by their relation to the Eucharist.¹⁵ He then turns to whether *ordo* is a sacrament, and how it can be a single sacrament. None of the senses of *ordo* discussed so far can be a sacrament in the same sense as the other sacraments; sacraments are signs that can be sensed, and not even *ordo*^b is sensible. But if one took the notion of sacrament to include invisible signs, then *ordo*^b could be a sacrament in a derivative sense.¹⁶ Scotus exclaims:

¹⁴ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 306–307: “Alii contradicunt conclusioni quam tenent istae duae viae, quia negant episcopatum esse ordinem proprie dictum; et ideo nec ponunt eum ordinem superiorem sacerdotio (ut dicit prima via), nec eo inferiorem (ut dicit secunda). Nec dicunt ibi characterem imprimi. Sed an sit debilis a Papa, deponente episcopum, vel non debilis propter consecrationem cum qua confertur, altercantur inter se. Sed vana videtur altercatio negando episcopatum esse ordinem: quaecumque enim iurisdictio in ecclesia vel per superiorem suspendi potest (ita quod si tempore suspensionis attentet aliquid facere, nihil facit), vel totaliter pro omni tempore tolli.”

¹⁵ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 307–308.

¹⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 308–309: “De tertio articulo dico quod, loquendo proprie de sacramento, ordo non est sacramentum, quia omne sacramentum est ‘signum sensibile’, et ordo – ut dictum est – est quidam gradus spiritualis. Tamen accipiendo sacramentum pro signo invisibili, sicut aliquid dicitur ‘res et sacramentum’, sic potest dici ‘sacramentum’, quia signum convenientis executionis actus debiti illi gradui, et etiam signum illius actus convenientis tali gradui.”

What, therefore, *is* the seventh sacrament? I say that it is *ordination*. The description of *ordination* can be: ‘Ordination is the installment of someone in a pre-eminent rank of the church, to which rank pertains some ministry to be practiced with respect to the Eucharist, which installment is made by a suitable person, bringing forth certain words and, together with due intention, an installment representing by some visible sign of that degree, by divine institution effectively signifying the pre-eminent grace by which the one ordained may worthily carry out some ministry.’¹⁷

The formula is generic, and each of the orders has a specific version of it.¹⁸ After providing examples of such specific formulations, Scotus concludes:

From these statements it is clear in what way there are seven ordinations, which are installments in orders; and in what way those seven are said to be contained under the sacrament of holy orders, or more properly under the sacrament of ordination, insofar as it is one sacrament.¹⁹

The relationship of proximate genus to species explains the unity of the sacrament of *ordo*: the generic sacrament is differentiated into the seven individual species. The key to understanding Scotus’ doctrine lies in the phrase above, “sub sacramento ordinis, vel magis proprie sub sacramento ordinationis”, an equation echoed twice in the rest of the question as *ordo vel ordinatio*. The reason Scotus does not have much interest in whether the episcopate is an *ordo* is because, unlike his interlocutors, for him *ordo* is not a sacrament. Therefore, it does not have to be a spiritual power, but merely a suitability. The sacrament is *ordinatio*, and Scotus equates discussion on the sacrament of *ordo* to the sacrament of *ordinatio*.

In *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., John Duns Scotus rejects one definition of *ordo* and proposes two others, all in the context of whether the

¹⁷ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 309 (Table 13 below, section E).

¹⁸ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 309: “Et secundum istam rationem universalem ordinationis, possunt proportionaliter accipi rationes speciales ordinationum, puta ordinatio alicuius in sacerdotem: ‘Institutio eius in gradu ecclesiae simpliciter praeeminente, disponens habentem ad consecrandum eucharistiae sacramentum, facta ab episcopo, certa verba cum intentione debita proferente.’”

¹⁹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 24, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 310: “Ex istis patet quomodo sunt septem ordinationes, quae sunt institutiones in ordinibus; et illae septem dicuntur contineri sub sacramento ordinis, vel magis proprie sub sacramento ordinationis, in quantum est unum sacramentum.”

episcopate pertains to the sacrament of *ordo*. He provides an account of these positions, but for him the question is secondary, since he does not think that *ordo* properly speaking is a sacrament; *ordinatio* is. To engage the debate on what constitutes the sacrament of *ordo*, Scotus equates the *sacramentum ordinis* with *ordinatio*.

When lecturing on book IV, d. 24, William of Brienne turned to the *Ordinatio* for guidance. His account does away with most of the debate on the status of the episcopate, relegating it to the next lecture, where it is summarily treated. On the sacrament of *ordo*, Brienne presents Scotus' two senses of *ordo*, namely as an arrangement of things (*ordo*^a) and as an indicator of rank (*ordo*^b), and then adds a third: *ordo* can also refer to *ordinatio* (*ordo*^c). Scotus' text strains under the weight of this maneuver, but it holds up.

Table 13: William of Brienne's adaptation of Scotus' discussion of *ordo*

#	IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, <i>Ordinatio IV</i> , d. 24, a. 1, (ed. Vaticana, p. 302, 309)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 71 (Appendix F)
A		[8] Quantum ad primum ordo capitur vel \primo modo/ pro relatione \vel/ habitudine relatorum adinvicem; secundo \modo est/ gradus eminentie respectu relatorum; tertio \modo capitur/ pro ordinatione ad talem gradum eminentie.
B	[16] Intelligendum igitur quod uno modo accipitur 'ordo' sicut eum describit Augustinus, XIX <i>De civitate Dei</i> cap. 13, quod "ordo est rerum parium dispariumque, unicuique sua loca tribuens, congrua dispositio." Isto modo communiter accipimus 'ordinem' cum dicimus entium in universo esse ordinem; et ita loquitur Aristoteles XII <i>Metaphysicae</i> : "Omnia aliququaliter ordinata sunt", et declarat quomodo. Hoc etiam modo accipitur ordo in politiis bene dispositis, ubi personarum parium et imparium in illa politia congrua dispositio dicitur esse ordo illius politiae, a quo dicitur esse ordinata.	Primo modo secundum Augustinum 19 <i>De civitate</i> \c. 13/ dicit quod "ordo est parium rerum et disparium, unicuique sua loca tribuens congrua dispositio", et sic capit Aristoteles ordinem XII <i>Metaphysice</i> .

C	<p>[17] Sed alio modo gradus praeeminens in tali politia dicitur ordo. Et sic persona in gradu eminenti dicitur habere ordinem, sicut dicitur habere gradum quasi antonomastice, quia qui sunt in gradu inferiore, non dicuntur habere gradum sic.</p>	<p>Secundo modo capiendo ordinem: ordo est gradus eminentie disponens aliquem ad aliquem dignitatis actum ad quem alias non esset dispositus de congruo. Patet in politia, ut patet de balivo et ceteris presidentibus. tertio modo ea</p>
D	<p>[18] Hoc modo in ecclesia, quae est politia ordinata, congrue est ordo secundum istam duplicem acceptionem: nam, secundum primam, tota ecclesia est ordinata illa congrua dispositione personarum parium et imparium, uniuscuiusque in loco suo; secundo modo, persona, habens gradum in ecclesia eminentem, dicitur habere ordinem.</p>	<p>[9] Et sic ordo est in ecclesia primo modo – patet, quia sicut in processu nature est, sic in ecclesia ubi est processus gratuitus {quod est [est] habitudo relatorum ad invicem, quorum unum est prius alio}, et ideo est ibi ordo primo modo. Similiter secundo modo, quia ibi est gradus eminentie disponens aliquem ad aliquem actum ad quem alias non esset dispositus, ut patet de sacerdote, dyacono et subdyacono.</p>
E	<p>[39] Quid est igitur septimum sacramentum? Dico quod ordinatio. [40] Cuius descriptio potest esse ista: ‘Ordinatio est institutio alicuius in gradu ecclesiae praeeminente, cui competit aliquod ministerium circa eucharistiam exhibendum, facta a ministro idoneo, certa verba proferente, et simul cum intentione debita gradus illius aliquo signo visibili repraesentans, ex institutione divina efficaciter significans gratiam praeeminentem, qua ordinatus digne aliquod ministerium exsequatur’.</p>	<p>Ac patet \similiter/ de tertio modo ordinis, et capitur pro ordinatione ad gradum eminentie, per quem efficitur quis dignus, etc., et sic est in ecclesia militante et de illo ordine(jilla ordinatione <i>corr.</i>) est maxime sermo. Et diffinitur sic, quia est sacramentum nove legis consistens in ordinatione facta per ministrum ydoneum et fit per certa verba aliquo signo sensibili \per quam aliquis ponitur in gradu eminentie disponens aliquem ad aliquem actum dignitatis ad quem alias non esset dispositus de congruo ex institutione divina signans effectum gratie/ etc.</p>

William sets out three ways in which *ordo* is taken, and the first two correspond to Scotus' senses introducing the question of whether the episcopate is an *ordo*. To be precise (and with reference to the rows of Table 13 above), William gives a brief summary of the three senses (A): he explains Scotus' *ordo*^a as a relation, or as a habit of *relata*, *ordo*^b as a position of eminence with respect to such *relata*, and introduces the third sense (*ordo*^c): "In the third way *ordo* is taken for ordination to such a degree of eminence." He then summarizes the passage where Scotus describes the first two senses: Scotus provides a definition for *ordo*^a (B) and *ordo*^b (C), and then explains how *ordo* is in the Church in each of the two senses (D). William lastly argues that *ordo*^c is also in the Church, namely as a sacrament, and so brings in Scotus' definition of the sacrament of *ordinatio* (E).

In effect, Brienne formulates two definitions of *ordo*^a and *ordo*^b: his own formulation (A) and that in the *Ordinatio* passage (B–C). Since Scotus' text (obviously) only argues for *ordo*^a and *ordo*^b, Brienne only gives one definition of *ordo*^c, his own. This asymmetry caught the *reportator* off-guard; he was already writing *tertio modo ordo* (see the end of §8, C), when Brienne, following Scotus' *Ordinatio* treatment, moved to explaining how the first two *ordines* pertained to the Church (D).

Scotus argued that the seventh sacrament was more properly speaking *ordinatio*, and shifted discussion in that direction. William of Brienne used Scotus as the basis for his lectures and made *ordo* signify *ordinatio*.

As William of Brienne finished the second question of *lectio* 71, the end of class was rapidly approaching. He therefore dispatched the final two questions quickly. On whether a deposed bishop could confer orders, he apparently states that *de iure* a deposed bishop cannot confer orders, but *de facto* there are some doubts; in any case, the specific formulation of the answer depends on whether the episcopate is an order. Brienne finishes: "But whether the episcopate is an order or not there are opinions, and it can be said that it is an order, and if there are more than seven orders, it is not a big deal" [§15].

William saves his biggest surprise for the end of class: he breaks with Scotus on the validity of the ordination of children. In *Ordinatio* IV, d. 25, q. 2, Scotus argues that, while children cannot receive due and honest ordination to any degree, and can only receive a legally valid ordination with regard to minor orders, since they do not have the power to undertake a vow of continence, they can *de facto* be ordained, since someone can be able to execute the sacrament before actually exercising

it.²⁰ After a brief summary of Scotus' arguments prohibiting women from taking holy orders (without drawing attention to the qualifications made),²¹ William finishes his lecture with the question on the ordination of minors:

I say that *de iure* age impedes the undertaking of holy orders; but some say that, *de facto*, age is not an impediment, because execution does not necessarily follow order. Nevertheless, it seems that would not be prudent, because there are many things attached

²⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 25, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 332–333: “Hic breuiter dico quod ‘excludi ab ordinum susceptione’ vel ‘non posse suscipere ordines’ potest intelligi tripliciter: vel non posse debite et honeste, vel non posse licite quia est contra praeceptum, vel nullo modo posse, etiam de facto. —Primo modo, puer et non habens discretionem non potest recipere ordines, quia non potest cum debita reverentia recipere talem gradum qui confertur in ordinatione. —Secundo modo, puer non potest recipere ordinem sacrum, licet possit secundo modo recipere ordines inferiores. . . —De tertio modo ‘non posse’, dico quod illud ‘non posse’ non inuenitur in puero, et hoc respectu cuiuscumque ordinis sacri, quia potestas exsequendi aliquem actum vel gradus, quo quis potest illum actum exercere, potest duratione illum actum praecedere, vel potentiam propinquam ad illum actum; ordo non est nisi gradus disponens ad ministrandum in determinato gradu ecclesiastico, ut dictum est distinctione praecedente; ergo ille potest competere alicui antequam, solutis impedimentis, sit in potentia propinqua ad exercendum actum illum, nec ibi requiritur ad impressionem characteris consensus sicut nec in minoribus ordinibus.” See also *Reportatio IV*, d. 25, q. 2, ed. VIVÈS, p. 369.

²¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 25, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 333–334: “Istud tamen ‘non posse’ tertio modo, est in muliere. Quod non est tenendum tamquam praecise per Ecclesiam determinatum, sed habetur hoc a Christo. Non enim Ecclesia praesumpsisset totum sexum muliebrem privasse – sine culpa sua – actu qui sibi posset licite competere, qui esset ordinatus ad salutem mulieris et aliorum in Ecclesia per eam, quia hoc videretur maximae iniustitiae, non solum in toto sexu, sed etiam in paucis personis; nunc autem si de Lege divina licite posset competere mulieribus Ordo ecclesiasticus, posset esse ad salutem et earum et aliorum per eas. Et quod dicit Apostolus ad Tim. 2, *Docere mulierem* in Ecclesia *non permitto*, intendens de doctrina publica in Ecclesia, non est dictum Apostoli tamquam statuentis, – sed puto quod nec Christus permisit. Cuius argumentum evidens accipitur, quia nec Matrem suam posuit in aliquo gradu Ordinis in Ecclesia, cui tamen nulla alia potuit nec poterit in sanctitate aequiparari. Ratio autem aliqualis huic consonat, quam Apostolus innuit I ad Cor., nam natura non permittit mulierem, saltem post lapsum, tenere gradum eminentem in specie humana, quod quidem dictum est sibi in poenam sui peccati, Gen. 3: *Sub viri potestate eris*.” Cf. Appendix F, §16: “Ad quartam, utrum etas impediatur susceptionem ordinis, dico quod sexus impedit a susceptione ordinis, quia Christus sic instituit et est congruentia, quia ordo est gradus eminentie in ecclesia; sed hoc magis competit viris quam mulieribus, et beatus Apostolus prohibet mulieres docere.”

to this order, namely chastity and the use of reason, etc., that are not actually in an infant and a child, but the age is required in which there is the use of reason, the vow of continence, and willful obligation. [§16].

Brienne seems to turn Scotus into one of the *aliqui* that he disagrees with, although very mildly.

Lecturing on book IV of the *Sentences*, Brienne hurried to cover the distance between the ontological discussions pertaining to the Eucharist, on the one hand, and, on the other, the (canon, civil and natural) legal discussions of marriage before concluding with the discussion of beatitude, particularly its philosophical-psychological aspects. He came into the lecture hall having drawn upon Scotus' *Ordinatio* for the structure and content, and he focused on communicating the core points of Scotus on the sacraments of extreme unction and holy orders, removing or minimizing Scotus' debates with his contemporaries, and, to some degree, normalizing Scotus' doctrine with respect to the cultural context of scholastic thought. The *reportator* likewise recorded the elements that appeared most salient, and further normalized the doctrine according to his own philosophical perspective. Finally, the post-lecture revision, conducted without a written source present, brought the text farther away from the letter of John Duns Scotus' works and towards what amounted to the spirit of the Subtle Doctor, a generation after he left the Franciscan convent in Paris.

***Lectio* 64: The Salted Fiery Sphere**

When hurrying through topics that, at least in his judgment, are of secondary importance, William of Brienne draws directly upon corresponding works of Scotus. Turning to hotly-contested aspects of Scotus' doctrine, however, William calls upon more recent sources as well. Like many of his contemporaries, William of Brienne saw the sharpest criticisms of Scotus as coming from his fellow Franciscan, Peter Auriol. Katherine Tachau has shown that Brienne knew and used Peter Auriol in *lectio* 5, and, in his recent study and edition of *lectio* 43, Chris Schabel has confirmed this assessment and attested to the influence of Francis of Marchia's distinction *de possibili/de inesse* as well.²² An examination of Brienne's *lectio* 64, on the case of the generation of substantial

²² See above, Introduction, pp. 16–17.

forms via accidents, shows that, indeed, William of Brienne used Francis of Marchia extensively as a source. Specifically, William discusses and rejects three opinions, those of Thomas Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Burley, before asserting the position of John Duns Scotus; his account of Aquinas likely comes from Scotus, as does the major part of his refutation; the treatment of Auriol and Burley, both the exposition and the refutation, definitely comes from the account in Francis of Marchia's commentary on book IV. As with *lectio* 71, treated above, many post-lecture corrections were made without reference to Brienne's source-text, be it Scotus or Marchia.

Lectio 64 addresses the issue of noble causation and the generation of substantial forms. The problem derives from a consequence of reading the Aristotelian categories in an ontological sense, holding that, in the world there are substances, such as chickens, people and houses, and there are accidents, such as being warm, being two-feet-long, and so on. Accidents are dependent for their being on substances. And, as Aristotle says, like generates like: a chicken generates another chicken.²³ But the problem is that one chicken does not come directly from another; a chicken makes an egg, and only if the accident of heat is applied to that egg will another chicken come about. Moreover, on the Aristotelian model, some plants and animals, such as shellfish, are not generated from seeds, but rather spontaneously. As Averroes puts the problem, something active must induce the living form in those beings spontaneously generated; similarly, in the case of generation from seeds, since a seed is only a living being in potentiality, some actuality must bring that being from potency to actuality. For this reason, Averroes argues, many later philosophers, including Avicenna, Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, posited that, at least in the generation of all living things, a separate substance, a *dator formarum*, supplies the forms.²⁴ Averroes notes that such an argument would even extend to elemental mixtures, since the accident of motion seems to bring fire from potency to actuality, but the accident cannot be the one that induces the form. Averroes therefore argues that, in things that generate via seeds, the substance that generates provides the substantial form in the generating

²³ ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* VII, c. 9 (1034a30–b7); *Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM (Aristoteles Latinus 25:3.2), Leiden 1995, p. 148.

²⁴ AVERROES, *Commentarium in libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis* VII, comm. 31, Venetiis 1562 (=Iuntina), ff. 180vb–181ra.

seed; in the case of spontaneous generation, the form comes from the celestial bodies.²⁵

Averroes passes lightly over a core problem. The accident of heat does not induce the form of fire, but it seems to cause fire; in the generation of animals, accidents also seem to play a causal role: the egg hatches only if the accident of heat is applied. So it seems that accidents can generate substances, which appears to be a violation of the principle that accidents depend on subjects. Moreover, medievals are particularly sensitive to hierarchies; the world is caused by the most perfect being, and everything that causes can only cause something of equal or lesser perfection. The dependence of accidents upon subjects means that subjects are more perfect than accidents; therefore, it would seem that, in the generation of substances through the causality of accidents, something less perfect brings about something more perfect.

These two rules, ‘like generates like’ and ‘a being can only cause an equally or less noble being’, inform medieval Latin solutions to the problem of substantial generation. The Eucharist served as the preferred topic for the discussion of accidental causality. The fact that the accidents of bread and wine exist without the substance in which they used to inhere made the Eucharist the ideal place to discuss accidents considered purely in themselves.²⁶

²⁵ AVERROES, *Metaphysicae* VII, comm. 31, ed. Iuntina, f. 181raC–rbD: “Et etiam potest aliquis dicere quod formae elementorum proveniunt a datore formarum, quoniam videmus a motu generari ignem in actu, ex eo quod est ignis in potentia, et non possumus dicere quod motus facit formam substantialem ignis. Sequitur igitur, ut forma ignis qui fit a motu sit a datore formarum. —Nos autem dicamus quod, cum considerata fuerit demonstratio Aristotelis in hoc loco super hoc, quod formae materiales sunt generantes formas materiales, apparebit quod semina sunt illa quae dant formas rerum generatarum a seminibus per formas quas dederunt semina generantia. In generabilibus autem non ex se, id est casu, apparebit quod corpora coelestia sunt illa quae dant istis aliquid loco seminum et virtutum quae sunt in seminibus, et in eis quae generantur ex semine, et quod omnia ista sunt virtutes naturales divinae generantes sibi similia, secundum quod artes generant sua artificata.”

²⁶ On the development of the doctrine of the Eucharist as accidents without a subject of inherence, see J. VIJGEN, *The Status of Eucharistic Accidents “sine subiecto”*. *An Historical Survey up to Thomas Aquinas and Selected Reactions* (Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens, neue Folge 20), Berlin 2013; P.J.J.M. BAKKER, *La raison et le miracle: les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250–1400)*. *Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*, Ph.D. thesis, Nijmegen 1999; F. AMERINI, “*Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis*.” Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of

In his discussion of accidental causality, Thomas Aquinas favors the doctrine of like generating like; he solves the problem of accidental causality by claiming that the accident is merely an instrument of the substance. Accidents produce substances by virtue of the substances in which they inhere, and not otherwise. An animal uses heat to generate another animal.²⁷ John Duns Scotus, on the other hand, holds to the notion of noble causality. Substances cause substances; accidents do not. As accidents can exist independently of their substances, their causality cannot depend on substances in any way. If accidents act in virtue of substances, either they are acting directly through the substance or by some power (*virtus*) in the substance. For Scotus, the first option cannot hold, since it would not explain the case of the Eucharist. Implicit in his teaching (and in Franciscan thought more generally) is the notion that Christ serves as the normative case for reality; hence the body of Christ in the Eucharist provides the rule for how bodies function, and not the exception to be explained.²⁸ Consequently, the persistence of accidents without a substance becomes an immovable given of metaphysics, and accidents need to be able to do everything accidents do without their subjects of inherence existing. Therefore, Scotus rejects the first option, that accidents act directly through the substances in which they inhere, since substances do not always exist. Thus, Scotus continues, the only way accidents can act in virtue of a substance is instrumentally, that is, they act via some power in the substance; but this power is an accident itself. The position of Aquinas entails an accident bringing about or ending substantial existence. As such, it threatens the hierarchy of the universe. Scotus explains:

This proposition: ‘what is simply less perfect in species or genus cannot be the entire active principle with respect to what is more perfect’, is just as well known to me as any in philosophy, and, were

Accidents”, in *Vivarium* 44 (2006), pp. 96–150; M.M. ADAMS, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham*, Oxford 2010.

²⁷ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1 a. 2 in *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. M.F. MOOS, v. 4, Paris 1947, p. 509.

²⁸ Bonaventure, for example, claimed that Christ represented the perfection of the universe, and therefore constituted theology’s subject of investigation; he further implemented this theological intuition into the Franciscan Order through the official hagiography of St. Francis, the *Legenda maior*. See W. DUBA, *Seeing God: Theology, Beatitude and Cognition in the Thirteenth Century*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa 2006, pp. 21–28.

it denied, I would be unable to prove any order of beings, indeed not even that the first being is the most perfect. For, taken to the extreme, it could be said that the whole universe and everything in it is made by a fly. For if you argue that a fly is so imperfect, and you yourself say that something less perfect can produce something more perfect, then, given this, there is no reason why something so much more imperfect cannot produce something more perfect.²⁹

For Scotus, accidents can in no way cause a substance. He makes this clear when he considers the objection:

If the accidents of fire were at their maximum, say having the same quantity as the sphere of fire [in the heavens], and nevertheless were separated from substance, it would then follow that they could not corrupt a drop of water that was existing there, which seems unlikely.³⁰

Scotus finds this apparently absurd position an acceptable consequence:

I concede that, if the entire substance of fire in its [heavenly] sphere were destroyed, and all accidents remained, a drop of water placed there would never be destroyed.

²⁹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., in *Ordinatio, Liber Quartus – a distinctione octava ad decimam tertiam*, ed. B. HECHICH (Opera Omnia XII), Vatican City 2010, p. 360: “Contra hoc, licet ista propositio: ‘Simpliciter imperfectius secundum speciem vel genus non potest esse totale principium activum respectu perfectioris’, sit mihi aequae nota sicut aliqua in Philosophia, qua negata nescirem probare aliquem ordinem entium, immo nec quod primum ens esset perfectissimum, immo posset proterviendo dici, quod totum universum, et quodlibet in eo factum est a musca; si enim arguas, quod musca est ita imperfecta, et tu idem dicis, quod imperfectius potest producere perfectius, habito hoc, nulla est ratio quare non sic imperfectius producere possit aliud sic perfectius. Nec ista protervia posita probari potest quod prima causa sit perfectissima, excellens omnia alia in creatione, nec etiam hoc addito, quod sit causa aequivoca, immo cum hoc posset stare secundum proterviam istam quod esset imperfectissima, vel imperfectior causatis; tamen proba dictam propositionem aliter.”

³⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 369: “Sed contra, quia tunc sequeretur quod accidentia ignis, si essent maxima, utpote tantae quantitatis sicut sphaera ignis, et tamen separata a substantia, non possent corrumpere guttam aquae ibi existentem, quod videtur improbabile. Aliud, quia si accidentia alterantia possunt in quemlibet gradum alterationis sicut prius, ergo ultimum; et per consequens, cum ille ultimus corruptus immediate disponat ad corruptionem substantiae, vel illo corrupto, immediate concomitetur corruptio substantiae, sequitur quod substantia corrumpetur.”

Lest this be called too absurd and contrary to sense, I say that, if there were some active accidents without a subject, and a quantified and qualified substance that was brought to them were to be corrupted, the corruption would be caused not by those accidents, but rather by the universal created agent, namely the heavens, which is the recourse of natural philosophers (*ad quod est fuga naturalium*)...

And if there were some form that the heavens were not enough to bring about, one would have to take recourse in the first cause in absolute, such that it here induces that natural form to which the natural agent disposes.

Nor is this to take recourse in a miracle, because as a rule (*regulariter*) God supplies every shortcoming of all created nature, as is clear in the animation of an organic body (where a miracle is not supposed); so here the entire created nature would not be enough for its generation, nor for its creation, and thus, when nature finishes arranging it, God as a rule supplies the shortcoming of nature.³¹

The followers of Scotus appealed to this rule of nobility such that it practically became the first principle of beltiodynamics: a being can only cause a being of equal or lesser nobility. This is why an object in itself cannot cause an act of intellection, but the intellect must consider the

³¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 369–370: “Ad primum, concedo quod si tota substantia ignis in sphaera sua destrueretur et manerent ibi omnia accidentia, gutta aquae ibi posita numquam destrueretur ab illis; et rationes prius positae hoc concludunt, quia non possunt aliquam aliam substantiam generare, nec corruptio istius potest esse nisi in substantiam, quia non est in nihil, nec in materiam nudam, nec in accidentia, et maxime virtute agentis naturalis, quia natura non potest aliquid annihilare; nec in materiam primam resolvere; nec accidentia facere sine subiecto. —Ne tamen hoc nimis absurdum dicatur et contra sensum, dico quod si accidentia aliqua activa essent sine subiecto, substantia quanta et qualis approximata eis corrumpereetur, sed non ab eis, immo ab agente universali creato, scilicet caelo, ad quod est fuga naturalium, praecipue cum forma hic inducenda sit imperfecta, quae totaliter est in virtute activa caeli, et per consequens nullo particulari agente impediante, immo magis disponente, potest forma ista a caelo induci, sicut inducit quasdam formas imperfectas in materias corruptibilium. —Et si esset aliqua forma, ad quam inducendam coelum non sufficeret, oporteret fugere ad primam causam simpliciter, quia hic induceret istam formam, ad quam agens naturale disponit. —Nec hoc est fugere ad miraculum, quia regulariter omnem impotentiam totius naturae creatae Deus supplet, ut patet in animatione corporis organici, ubi non ponitur miraculum; ita hic tota natura creata non sufficeret ad generationem istam, nec ad corruptionem, et ideo natura disponente ad eam ultimata dispositione, Deus regulariter suppleret impotentiam naturae.”

object, and this is why, for the generation of animals, some higher force must be at play – for the philosophers this force comes from the celestial intelligences, and for theologians, the Scotists say, it is God. There is a gap between the causality that accidents can exercise and that needed to make a living being. To bridge this gap, God acts directly according to His ordained power.³²

Peter Auriol rejects the position of Thomas Aquinas and finds that of John Duns Scotus ridiculous. As he puts it, “More miracles should not be posited for an effect that can be saved by fewer.”³³ In his commentary on book IV of the *Sentences*, he explicitly aligns himself with Averroes and Aristotle while proposing a third way:

Thus I say to the matter at hand that when a natural agent alters matter, in the last instant the agent does not act through its own form to bring out the form, but rather the form in that same instant follows that alteration as the result (*per modum sequelae*) and end of the alteration. I prove this proposition: if in the last instant a substantial form were to flow in by the action of a substantial form, and the accidents were to flow in by other accidents in the preceding alteration, it would follow that, in the absence of the [agent’s] substantial form, accidents could not bring about the form, yet we experience the contrary. Put an egg in manure; experience teaches (*expertum est*) that it hatches. Likewise, there are some animals that never sit on their eggs, such as snakes and some other animals that lay eggs in the sand or in some other warm place, and there they hatch. Then I ask, ‘from what form is the form of this hatchling brought about?’ Not from the manure, nor the sand, nor from the form of the chicken that laid the egg (*pullus ovans*), because it could have died beforehand. Therefore, since it is not evident from what the hatchling comes to be, one must say that it comes to be from those active qualities in such a way that the heat that is in the manure, or the heat of the sun present in the sand changes the matter of this egg until it brings about the quality that is necessary for the form of the hatchling, and

³² For a fuller treatment of the views of Peter Auriol, Walter Burley and Francis of Marchia on accidental causality, see my discussion in T. SUAREZ-NANI and W. DUBA, introduction to FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA*, qq. 13–27, ed. T. SUAREZ-NANI, W. DUBA, E. BABEY and G. ETZKORN (*Opera Philosophica et Theologica II*, 2), Leuven 2010, pp. lviii–lxxxiii, from which the following pages derive.

³³ PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 120a: “ponenda non sunt plura miracula ad aliquem effectum qui potest salvari per pauciora.”

when that quality is brought about, at that same instant, in the manner of a result, the form of the hatchling immediately follows.³⁴

The instrumental theory defended by Thomas Aquinas does not work, because the agent can change: the heat for the egg does not need to come from the chicken that made it. So Auriol proposes that substantial change comes about as the result of a process of alteration. What about Scotus? Auriol dismisses it out of hand:

But it appears to some that the form of the hatchling, which is generated at the instant at which the preceding alteration has been achieved, is brought about by the form of the heavens. Against this: this is the refuge of the wretched (*refugium miserorum*) in philosophy, just as God is the refuge of the wretched in theology.³⁵

Auriol replies to Scotus' appeal to the *fuga naturalium* by calling it the *refugium miserorum*.

³⁴ PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 3, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 15b–16a: “Sciendum est enim quod sicut qui facit domum, non est imaginandum quod primo eleuet lapidem post lapidem, et postquam facta est ultima elevatio lapidis, agens inducit formam domus; sed imaginandum est quod ultima elevatione facta lapidis, sequitur statim eadem actione ex parte agentis per modum sequelae forma domus. Sic dico de sigillo imprimente figuram in cera per motum localem partium; non enim primo est motus localis partium, et deinde, illo completo, figura fit in cera a sigillo, sed figura sequitur immediate motum ipsarum partium per modum cuiusdam sequelae. —Sic dico in proposito: quando agens naturale alterat materiam, in ultimo instanti non agit ad eductionem formae per formam suam, sed forma in eodem instanti sequitur eandem alterationem per modum sequelae et finis alterationis. Hanc autem probo, quoniam, si in ultimo instanti forma substantialis influeret per formam substantialem, et accidentia influerent per praecedentem alterationem alia accidentia, sequeretur quod, absente forma substantiali, non possent accidentia inducere formam, cuius contrarium experimur. Nam pone ovum in fimo, expertum est quod pullificat. Similiter aliqua sunt animalia quae numquam cubant super ova sua, sicut serpens et quaedam alia in sabulo, vel alibi in loco calido, et ibi pullificant. Quaero tunc a qua forma inducitur forma ipsius pulli: non a fimo sive sabulo, nec a forma pulli ovantis, quia potuit ante mori. Ergo, cum non appareat a quo fit, oportet dicere quod fit ab ipsis qualitatibus activis hoc modo quod calor existens in fimo, vel calor solis existens in sabulo, alterat materiam ipsius ovi, quousque inducunt qualitatem quae est necessitas respectu formae pulli, qua qualitate inducta, statim in illo instanti per modum cuiusdam sequelae sequitur forma pulli.”

³⁵ PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 16a: “Videtur autem quibusdam quod forma pulli geniti in instanti quo completa est praecedens alteratio inducitur a forma caeli. Sed contra: hoc est refugium miserorum in philosophia, sicut Deus est refugium miserorum in theologia.” Also cited in A. MAIER, *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 37), third ed. Rome 1968, p. 182, n. 29.

Obviously, Auriol's fellow Franciscans were not very happy with the accusation. Landulph Caracciolo goes to great detail to show that Auriol is, in fact, misreading Averroes, who, on his reading, appeals to the causality of the heavens, precisely "the refuge of the wretched" Auriol thinks should be avoided.³⁶ Francis of Marchia was also furious. In a comment that appears only in the version of his lectures closer to the original *reportatio*, he states:

But concerning animals generated by putrefaction or by propagation when the particular generating animal is corrupted, if they are led back to God [as their cause], this is called the refuge of the wretched. But I say that it is not, because to lead a noble cause back to a less noble cause, as you do, is the refuge of the wretched, rather than to lead a noble cause back to the most noble cause, of which sort is God, as I do.³⁷

³⁶ LANDULPHUS CARACCIOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, conclusio 1, Firenze, B.N.C., Conv. Sopp. G.1.643, f. 3va; also cited in FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA*, qq. 13–27, p. lxxv, n. 85: "Et quod rationes eorum non concordant philosophis, patet. Generatio enim est finis alterationis non quia alteratio inducat formam substantialem, sed quia disponit ad ipsam. —Quod dicunt quod complexionibus causatis in passo sequatur forma substantialis, improbat Commentator VII *Metaphysicae*, commento 31, ubi dicit 'in semine non est anima in actu, et omne quod est in potentia indiget aliquo quod est in actu et omne quod est in potentia indiget aliquo quod est in actu extrahente ipsum, et non possumus confingere quod animae sunt ex complexionibus nisi secundum opinionem dicentem animam esse complexionem'. —Quod ulterius dicunt de forma pulli et de ovo pullificante, verum est effective; tamen possumus recurrere ad formam caeli, quae est refugium miserorum in philosophia. Et est expresse contra Commentatorem in eodem commento, qui dicit in habentibus semen, 'semina... dant formas rerum generatarum... in generabilibus autem non ex semine... apparet quod corpora caelestia sunt illa quae dant aliquid loco seminis et virtutum quae sunt in seminibus... Et omnia ista sunt virtutes divinae, generantes sibi similia... Et Aristoteles, libro *De animalibus*, dicit quod sunt similes intelligentiarum... Et Commentator subdit quod ista virtus immissa a corporibus celestibus est illa quem magnificat Aristoteles et attribuit eam divinis, non naturalibus. —Item, Commentator dicit XII *Metaphysicae*, commento 18, quod non 'dicit Aristoteles quod genitur homo ex sole et homine, dicit et factus est iste calor in terra et aqua ex calore solis commixto cum calore aliarum stellarum, et ideo sol et aliae stellae sunt principium cuiuslibet vivi in natura. Calor igitur solis et stellarum diffusius in aqua et terra generat animalia nata ex putrefactione, et universaliter omnia quae fiunt'. Et videtur quod Commentator accepit in toto commento isto quod corpora caelestia materiam disponant per calores et demum inducunt formas substantiales."

³⁷ FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIB*, q. 31, ed. G. ETZKORN, forthcoming; also cited in the introduction to FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA*,

By the time Francis of Marchia lectured in 1320, another opinion on natural causality had surfaced at Paris and attracted his attention. In one of the earliest known series of *principia* disputations, dating from around 1314, Walter Burley defended an explanation based on virtual causality; his solution became quickly known and discussed at Paris.³⁸ Some years later, Burley revised his Paris principal disputation into a work known as the *Tractatus Primus*. In that text, Burley proposes a solution to the problem of accidental causality by positing a distinction with respect to virtual containment. On this account, there are two ways in which one thing can virtually contain another: (A) according to nobility or perfection and (B) according to causality or activity. By separating nobility (A) from causation (B), Burley explains that a less-noble being can still have greater causality. Being endowed with the power to cause something else (B), Burley argues, is entirely different from (A) a more perfect being being virtually containing a less perfect one (such as an inferior angel).³⁹

In his commentary on book IV of the *Sentences*, q. 22 (published here as Appendix H), Francis of Marchia defends a theory of accidental causation aligned with Scotus and criticizes the opinions of Thomas Aquinas,

qq. 13–27, p. lxxix): “Sed de animalibus generatis per putrefactionem vel propagationem corrupto particulari generante, si reducantur in Deum, hoc dicitur refugium miserorum. Dico tamen quod non, quia reducere effectum nobilem in causam minus nobilem est potius refugium miserorum, sicut tu facis, quam reducere effectum nobilem in causam nobilissimam, cuiusmodi est Deus, sicut ego facio.”

³⁸ For the discussion of Burley’s *principium* in the *Quodlibet* of Radulphus Brito, see the introduction to FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA*, qq. 13–27, pp. lxxiii–lxx. On Walter Burley’s *Tractatus primus* see E. SYLLA, “*Disputationes Collativae*: Walter Burley’s *Tractatus Primus* and Gregory of Rimini’s *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*”, in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 22 (2011), pp. 383–464; L.M. DE RIJK, “Burley’s so-called *Tractatus Primus*, with an edition of the Additional Quaestio ‘Utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio’”, in *Vivarium* 34 (1996), pp. 161–191.

³⁹ GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, *Tractatus primus*, conclusio prima, ed. SYLLA, forthcoming: “Ad rationes quae sunt contra istam opinionem. Ad primam dico dupliciter: uno modo quod continere aliud virtualiter est dupliciter, vel secundum gradum perfectionis et nobilitatis vel secundum gradum causalitatis seu activitatis. Et istae continentiae sunt diversae, quoniam species universi se habent ut numeri, ita quod sicut numerus maior continet minorem ita species perfectior continet imperfectiorem secundum gradum nobilitatis et perfectionis. Et tamen certum est quod non omnis species perfectior continet imperfectiorem secundum gradum activitatis et causalitatis. Nam intelligentia superior continet inferiorem secundum gradum perfectionis, non tamen secundum gradum activitatis, quia intelligentia superior non potest producere intelligentiam inferiorem.”

Peter Auriol and Walter Burley. Francis of Marchia presents Burley's view with an important distortion, one that enables the influence of Marchia's account to be measured. The beltodynamic principle, the rule that more noble things cause less noble things, is so fundamental to his thought that he renders Burley's division between nobility and causation as one between different sorts of nobility: (A') eminence of entity and (B') eminence of activity [§29].

Ten years after Francis of Marchia's lectures on the *Sentences*, William of Brienne had his turn. Lecturing on book IV, d. 12–13 and the question of accidental causality, William pulled together Scotus and Marchia. *Lectio* 64 (published here as Appendix E), the third lecture on book IV, d. 12, and the first on d. 13, announces four questions: 1. Whether separate accidents can be the producing principle of substance, 2. Whether they can be the corrupting principle, 3. Whether substance can be generated from them, and 4. Whether they can be naturally corrupted by a natural agent. William treats the first two questions together, and he is so taken with the topic that at the end of the lecture he has to dispose summarily of the last two questions. He begins (noting the post-lecture additions in the translation as well):

To the first two questions I say that they cannot [be the principle of production or corruption of a substance], because if they were, it would be either insofar as they are instruments of substance, or as the result (*per modum sequelae*), or because they are active principles \of a substance/, and as such are more perfect \although with respect to entity they are less perfect/ than substances; but accidents, joined to their subjects or in separation, are not principles in any of these ways; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear by sufficient division according to the various opinions, which are three; I prove the minor [§3].

William claims that there are only three ways that separate accidents could possibly be the producing or corrupting principle, and these three ways match three positions on the topic. The three positions are clearly those of Thomas Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Burley.

For Thomas Aquinas, William turns to Scotus. Since, however, Scotus' *Ordinatio* account of Thomas Aquinas is taken verbatim from Thomas' *Sentences* commentary, the dependence alone is not conclusive proof that William copies from Scotus:

Table 14: Aquinas' doctrine of instrumental accidental action in the *Ordinatio* and in *lectio* 64

#	THOMAS DE AQUINO, IV <i>Sent.</i> , d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, ed. MOOS, p. 509; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, <i>Ordinatio</i> IV, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana, pp. 351–352.	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E).
1	Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod in actionibus naturalibus formae substantiales non sunt immediatum actionis principium, sed agunt median- tibus qualitatibus activis et passivis, si- cut propriis instrumentis;	[4] Quod non primum sit verum, scilicet quod sint instrumenta productionis substantie,
2	ut dicitur in 2 <i>De anima</i> , quod calor naturalis est quo anima agit;	[5] et ratio tamen ad eam est quia calor anime intro- ducit formam carnis, II <i>De anima</i> .
3	et ideo qualitates non solum agunt in virtute propria, sed etiam in virtute for- mae substantialis. Unde actio earum non solum terminatur ad formam ac- cidentalem, sed etiam ad formam sub- stantialem; et propter hoc generatio est terminus alterationis. Huiusmodi autem virtutem instrumentalem recipi- unt eo ipso quo a principiis essentialibus causantur.	[6] Et confirmatur, quia in virtute propria possunt pro- ducere accidentia; ergo in virtute substantie plus, et hoc non est nisi substan- tiam, etc.
4	Unde sicut remotis substantiis re- manet accidentibus idem esse secun- dum speciem virtute divina, ita etiam remanet eis eadem virtus quae et prius; et ideo, sicut ante poterant immutare ad formam substantialem, ita et nunc.	[7] Et quia coniuncta hoc poterant, ideo et separata.

William's summary of the opinion could either come directly from Thomas or mediated through Scotus. When, however, William argues against Thomas, he reveals his debt to Scotus. He presents two short arguments against Thomas that accidents cannot act in virtue of substances, namely, because a substance does not have an active force [§8],⁴⁰ and

⁴⁰ William's point in §8 is not clear, and four possible interpretations can be advanced: first, the passage can be read: *arguo primo, quando dicitur 'accidens in virtute substantiae', quod nullam virtutem activam habet*, that is, the expression

because Thomas' position is contradictory, holding on the one hand that accidents act in virtue of the substances they inhere in, and, on the other, that, since they do so when they inhere in substances, they do so all the more when they do not inhere in any subject [§9]. Then he levels his major criticism, built on that of Scotus, but with some modifications. At the origin of Brienne's criticism lies Scotus' objection:

Against this, I ask what is understood by the expression 'in virtue of substance?' Because, whether he means something absolute or relative, I ask, "what is it in?" If it is an absolute that is substance or that is in substance, since the substance of bread simply does not exist, it follows that an accident will generate by nothing (or non-being) or in virtue of nothing. If he means an absolute that is an accident, or something in an accident, there is nothing there more noble than an accident, and consequently, no more can it cause something more perfect in virtue of such an accident than it can in virtue of itself. But if he means the habit of an accident to a substance as to its prior cause, since no habit is with respect to nothing, and the bread is not some being, it follows that by the statement that it is 'in virtue' something positive is not supposed, and so, the same as above.⁴¹

in virtute illius assigns no active force to the accident; rather the substance has the active force, and therefore, the substance, not the accident, causes a substance. More likely, this passage derives from Scotus' statement (n. 43, below): "nihil est causa instrumentalis respectu illius ad quod sua virtus activa sola sufficit producendum." The substance has no active force, because the accident by itself has the active force; therefore the accident cannot be an instrument of the substance. Third, one could read this passage as yet another appeal to the case of a non-existent subject in the Eucharist, and so the sense would be: "it is in virtue of what has no active force, because it does not exist." Fourth (and least likely), it might be a dialectical argument, claiming that the subject of inherence *qua* subject is purely passive with respect to the actuality of the inhering accident; therefore, the actively inhering accident cannot get activity from its passive subject.

⁴¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 352: "Contra istud, quaero quid intelligitur per hoc quod dicitur 'in virtute substantiae'? Quia sive intelligat absolutum sive respectum, quaero in quo est illud? Si 'absolutum quod est substantia' vel 'quod est aliquid in substantia', cum substantia panis non sit simpliciter, sequitur quod per nihil vel non-ens accidens generabit vel virtute nihili! Si intelligat 'absolutum quod est accidens' vel 'aliquid in accidente', nihil est ibi nobilius accidente, et per consequens non magis potest in virtute talis in aliquid perfectius quam in virtute propria. —Si vero intelligat habitudinem accidentis ad substantiam ut ad causam priorem, cum ad nihil non sit aliqua habitudo, et panis non sit aliquod ens, sequitur quod per hoc quod est 'in virtute' non ponitur aliquid positivum, et ita idem quod prius."

Scotus explores the possible meanings of “in virtue of substance” and finds them all wanting: if such an expression refers to substance, to something in the substance, or to the fact that substance first caused the accident, then the case of the Eucharist falsifies the account. If, on the other hand, it refers to an accident or something in an accident, then the problem of noble causality persists. He therefore concludes that the expression intends to refer to a relationship of co-causality, which again cannot work because the substance does not exist when the accident causes something.⁴² Finally, he attacks the argument from the notion of instrument:

Nothing is an instrumental cause with respect to an effect that it can sufficiently produce by its own active force. This is clear, if ‘tool’ (*instrumentum*) is taken strictly, as a saw and an axe are called tools that, when moved, move; for such a tool does not have of itself a form sufficient for bringing about the effect, but what is produced is produced only by the motion of the principal agent. Even if ‘tool’ is taken according to the other ways set out above, namely as an inferior [subordinate] cause is called a tool, or as the form that this sort of cause receives by the motion of a superior agent, by which form it acts, still none of these tools is able by its form to bring about the effect with respect to which it is a tool, but it is necessary that that of which it is a tool, co-causing, works at the same time to that effect.⁴³

⁴² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana, p. 353: “Ex his verbis videtur quod ponat illam virtutem esse instrumentaliter in accidente: dicit enim quod causatur illa virtus in accidentibus, vel quod ‘ipsa recipiunt huiusmodi virtutem instrumentalem eo quod causantur a principiis essentialibus substantiae’. Et tunc sequitur manifeste, cum nihil in accidente sit nobilius eo accidente, non potest accidens per hoc quod dicitur primo in virtute vel per hanc virtutem, in aliquid perfectius quam possit ex se et per se. —Sed verus intellectus istorum verborum ‘in virtute talis causae’, ubi dicta verba locum habent, videtur esse iste, scilicet quod dicit habitudinem causae inferioris ad causam superiorem sive perfectiorem concurrentem in causando, sicut supra dictum est quod influentia — quam recipit agens inferius a superiore — non est aliqua forma tunc causata, sed est tantum ordo determinatus causarum in simul agendo sive causando. —Item, quod non est, nullam rationem causae habet respectu geniti quando generatur, II *Physicorum* et V *Metaphysicae* cap. ‘De causa’, quia ‘causa in actu et effectus in actu simul sunt et non sunt’. Et patet per rationem, quia non-ens, quando non est, nihil causat in quocumque ordine causae; substantia autem non est quam istud accidens affecit et cuius erat accidens; ergo illa substantia nullam rationem causae habet propinqua vel remotae respectu effectus causati ab accidente, — et per consequens accidens non causat aliquid in virtute eius tamquam in virtute causae superioris.”

⁴³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 12, pars 2, q. un., ed. Vaticana,

In this criticism, Scotus focuses on the inactivity of an instrument: a tool has no force of its own; the agent applies force through it; but in accidental causality, the accident appears to have a force of its own that it applies irrespective of the agent. The reality of the Eucharist underlies all of Scotus' arguments: the accidents appear to exist independently of the substance, and therefore, cannot act in virtue of a non-existent substance. Appeals to the subject of inherence do not therefore save the principle of noble causation.

In *lectio* 64, William of Brienne's criticism of the instrumental solution follows Scotus' arguments, but with a significant development: a passage added after the lesson uses an example of a tool that implies a response to Scotus:

Again, \it is asked/, what is the meaning of the expression 'acting in virtue of the substance'? Either because [the accidents] are the forces (*virtus*) of substance ~~etc.~~, or they act by a virtue that ~~proceeds~~ \existss subjectively/ in substance, \or by a force that proceeds from the substance, as an arsonist burns by means of fire/. If the first case, then my point is made, because then accidents act by their own force; but if in the second way, this is a contradiction in the case of separate accidents; but if in the third way, \as an arsonist by means of fire burns a house, because he expects the fire that he applies to act, and thus accidents presuppose their substance to act/, this does not hold, instead the substance rather acts in virtue of the accidents, as is clear, because \substance/ they presuppose the power of the substance, therefore etc. And thus the first branch of the division is not true [§10].

The passage is directly modeled on that of Scotus, beginning with the rhetorical question "what does 'in virtue of the substance' refer to?" William of Brienne also follows Scotus in considering the cases of 'in

pp. 353–354: "Item, nihil est causa instrumentalis respectu illius ad quod sua virtus activa sola sufficit producendum, – patet, si accipiat 'instrumentum' stricte, sicut serra et securis dicuntur instrumenta moventia mota: tale enim instrumentum non habet de se formam sufficientem ad producendum effectum, sed tantum per motionem principalis agentis producit quod producit. Si etiam instrumentum accipiat secundum alios modos supra positos, scilicet prout inferior causa dicitur instrumentum vel forma quam huiusmodi causa recipit per motionem agentis superioris, qua forma agit, adhuc nullum istorum instrumentorum per formam suam potest in effectum respectu cuius est instrumentum, sed necesse est quod ad illum effectum concurrat simul concausans illud cuius est instrumentum. Nunc autem accidens per formam suam praecise, sine omni actione substantiae, in quodcumque agat, agit; ergo nullo modo agit in virtute substantiae vel ut instrumentum eius ad aliquem effectum."

virtue of the substance' referring to the substance or something in the substance, on the one hand, and to the accident or something in the accident, on the other; Brienne addresses them in an inverted order, but the sense and the arguments are the same. Yet where Scotus' text continues to consider the case of habits, Brienne's third way proposes an example involving an arsonist, quite unlike anything found in Scotus, or contemporary Franciscans, for that matter.

The positive description of the third way ("as an arsonist by means of fire") occurs entirely in the margin; in class, the *reportator* left no blank spaces to fill in later; the first reported mention of the third way is its rejection. The unrevised text from the classroom replied to an unstated third way by saying that the substance acts in virtue of the accidents, as accidents require a substance's power to act. Such a statement evokes Scotus' final argument, "Nothing is an instrumental cause with respect to an effect that it can sufficiently produce by its own active force"; obversely, an instrumental cause is one that requires some other active force to produce, and this is where Brienne's argument can be understood, namely that an agent acts in virtue of a tool more than a tool acts in virtue of an agent. If that is the case, where does the example of the arsonist come from? The easiest answer would be that William, or whoever was correcting the *reportatio*, simply came up with an answer on the spot. But a better answer can be found, once the question is reformulated to 'what advantage does the example of the arsonist have over Scotus' example of the saw and the axe?' Scotus' account of tools, based on the Aristotelian example of a saw, assumes that tools are merely mechanisms for translating the power of the agent. To his statement, 'none of these tools is able by its form to bring about an effect by the form with respect to which it is an tool', one could object that an arsonist uses fire as a tool to burn a house; to an arsonist, fire is a tool, and, even if an arsonist does not use it, it is capable of generating fire, which is the form with respect to which it is a tool. Yet, even in this case, Brienne argues, the instrumental (as opposed to natural) causality of the torch requires the agent to apply it, and therefore cannot apply itself without an agent. The example of the arsonist implicitly replies to an objection to Scotus based on what might be called 'power tools'.

If William of Brienne's presentation and refutation of Thomas Aquinas's position is inspired by Scotus, when he comes to describing and criticizing the doctrines of Peter Auriol and Walter Burley, he draws upon Francis of Marchia, specifically Francis of Marchia's commentary

on the *Sentences*, book IV, q. 23. As Table 15a shows, Marchia’s account gathers together Auriol’s comments in book IV, d. 1 and d. 12; William of Brienne follows the same reconstruction and even uses the same expressions as Marchia, such as the use of the verb *coexigo* (#1), which Auriol does not use in this context, but Francis of Marchia does. Brienne also diverges from both Auriol and Marchia’s summary of Auriol, most notably in the elimination of the notion that alteration and generation accompany each other (*concomitantes*), in favor of a simplification, namely that alteration is prior to generation. Here, William of Brienne is getting Auriol from Francis of Marchia.

Table 15a: William of Brienne, *lectio* 64, Auriol’s position as mediated by Francis of Marchia

#	PETRUS AUREOLI, <i>IV Sent.</i> , ed. Romae 1605.	FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, <i>IV Sent.</i> , q. 23 (Appendix H).	GUIELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E).
1	[IV.1.1.3, p. 15b] Ego autem eligo opinionem Philosophi et Commentatoris, propter quod pono istam propositionem, quod agens principale in generatione substantiae, de qua est sermo, non inducit per formam suam immediate in materia formam substantialem, sic quod in fine alterationis cesset actio agentis instrumentalis, et forma inducatur actione agentis principalis. Non enim imaginor, quod alia actione agat agens principale et secundarium, puta generans et alterans. Sed puto quod	[10] Quantum ad primum, est unus modus dicendi quod duplex est principium generationis: quoddam determinativum tantum determinans et coexigens sibi formam ad determinatum effectum determinatam, aliud transmutativum passi de potentia ad actum. Tunc dicunt quod substantia est principium generationis primo modo. Determinat enim sibi non effective, sed tantum coexigitive, determinata accidentia determinatam virtutem habentia; ipsa autem accidentia sunt totale principium	[14] Nec valet secundum membrum, licet unus doctor dicat quod mutatio \simpliciter/ et alteratio non distinguuntur nisi ratione terminorum. \Dicit enim quod generatio et alteratio non distinguuntur ex parte principii effectivi – est enim idem, scilicet accidens – sed ex parte terminorum, quia terminus accidens est terminus immediatus alterationis, sed per modum sequele terminus est forma substantialis/. Ratio: quia forma substantialis diversa requirit diversam materiam propinquam, et ideo

	<p>generatio et alteratio sint una simplex actio. Dico autem, quod sunt una actio in ordine ad agens, licet non in ordine ad terminum. Hoc autem apparet, si consideremus, quod generatio est finis alterationis. Non ergo forma substantialis est per se et immediate ab alio agente quam ab alterante, immo naturaliter forma substantialis est sequela alterationis, et ideo accidentia inducunt formam substantialem [16a] per modum sequelae eo, quod generatio finis est alterationis. Accidentia enim inducunt dispositiones necessitantes in materia, quae sunt necessantes respectu formae inducendae, quibus acquisitis in materia statim ibi sequitur forma substantialis per modum finis et sequelae.</p>	<p>generationis secundo modo, videlicet transmutativum, ita quod substantia secundum istos non facit aliquid effective, sed tantum coexigit accidentia determinata et secundum determinatum gradum et proportionem, que quidem in quocumque subiecto posita et secundum eandem proportionem essent causa eiusdem substantie. Tunc ergo dicunt quod accidens per se et directe generat accidens, ut calor calorem, secundario autem et indirecte sicut per modum sequelae generat quasi per quandam concomitantiam substantiam.</p>	<p>coexigitive forma substantialis determinatum accidens tale in materia. Sed aliter \se habent/ accidentia ad formam substantialem, quia per modum [87r] sequele.</p>
2	<p>[IV.12.3, p. 117a–b] Dico ergo quod accidentia in sacramento possunt agere ad eductionem formae substantialis in passo approximato, haec propositio licet dependeat ab eis quae</p>	<p>[11] Pro ista opinione arguitur primo sic: quandocumque sunt alique due mutationes necessario se comitantes quoddam ordine, quod potest in primam, et in secundam, alias non</p>	<p>[15] Ratio \pro illa opinione prima est:/ quando\que enim/ due mutationes se habent \ad invicem/ quod inseparabiliter sunt connexe et una prior \est/, alia posterior, quidquid</p>

	<p>dixi distinctione prima, probo tamen eam nunc unica ratione sic: Quando duae mutationes concomitantur se ad inuicem necessario, ita quod si una sit necessario per concomitantiam, ponitur alia eadem actione, et eodem priuilegio formali ponitur in esse una et alia: sed secundum mentem Philosophi generatio et alteratio sunt duae mutationes, habentes se necessario per concomitantiam; nam impossibile est, quod alteratio sit ultimata quo ad terminum, puta quod omnes dispositiones ponantur in ultimo instanti, quin in eodem fiat forma; sicut si caliditas, et raritas fiant in summo, necessario per concomitantiam sit forma ignis, ut necessaria quaedam sequela: ergo.</p>	<p>concomitarentur se necessario. Sed generatio et alteratio sunt due mutationes se necessario concomitantes; generatio enim concomitatur necessario alterationem; ergo agens potens in alterationem potest in generationem, et in eius terminum. Sed accidens virtute propria potest in alterationem totam generationi previam. Ergo in terminum generationis per modum sequele.</p>	<p>potest in priorem, et posteriorem; sed acciden. generatio et alteratio sunt huiusmodi, \et alteratio est prior generatione, et accidens effective potest in alterationem; ideo etc./</p>
3	<p>Confirmo hoc, quoniam da oppositum, sequitur, quod forma substantialis bis fiet, semel per concomitantiam, et semel per actionem directe terminatam ad eam, quod est inconueniens.</p>	<p>[12] Preterea secundo arguitur sic: eadem substantia non producit simul bis; si substantia producit ab accidente per concomitantiam, ergo non potest produci per se sive ab alia substantia, quia tunc</p>	<p>[16] Secundo sic: impossibile est idem duabus producentibus produci; sed hoc sequeretur nisi esset idem principium. Probatio: \quia \substantia/ accidens semel produceretur ab accidente</p>

		bis produceretur, semel per concomitantiam ab accidente, et semel per se ab alia substantia.	alteratione et semel a forma substantiali ipsa generatione, quod est inconveniens/. Et ideo sicut coniuncta poterunt, sic etiam separata.
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William of Brienne’s summary of Auriol’s position matches that of Francis of Marchia; it follows Marchia’s reconstruction of the argument from two separate places in the surviving text from Auriol, and it only witnesses those elements of Auriol’s text that can be found in Marchia’s commentary. Admittedly, the very end of the passage (#3) is inconvenient, where William of Brienne summarizes Marchia’s gloss of Auriol’s *confirmatio*. Marchia explains the passage as an argument. On Marchia’s account, Auriol argues that the same substance cannot be produced twice at the same time; yet, if the principle behind alteration and generation is not the same, then the same substance would be produced twice, once by the accidental change and once by the substance. Brienne follows that explanation, but adds the last phrase after the lecture, along with the conclusion, “which is absurd” (*quod est inconveniens*), an expression found in the original text by Auriol, but not Marchia’s summary. Brienne might have taken this last phrase directly from Auriol, but it is likely a coincidence.

Brienne’s reply to Auriol also comes from Francis of Marchia (Table 15b).

Table 15b: William of Brienne, *lectio* 64, response to Auriol in relation to Francis of Marchia

	FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, <i>IV Sent.</i> , q. 23 (Appendix H)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E)
4	[15] Contra istam opinionem arguo primo sic: prius essentiali ordine non est sequela posterioris nisi virtute alicuius prioris illo posteriori; sed substantia est prior essentialiter accidente; ergo non potest esse sequela accidentis nisi virtute alicuius prioris accidente. Sed prius accidente non est nisi substantia; ergo	[17] Contra arguitur sic: illud quod est simpliciter altero prius non potest esse sequela illius essentiali ordine; sed substantia est simpliciter prior accidente; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia sic idem esset essentialiter prius et posterius; minor VII <i>Metaphysice</i> .

	etc. Sed non potest esse sequela accidentis virtute substantie, ut substantia habet precise rationem subiecti accidentis; quia subiectum non dat sequelam per modum efficientis; ergo substantia que sequitur alterationem sequitur virtute substantie ut efficientis, quod est propositum.	
5	[16] Preterea secundo, nullus terminus per accidens potest esse perfectior termino per se in ordine ad idem agens, licet bene respectu diversorum; tunc enim ens per accidens esset perfectius ente per se. Sed substantia que est terminus per accidens alterationis est perfectior qualitate que est terminus per se eius; ergo ipsa substantia est ab alio principio quod agit necessario ad alterationem previam; hoc autem non potest poni nisi substantia; ergo etc.	[18] Et confirmatur: terminus simpliciter posterior et accidentalis non est perfectior \et principium/ quacumque mutatione simplici(\simplex <i>cod.</i>) substantiali; sed accidentalis est huiusmodi ad substantialem; ideo etc.
6	[17] Preterea, nullum agens potest in terminum perfectiorem suo termino per se et sibi adequato; sed substantia est perfectior quocumque accidente; ergo non potest esse terminus per accidens actionis alicuius accidentis.	[19] Tertio sic: illud quod dependet ab alio quantum ad suum esse & \et/ est natura posterius illo, et duratione, {non potest esse principium productivum eius}; sed accidens est huiusmodi ad substantiam, quia substantia \est prior accidente natura, tempore et ratione VII <i>Metaphysice</i> /.
7	[63–11] Ad argumenta illarum opinionum. Ad primum prime, quando arguitur ‘quando sunt due mutationes se concomitantes necessario’, etc., dico quod verum est quando ille mutationes ex natura propria ipsarum, non ratione alicuius extrinseci connectentis eas, se necessario concomitantur; quando autem sunt concomitantes se non ex natura mutationum sed tantum ex ratione principiorum extrinsecorum	[20–15] Nec rationes valent. Ad primam, ‘quando due mutationes’, etc., dico quod actiones esse coniunctas est dupliciter: vel ratione rei intrinsece, vel ratione connectentis extrinsece. Primo modo concedo maiorem, sed non secundo(\primo <i>corr.</i>) modo. Sed minor est vero secundo modo et non primo modo, quia ratione principiorum sunt annexe alteratio et generatio.

	<p>quorum unum, videlicet principium actionis posterioris coniunctum principio actionis sive mutationis prioris, est necessario principium actionis sue, prima actione a primo principio precedente, tunc est maior falsa, quia tunc non oportet quod potens in primam mutationem sive actionem possit in secundam que ad illam concomitatur necessario precise ratione principii eius coniuncti principio actionis prioris. Tunc ad minorem, quando dicitur quod generatio et alteratio se necessario concomitantur, dico quod non est verum ex natura mutationum, cum possit una poni sine alia absolute. Potest enim alteratio a generatione absolvi, sed concomitantur se tantum ratione principiorum, quoniam principium alterationis est accidens; principium vero generationis est substantialis forma. Que quidem substantia, quia agit necessario in materia sufficienter disposita, cum agat naturaliter, ideo dispositione precedente per alterationem factam ab accidente, sequitur necessario generatio non ab accidente alterante, sed a substantia sibi coniuncta.</p>	
8	<p>[64–12] Ad secundum, quando dicitur quod tunc substantia eadem bis produceretur, dico quod non sequitur, quia substantia non producit concomitanter per se, sed per accidens; per se autem producit a substantia sine concomitantia; concomitanter autem non nisi per accidens pro quanto substantia producus est coniuncta principio alteranti.</p>	<p>[21–16] Ad aliam, ‘idem non potest’, etc., verum est, et quando dicitur ‘sequeretur hoc’, nego. Numquam enim in virtute principii alterantis forma substantialis accipit esse.</p>

Finally, a similar situation occurs with the position attributed to Walter Burley: the exposition and refutation in William of Brienne follows that in Francis of Marchia. The very first paragraph of Brienne's discussion reveals his debt to the *Doctor succinctus*:

Table 16: William of Brienne's derivation of Burley's opinion from Francis of Marchia

FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, <i>IV Sent.</i> , q. 23 (Appendix H)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E)
[29] Tertius modus est apparentior predictis, quod aliquid esse nobilius alio potest esse dupliciter, quia vel eminentia entitatis, vel eminentia activitatis. Iste enim sunt due preeminentie separabiles et alterius rationis. In numeris enim est ordo preeminentie secundum entitatem, non tamen secundum activitatem; licet enim species superior contineat speciem inferiorem quantum ad entitatem, non tamen est eius effectiva causa. Similiter, quantitas est perfectior qualitate in entitate, non tamen secundum activitatem, immo ut sic est imperfectior.	[22] Nec tertium valet, licet unus doctor hic dicat, quia dicit quod potest aliquid esse eminens secundum entitatem et non secundum activitatem, ut patet de speciebus \ordinatis essentialer adinvicem, quarum tamen superior non est semper activior inferiori, licet sit eminentior in entitate/.
[30] Nunc autem constat quod agens non agit nisi ut est activum, ex quo sequitur quod aliquis effectus non requirit causam perfectiorem nec eque perfectam quantum ad entitatem, sed tantum secundum activitatem, ex quo sequitur quod imperfectius secundum entitatem potest esse causa alicuius perfectioris secundum entitatem, dum tamen sit eo perfectius secundum activitatem. Et ita, licet accidens sit imperfectius substantia secundum entitatem, quia tamen est perfectius ea secundum activitatem, ideo etc.	Et ideo dicunt quod accidens potest esse principium productivum substantie et sic nobilius secundum activitatem, licet non secundum entitatem.
[31] Pro ista opinione arguitur primo sic: illud quod potest in dispositionem necessitantem ad formam substantialem potest in ipsam, quia [P 211ra] quod potest in antecedens potest in	Et potest sic argui: quod potest introducere dispositionem necessitantem ad aliquam formam substantialem etiam potest illam formam introducere – illa

consequens quod sequitur necessario ad antecedens; sed accidens in virtute propria quocumque alio circumscripto potest in formam sive dispositionem necessitantem ad substantialem formam; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia dispositio necessitans ad formam ignis est calor in tali gradu, puta summus; sed calor potest in talem, quoniam, si tantus calor potest in tantum, et summus potest in summum; ergo etc	patet; sed accidens est huiusmodi; ideo etc.
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William of Brienne copies Francis of Marchia's deformation of Burley's position. As mentioned above, Burley argues for a distinction between virtual containment (A) according to nobility or perfection and (B) according to causality or activity. Yet Francis of Marchia interprets this view as being a distinction between (A') eminence of entity and (B') eminence of activity. William of Brienne presents the same view, and many of the same words to describe it come through. Either Brienne had Marchia's text in front of him while lecturing, or he had studied it extensively while preparing for the day's lecture. Almost all of Brienne's treatment can be found in Francis of Marchia, and the derivation can be rendered schematically on a table, according to the paragraph numbers used in the editions in the appendices:

Table 17: Burley's opinion and refutation in Francis of Marchia and William of Brienne

FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, <i>IV Sent.</i> , q. 23 (Appendix H)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E)
29–31	22
32	23
33	24
34	25
	26–29
66–69	30
70–71	31–35
72	38
73–77	36–37

An examination of the corresponding passages shows that the text in Brienne follows Francis of Marchia to varying degrees of fidelity. There are two points where Brienne breaks entirely from Marchia, and they relate to Scotus' *Ordinatio*. In one case, Brienne salts Burley's view with an objection to Scotus; in the other, he presents Scotus' thesis as the refutation of Burley.

First, William of Brienne adds an example to those in Marchia's account:

Table 18: William of Brienne's interpolated example

FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, <i>In IV Sent.</i> , q. 23 (Appendix H)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 64 (Appendix E)
[34] Preterea, illud quod in quocumque subiecto positum producit substantiam eandem sive eiusdem rationis producit illam virtute propria, non virtute subiecti; nam, si virtute subiecti produceret, produceret non eandem sed diversas, cum subiecta ponantur diversa; sed calor ignis, et sic de aliis accidentibus, est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor probatur dupliciter, primo sic: illud quod uniformiter disponit materiam uniformiter perficit eam; sed calor et quodcumque accidens uniformiter disponit materiam, sed non perficit nec disponit eam immediate, sed tantum forma substantiali ab eo inducta; ergo etc. Secundo etiam probatur experimento. Ex ovo enim anseris per fomentum galline et calorem eius extrinsecum proportionatum generatur anser; ergo sequitur quod calor iste – et sic de alio accidente quocumque in quocumque subiecto ponatur – secundum eandem proportionem est causa eiusdem substantie, ut patet de isto calore extrinseco anseris et galline. Preterea tertio, hoc idem patet de motu qui semper causat ignem a quocumque fiat.	[25] Quarto, si 1 non, tunc totus(1tota <i>corr.</i>) calor spere ignis non posset unam guttam aque corrumpere, et sunt multa exempla alia, \scilicet/ de collisione lapidum, ex quibus \recte motus/ generatur ignis. Et patet de generante ubi est virtus formativa, que est accidens producens formam substantialem fetus.

On Marchia's account, Burley gives two examples of heat causing a substance, that a chicken completing the development of a duck fetus, and that of a movement that causes fire. William of Brienne gives two analogous cases: the development of a fetus and two stones striking together to generate fire. Yet Brienne adds a third at the beginning: all the heat of the sphere of fire would not be enough to corrupt a single drop of water. Burley never considered the specific example,⁴⁴ but the objection was certainly mentioned in Scotus.⁴⁵

With the example of the sphere of fire, William of Brienne puts words in the mouths of his adversaries, manipulating the text to justify the intercession of the Subtle Doctor in a debate that took place after his death. Thus, at the end of the question, he triumphantly introduces the Subtle Doctor: "And therefore, 'if the whole sphere', etc., Our Doctor says that, in virtue of itself, that heat could not corrupt a single drop of water" [§36]. Brienne delivers the punchline he himself set up.

The following paragraphs begin with another bold declaration of 'Our Doctor', namely "no total productive principle of some affect can be \simply/ less perfect than that whole thing \or effect/ produced" [§26]. Brienne brings in the beltodynamic principle. He then follows with what may be arguments of his own invention.

In *lectio* 64, Brienne engages a topic of metaphysical and physical debate in the fourteenth century, the issue of the role of accidents in generation. He works his sources so that Scotus' *Ordinatio* provides the frame of the debate and the conclusion. In fact, for Brienne, the goal is not to explain the role that accidents play in generation, but rather to exclude their playing a role by refuting every contemporary argument, such that the reader is left with Scotus' appeal to divine causality. Brienne takes Thomas Aquinas' view and its refutation from the Subtle Doctor, but he gets Peter Auriol and Walter Burley primarily from Francis of Marchia, and so his presentation reflects Marchia's distortions of the view. He arranges the exposition that Scotus comes out the hero, posthumously vanquishing his enemies. The post-lecture

⁴⁴ In fact, Burley does argue that heat can corrupt water, although not in the terms that Brienne uses, see GUALTERUS BURLAEUS, *Tractatus primus*, conclusio 1, ed. SYLLA, forthcoming: "Quarto potest argui ad principale sic: istud quod in virtute propria potest in corruptionem unius substantiae, istud in virtute propria potest in generationem alterius substantiae. Sed calor in virtute propria potest corrumpere aquam, quia in virtute propria potest calor summus inducere calorem impossibilem formae aquae et per consequens potest in virtute propria corrumpere aquam. Ergo in virtute propria potest aliam substantiam producere."

⁴⁵ See above, p. 154.

revisions were, once again, made without reference to the sources, as Brienne's example of the arsonist shows.

Lectio 26: Distinguishing Divine Simplicity

This pattern of basing the *lectio* on Scotus and updating it with material from later authors appears throughout Brienne's commentary. For example, in *lectiones* 102 and 103, on elements in mixtures, William proposes to look at the problem from the perspective of the philosophers, and for this he uses the *Ordinatio* summary of Avicenna's position (as recounted by Averroes) and Averroes' view;⁴⁶ he then summarizes in the form of *conclusiones* the opinions of two Franciscan theologians, Francis of Marchia⁴⁷ and Peter Auriol,⁴⁸ and his summary comes directly from their *Sentences* commentaries. In form of a resolution, Brienne first recapitulates the view of Scotus, and then concedes the conclusions of

⁴⁶ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 102, ff. 128v–129r: “Ad tertiam questionem, utrum elementa maneant in mixto realiter secundum suas formas et ad quartam. Et primo videndum est de hoc secundum doctores et philosophos; secundo quid veritatis in istis continetur. —Quantum ad primum oportet esse apud omnes quod in mixtis elementa habeant se nunc aliter quam prius, et ideo ~~una~~ \due/ est \sunt/ opiniones in III *Celi* \secundum Commentatorem, commento 67. Unde dicit ibi Commentator quod/ ~~et~~ Avicenna voluit quod simpliciter et absolute remanent salvis formis absoluti, sed mutatis accidentibus. . . —Contra illam opinionem arguit ibidem Commentator sic. . . —Secundo, Commentator ponit ibi sua opinionem, dicens quod ibi manent elementa quantum ad sua essentialia et accidentalialia, sub esse tamen refracto et remisso. . . —Hec est opinio Commentatoris.”

⁴⁷ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 102, f. 129r: “Alie sunt opiniones theologorum, et est unius (=Francisci de Marchia) opinio dicens primo quod forme elementorum non sunt in mixto ~~non~~ in potentia simpliciter, sed aliquid in actu. Secundo, quod non in actu virtuali. Tertio, quod neque \in actu/ perfectionali. Quarto, quod neque secundum actum formalem ipsorum. Quinto, quod manent in actu confusionis innominato.” These *conclusiones* and the exposition of them that follows (with the implicit criticism of the *actus confusionis innominatus*) correspond to FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum* (*Reportatio IIA*), qq. 28–49, ed. T. SUAREZ-NANI, W. DUBA, D. CARRON and G. ETZKORN (*Opera Philosophica et Theologica* II,3), Leuven 2012, qq. 33–36, pp. 68–91.

⁴⁸ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 102, f. 129v: “Quarta opinio alterius (=Petrus Aureoli) est, dicens primo quod elementa non manent in mixto secundum rationes formales. Secundo, \quod/ quantum ad suas realitates ibi manent. Tertio, quod non manent aliquid secundum rationes suarum terminationum et secundum rationes actus completi.”; cf. PETRUS AUREOLI, *II Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 206a–b.

both Franciscans up to the point that they agree with the Subtle Doctor; when they depart from the way of Scotus, he states “I do not stand with him” and moves to refute them.⁴⁹

Yet if William’s teaching focuses on Scotus, his use of later authors, such as Auriol and Marchia, shows his awareness that the debate has progressed since the Subtle Doctor. William relies on Franciscan sources in the *lectiones* not merely because he could easily find them in the conventual library. Rather, they match his pedagogical and rhetorical objectives; in the *lectiones* he primarily addresses friars in the Franciscan convent, using the texts and methods internal to the Franciscan school. This esoteric aspect to his lectures can best be seen when William discusses the formal distinction. As noted in Chapter III, the formal distinction was one of the most notorious doctrines of the Scotists, and, over the course of his *principia*, William of Brienne defended it extensively. Still, as shown above, that discussion was largely exoteric, focusing on whether there is a formal distinction, rather than on what it is or how it works. In the *principia*, William represented the Franciscan school and debated with bachelors from other schools; these bachelors deployed fairly standard attacks on the formal distinction, and William gave fairly common replies. By contrast, in his lectures William evaluates the latest formulations by his Franciscan confrères and follows them to a point, a point that appears to coincide with how he understands the teaching of Scotus.

In *lectio* 26 (Appendix D), concerning the compatibility of distinctions (of all kinds) with the highest simplicity, which characterizes God, William develops his own position through a criticism of the doctrine of Francis of Meyronnes, the Franciscan who lectured on the *Sentences* in 1320–21 and became master of theology in 1323. Specifically, William cites Meyronnes’ definition of distinction and typology of distinctions; he rejects Meyronnes’ major innovations with respect to Scotus’ original teaching, specifically the notion that a distinction in general is a relative transcendental and his introduction of the modal distinction.

⁴⁹ For Francis of Marchia, William of Brienne concludes, GUILDMUS DE BENA, *lectio* 103, f. 130r: “Ex illa conclusione patet quod opinio dicta dicens oppositum non dicit verum. Distinxit enim de potentia et per hoc probabat conclusionem per aliquas rationes. Conclusionem tamen secundam concedo, loquendo de existentia cause efficientis in suo effectu. Sed quantum ad tertiam suam ~~neg~~ conclusionem non sto cum eo, ut videbitur. Similiter quartam conclusionem suam non intelligo, quia vel actus et potentia capiuntur ~~vel~~ ut sunt differentie entis, ut modo aliquod est in actu, aliquando ~~entis~~ \in potentia erat/, vel pro partibus entis.” The refutation of Auriol appears on f. 130v.

To the contrary, William claims that ‘distinction’ has several senses, but properly speaking, it signifies a real relation; in a diminished sense, a distinction indicates a mere denomination of the extremes; a formal distinction is a distinction in this diminished sense. He also dismisses the modal distinction as incomprehensible. Speaking inside his school, William does not hesitate to differentiate Franciscan solutions.

On a superficial level, therefore, William of Brienne presents Meyronnes’ thought as the latest variant in Scotist teaching and castigates it where it departs from Scotus. Yet, as is often the case with Scotus’ thought, the Subtle Doctor’s teaching on the nature of distinctions was not univocally clear, even to the students in his classroom. The formulation of Francis of Meyronnes that William of Brienne quotes has the advantage of stating a position succinctly; the position in question reflects an ambitious attempt to formalize and to build on Scotus’ observations, and, in the crucial part of his career, Meyronnes repeatedly revised and added to his solution. William of Brienne calls upon Meyronnes’ account of distinction for its succinct structure, and while he rejects the elements that most obviously go beyond Scotus’ position, he implicitly adopts Meyronnes’ systematization, most notably, how Meyronnes ultimately incorporates purely potential beings into the system of distinctions, and the impact such an incorporation has on the doctrine of the essential distinction. In a broad sense, the story of *lectio* 26 is the story of the formal distinction at the Franciscan convent at Paris. In a more restricted sense, *lectio* 26 shows the impact of Scotus’ doctrine and Francis of Meyronnes’ successive revisions.

1. Scotus on the Distinction between Divine Essence and the Personal Properties

In *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, John Duns Scotus discusses the problem of the distinction between the divine essence and the personal properties.⁵⁰ On

⁵⁰ Countless publications and translations concern Scotus’ doctrine of the formal distinction. For the classic discussions of the formal distinction, see M.M. ADAMS, “Ockham on Identity and Distinction”, in *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976), pp. 5–74; S.D. DUMONT, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction”, in *Vivarium* 41 (2005), pp. 7–62. For the connection between the parts of Scotus’ thought considered here and Francis of Meyronnes’ works, see B. ROTH, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott* (Franziskanische Forschungen 3), Werl-in-Westfalen 1936, pp. 283–550. For an attempt to resolve within the doctrine of Scotus many of the problems discussed here, see R. CROSS, “Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence”, in *Oxford*

Christian doctrine, God is both one divine essence and three persons; these persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are all God, the divine essence, but really distinct from each other. Each person, therefore, can be seen to have two aspects: on the one hand, it is a *suppositum*, a self-subsisting entity, really distinct from other entities; on the other, it is an essence shared with other *supposita*. This leads to a problem, Scotus says:

For it does not seem understandable that an essence is not multiplied while there are many *supposita* unless some distinction is posited between the aspect (*ratio*) of the essence and the aspect of the *suppositum*. And for this reason, to save the aforesaid compossibility [of a single essence and multiple *supposita*], we will have to see about this distinction.

And I say without assertion or prejudice to a better opinion that the aspect by which a *suppositum* is formally unshareable (let it be *a*) and the aspect of essence as essence (let it be *b*) have some distinction that precedes every act of a created or uncreated intellect.⁵¹

These aspects, *rationes*, correspond to formal elements in God, the objects of definitions (or, for those things that do not admit of definitions, what would be the objects of definition if they did). One of them, the divine essence, is communicable, that is, it can be and is shared by all three persons; the other, however, is incommunicable, since one and only one person can have a given personal property. It is contradictory for something that is in every way one and the same thing to be communicable

Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013), pp. 172–203. See also most recently, J. BLANDER, *Dependence, Separability, and Theories of Identity and Distinction in Late Medieval Philosophy: Case Studies from Scotus and Ockham*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of California, Los Angeles, 2014, pp. 6–84, which challenges the standard association of separability with the real distinction, largely on the basis of the real distinction and inseparability of the divine persons.

⁵¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4 in *Ordinatio. Liber Primus – distinctio prima et secunda* ed. C. BALIĆ, (Opera Omnia 2), Vatican City 1950 (=ed. Vaticana), p. 349: “Sed adhuc restat ulterior difficultas. Non enim videtur intelligibile quod essentia non plurificetur et supposita sint plura nisi aliqua distinctio ponatur inter rationem essentie et rationem suppositi. Et ideo ad salvandum istam compossibilitatem praedictam, oportet videre de ista distinctione. —Et dico sine assertionem et praeiudicio melioris sententiae quod ratio qua formaliter suppositum est incommunicabile (sit *a*) et ratio essentiae ut essentia (sit *b*) habent aliquam distinctionem praecedentem omnem actum intellectus creati et increati.”

and incommunicable at the same time. Therefore, there must be some basis in reality for the distinction between a personal property and the divine essence.⁵² Yet to say that the divine essence were really distinct from the personal properties would be to posit a (heretical) quaternity in God. Scotus therefore claims that those formal aspects themselves, referred to as '*rationes*', 'quiddities', or sometimes 'formalities', form the real basis for a distinction.

To explain what sort of distinction he has in mind, Scotus considers the degrees of unity:

Just as we can find many degrees of unity – first, the least unity is that of a heap; unity to the second degree is the unity of order, which adds something to a heap; to the third degree is accidental unity, where beyond order there is informing, although it is just of an accident; to the fourth degree is the unity of a compound from its essential principles, in themselves in actuality and in potency; to the fifth degree is the unity of simplicity, which truly is identity (for whatever is there, is really the same as any other thing there) – so, now further, not every identity is formal; rather I call formal identity where what is called the same in this way includes in its quidditative formal aspect, and in the first way of *per se* predication, that with which it is the same. Yet in the case at hand the essence does not include the property of the *suppositum* in its quidditative formal aspect, nor vice versa. And for this reason it can be conceded that before every act of the intellect exists the reality of the essence by which it is shareable and the reality of the *suppositum* by which the *suppositum* is unshareable; and before the act of the intellect, the latter reality is not formally the former, or rather, it is not formally the same as it, in the sense in which the meaning of 'formally' was expounded previously.⁵³

⁵² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4, ed. Vaticana, pp. 349–350.

⁵³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4, ed. Vaticana, pp. 356–357: "Vel, ut propriissime, dicatur: sicut possumus invenire in unitate multos gradus – primo, minima est aggregationis; in secundo gradu est unitas ordinis, quae addit aliquid supra aggregationem; in tertio est unitas per accidens, ubi ultra ordinem est informatio, licet accidentalis, unius ab altero eorum quae sunt sic unum; in quarto est per se unitas compositi ex principiis essentialibus per se actu et per se potentia; in quinto est unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas (quidquid enim est ibi, est realiter idem cuilibet) – ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quidditativa et per se primo modo. In proposito autem essentia non includit in ratione sua formali quidditativa proprietatem suppositi, nec e converso. Et ideo potest concedi quod

Scotus works towards separating formal and real identity. Each progressive degree of unity adds something to the preceding degree, up to the fifth degree, the ‘unity of identity’, a unity that is not just of a heap, ordered, informed, compounded from passive and active principles, but also a simple, real unity. Scotus then takes a step beyond, to formal identity, an identity of elements that are the same *per se primo modo*, that is, according to essential predication, where the predicate belongs to the definition (or what would be the definition) of the subject. Now, the quidditative aspect of the divine essence and that of a personal property only have unity in the fifth degree, that is, real identity, since they are really the same, but their descriptions are different; therefore, they are not formally the same.

In this passage, Scotus implies that formal identity is a sixth degree of unity, but he does not actually make such a statement. He also creates the expectation that he will draw a parallel between degrees of unity and degrees of distinction, since distinction constitutes the immediate context, and the conditioned reply to “just as we can find many degrees of unity” is “so too we can find as many degrees of distinction.” Instead, however, Scotus replies “so not every identity is formal”, leaving open whether formal identity is a degree of unity, or something else, and raising the question of distinction:

Therefore, should some distinction be conceded?

It is better to use this negative expression: ‘this is not formally the same’, rather than ‘this is such, and, as such, it is distinct’.

But does it not follow: ‘*a* and *b* are not formally the same, therefore they are formally distinct’?

I reply that it does not have to follow, because a formality is denied in the antecedent, and is affirmed in the consequent.

Therefore I briefly say that in the divine essence before the act of the intellect there is entity *a* and entity *b*, and the latter is not formally the former. Thus, the Paternal intellect, considering *a* and considering *b*, has the grounds for the truth of the composition ‘*a* is not formally *b*’ from the nature of the thing, and not precisely from some act of the intellect concerning *a* and *b*.⁵⁴

ante omnem actum intellectus est realitas essentiae qua est communicabilis, et realitas suppositi qua suppositum est incommunicabile; et ante actum intellectus haec realitas formaliter non est illa, vel, non est formaliter eadem illi sicut prius expositum est quid est ‘formaliter’.”

⁵⁴ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4, ed. Vaticana,

The reasoning from types of unity leads to the conclusion that two entities *a* and *b* are not formally the same, but does not in itself allow the further inference that they are formally distinct. Apparently, saying that things are *formaliter* distinct makes a claim about formalities not necessarily compatible with the claim that things are formally not-the-same; asserting formal non-identity between *a* and *b* amounts to stating that *a* and *b* are not one single formality, while asserting a formal distinction equals the claim that two formalities, *a* and *b*, are in some way distinct. Whatever Scotus intended this passage to mean, his contemporaries understood it as emphasizing that a distinction makes a claim about the being of its extremes, while non-identity does not.⁵⁵

For Scotus, however, the main point of his argument lies in the last statement of the passage above, that the intellect has the grounds for the truth of '*a* is not formally *b*' from external reality. Formal non-identity allows for a basis in reality for two formal aspects not to be the same, as opposed to relying on the operation of some mind, be it divine or human.

pp. 357–358: “Numquid igitur debet concedi aliqua distinctio? —Melius est uti ista negativa ‘hoc non est formaliter idem’, quam ‘hoc est sic et sic distinctum’. —Sed nonne sequitur ‘*a* et *b* non sunt idem formaliter, ergo sunt formaliter distincta’? Respondeo quod non oportet sequi, quia formalitas in antecedente negatur, et in consequente affirmatur. —Breviter ergo dico quod in essentia divina ante actum intellectus est entitas *a* et entitas *b*, et haec formaliter non est illa, ita quod intellectus paternus considerans *a* et considerans *b* habet ex natura rei unde ista compositio sit vera ‘*a* non est formaliter *b*’, non autem praecise ex aliquo actu intellectus circa *a* et *b*.”

⁵⁵ DUMONT, “Scotus’s Parisian Question”, p. 37, n. 67, emends *formalitas* to *formaliter* to capture the precise logical sense of the passage. Dumont reads the passage with the help of the *Logica Scoti* (the *Quaestio de formalitatibus*, discussed below), and argues (p. 37): “The analysis in the *Logica* shows that in the above text of the *Ordinatio* [the text cited above] Scotus sees the inference as constituting a fallacy of the consequent, equivalent to reasoning from ‘man is not necessarily white’ to ‘man is necessarily not white’.” In any case, at least some subsequent Scotists understood formal non-identity and distinction as making distinct claims about their extremes. See, for example, NICHOLAS BONETUS, *Metaphysica* III, c. 3 in *Philosophia naturalis*, ed. Venetiis 1505, f. 20rb: “Et si queras utrum sequatur ‘sunt non-idem formaliter, ergo distincta formalia’, dicitur quod non-identitas est in plus quam distinctio, quia distinctio requirit extrema positiva, non autem non-identitas, quia homo est non-idem formaliter cum ente, non tamen distinctum. Omne enim quod est ab altero distinctum est non-idem cum illo, non tamen econtra.” For that matter, Brienne’s *lectio* 26, Appendix D, §30, accepts as a given that non-identity exceeds distinction precisely because non-identity can have non-beings as extremes.

The formulation in the *Ordinatio* is usually taken to be a reworking of that in the Oxford *Lectura*, the fruit of Scotus' thought before he went to Paris to read the *Sentences*. In his subsequent works, Scotus clarifies his position. In the *Reportatio* of his lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris, Scotus underscores that being formally distinct is a distinction *secundum quid*, that is, in a diminished sense of 'distinction', in the way that a dead human is a human in a diminished sense. In a given person of the Trinity, the divine essence and the personal property (a relation) are really identical, but their distinction is merely a *secundum quid* non-identity.⁵⁶ Examining in detail the passages considered here, Hester Gelber comes to the conclusion that the *Reportatio* version reflects a development in Scotus' thought:

Where before Scotus spoke of a distinction between two realities, here he seems to reject such a view of God, although to be fair, he did say that the reality of essence was only formally distinct from the reality of relation in the *Lectura*. In the Parisian commentary Scotus also fully elaborated the exact nature of the *secundum quid* distinction or non-identity that marked his mature work. One might have concluded from the *Lectura* that Scotus advocated some form of positive distinction or non-identity in God,

⁵⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Reportatio IA*, d. 33, q. 2 in *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A*, ed. A.B. WOLTER, O.V. BYCHKOV, v. 2, St. Bonaventure 2008, pp. 327–329: “Dico quod essentia et relatio sic distinguuntur, quod ante omnem actum intellectus haec proprietas distinguitur ab essentia secundum quid. . . Alio modo potest haec determinatio ‘secundum quid’ referri ad distinctionem, ut sit sensus quod essentia et relatio ex natura rei distinguuntur secundum quid. Et sic est verum quia distinctio essentiae et relationis est rei et rei et simpliciter, sed distinctio est secundum quid. . . Diversitas autem in omnibus tribus primis condicionibus – salvata identitate – est distinctio secundum quid, quia non est non-identitas nisi secundum quid. Essentia vero et relatio habent tres primas condiciones, quia non habent esse potentiale nec virtuale nec confusum, sed actuale, formale et proprium et determinatum, quia essentia est ita perfecte secundum omnes tres primas condiciones in persona, ac si nihil aliud esset ibi. . . Eis tamen non competit quarta condicio, quae est completiva distinctionis, scilicet non-identitas simpliciter (quam non habent), sed tantum secundum quid, scilicet secundum tres primas condiciones. Sunt enim idem simpliciter, quia altera, scilicet essentia, est infinita formaliter; infinitum autem est cuilibet sibi compossibili idem, – cui repugnat etiam aliquo alio perfici vel actuari, quia sic esset compossibilis cum illo addito, et per consequens non esset simpliciter infinitum. Relatio autem originis est sibi compossibilis, cum oriatur ex fecunditate eius, ut ostensum est supra, et ideo relatio est eadem perfectissima identitate, ac si nullo modo distingueretur ab ea. Et ideo non-identitas eorum est tantum secundum quid, et per consequens distinctio eorum est tantum secundum quid.”

but in fact, as he elaborated the position at Paris, he means only a quasi-distinction or non-identity in which all of the requirements for distinction exist except simple non-identity.⁵⁷

Gelber's comments have been used as the basis for an interpretation of Scotus' doctrine that sees him moving from a doctrine of the formal distinction as a positive distinction between *formalitates* to one that merely reduces it to an accidental non-identity, making no claims about extramental entities.⁵⁸ A more recent reconstruction and edition of Scotus' Parisian *Quaestio de formalitatibus* has called this division into question.⁵⁹ Stephen Dumont, in particular, has argued that the later Scotus does not exclude *formalitates*, but rather seeks to protect against an inference from a formal distinction to a real distinction between such *formalitates*. The picture that emerges from Dumont's study is of Scotus maintaining and developing a coherent doctrine where the formal distinction is a distinction *secundum quid*, the non-identity of formal aspects of one really identical thing.⁶⁰

In summary, in *Ordinatio I*, d. 2, Scotus introduces the formal distinction as holding between the divine essence and the personal attributes. He argues that the essence and attributes are in some way distinct before any mental operation, that is, that there is something in reality that grounds their being-not-the-same. To explain this difference, he appears to make a comparison with degrees of unity, arguing that formal unity is highest degree of unity and that really the same being can have aspects that are formally not-the-same. Formal non-identity has a larger scope than formal distinction, since a formal distinction requires two formalities, while formal non-identity does not. In the later *Reportatio*, he clarifies that the formal distinction is a distinction *secundum*

⁵⁷ H.G. GELBER, *Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974, pp. 84–85.

⁵⁸ ADAMS, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction", p. 37: "Perhaps it was because of pressure from such adversaries at Paris that Scotus adopted a different stance in the *Reportata Parisiensia I*, d. 33, qq. 2–3 and d. 34, q. 1, and in his *Logica*. In these works, he continues to insist on the recognition of some distinction in reality (*ex natura rei*) and prior to every act of any intellect, but alternative to the real distinction between one thing (*res*) and another. Yet, he now denies that this involves distinguishing a plurality of entities or property-bearers within what is really one and the same thing (*res*)."

⁵⁹ K. EMERY, JR., and G.R. SMITH, "The *Quaestio de formalitatibus* by John Duns Scotus, sometimes called the *Logica Scoti*", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 (2014), pp. 91–182.

⁶⁰ S.D. DUMONT, "Scotus's Parisian Question."

quid, that is, it is a distinction only in a diminished or accidental sense. Although his statements on formalities have led to divergent contemporary interpretations of how his doctrine has developed, he seems to have consistently maintained that two formalities can be really the same and formally distinct.

2. The Development of Francis of Meyronnes' Doctrine of Distinctions

Scotus' position in itself is not immediately evident. In explaining the formal distinction he enumerates the degrees of unity, giving the expectation for a single sense of distinction that admits of degrees. His actual doctrine of distinction goes against this expectation, making clear that the formal distinction does not have all the characteristics of a distinction in the proper sense of the word. Francis of Meyronnes takes the path signaled but not followed by Scotus, giving a common, transcendent definition to distinction, and listing the types of distinction, from the essential distinction to the modal distinction.

A common opinion holds that, among Franciscans at Paris, two main threads developed, one taking the formalizing aspect of Scotus' thought further, emphasizing the positive nature of the formal distinction and focusing on formalities, and characterized by such thinkers as Francis of Meyronnes, the other focusing on the formal distinction as a case of *secundum quid* non-identity, and including Landulph Caracciolo (and, outside of Paris, Peter Thomae) among its defenders. Hester Gelber summarizes:

Thus two trends emerged at Paris among Scotus' successors. The first, syncretist, equated a diversity of formalities, realities, quiddities, etc., with formal non-identity, and showed no great interest in the subtleties of Scotus' position. The second, showing the influence of Scotus' later works, adhered to his careful differentiation of formal non-identity from formal distinction, at least from formal distinction understood simply and without qualification. Both these trends thread their way through the history of the Scotist school during the fourteenth century.⁶¹

This view has some correspondence in reality – for indeed, in other matters, Landulph Caracciolo appears to adhere more strictly to Scotus

⁶¹ H. GELBER, "Logic and the Trinity", pp. 105–106.

than do Hugh of Novocastro or Francis of Meyronnes,⁶² but its specific formulation – the source of Gelber’s source, so to speak – comes from an anachronistic and anecdotal comment. To be precise, it was taken from an assessment of Francis of Meyronnes, and refers to annotations made well after Francis’ ca.-1328 death. For the members of the two groups, Gelber cites a discussion by Bartholomäus Roth of the formal distinction as contained in Meyronnes’ *Conflatus*, and Roth reports selectively the marginalia in the 1520 Venice edition and his manuscript of reference, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8854, giving the names of Landulph Caracciolo and Peter Thomae as Francis of Meyronnes’ opponents on interpreting Scotus’ doctrine of *formalitates*. He does not mention Adam Wodeham, who is also named in the same marginalia. Wodeham’s major critiques stem from the 1330s, well after Meyronnes’ death.⁶³ Therefore, the marginal references come from much later than the text, and it is not surprising that Roth confesses that he could not find in the work of such authors a passage that corresponded to the summary of the position given by Meyronnes.⁶⁴ In other words, the common opinion that early Scotists at Paris divided into two clearly distinct camps is based on an acritical reading of marginalia that do not provide a privileged witness to the period in question.

As alluded to several times already, Francis of Meyronnes’ discussion of the formal distinction served as a pivotal point in the doctrine. As the Franciscan *Sententiarius* at Paris in 1320–21, he created considerable controversy when he made the formal distinction part of his *principia* debate. He then revisited the discussion throughout his works, developing, refining, and correcting his position.⁶⁵ In his *principia*, he explicitly defends the doctrine of the formal distinction as that of *schola nostra*, the

⁶² See, e.g., the catalogue of opinions in W. DUBA, “The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330”, in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750)* ed. P.J.J.M. BAKKER, S.W. DE BOER, C. LEIJENHORST (History of Science and Medicine Library 33), Leiden 2012, pp. 171–272.

⁶³ The marginal discussion concerns the passage cited in n. 77, below. On Adam Wodeham’s doctrine see EMERY and SMITH, “The *Quaestio de formalitatibus*”, pp. 107–109, also citing GELBER, *Logic and the Trinity*, p. 15 and p. 630, n. 4, and DUMONT, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question”, p. 15, n. 3.

⁶⁴ ROTH, *Franz von Mayronis*, O.F.M., pp. 308–310.

⁶⁵ For a similar case of tracing Meyronnes’ development on another aspect of the formal distinction across his work, see W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, “*Ni chose, ni non-chose*: The *Sentences*-Commentary of Himbertus de Garda, OFM”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232.

Franciscan School, and defends two types of distinction, one as involving a real relation, and the other as a passion of being. During his *lectiones*, he presents distinctions only in the latter sense, as a passion of being, namely a relative transcendental. In revising his account of distinctions, he becomes increasingly aware of the challenge posed by the objects of creation before they are created. First, in the *Conflatus*, he expands his definition of distinctions to include beings in objective potency, stating they are formally distinct. Then, in the quodlibetal question known as the *Vinculum*, he specifies that not only does the formal distinction apply to such beings, but the essential one does as well. This specification requires a change in the definition and role of the essential distinction from his early work. Over the course of a few years, therefore, Francis of Meyronnes develops his position even further away from the alleged ‘conservative Scotist’ consensus on the formal distinction, and it is the mature Francis of Meyronnes that William of Brienne engages in his own *lectiones*.

While often discounted in the literature,⁶⁶ Francis of Meyronnes had a brilliant and prolific career, and became one of the most influential thinkers of the fourteenth century. He rose to prominence in 1320–21, when he was sent to Paris to lecture on the *Sentences*; in 1323, on the request of King Robert the Wise of Naples, Pope John XXII asked that he be promoted to master of theology; the next year he went to the papal court. He died in Piacenza ca. 1328.⁶⁷ Meyronnes’ works played a major role in the diffusion of Scotism; hundreds of copies still survive in manuscript and dozens in print.⁶⁸ The theme of the formal distinction

⁶⁶ See, for example, the comments by Hester Gelber above, or Sylvain Piron’s comment concerning the Languedocian Franciscans Peter John Olivi, Peter Auriol and Guiral Ot, who “se distinguent précisément par leur indépendance d’esprit qui les conduit à s’opposer aux traditions reçues et à proposer chacun des pistes neuves et audacieuses.” S. PIRON, “Les *studia* franciscains de Provence et d’Aquitaine”, in *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts* ed. K. EMERY, JR., W.J. COURTENAY, and S.M. METZGER, (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 15), Turnhout 2012, pp. 303–358, at pp. 354–355), to which he adds in a note (n. 211): “François de Meyronnes mériterait d’être placé à leurs côtés si l’on considérait uniquement l’ampleur de son oeuvre écrite; en revanche, il ne démontre pas la même audace intellectuelle, étant principalement un disciple et défenseur de Duns Scot.”

⁶⁷ W. DUBA, “Francis of Meyronnes”, in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, ed. H. LAGERLUND, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 364–366.

⁶⁸ On the number and spread of Francis of Meyronnes’ work see B. ROTH, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M.*, as well as the updated presentation in H. ROSSMANN, “Die Sentenzenkommentare des Franz von Meyronnes OFM”, in *Franziskanische*

recurs throughout Meyronnes' oeuvre. For the discussion at hand, the following observations on chronology are relevant. Either before going to Paris in 1320, or during his time there, a commentary on book I was produced, the *Ab oriente* commentary.⁶⁹ During the academic year 1320–21, he held principal debates, some of the elements of which have been published by Jeanne Barbet.⁷⁰ After his Paris lectures, a revised version of his lectures circulated as the *Reportatio* on the *Sentences*, with book I also known as the *Summa simplicitate* commentary.⁷¹ Meyronnes subsequently produced another commentary on book I of the *Sentences*, the *Scriptum* or *Conflatus*, which, as the names suggest, constitute a more literary work that brings together material from his previous commentaries. Finally, as master of theology at Paris, Francis held a *Disputatio de quolibet*, and questions from such a *Quodlibet* survive in one major redaction and several minor ones; from these quodlibetal questions, q. 8, the *Vinculum*, also enjoyed an extensive independent circulation of its own.⁷²

In spite of its relatively late date, the *Conflatus* begins with a version of Francis' *principium* on the *Sentences*, asking the question "whether the complex first principle can be applied to theology" (*Utrum primum principium complexum possit formari in theologia*), where the "complex first principle" is understood as a combination of the principle of the excluded middle and that of non-contradiction applied to propositions, "of anything either an affirmation or a negation is true, and of nothing

Studien 53 (1971), pp. 129–227; IDEM, "Die Quodlibeta und verschiedene sonstige Schriften des Franz von Meyronnes OFM", in *Franziskanische Studien* 54 (1972), pp. 1–76.

⁶⁹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *I Sent. (Ab oriente)*, Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 896, f. 1ra: "Incipit opus super primo libro *Sententiarum* editum a reverendo tunc Parigiensi bacallario fratre Francisco de provincie Provincie ordinis fratrum minorum"; f. 132rb: "Explicit hoc opus super primo *Sententiarum* editum a reverendo religioso viro, scilicet fratre Francesco de Marona de provincie Provincie, tunc bacallario Parigiensi, nunc autem per dominum Iohannem summum pontificem in sacra theologia doctore ordinis minorum."

⁷⁰ Pierre Roger – François de Meyronnes. *Disputatio (1320–1321)*, ed. J. BARBET, (*Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge* 10), Paris 1961.

⁷¹ On the practice of revision, in addition to ROSSMANN, "Die Sentenzenkommentare", see DUBA and SCHABEL, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*", pp. 158–185.

⁷² W. DUBA, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. SCHABEL (*Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition* 1), Leiden 2007, pp. 569–639, at pp. 609–621.

are both true at once.”⁷³ When Francis arrives at the second part, concerning the impossibility of contradictories holding of the same thing in the same way, he confronts the problem applying this principle to God, because the formal aspects of God appear to be contradictory. After exploring competing solutions, including one by “*unus socius excellens*”, identified in the margin as Pierre Roger, he declares:

From these most agreeable sayings follow four theses (*conclusiones*), on which our school is used to be strongly attacked. The first is that one should posit some middle distinction between a distinction forged by the soul and one that is real, because the distinction that is given, namely one according to distinct definitions that are not forged by the soul, is related to both by negation. For it is neither a real distinction nor one of reason forged by the soul.

The second thesis is that there is some distinction from the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*) that is not real, because what is suited to some things from its definitive aspects is suited to them from the nature of the thing. But this distinction pertains to those extremes from their definitive aspects that are not forged by the mind; therefore, etc.⁷⁴

Since, Meyronnes argues, we can apply definitions to God that are not just made up, but cannot correspond to two really different things, there must be some distinction midway between a real and a rational distinction; while this distinction cannot be real, it is based in reality, since it is based on their objects’ definitive aspects (*ex suis rationibus definitivis*), that is, elements from their definitions. With these two statements, Meyronnes takes a conciliatory route; he presents the rationale for the formal distinction in a way that every defender of the doctrine would

⁷³ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 2rb: “Et quantum ad hoc videndum est quid est istud primum principium, et dico est tale: ‘de quolibet est affirmatio vel negatio vera, et de nullo eorum ambo simul.’ Istud conceditur communiter primum principium.”

⁷⁴ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, f. 3ra: “Ex istis dictis valde gratiosis sequuntur quatuor conclusiones in quibus schola nostra consuevit fortiter impugnari. Prima est quod est dare aliquam distinctionem mediam inter distinctionem rationis fabricatam ab anima et illam que est realis, quia illa que data est, scilicet secundum distinctas diffinitiones ab anima non fabricatas, se habet ad utramque per abnegationem. Nec enim est realis nec rationis fabricate ab anima. —Secunda conclusio est quod aliqua est distinctio ex natura rei que non est realis, quia illud quod convenit aliquibus ex suis rationibus diffinitivis convenit eis ex natura rei; ista autem distinctio competit istis extremis ex suis rationibus diffinitivis non fabricatis; ergo etc.”

agree with. In using the term ‘*schola*’, he takes the voice not of a theologian defending his own view, but rather as a member of a school. As noted in the introduction, the use of ‘*schola*’ is slightly ambiguous; technically, at the University of Paris, each regent master ran one and only one *schola*, and the bachelors were affiliated with the master’s school. In Meyronnes’ case, the regent master would probably have been Hugh of Novocastro.⁷⁵ As mentioned in the Introduction, Francis of Meyronnes in his works as a bachelor refers frequently not just to *schola nostra*, but to the *schola minorum*, which is opposed to the *schola communis doctorum*, sometimes even called the *schola maior*, referring to the Dominicans.⁷⁶

His next move explains that these definitive aspects are *formalitates*:

The third thesis is that many formalities can be in the same entirely undivided reality, because a formality, according to the description given to them by those who posit them, is the definitive aspect of each and every thing. But here (as is clear) many definitive aspects are posited into being.

Yet some say that for this reason it should not be supposed that there are many formalities, nor should a distinction be granted. Rather, it should be said that they are not-the-same, referring this non-identity not to the extremes, but rather to the composition of the extremes.

But I do not understand how there can be a distinction or a non-identity, while at the same time the extremes of such a non-identity or a distinction do not exist. For it seems to me to imply a contradiction.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ R. LERNER, “Antichrist Goes to the University: The *De victoria Christi contra Antichristum* of Hugo de Novocastro, OFM (1315/1319)”, in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. S.E. YOUNG (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 36), Leiden 2011, pp. 277–313, at p. 283; W.J. COURTENAY, “Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconsideration”, in *Franciscan Studies* 69 (2011), pp. 175–229, at p. 208.

⁷⁶ See Introduction, p. 23–24; DUBA and SCHABEL, “*Ni chose, ni non-chose*”, pp. 190–192.

⁷⁷ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, f. 3ra-rb: “Tertia conclusio est quod plures formalitates possunt esse in eadem re penitus indivisa, quia formalitas secundum descriptionem eorum qui ponunt eas est ratio diffinitiva uniuscuiusque. Hic autem (ut patuit) ponuntur plures rationes diffinitive. —Sed tamen aliqui dicunt quod propter hoc non debet poni quod sint plures formalitates, nec oportet concedi distinctio, sed debet dici quod sunt non-idem, referendo istam non-identitatem non ad extrema, sed magis ad compositionem extremorum. —Sed istud non intelligo quod sit distinctio vel non-identitas et cum hoc

This third thesis incurs some friction: some people do not like to posit multiple formalities and a distinction between them. Instead, they speak of a non-identity of the two composed formalities, but, Francis argues, one cannot have the two composed if they are not considered as extremes. This position, insisting on the non-identity of formalities instead of their distinction, is the one for which Roth notes his manuscript has the names of Landulph Caracciolo and Petrus Thomae without, however, being able to find any such arguments in their works.⁷⁸ If Meyronnes' opponent is a Franciscan, a good candidate would be William of Alnwick.⁷⁹ Whoever the intended target, Francis is conciliatory:

To demonstrate this statement, it should be known that he who first said it seems to have meant that a distinction should not be applied absolutely to extremes, but always with a qualification, because they are distinct in such a way, because they are not quidditatively the same in the first way of *per se* speech.

non sint extrema talis identitatis vel distinctionis. Videtur enim mihi quod sit implicatio contradictionis."

⁷⁸ ROTH, *Franz von Mayronis*, p. 308: "Ich konnte die in Frage kommende Texte nicht einsehen."

⁷⁹ William of Alnwick famously rejects distinct formalities in God; GUILIELMUS DE ALNWICK, *Quodlibet*, q. 2 in *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet*, ed. A. LEDOUX (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi X), Quaracchi 1937, p. 232: "Item, tertio, quaecumque distinguuntur formaliter habent distinctas formalitates, sicut quaecumque sunt unum formaliter habent unam formalitatem; sed attributa in Deo non habent distinctas formalitates; igitur non distinguuntur formaliter in Deo." For the claim that he refers non-identity to the extremes, p. 239: "Ad secundum, cum arguitur quod si formalitas sapientiae sit formalitas iustitiae, tunc sapientia esset iustitia secundum suam formalitatem, respondeo quod ista: 'sapientia secundum suam formalitatem est iustitia' distinguenda est prout praepositio cum suo causali potest determinare extremum vel compositionem. Primo modo est propositio vera, quia sapientia accepta secundum suam formalem rationem est iustitia; quantumcumque enim praecise accipiantur, semper una est alia in Deo propter infinitam perfectionem. Secundo modo, prout praepositio cum suo casuali determinat compositionem, sic est propositio falsa; sic enim aequipollet adverbiali determinationi compositionis, ut dictum est secundo articulo; igitur sapientia in Deo non est formaliter iustitia, quia non sunt idem quidditative." On Alnwick's position, see T. NOONE, "Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction", in *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993), pp. 231–261; IDEM, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction" in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. S.F. BROWN, T. DEWENDER, and T. KOBUSCH (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden 2009, pp. 127–149.

Thus it should be considered that a distinction for me can state a real relation between what are distinct, and thus it requires a real distinction among the extremes, and in this way a distinction between essence and relation should not be admitted in God, since they are really the same. In another way, a distinction is taken as it is a passion of being, and as such it does not require extremes that are really distinct, but only in some way, and as such a distinction is in God.⁸⁰

Francis deflates the objection, reasoning that it originally meant to emphasize the non-absolute nature of formal non-identity; hence, he resolves the problem by appealing to the thesis, found in Scotus, that a distinction in *divinis* is a distinction in a qualified sense. Finally, he generalizes and states that a distinction can either state a real relation or a passion of being, and that God only has distinctions in this latter sense, as a *passio entis*. In spite of his appeal to a qualified use of distinction, the notion of *passio entis* is most certainly incompatible with Scotus' doctrine of *secundum quid* non-identity, and thus it constitutes the point of departure from Scotus' doctrine, as Francis will make clear subsequently. Here in the *principia* disputation, however, he seeks to hold the common front of his school. Therefore, he moves on to the fourth conclusion, that such a quidditative distinction is compatible with the greatest simplicity, just because it is found in a divine person, between the essence and the relation, and each divine person has the greatest simplicity.⁸¹ He concludes his defense: "There must be peace between the opinions among which there first seemed to be disagreement, although it was not a disagreement of minds."⁸²

⁸⁰ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 3rb: "Ad declarationem autem huius dicti est sciendum quod ille qui sic primo dixit videtur intelligere quod distinctio non est ferenda ad extrema simpliciter, sed semper cum determinatione, quia sub modo tali, quia non sunt idem quidditative et in primo modo dicendi per se. —Unde advertendum est quod distinctio potest mihi dicere realem relationem inter distincta, et sic requirit realem distinctionem in extremis, et isto modo non debet admitti in divinis inter essentiam et relationem, cum sint realiter idem. Alio modo distinctio accipitur ut est passio entis, et ut sic non requirit extrema realiter distincta, sed tantum aliquo modo, et sic est in divinis."

⁸¹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 3rb: "Quarta conclusio est quod cum ista distinctione quidditativa stat summa simplicitas. Probatur, quia que inveniuntur in summo simplici stant cum summa simplicitate; sed in persona divina, que est ita simplex sicut essentia, invenitur talis distinctio; ergo stat cum summa simplicitate."

⁸² FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, Prol., q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 3rb: "Ex istis apparet quid est dicendum consequenter ad primum dictum. Oportet enim

In his *principium*, Francis is diplomatic, minimizing the disagreement among the defenders of the formal distinction and seeking a common ground. Inside the Franciscan school, however, he handles the matter differently. Francis of Meyronnes goes beyond his colleagues' positions, elaborating a doctrine of distinctions according to which a distinction properly speaking is no longer an accident of the category of relation, but a relative (*respective*) transcendental expressing non-likeness. In his (revised) *Reportatio* (*Summa simplicitate*) I, d. 33, q. un., a. 1, answering the question "What is a distinction?" (*quid est distinctio*), he proposes four theses:

First, the formal aspect of a distinction is not absolute, but relative (*respectiva*), because everything that is distinguished, insofar as it is distinguished, is distinct from something else.

Again, distinction and identity are founded on the same thing through comparison to different things, which is an indicator of things that are relatively opposite.

The second thesis: that a distinction is not in a genus, but is transcendent, because it encompasses every category, and is suited to being and its passions before being is contracted to the genera, since, in that prior state, being is distinguished from its passions.

The third thesis: that it is not an extrinsic respect, but an intrinsic one, because when the principles that make some things distinct are posited into being, necessarily a distinction arises within them, just as with likeness.

The fourth thesis: that it is not a likening respect (*respectus equiparantie*), but one of dislikening (*respectus disquiparantie*), because a likening respect is only native to extremes of the same sort (*eiusdem rationis*), and such extremes cannot be principles that make things distinct.⁸³

quod pax sit inter opiniones inter quas primo videbatur esse contentio, licet non esset contentio animorum."

⁸³ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum* (*Summa simplicitate*), d. 33, q. un. ("Utrum in divinis sit distinctio"), a. 1, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 91, f. 60va; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Rkps. 53/102, f. 181va: "Circa primum ponuntur quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod ratio formalis distinctionis non est absoluta, sed respectiva, quia omne quod distinguitur in quantum distinctum est, est distinctum ab alio. —Item, distinctio et idemplitas fundantur in eodem per comparisonem ad diversa, quod est signum oppositorum relative. —Secunda conclusio: quod distinctio non est in genere, sed transcendens, quia circuit omne predicamentum et convenit enti et suis passionibus antequam ipsum ens contrahatur ad genera, cum in isto priori ens a suis

That is, a distinction is essentially said with respect to two things ('extremes'), which makes it relative, as opposed to absolute. Typically for a Scotist, the categories of substance, quantity and quality are absolute, and the remaining ones are relative, and can be referred to as *respectus*, 'respects' (in the discussion below, 'relation' will be reserved for accidents belonging to the category of relation). Meyronnes further says that a distinction functions by indicating that one extreme is not like the other (thesis 1). As we saw in Chapter III, that it is an intrinsic respect and not an extrinsic one refers to Scotus' division of relative beings into those that immediately and necessarily come about when the extremes are posited in being (*respectus intrinsecus advenientes*), and those that, in order to come about, require something other in addition to the extremes (*respectus extrinsecus advenientes*). On Scotus' doctrine, the former belong to the category of relation, while the latter, the "extrinsically-arising respects", fall into the six categories of action, passion, position, when, where and habit.⁸⁴ A distinction, Meyronnes holds, arises immediately whenever two things are posited (thesis 3). On these two points, Francis of Meyronnes and John Duns Scotus are in agreement, but their underlying ontologies vary. Scotus holds that a distinction properly speaking belongs to the category of relation, and relations for Scotus are relative beings, namely intrinsically-arising respects. Francis of Meyronnes, however, states that a distinction does not belong to any category, but rather is a transcendental, prior to and encompassing all of them (thesis 3), since being (*ens*), before it falls into the categories, is distinguished from its subsequent passions and differences, and these passions and differences are distinct from each other as well. Finally, Meyronnes argues that a distinction is a "respect of dislikening" (*respectus disquiparantiae*), not one of likening (*respectus aequiparantiae*) (thesis 4). For Scotus, a relation of dislikening holds between two extremes of different kinds.⁸⁵ By saying this, Meyronnes

passionibus distinguatur. —Tertia conclusio: quod non est respectus extrinsecus sed intrinsecus, quia positis principiis distinctivis aliquorum, necessario innascitur distinctio inter illa, sicut et similitudo. —Quarta conclusio: quod non est respectus equiparantie, sed disquiparantie, quia respectus equiparantie non innascitur nisi inter extrema eiusdem rationis, sed talia non possunt esse principia distinctiva."

⁸⁴ M. HENNINGER, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford 1989, p. 105; R. CROSS, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision*, Oxford 1998, pp. 112–115.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., the addition to IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 28, q. 3, in *Ordinatio, Liber Primus – a distinctione vigesima sexta ad quadragessimam octavam*,

allows a distinction to hold even if the two extremes are completely different sorts of things.

This specification comes into play in the next article, when he lists the types of distinction, including his contribution, the modal distinction. Therefore, perhaps inspired by Scotus' hierarchy of unity, Meyronnes defends four types of extra-mental distinction:

Besides the distinction that comes about through the operation of the created intellect (which is not relevant at the moment), there are four ordered distinctions. The first is the essential distinction, which is between essences. The second is the real distinction, which is between a thing and a thing. The third is the formal distinction, which is between quiddity and quiddity, because a formal aspect and a quiddity are the same. The fourth is the modal distinction, which is between an intrinsic mode and a formal aspect, such as between a specific nature and its finitude. And these distinctions are related in order, as an essential distinction is greater than a real one, because whatever are distinguished essentially are distinguished really (as is clear by induction) in things, and not the other way around, as is clear in the divine persons. And the real distinction is greater than the formal distinction because those things that belong to different persons in God are distinguished more than those things that belong to one person, such as opposite relations are more distinguished than essence and relation, which are only formally distinguished. And the formal distinction is greater than the distinction of intrinsic mode, because, unlike a second formal aspect, an intrinsic mode does not leave the formal aspect. Whence less distinction is posited between divine wisdom and its infinity than between wisdom and justice.⁸⁶

ed. C. BALIĆ (Opera Omnia 6), Vatican City 1963, p. 157: "quia omnis relatio disqu岸arantiae est ad aliquid alterius speciei."

⁸⁶ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum (Summa simplicitate)*, d. 33, q. un., "Utrum in divinis sit distinctio", a. 2, Admont 91, f. 60vb; Pelplin 53/102, f. 181vb: "Circa secundam partem questionis est intelligendum quod preter distinctionem que est per operationem intellectus creati, que non facit ad propositum, sunt quatuor distinctiones ordinate. Prima est distinctio essentialis, que est inter essentias. Secunda est distinctio realis, que est inter rem et rem. Tertia est distinctio formalis, que est inter quidditatem et quidditatem, quia ratio formalis et quidditas idem est. Quarta est modalis, que est inter modum intrinsecum et rationem formalem, sicut inter naturam specificam et suam finitatem. Et iste distinctiones sic se habent per ordinem, quod distinctio essentialis est maior reali, quia quecumque distinguuntur essentialiter distinguuntur realiter, ut patet inductive in rebus, et non econverso, ut patet in divinis personis. Et realis est maior formali, quia plus distinguuntur ea que sunt diversarum personarum in Deo quam ea que sunt unius persone, ut relationes opposite quam essentia et relatio,

The four distinctions have a hierarchical order. The greatest distinction is the essential distinction, which plays in the *Reportatio* (*Summa simplicitate*) just the role of explaining how God can be essentially one, while the persons of the Trinity are really distinct. It appears that the only difference between the real distinction and the essential distinction is that a real distinction applies between the persons of the Trinity, but an essential distinction does not; the persons are really distinct, but have the same essence. Meyronnes' use of the essential and real distinction in this passage reflects the common position of Scotists.⁸⁷ Likewise, his description of the formal distinction as holding between quiddities reflects his defense of the doctrine in his *Principium* above: a formal distinction holds between formalities, that is, formal aspects of a thing. The last distinction represents Francis of Meyronnes' contribution: the modal distinction.

Francis of Meyronnes builds the modal distinction upon another doctrine associated with Scotus, that of intrinsic modes. For Francis of Meyronnes, an intrinsic mode is what, when added to a quiddity, does not change that quiddity's formal description. Examples of intrinsic modes include something's existence, thisness (*haecceitas*, or individuating principle), or its being finite.⁸⁸ When challenged, Meyronnes insists

que tantum formaliter distinguuntur. Et distinctio formalis maior distinctione modi intrinseci, quia modus intrinsecus non egreditur ultra rationem formalem sicut alia ratio. Unde ponitur minor distinctio inter sapientiam divinam et suam infinitatem quam inter sapientiam et iustitiam."

⁸⁷ See for example, the discussion by the late-fifteenth-century Hebrew philosopher ELI HABILLO, *Introduction to the Hebrew Translation of Antonius Andreas's Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum*, paraphrased by M. ZONTA, *Hebrew Scholasticism in the Fifteenth Century* (Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 9), Amsterdam 2006, pp. 195–196: "Essential distinction – in Latin, *distinctio essentialis*. — Things that are essentially distinct are those things each one of which exists without the other, e.g., accident and substrate, matter and form. . . — This distinction and the real distinction are always found together in created things (in fact, two created things that are really distinct are also essentially distinct), but not in non-created things. In fact, Scotists do not assume an essential distinction between those divine things they call *personas*, since they believe that their essentiality and essence are the same, but they assume a real distinction between them. However, we should not bother about this; therefore this fifth distinction is useless, as if it did not exist."

⁸⁸ The classic study is H. MÖHLE, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus. Die Entwicklung der scotischen Metaphysik bei Franciscus de Mayronis* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.F., 70), Münster 2007, esp. pp. 286–336. See also the succinct remarks by CROSS, "Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence", pp. 172–173.

that the notion comes from Scotus. In a redaction of his *Quodlibet* found only in a Troyes manuscript, Meyronnes responds to his adversary (possibly the same as in his *principium*) who denies formalities and accepts the formal distinction. Regarding the modal distinction:

But that doctor says that this distinction is fake, and a certain invention, because until now no given doctor posited a mode-from-quiddity distinction that was neither real nor formal.

I say that this distinction is not new. Whence he himself heard the Doctor [=Scotus] setting out the intrinsic mode of a quiddity, say the divine essence and infinity, which is its intrinsic mode. Likewise, he set out that an attribute and its infinity are not formally distinguished, nor really, but as a mode from quiddity. Whence I say that one and the same quiddity can have several modes, and can be taken in this or that mode.

But by 'mode' I understand something that does not change the formal aspect of a quiddity nor belong to any genus, but belongs to the same genus and is posterior it, as if grounded in it. Thus we say that intension and remission is a mode of quality. For when some quality is increased or decreased, its formal aspect does not change, nor does it belong to any other genus than quality. In the same way actual existence is a mode of a quiddity. For it does not alter the quiddity, as is clear. For a rose, because it actually exists, does not have a different quiddity than when it did not exist, nor did it belong to a different genus, because it is not an accident, rather more to the contrary, an accident exists through the substance.

And so, to the case at hand, I say that a formality and a reality are distinguished as a mode from a quiddity.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Quodlibet*, q. 7** ("Utrum genus et differentia distinguantur formaliter."), Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 995, f. 180rb: "Sed ad hoc dicit ille doctor quod ista distinctio est ficticia, et adinventio quedam, quia usque ad tempora ista non poneret doctor aliquis distinctionem modi a quidditate, que non esset vel realis vel formalis. —Dico quod ista non sit nova. Unde ipsemet audivit doctorem ponentem modum intrinsecum quidditatis, puta essentiam divinam et infinitatem, que est modus intrinsecus ipsius. Similiter, quod attributum et sua infinitas non distinguuntur formaliter, nec realiter, sed sicut modus a quidditate. Unde dico quod quidditas una et eadem potest habere plures modos, et potest accipi hoc vel illo modo. —Per modum autem intelligo aliquid quod non variat rationem formalem quidditatis, nec pertinet ad aliquid genus, sed est eiusdem generis et est posterius eo, sicut fundatum in eo. Sic dicimus quod intensio et remissio est modus qualitatis. Quando enim qualitas intenditur vel remittitur, non variatur eius ratio formalis, nec pertinet ad aliud genus quam qualitatis. Eodem modo existentia actualis est modus quidditatis."

Meyronnes' adversary appears to have personally heard Scotus speak, and Meyronnes claims that Scotus spoke not only of intrinsic modes, but also of a distinction between them. Recent studies point to Meyronnes' inspiration as lying in Scotus' use of the term in *Ordinatio I*, d. 8, where he argues that the concept of infinity that contracts being is an intrinsic mode that does not change the genus,⁹⁰ as well as *Ordinatio I*, d. 17, where Scotus holds that the intention and remission of forms constitute intrinsic degrees.⁹¹ For Meyronnes, however, the key passage appears earlier in the *Ordinatio*, specifically, in the question immediately following Scotus' treatment of the formal distinction, in d. 3, concerning what concepts creatures can have of God:

I say that we can arrive at many concepts proper to God that are not suited to creatures, like the concept of all perfections absolutely, to the highest. And the most perfect concept, in which we most perfectly cognize God like in some description, is in conceiving all perfections absolutely and to the highest. Yet the concept that is at once the most perfect and most simple that is possible for us is the concept of infinite being. For this concept is more simple than the concept of being good, being true, or similar concepts, because 'infinite' is not like an attribute or passion of being, or of whatever it is said, but rather signifies an intrinsic mode of that

Non enim variat quidditatem, sicut patet. Non enim rosa quia actualiter existit habet aliam quidditatem quam quando non existit, nec etiam pertinet ad aliud genus, quia non est accidens, immo magis e converso accidens existit per substantiam. —Ita in proposito dico quod formalitas et realitas distinguuntur sicut modus a quidditate."

⁹⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, in *Ordinatio, Liber Primus – a distinctione quarta ad decimam*, ed. C. BALIĆ (Opera Omnia 4), Vatican City 1956, p. 221: "Ad primum argumentum principale concedo quod iste conceptus dictus de Deo et creatura in quid contrahitur per aliquos conceptus dicentes quale contrahentes, sed nec iste conceptus dictus in quid est conceptus generis, nec illi conceptus dicentes quale sunt conceptus differentiarum, quia iste conceptus quidditativus est communis ad finitum et infinitum, quae communitas non potest esse in conceptu generis, – isti conceptus contrahentes dicunt modum intrinsecum ipsius contracti, et non aliquam realitatem perficientem illum."

⁹¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 17, pars 1, q. 1–2 in *Ordinatio, Liber Primus – a distinctione undecima ad vigesimam quintam*, ed. C. BALIĆ (Opera Omnia 5), Vatican City 1959, p. 150: "Contra istud arguo, quia intensio actus non est aliquod extrinsecum, accidens actui, sed gradus intrinsecus actui, – ita quod actus intensus est quoddam per se unum, sicut huiusmodi individuum in specie. Non ergo potest esse aliud principium substantiae huiusmodi actus et intensionis suae, quia a quo est hoc individuum, ab eodem est gradus intrinsecus proprius huic individuo; non enim potest recipere naturam ab aliquo, et hanc naturam signatam, quin recipiat eam in certo gradu."

entity, such that, when I say ‘infinite being’, I do not have a quasi-accidental concept, made of subject and passion, but an essential (*per se*) concept of the subject in a certain degree of perfection, namely, of infinity, – just as ‘intense whiteness’ does not signify an accidental concept like ‘visible whiteness’ does, but rather intensification signifies an intrinsic degree of essential whiteness. And so is clear the simplicity of the concept ‘infinite being’.⁹²

For Scotus, the mode of infinite does not alter the description of the being it modifies, but rather is fundamentally inseparable from the being; like a degree of whiteness, infinity is a degree of being, namely, the maximum degree. Scotus calls infinity a *modus intrinsecus* and leads it back to the notion of a *gradus intrinsecus* or *gradus perfectionis*.

Meyronnes’ development of intrinsic modes reverses this order: degrees of perfection are merely one kind of intrinsic mode; and where his colleagues, and possibly even his secretary, consistently speak of *gradus intrinsecus*, he uses *modus intrinsecus*.⁹³ Meyronnes reasons that, since being can have the mode of infinity or finitude without any essential alteration, its quiddity is distinct from its mode. Hence, an intrinsic mode has an extramental foundation for being distinct from its quiddity, and Meyronnes includes among intrinsic modes not just Scotus’ examples, but also *haecceitas* (what explains a thing’s individuation) and existence. But when he posits that extrinsic modes can have an extramental distinction from their quiddities, Meyronnes encounters a problem in the doctrine of distinction. Whereas the previously-admitted distinctions hold between things of the same sort, that is, between essence and essence (essential distinction), thing and thing (real distinction), or quiddity and quiddity (formal distinction), the modal distinction holds

⁹² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, ed. Vaticana, p. 40: “Quarto dico quod ad multos conceptus proprios Deo possumus pervenire, qui non convenit creaturis, – cuiusmodi sunt conceptus omnium perfectionum simpliciter, in summo. Et perfectissimus conceptus, in quo quasi in quadam descriptione perfectissime cognoscimus Deum, est concipiendi omnes perfectiones simpliciter et in summo. Tamen conceptus perfectior simul et simplicior nobis possibilis est conceptus entis infiniti. Iste enim est simplicior quam conceptus entis boni, entis veri, vel aliorum similium, quia ‘infinite’ non est quasi attributum vel passio entis, sive eius de quo dicitur, sed dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis, ita quod cum dico ‘infinite ens’, non habeo conceptum quasi per accidens, ex subiecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subiecti in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis, – sicut albedo intensa non dicit conceptum per accidens sicut albedo visibilis, immo intensio dicit gradum intrinsecum albedinis in se. Et ita patet simplicitas huius conceptus ‘ens infinite’.”

⁹³ DUBA and SCHABEL, “*Ni chose, ni non-chose*”, pp. 163–164.

between quiddity and mode. Here Meyronnes' definition of distinction as a respect of dislikening comes in. Since it effectively removes the requirement that *distinguenda* have some commonality (*equiparentia*), a respect of dislikening can involve metaphysically diverse extremes.

Meyronnes' doctrine of distinctions in the *Summa simplicitate* version already reflects some advances over the one found in his early *Ab oriente* commentary on book I, d. 8 of the *Sentences*, a treatment that also circulated separately as Meyronnes' *Formalitates*.⁹⁴ Indeed, in that work, Meyronnes defends an embryonic doctrine of intrinsic modes. Its pedigree as deriving from Scotus' intrinsic degrees surfaces in a distinction that he implies (but does not explicitly state) between intrinsic modes, in their most proper sense, as the "quantity of force" (*quantitas virtutis*) and other uses of intrinsic modes, such as *haecceitas*.⁹⁵ He also argues that distinctions are transcendental relations, and that, while a real distinction is greater than a formal distinction, this hierarchy is only established by the status of the foundations of those relations, and not by the relations themselves. It does not imply that really distinct objects are also formally distinct.⁹⁶ Yet he does not seem to achieve

⁹⁴ This work should not be confused with the spurious *Tractatus formalitatum*. See ROSSMANN, "Die Quodlibeta", p. 72; G.R. SMITH, "*Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae*", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 52 (2010), pp. 161–200, at p. 168; CROSS, "Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence".

⁹⁵ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum (Ab oriente)*, d. 8, q. un., pars 2, subpars. 1, a. 16, Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., vat. lat. 896, f. 65rb: "16 articulus: si modus intrinsecus distinguatur ex natura rei ab hequeitate. —Et dicitur quod non, quia hequeitas est quidam modus intrinsecus, ergo etc. —Sed contra, quia hic loquimur precise de modo intrinseco qui dicitur esse quantitas virtutis. —Ideo dicitur quod talis modus intrinsecus distinguitur ex natura rei ab hequeitate, quia in relationibus est hequeitas sine quantitate virtutis... —Sed tunc prima oritur difficultas: si realiter differt modus intrinsecus ab hequeitate... —Et dicitur quod sic, quia hequeitas est ultimum ante rationem supponibilem, quia per ipsam est incommunicabilitatis una*. Ideo in quolibet primo est ratio formalitatis, secundo est realitatis (que est communissimus modus), tertio ratio quantitatis virtutis, quarto hequeitas, quinto supponibilis ratio."

⁹⁶ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum (Ab oriente)*, d. 8, q. un., pars 2, subpars 1, a. 19, vat. lat. 896, f. 65rb: "19 articulus est si ista realitas minus distinguitur a formalitatibus quam formalitates mutuo a se ipsis. —Et dicitur quod sic, quia omne commune minus distinguitur ab illis quibus est commune quam illa que se ipsis; realitas autem formalitatibus est communis; ergo. —Sed contra, quia magis distinguitur formalitas a non-formalitati quam una formalitas ab alia per realem differentiam; realitas autem non est formalitas. —Ideo dicitur quod maior est distinctio realitatis a formalitatibus quam formalitatum inter se invicem. —Sed contra, quia magis et minus non est sine quantitate virtutis qua caret omnis relatio; distinctio autem est respectus. —Ideo dico quod

the unitary definition of distinction that he uses in the *Summa simplicitate* version. In particular, he struggles with distinctions involving intrinsic modes; in the lengthy treatment, how intrinsic modes are distinct from the things of which they are modes provides the only occasion where Meyronnes qualifies his conclusions with “it seems” (*videtur*) or by reference to “some” (*aliqui*), and he leaves a series of objections unanswered.⁹⁷ When compared to the *Ab oriente* version, the *Summa*

nulla distinctio est maior altera aut minor, loquendo vere et proprie. —Secunda difficultas: qualiter potest esse essentialis ordo in disparatis relationibus universi nisi mutuo se extendant. Et dicitur quod, licet non sit ibi ordo dependentie sive eminentie, tamen ordinem habent eminentie per attributionem ad fundamenta.” See also pars 3, conclusiones 51–52, vat. lat. 896, f. 70ra: “51a: Si realis distinctio est maior quam formalis. Et dicitur quod sic, ut fuit declaratum, eo modo quo est magis et minus in distinctione, quia magis ponuntur distingui divine persone quam ea que sunt in unica persona divina, ergo etc. —52a: Si quecumque realis distinctio est maior quacumque formali. Et dicitur quod non, quia distinctio individuorum non est tanta que est realis quanta est distinctio generum et specierum que est pure formalis.”

⁹⁷ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum (Ab oriente)*, d. 8, q. un., pars 2, subpars. 1, a. 19, vat. lat. 896, f. 65ra–b: “15 articulus est si modus intrinsecus differt realiter a sua formalitate. Et dicitur quod non, quia formalitas in creatis non videtur posse fieri sine modo suo intrinseco. —Item minor est distinctio inter modum et formalitatem, ut patuit, quam inter duas formalitates, et tamen talis distinctio est maior formali. —Sed contra, quia remanente tota ratione formali aliquis gradus corrumpitur, ergo ille gradus est ab ipsa distinctus. —Item, quando adgeneratur gradus in intentione, non generatur ratio formalis, quia tunc preexistebat. —Item privatio gradus stat cum tota formalitate, quod non esset si essent realiter idem. —Item, contrarium est compossibile cum ratione formali in gradu remisso et non cum modo intenso, ergo ratio formalis non est idem realiter cum intenso. —Item, gradus intensus et remissus sunt due res, ergo ratio formalis non potest esse una res cum utroque. —Item, multiplicaretur gradus, nulla multiplicatione facta in formalitate, quia talis multiplicatio variat formalem rationem. —Ideo dico quod videtur esse realis distinctio. —Sed tunc esset prima difficultas, quia Deus posset facere omnem creaturam sine omni quantitate virtutis, quod oportet concedere propter prioritatem et realem distinctionem. —Secunda, quia maior esset distinctio modi intrinseci a formalitate quam formalitas a formalitate, quod esset verum quantum ad modum intrinsecum qui dicit intensionem, licet non quantum ad alios. —Tertia, quod modus intrinsecus quantitatis huius haberet modum intrinsecum realitatis ut prescindit a formalitate, quod esset tunc verum si formalitas unius rationis habet formalitatem alterius rationis. —Quarta, quod eadem ratione semper genus distingueretur realiter a differentia, cum in differentiis ratio generis non varietur. —Quinta, quod idem esset de natura et hequeitate, cum adveniat in gradu hequitas preexistente natura. —Sexta, quod ratio entis a quolibet predicato cum sine ipso inveniat in quo. —Quere solutionem.”

simplicitate version shows that Francis' breakthrough teaching the *Sentences* at Paris was precisely in the unified definition of distinction as a respect of dislikening, allowing him to portray the modal distinction as a type of distinction in its own right and to separate it from the notion of a real distinction.

Where Scotus explains the formal distinction as only a distinction in a diminished sense, Meyronnes at Paris aims for a general, transcendental theory of distinction, according to which the formal distinction and the real distinction are just sub-types. Such a lofty goal compels him to embrace every kind of being produced by the philosophy of the *schola minorum*, and so he develops the modal distinction. Yet, as he lectures on subsequent books of the *Sentences* at Paris, Meyronnes was compelled to consider another class of non-existing beings, namely, beings in objective potency, things that could be produced. The later version of his definitions of distinction in the *Conflatus* takes into account these beings, claiming that they too can be formally distinct, even if they do not really exist.

While dynamics constitutes a fundamental aspect of Scotist doctrine deserving investigation in itself, a brief summary of the relevant points pertaining to the doctrine of objective potency will help elucidate how and why Meyronnes adjusts his doctrine of distinctions. First, according to Scotus, all creatures, that is, created beings, fall into the categories. Inside of each category, beings can be divided into beings-in-actuality and beings-in-potency; beings-in-actuality are those that actually exist; beings-in-potency are in passive potency, that is, they have the capacity to become something on the action of an agent. This passive potency can be divided into two sub-types: a) subjective potency, the capacity something has to become something else, as a subject of change, and b) objective potency, the capacity to become something that corresponds to an agent's power to act, the ability to be an object of an action. Say, for example, I have the power to make a pizza. There are two ways to speak of this pizza-in-potency: as the capacity had by dough, sauce, cheese and so on, to be a pizza (subjective potency), or as the pizza that I can make (objective potency). God's creative power is an active power, capable of bringing about creatures from nothing, and therefore without subjective potency. Corresponding to God's power to create is the objective potency of the creature to be created. As a result, the objects of creation, prior to being created, are in objective potency.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ See, e.g., the discussions in R. CROSS, "Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence",

Francis of Meyronnes considers objective potency in a particularly rough section of his unprinted commentary on book II of the *Sentences*.⁹⁹

There are four kinds of potency: one, effective, according to which the sun illuminates, another subjective, according to which the air is illuminated or can receive the illumination of the sun, another objective, according to which light is producible, and shadow is not, given that there were neither sun nor air, another transmutative, according to which they say that the conversion of bread into the body of Christ occurs, because it transmutes into it.

But before creation, the being of a created thing did not have being in subjective potency, because creation precedes every material creatable thing; not did it have transmutative potency, for there is no being that was converted into a creature by creation. But certainly it was in effective potency – because God had the power of producing a creature before He produced it – and it was in objective potency, because production is not repugnant to it, since it is not a prohibited being.¹⁰⁰

What Meyronnes calls “effective potency” is an active power, and it is relatively uncontroversial that God had the power to create prior to creation. On the other hand, in positing being-in-objective potency before

pp. 190–195; W. DUBA, “Aristotelian Traditions in Franciscan Thought: Matter and Potency according to Scotus and Auriol”, in *The Origins of European Scholarship*, ed. I. TAIFACOS, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 147–161; “The Ontological Repercussions of Francis of Marchia’s Distinction between Determination *de possibili* and *de inesse*”, in *Contingenza e libertà. Teorie francescane del primo Trecento*, ed. G. ALLINEY, M. FEDELI, and A. PERTOSA, Macerata 2012, pp. 177–202, at pp. 184–201.

⁹⁹ That is, FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *II Sent. (Principium et Finis)*, qq. 62–66. The commentary as a whole survives in only two manuscripts (Erlangen-Nürnberg, Universitätsbibliothek, 255, and Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Sopp. A.9.731, and last question, q. 66, is only in the Erlangen manuscript and ends abruptly). Access here is through the Erlangen manuscript.

¹⁰⁰ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *II Sent. (Principium et Finis)*, q. 62, Erlangen, UB, 255, f. 117ra: “Circa istam questionem intelligendum est quod quadruplex est potentia: una effectiva secundum quam sol illuminat, alia subiectiva, secundum quam aer illuminatur, vel potest illuminationem solis recipere, alia obiectiva, secundum quam lux est producibilis et non tenebra, dato quod non esset sol nec aer, alia transmutativa, secundum quam dicunt quod fit panis conversio in corpus Christi, quia transmutat in ipsum. —Esse autem rei create non prehabuit esse potentia subiectiva, quia creatio precessit omnes creabilitates materiales; nec transmutativa, quia non est aliquid ens quod in creaturam per creationem fuit conversum; sed bene in potentia effectiva – quia Deus habuit potentiam producendi creaturam antequam produceret ipsam – (et) in potentia obiectiva, quia sibi non repugnat productio, cum non sit ens prohibitum.”

creation, Meyronnes makes an ontological claim that his contemporaries do not universally hold. In the discussion that follows, he adds others. Considering the question whether a being-in-objective-potency has a reality, he states that no, it is not real, because it is neither created nor uncreated; that raises the question of whether, since it is neither created nor uncreated, it can even be said to have an essence. Meyronnes seems to reply that a being in objective potency does not have a real essence, but might have an essence without such a determination to reality.¹⁰¹ Further, an essence and its objective potency are not really the same, because they are not real.¹⁰² Similarly, on the formal level:

The essence of any producible nature is not formally its objective potency, because anyone can conceive the quiddity of humanity without conceiving its producibility or non-producibility, which would not be the case if producibility belonged to its formality.

Again, a man and an ass share the formal aspect of being produced, and differ in their proper formalities.¹⁰³

Being producible is distinct from the formal aspect of a thing. This passage implies that, while beings in objective potency are not real, they can still be formalities, and therefore, they can be distinguished formally.

Meyronnes later considered the doctrine of distinction in his commentary on book I of the *Sentences* known as the *Conflatus*, which, as noted above, draws upon material from both his previous commentaries (*Ab oriente* and *Summa simplicitate*). There, he explicitly states that

¹⁰¹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *II Sent. (Principium et Finis)*, q. 62, Erlangen, UB, 255, f. 117ra: “Tertia difficultas: si essentia in tali potentia habet aliquam realitatem. Dicitur quod non, proprie loquendo de aliqua realitate, quia omnis res est creata vel increata, et hic Deus. Si arguitur idem de essentia, dicitur quod divisio conceditur de reali essentia.”

¹⁰² FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *II Sent. (Principium et Finis)*, q. 64, Erlangen, UB, 255, f. 117rb: “Quarta conclusio, quod potentia obiectiva non est idem realiter cum essentia antequam producatur, quia ubi nulla realitas, ibi nulla est ydemp-titas. Nulla autem esse talis antequam crearetur vel ante suam creationem habet realitatem.”

¹⁰³ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *II Sent. (Principium et Finis)*, q. 64, Erlangen, UB, 255, f. 117rb: “Circa istam questionem inducuntur quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod essentia cuiuslibet nature producibilis non est sua potentia obiectiva formaliter, quia quilibet potest concipere quidditatem humanitatis absque eo quod concipiat producibilem vel non producibilem, quod non esset si de formalitate eius esset producibilitas. —Iterum, homo et asinus conveniunt in ratione formali producendi et differunt in formali(tati)bus propriis.”

beings in objective potency can be distinguished formally. In producing d. 8 of the *Conflatus*, he incorporates the definition of distinction and the typology of distinctions found in *Reportatio* (*Summa simplicitate*) I, d. 33. While his definition of distinction remains substantially unchanged, if more detailed,¹⁰⁴ the descriptions and examples of the types of distinction now include elements that show a deeper concern for the consequences of his doctrine of distinctions. In the example for the formal distinction, he echoes his statements above on objective potency: “Thus we say that a man and an ass in objective potency are distinguished, and this distinction is properly of distinct aspects.”¹⁰⁵ In this way, he makes explicit the implication in book II that they can be formally distinguished.

Meyronnes defines the essential distinction in the *Conflatus*. In the *Reportatio* he merely described the essential distinction by reference to the real distinction and a comparison between *in rebus* and *in divinis*, saying that the essential distinction had greater extension than the real one, since the persons are really distinct, but not essentially distinct. Now, in the *Conflatus*, Meyronnes explains the essential distinction as “when a quiddity with its existence is distinct from another quiddity with its existence”, and gives the unhelpful example of God being distinct from creation, unhelpful because this is the first and greatest division of being.¹⁰⁶ Finally, Meyronnes emphasizes the order of the distinctions:

These distinctions are essentially ordered, because the greatest one is the essential distinction, and for that reason, those things that are essentially distinguished are distinguished by all the other distinctions. The second-greatest, after the essential distinction, is the real distinction. After that there is the third, namely the quidditative or formal distinction. The fourth is the least of all, namely the distinction of quiddity and intrinsic mode.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43rbH–vbN.

¹⁰⁵ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43vbO. See Table 19, below.

¹⁰⁶ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43vbO. See Table 19, below.

¹⁰⁷ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Conflatus*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43vbO–P: “Iste distinctiones sunt essentialiter ordinate, quia maxime est essentialis, et ideo que essentialiter distinguuntur omnibus aliis distinctionibus distinguuntur. Secunda post essentialem maior est realis. Post illam est tertia, scilicet quidditativa vel formales. Quarta est minor omnibus, scilicet quidditatis et modi intrinseci.”

By being the greatest distinction, the essential distinction implies all the others.

Francis of Meyronnes breaks this last rule in his *Quodlibet*, held at Paris in either Advent 1323 or Lent 1324.¹⁰⁸ As he further refines his doctrine of distinctions with respect to objective potency, he argues that beings in objective potency can be essentially distinct without being really distinct. In the redaction of the *Quodlibet* that survives in the printed editions, Francis of Meyronnes discusses objective potency in question 7 of the disputation held at Paris, arguing that beings in objective potency can be considered ‘real’ insofar as they are not forged by the mind.¹⁰⁹ This sets the scene for the next question, “Whether the being of the essence of creatable quiddities was eternal” (*Utrum esse essentie creabilium quidditatum fuerit eternum*), also known as the *Vinculum*. Indeed, as creatable quiddities are in objective potency prior to creation, their essences are perpetual.¹¹⁰ Existence is an intrinsic

¹⁰⁸ DUBA, “Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus”, pp. 609–621.

¹⁰⁹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Quodlibet (versio imprimata)*, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 239rbH–vaI: “Sextum punctum est de entibus possibilibus, quia omnia possibilia possunt intelligi et esse in intellectu, et tamen non videntur esse entia realia, cum non sint in rerum natura, ut dum sunt in potentia obiectiva. Et ideo videntur entia rationis. Et quantum ad istud punctum ponuntur quatuor conclusiones. —Prima est quod ens dicitur secundum eandem rationem formalem de ente in potentia obiectiva et in actuali existentia, quia actus et potentia non diversificant essentiam. Et confirmatur, quia dicit Averroes (Iudicant artiste *ed.*) quod actus non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem; tum quia dicit quod in eodem genere est quidditas in actu et in potentia, et per consequens eadem diffinitio utrobique. —Secunda conclusio: quod istud ens quod sic dividitur in potentia et actum non potest esse ens rationis, quia tunc entia tam in actu quam in potentia essent entia rationis, cum superius de suo inferiori quidditative dicatur. —Tertia conclusio est quod istud ens commune est ens reale, accipiendo reale pro omni non fabricato ab anima, quia non est dare medium inter ens fabricatum ab anima et non fabricatum, per contradictionis extrema. —Quarta conclusio, quod entia in potentia obiectiva que dicuntur entia non prohibita non sunt entia rationis, quia ens commune quod in eis includitur, ut patet in precedentibus, est reale. Et confirmatur ista conclusio, quia, si entia non prohibita essent talia per actum nostre rationis, circumscripto tali actu fierent prohibita et sic essent impossibilia. —Sed oritur difficultas: quomodo possunt ista entia esse realia, cum non sint existentia, et realitas et existentia videantur adequata secundum principia nostra? Dicitur quod accipitur hic ‘realitas’ stricte pro modo intrinseco, scilicet pro non (I sed non pro *ed.*) fabricato ab anima quoque in commune.” Objective potency also appears in Meyronnes’ quodlibetal questions as contained in Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, Ms. 995, q. 6, f. 176ra–b, “Utrum res ante suam creationem sint vere create”, which ends abruptly with the page.

¹¹⁰ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Quodlibet (versio imprimata)*, q. 8 (*Vinculum*), a. 2,

mode of essences, and essences can be without such a mode. Meyronnes further separates these quiddities from God, since God is in actuality and existing, and these quiddities are not. But how can these perpetual quiddities be distinct from God?

Here four theses are set out, the first of which is that those quiddities in such being [of essence] are distinguished according to the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*) from the divine essence, because to whatever are suited, according to the nature of the thing, the extremes of a contradiction, those things themselves are distinct according to the nature of the thing, since, according to the first principle [i.e., the principle of non-contradiction] contradictories cannot be suited to the same thing and in the same way; but these are from the nature of the thing distinct, that is, they are distinct independently of any work of reasoning, because these quiddities are the secondary objects of the divine intellect, and the divine essence is not its secondary object; therefore, they are distinct in this way.

The second thesis: they are not only distinct according to the nature of the thing, but also formally, because whenever some two are related such something is predicated essentially (*dicitur in quid*) of one and not of the other, those two things are quidditatively distinct, which is to be formally distinct; but 'body' is predicated essentially of 'man' in being of essence, since body belongs to its essence, which body is not predicated of the divine essence; therefore they are formally distinct.

The third thesis: they are not only distinguished formally, but also essentially, because things are essentially distinguished by being in different genera, since the difference according to genus and species is properly essential, and then, by the same reason, and all the more, what is in genus is distinguished from what is outside genus; but the quiddities of creatable things are in different genera, and the divine essence transcends every genus; therefore they are essentially distinct.

The fourth thesis: they are not really distinguished, because where any extreme is not a thing (*res*), there cannot be a real distinction; but the quiddities of creatable things before their creation are not

ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 241vaM: "Ideo dico quod quidditates creabiles ante suam creationem habent esse essentie, quicquid sit illud esse, quia ante suam creationem sunt entia in potentia, et actus et potentia non diversificant essentiam (sic confitentur philosophi), et constat quod essentia et esse essentie sunt idem."

things, since everything either is created or uncreated in actuality, and therefore, there cannot be a real distinction.¹¹¹

On Francis of Meyronnes' reckoning, the quiddities perpetually in objective potency are not reducible to God, but are rather distinct, formally, and now essentially. In fact, Meyronnes has changed the definition of what constitutes an essential distinction. In the *Conflatus*, an essential distinction is between a quiddity-with-its-existence and another quiddity-with-its-existence. In the *Quodlibet*, Meyronnes removes the requirement of the intrinsic mode of existence, and so, quiddities of things that do not exist, such as those in objective potency, now admit of both essential and formal distinctions. Since they are not real, however, they cannot be really distinct, and so an essential distinction no longer implies a real distinction. The examples that Meyronnes gives are no longer limited to the case of God and creation, the most general division of being, but now descend all the way to the distinction between genus and species. Indeed, Meyronnes' essential distinction has become extremely formal, to the point that he himself raises the doubt that "the

¹¹¹ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Quodlibet (versio imprimata)*, q. 8 (*Vinculum*), a. 4, ed. Venetiis 1520, ff. 241vbP–242raA: "Quartus articulus est si quidditates creabilium in tali esse a divina essentia realiter distinguantur. Et ponuntur hic quatuor conclusiones. Quarum prima est quod ille quidditates in tali esse distinguuntur a divina essentia ex natura rei, quia quibuscumque conveniunt ex natura rei extrema contradictionis, illa sunt ex natura rei distincta, cum eidem et secundum idem convenire non possunt per primum principium; istis autem conveniunt extrema contradictionis ex natura rei, id est, circumscripto omni opere rationis, quia ille quidditates sunt obiecta secundaria divini intellectus, et divina essentia non est eius obiectum secundarium; igitur sic sunt distincta. —Secunda conclusio: quia illa non solum distinguuntur ex natura rei, sed et formaliter, quia quandocumque aliqua duo ita se habent quod aliquid dicitur in quid de uno, quod non dicitur in quid de alio, illa sunt quidditative distincta, quod est formaliter; sed de homine in esse essentie dicitur in quid corpus, cum sit de eius essentia, quod non dicitur de divina essentia; ergo illa sunt formaliter distincta. —Tertia conclusio: quia illa non solum distinguuntur formaliter, sed etiam essentialiter, quia per hoc quod est esse in diversis generibus distinguuntur aliqua essentialiter, cum differentia per genus et speciem sit proprie essentialis, et tunc eadem ratione et maiori illud quod est in genere ab eo quod est extra genus; sed quidditates creabilium sunt in determinatis generibus, et divina essentia omne genus transcendit; ergo illa sunt distincta essentialiter. —Quarta conclusio: quod illa non distinguuntur realiter, quia ubi non est res quodlibet extremum, non potest esse realis distinctio; quidditates autem creabilium ante suam creationem non sunt res, cum omnis res aut sit creata aut increata in actu, et ideo ibi non potest esse realis distinctio."

essential distinction does not seem to be different from the formal distinction, since both are quidditative.” He replies that the distinction is a matter of scope:

The formal distinction is had in more than the essential distinction is, although every essential distinction is formal, and thus both are quidditative distinctions, but they are not equal. Whence in God, opposite relations are distinguished quidditatively, and not essentially.¹¹²

Meyronnes says that more things are formally distinct than are essentially distinct, and he points to the properties of the divine persons, which are formally (and really) distinct, but not essentially. He does not further explain how this distinction holds, and he seems to have retreated to the understanding he held in the *Summa simplicitate* version.

In his *principia* on the *Sentences*, Francis of Meyronnes, like William of Brienne, engages in fierce debate with his *socii* on the formal distinction. Meyronnes makes explicit that he is defending the common doctrine of his school, and emphasizes the points he shares with other champions of the formal distinction, showing great interest in the subtleties of Scotus’ position. In the course of lecturing on the *Sentences*, however, he defines distinction as a transcendental, intrinsically-arising respect, and so allows for one sense of distinction to include essential, real, and formal distinctions. His further specification that a distinction is a respect of dislikening allows him to include the distinction between intrinsic modes and their quiddities, calling it the modal distinction. As he explores the ramifications of the doctrine of intrinsic modes, particularly with respect to non-existent beings in objective potency, Meyronnes adjusts the definitions and relative scope of these four distinctions to accommodate his evolving ontology, allowing for beings in objective potentiality to be formally distinct. In the *Conflatus*, he tries to present the essential distinction as something more than an *ad hoc* distinction that only applies to the Trinity, defining it as the distinction between two quiddities with their existences and claiming that it implies all other distinctions. Finally, in his *Quodlibet*, Meyronnes confronts again the problem of beings in objective potency, and has to reject

¹¹² FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Quodlibet (versio imprimata)*, q. 8 (*Vinculum*), a. 4, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 242raA–B: “Tertia quia distinctio essentialis non videtur alia a formali, cum utraque sit quidditativa. . . Ad tertium, quod in plus se habet formalis quam essentialis, licet omnis essentialis sit formalis, et sic utraque quidditativa, sed non adequate. Unde in divinis relationes opposite distinguuntur quidditative, et non essentialiter.”

both statements about the essential distinction, since beings in objective potency, he claims, do not really exist, and yet can be essentially distinct.

3. *William of Brienne*

William of Brienne inherited these terms of the debate. As noted earlier, in general he favors a philosophical approach more faithful to Scotus' original statements than to the innovations introduced by the early Scotists. In *lectio* 26, he defends a doctrine of the formal distinction that is closer to Scotus than Meyronnes, but he uses the subsequent discussion to arrive at the doctrine, bringing in Francis of Meyronnes' doctrine of distinctions specifically to criticize it.

William of Brienne dedicates four *lectiones* to book I, d. 8 of the *Sentences*, and the second one, *lectio* 26, focuses specifically on applying distinctions to God, discussing two questions, "Whether every distinction is repugnant to divine simplicity" (q. 3) and "Whether a formal distinction is more repugnant to divine simplicity than is non-identity" (q. 4). For q. 3, William considers the definition of a distinction, first defining what a distinction is [§2–18], then specifying the kinds of distinction [§19–20], before determining that the formal distinction, understood as a denomination of what it distinguishes, exists in God [§21–25]. In the final question (q. 4), William argues against making the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction [§26–45]. William structures the *lectio* dialectically, presenting the opinion of an adversary and dismantling it to arrive at his view.

Therefore, in defining distinction, William presents and criticizes Meyronnes' view, that a distinction is "an intrinsically-arising respect of dislikening that is transcendent, not belonging to a given genus" (*respectus intrinsecus adveniens disquiparentie transcendens, non determinati generis*) [§2]. After explaining what Meyronnes means [§2–7], William raises two objections against Meyronnes' definition. First, Meyronnes asserts that a distinction is a real respect. Yet something cannot signify a real respect if its opposite is not a real, positive being, and the opposite of distinction, identity, does not seem to be able to signify a real respect, since its two terms are identical [§8–9]. Second, William disputes Meyronnes' claim that a distinction is a respect of dislikening (*respectus disquiparantie*), because the two extremes are convertible: *a* is not *b* and *b* is not *a*; therefore, it appears that a distinction is a respect of likening (*respectus equiparantie*) [§10].

I say therefore otherwise, first that distinction properly speaking is an intrinsically-arriving respect and real. Secondly, that a distinction can also be taken for the mere denomination of the extremes. Thirdly, that taking it in general it signifies something relative (*dicitur ad aliquid*). Fourth that it signifies a relation, namely a likening [§11].

Most notably, William introduces two different kinds of distinction: distinction properly speaking and “mere denomination.” With respect to distinction properly speaking, he argues it is a real relation; implicitly addressing his first objection, that distinction cannot be a real relation if identity is not, he asserts that, in fact, identity is a real relation. Unfortunately, if William meant to apply a proof that identity constitutes a real relation, the *reportator* did not record it, writing just “et quantum ad primum” [§12]. To prove that there has to be some distinction that is mere denomination, William gives a *reductio ad infinitum*. A distinction in the proper sense is something distinct from its extremes; therefore, a distinction obtains between that distinction and those extremes. If that distinction is a distinction in the fullest sense, then, in turn, another distinction will obtain, and so on to infinity. Therefore, in some (diminished) sense, a distinction has to signify just the two extremes [§13]. For William of Brienne, distinction properly speaking belongs to the category of relation, and he assigns to ‘mere denomination’ the cases Meyronnes used to argue for a transcendental distinction. William’s discussion of the distinction of mere denomination reflects Scotus’ characterization of the formal distinction as a distinction *secundum quid*. Yet it calls upon Francis of Meyronnes to do what Scotus does not: explicitly define and classify distinction, and that definition and classification give Brienne the structure to work back to Scotus.

This tendency to ‘return Meyronnes to Scotus’ becomes more evident in the second article, where Brienne copies four types of extramental distinction. Interestingly, Brienne accepts the first three (essential, real, and formal distinctions) without discussion, and rejects the last, the modal distinction. Brienne begins by summarizing Meyronnes’ view:

With respect to the second article, one doctor says that ‘distinction’ is taken in four ways. Sometimes it refers to essential distinction, as God is distinguished from creation, and a thing of one category from a thing of another, because they do not any commonality within them. Secondly, it refers to real distinction, and in this way the persons are distinguished in God, but not essentially, since they are one essence and one nature. In the third

way, it is taken for the formal and quidditative distinction, as man-in-potency and ass-in-potency, for they are not things, but their quiddities are different. And likewise, Paternity and [divine] essence, because the quiddity of one is not the quiddity of the other. The fourth is the distinction of a quiddity from its intrinsic degree of perfection, as is clear with a more intense and less intense whiteness [§19].

William of Brienne is faithful enough to his source to permit its identification as d. 8, q. 1 of the *Conflatus*, but with precise modifications that reflect Meyronnes' view from the *Quodlibet*.

Table 19: William of Brienne lecturing on the *Conflatus*

FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, <i>Conflatus</i> , d. 8, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43vbO–P)	GUILELMUS DE BRENA, <i>lectio</i> 26 (Appendix D)
Secundo videndum est quot sunt modi distinctionum, quod fuit secundum declarandum. Ad quod dico quod sunt quatuor gradus distinctionum non fabricati ab intellectu sive ab anima.	[19] Quantum ad secundum dicit unus doctor quod distinctio quadrupliciter accipitur.
Prima est distinctio essentialis, eo modo quo distinguitur Deus a creatura, et iste proprie accipiendo est quando quiditas cum sua existentia est distincta ab alia quiditate cum sua existentia. distinguitur Deus a creatura, et iste proprie accipiendo est quando quiditas cum sua existentia est distincta ab alia quiditate cum sua existentia.	Quandoque pro essentiali, ut Deus distinguitur a creatura et res unius predicamenti a re alterius, que non habent convenientia intra.
Secunda est realis, eo modo quo est distinctio inter Patrem et Filium. Unde distinctio realis est illa que est inter rem et rem.	Secundo pro reali, et hoc \modo/ distinguuntur persone in divinis, sed non essentialiter, quia sunt una essentia et una natura.
Tertio est formalis, et ista est inter quiditatem et quiditatem. Sic dicimus quod homo et asinus in potentia obiectiva distinguuntur, et ista distinctio proprie est rationum distinctarum.	Tertio modo capitur pro distinctione formali et quiditativa, sicut homo in potentia et asinus in potentia; non enim sunt res, sed quiditates eorum sunt diverse. Et similiter paternitas et essentia, quia quiditas unius non est formaliter \quiditas/ alterius.

Quarta est distinctio non quiditatis et quiditatis, sed quidditatis et modi intrinseci, sicut est inter quiditatem hominis et eius finitatem, et quiditatem albedinis et eius remissionem et intensionem.	Quarta est distinctio [formalis] \quiditatis a suo gradu perfectionali intrinseco/ a ratione gradus [intrinseco], ut patet de albedine intensiore et minus intensa.
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The *reportatio* of William's lectures distorts Meyronnes' definition in a few ways. Trivially, it lacks Meyronnes' qualification that the four senses of 'distinction' exclude those purely made by the mind. William also gives the example of the formal distinction between man-in-potency and ass-in-potency without specifying that the intended division applies to objective potency, although such a specification is understood. More seriously, the *reportatio* of William of Brienne's lecture stumbles over Francis of Meyronnes' definition of the modal distinction. In the *reportatio*, the initial rendition of Meyronnes' distinction was nonsense (*distinctio formalis a ratione gradus intrinseco*); the correction, moreover, fails to delete the words *formalis* and *intrinseco*, making the sense difficult to achieve; maybe Meyronnes' modal distinction was new to the *reportator*.

William's comments on Meyronnes' essential distinction go beyond what can be found in the *Conflatus*. Although the *Conflatus* defines the essential distinction as that holding between one quiddity-with-existence and another quiddity-with-existence, and gives the example of the division between God and creation, the *reportatio* of Brienne's lecture gives no definition and two examples. Besides God and creation, the *reportatio* provides the example of items from different categories, and says they are distinct because of a lack of commonality (*convenientia*). The formulation is quidditative; essentially distinct items are so on the basis of what they are. The addition is probably an attempt to update Meyronnes' definitions of distinctions to reflect his mature view (which drops the qualification of existence), although the example and statement added (for I have not found such a variant reading in any manuscript of the *Conflatus* I have examined) suggest a more dangerous solution: the essential distinction holds at all the levels of being for which a Thomist would use analogy: between God and creation, and between one category and another. If applied just at this level, then two really distinct members of the same category, say a cat and a dog, would not be essentially distinct, just like the persons of the Trinity are not.

William of Brienne presents Francis of Meyronnes' four types of extramental distinctions, with a major modification to the example of the essential distinction and a garbled presentation of the modal distinction. He then decides the issue:

Now, conceding the first three ways, I do not understand the fourth way, arguing thus: a distinction that arises by the act of ab\tracti\ve consideration is not from the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*). But the distinction of quiddity and its degree is of this sort; the proof: between those things is a distinction, etc., that are presented as objects entirely indistinct to an act of intuitive \consideration/ – this is clear in itself. But a quiddity and its degree of perfection are of this sort; the proof: they do not have the aspect of two formal objects, otherwise a quiddity could be intuited without perfection, which is false. And therefore in such forms the quiddity and the degree of perfection are not different objects [§20].

William grants without discussion the first three ways, which, at least superficially, is in line with a conservative Scotist's position, and refuses the one that goes beyond the Subtle Doctor. Intrinsic modes or degrees do not change the quiddity of what something is, and therefore do not change how the mind understands the object; it is only by reasoning through abstraction that the mind arrives at a notion of such modes, and therefore, their distinction depends entirely on an operation of the mind.

The final section of William of Brienne's *lectio* 26 addresses q. 4, the inference from formal non-identity to formal distinction, specifically from 'quiddity A is not formally quiddity B' to 'quiddity A is formally distinct from quiddity B'. William has in mind an opponent whom I have not succeeded in identifying, who makes two claims. First, any pair of quiddities are either formally the same or formally distinct [§27]. Second, no two quiddities can be formally not-the-same without having a distinction that connects them [§33]. Against this position, William sets a second, which he apparently favors:

Another way of speaking is that there is no necessity that a connecting formal distinction be posited in the extremes when formal non-identity is posited. The reason: when some form has multiple degrees and modes, it does not follow from its negation in one mode that its opposite be posited in another mode; but it is

such concerning identity, because there is real, formal, etc.; therefore, given some things that are formally not-the-same, it does not follow that they are formally distinct; wherefore, etc.

But it should be noted that distinction is taken in two ways, either as it signifies a real disposition of the extremes towards each other; in the second way, as it signifies to me the mere denomination of the extremes. In the first way, I do not believe that there is a distinction between such extremes, which are only formally not-the-same, but in the second way I indeed concede it [§36–37].

That is, the second position holds that the inference from two formally non-identical quiddities to two formally distinct ones need not follow. William makes clear, however, that it does not follow in the case where a formal distinction signifies some real relation between the two extremes, that is, if the formal distinction is a distinction properly speaking. As he explained at the beginning of the lecture, however, he holds that the formal distinction is a distinction *secundum quid*, in the diminished sense of merely denominating the extremes. In this sense, one can infer a formal distinction from two distinct quiddities.

John Duns Scotus left his followers a fertile philosophical system. That is, his ambiguity on his core ideas enabled his followers to develop them in divergent ways. His teaching on the formal distinction gave rise to the expectation that it was one of several degrees of distinction, while actually holding that it was only a distinction in a diminished sense. Francis of Meyronnes aggressively develops on these expectations, spinning a definition of distinction as a transcendental and enumerating a hierarchy of distinctions that includes one between intrinsic modes and their quiddities. William of Brienne defends a line of interpretation implicitly closer to Scotus' own doctrine and explicitly against the ambitious formulation of Francis of Meyronnes. Francis of Meyronnes, however, furnishes William of Brienne with the means to express clearly his own view: Meyronnes gives the definition and the list that Scotus never did. In presenting this position as a correction of Meyronnes, William of Brienne reveals a fundamental distinction among the followers of Scotus. Yet, like Meyronnes, Brienne keeps the discussion of this distinction inside the Franciscan school; in his *principia* on the *Sentences*, debating with bachelors from other schools, he does not descend into such divisive detail.

Conclusion

For William of Brienne, Scotism permeates his method; the *Ordinatio* is the point of departure for his own reflection and his own course. His lectures on the *Sentences* are not merely position-centered, they are text-centered, and that center text is the *Ordinatio*. On contested issues, William supplements Scotus with *Sentences* commentaries from the intervening period, most notably with the commentaries of Marchia, Meyronnes and Auriol. But William of Brienne does more than simply read other texts aloud; he focuses on specific topics, and he organizes the material to communicate doctrine within the constraints of the Parisian academic year. The *reportator* doubtless further simplified and distorted the teaching. The subsequent corrections did more than just fix mistakes and clarify points; they would often lead away from the source texts and take the discussion in new directions.

Scotus does not always determine William's conclusions. In *lectio* 71, William went against Scotus with regards to the ordination of minors; in both *lectio* 64 and 71, Brienne processed Scotus' doctrine, simplifying, extending and modifying it; in *lectio* 26, he arrives at Scotus by criticizing scholars who came after him. At times, William of Brienne even seems to hold the views of others. For example, in discussing the problem of the soul as form of the body, he seems to support Peter Auriol's position that the soul is a substantial form in an equivocal sense with respect to other substantial forms, but that one must hold otherwise purely on the authority of the Council of Vienne, since it cannot be demonstrated.¹¹³

¹¹³ GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 104, ff. 131v–132r: “Quantum ad secundum articulum utrum secundum veritatem hoc possit probari animam esse formam substantialem. Et dicit unus doctor quod non est de necessitate fidei, quia nec alii articuli, ut Trinitas. Alius dicit quod oportet hoc, quia de necessitate fidei probatur quod homo non sit asinus. Secundo de necessitate fidei ~~probat~~ **probat**ur est probari quod homo habeat in se principium actuum laudabilium; sed ita est. Dico tamen cum primo, quod non est de necessitate fidei. Nec valent obiecta, quia hoc non est de necessitate fidei, sed de decencia fidei. Sed unus doctor dicit ~~quod~~ animam esse formam alterius rationis ab aliis formis substantialibus, quia substantia secundum se, tamen tenendum est quod forma univoce dicta cum aliis formis vivificans corpus et informans ipsum corpus, quia nobilior vivificat ignobilior et anima est nobilior corpore, ideo etc. Et hoc tenendum est inconcusse secundum fidem et veritatem.” This is the end of the *lectio*; the objection from from *decencia* is that of Landulph Caracciolo. On the discussion among Franciscans, including Peter Auriol's position, see DUBA, “The Souls after Vienne”.

Throughout the *lectiones*, William of Brienne speaks the language of Scotism, a language in which his *reportator* was fluent. He focuses on the topics that most appealed to Scotists, and, around the guiding star of the *Ordinatio*, organizes a small constellation of source texts. He has a close familiarity to these sources and synthesizes a version of Scotus that matches the demands of the classroom in the academic year 1330–31. Contrary to what editors might expect, revisions and corrections can move *away* from the sources.

Scotism, then, appears in many ways in Brienne's *reportatio*, as has been evident throughout this study. Scotism is the language that Brienne speaks; when, for example in his *principium*, he replies to a colleague by appealing to the distinction between intrinsically- and extrinsically-arising-relations (Chapter III). Scotism is the selection of lecture topics, spending the most time on those central to the Subtle Doctrine (Chapter IV). Scotism can be manipulating the account of scholastic debates so that John Duns Scotus comes out the victor, even posthumously. It can also be explicitly or implicitly deviating from the Subtle Doctor's teaching, or incorporating and castigating the contributions of later Scotists. For much of the time, William of Brienne was a Scotist also insofar as the major source for his lectures was the *Ordinatio*.

Beyond Scotism, these cases show how teaching fueled the iterative transformation of the discipline. Take the tables that fill the preceding pages: their explicit purpose is to demonstrate the dependence of the text on the right on the text of on the left, the motion of ideas from left to right, generation to generation at the University of Paris. They also reveal, in that right-most column, the shoots of new ideas and perspectives, which grow further in revision. The one warm line dividing the two is the philosopher's agency. Most philosophical and theological works that come from *reportationes* reflect the process one step later, after these ideas and perspectives are fully grown; here we can see their early origins in the classroom.

Chapter VI

After the Lectures

The academic year at Paris officially ended with the feast of Saints Peter and Paul, June 29. On that date in 1331, William of Brienne would have finished his lectures on the *Sentences* and become a *baccalarius formatus*, a “formed bachelor.” While the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris required a formed bachelor to be active in the faculty for six years from when he started reading the *Sentences*, the mendicants were excepted from this rule.¹ Thus, in this period the Dominicans appeared to incept in the third year after starting to read the *Sentences*, so that they would lecture for a year, spend a year as formed bachelor, and then incept as a master of theology in the next year.²

A formed bachelor in theology had numerous duties, such as participating as a *respondens* in quodlibetal disputations and in promotion ceremonies, as well as giving sermons as part of the university’s annual cycle.³ The year after reading the *Sentences*, a mendicant bachelor

¹ CUP II-1, n. 822, pp. 271–272 contains a May 1323 letter to the chancellor of Paris, asking him to promote Pierre Roger, O.S.B., to the rank of Master in Theology, in spite of the six-year requirement (Pierre Roger lectured on the *Sentences* in 1320–21); twenty-one years later, Pierre Roger himself, as Clement VI, writes a similar promotion letter for a theologian and canon of Sainte-Geneviève, explicitly requesting an exemption of the six-year requirement, n. 1093, pp. 551–52. Papal letters for Franciscans, such as that for William of Brienne, make no mention of the requirement.

² W. DUBA, “Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet”, in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics* ed. F. AMERINI and G. GALLUZZO (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 43), Leiden 2014, pp. 413–493, at pp. 467–468.

³ Traditionally, sermons at the fourteenth-century University of Paris were given in the Dominican church on Sundays and in the Franciscan church on feast days, with a few exceptions (such as the Immaculate Conception, which was given in the Carmelite church). On the duties of a formed bachelor in theology as described by the fourteenth-century statutes of the University of Paris, see P. GLORIEUX,

would likely have duties within the university convent; the Dominicans, for example, made such a bachelor serve as the *magister studentium*, the authority in charge of those friars studying at the convent.⁴ Although such duties as a guardian of students might have pertained to William of Brienne, it is unlikely that he ever carried them out. For, on July 15, 1331, just over two weeks after the end of his teaching on the *Sentences*, Pope John XXII sent a letter to the Chancellor of Paris:

To my beloved son, . . . , chancellor of Paris, greetings. We joyfully grant the aid of apostolic favor to religious persons who, in their study of virtues, sweat so laudably in giving lectures that they deserve to pursue the reward of knowledge. And so, since, as we understand by a trustworthy account, our beloved son William of Brienne, of the Order of Friars Minor, a Bachelor in the Sacred Page, with divine grace supporting him, has so advanced in the theological faculty that he should be reputed suitable for obtaining the license of doctorate in said faculty, we therefore via apostolic writings enjoin upon your discretion that, if said William should be found suitable, on the testimony of the masters of the aforesaid faculty, that you grant him this sort of license, notwithstanding any contrary statutes or customs, protected by oath, apostolic confirmation, or any other strengthening. Given at Avignon, on the Ides of July, in the fifteenth year.⁵

The text of the letter is formulaic, but the consequence was practically automatic: William of Brienne was soon granted the *licentia docendi* in theology and shortly thereafter incepted as a master of theology.

“L’enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIII^e siècle”, in *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 43 (1968), pp. 65–186, at pp. 97–98.

⁴ M.M. MULCHAHEY, “*First the Bow is Bent in Study . . .*” *Dominican Education Before 1350* (Studies and Texts 132), Toronto 1998, pp. 382–383.

⁵ CUP II-1, n. 914, p. 346: “Dilecto filio . . . cancellario ecclesie Parisiensis salutem. Religiosis personis que virtutum studiis per lectionum exercitia laudabiliter sic insudant quod scientie bravium assequi promerentur libenter apostolici favoris presidium impertimur. Cum itaque, sicut fidedigna relatione percepimus, dilectus filius Guillelmus de Brena, Ordinis fratrum Minorum, bacalarius in sacra pagina, adeo in theologica facultate divina sibi gratia suffragante profecerit quod debet ydoneus reputari ad obtinendum doctoratus licentiam in eadem: discretioni tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus dicto Guillelmo, si ipse ad hoc ex testimonio magistrorum facultatis predicte ([predicta Denifle] ydoneus repertus extiterit, non obstantibus statutis et consuetudinis quibuscumque contrariis iuramento confirmatione apostolica vel quacumque alia firmitate vallatis, huiusmodi licentiam largiaris. Dat. Avinione id. Julii, anno xv.”

The inception ceremony of the Faculty of Theology at Paris signified the elevation of the candidate to the community of masters.⁶ It took place over two days. The first day saw the vespers, where, in the evening, the candidate performed his last acts as bachelor. The vespers had two questions and a concluding speech. In the first question (the *expectativa magistrorum*), a formed bachelor responded to a question. Then, a second question, itself (confusingly) also called the vespers, involved the candidate and three masters; one of them, the promoting master, presided over the question. The candidate gave a response to the question; then the first master challenged the candidate's arguments, and he and the candidate exchanged arguments and counterarguments. After the candidate responded to the first master, the second master challenged him, and the process repeated. Finally, the master promoting the candidate gave a speech, praising Scripture and the candidate. The candidate therefore ended his career as one of the bachelors in theology disputing a question under the authority and guidance of the masters.

The second day consisted of the ceremony in the bishop's *aula*, where the candidate was promoted and performed his first acts as master. The candidate sat between the chancellor of Paris and the master who was promoting him, and around them were arrayed all the masters of theology of Paris. His promoting master would place the *biretta* on his head, and, with the blessing of the chancellor, the new master would incept. His first duty was to preach, specifically, to give a speech in praise of Scripture, known as a *principium in theologia*. After the speech, a formed bachelor would dispute a (third) question (the *disputatio in aula*), and the new master would preside over the disputation, posing the first series of objections. After the third question, the fourth question (the *quaestio magistrorum*) involved the community of masters disputing among themselves. The ceremony would end with a procession of the assembled masters to the new master's residence, and the new master would be expected to hold a feast.⁷ Some time later, the new master

⁶ GLORIEUX, "L'enseignement au Moyen Age.", pp. 141–146; B.C. BAZÁN, "Les questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie", in *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, ed. B.C. BAZÁN, J.F. WIPPEL, G. FRANSEN, D. JACQUART (Typologie des sources du Moyen Age 44–45), Turnhout 1985, pp. 13–149, at pp. 112–122; C. SCHABEL, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientiae Dei*", in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 81 (2014), pp. 237–272.

⁷ The expense of these feasts was a cause for concern, at least among the Dominicans. Precisely in Spring 1331, the Dominican General Chapter meeting forbade

would hold his first class, known as the *resumptio* (or *lectio resumpta*), in which he addressed and decided the third question, and any other issues left open from his inception.⁸ In this way, the promoting master, in the *aula*, would physically invest the new master with the physical symbols of his rank (most notably the hat), and the new master would perform the duties of a theologian, namely lecturing, disputing, and preaching (*legere, disputare, et praedicare*), by giving a sermon-like speech,⁹ presiding over a bachelor's disputation, which served as the basis for his lectures, and joining the company of masters who disputed the question. The promotion received the ecclesiastical authority of the bishop of Paris, in whose *aula* (if not presence as well) the event occurred.

A copy of William of Brienne's *principium in theologia* attests to his inception ceremony. Preserved in a collection of sermons in a single manuscript, Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 105, on folios 86v–88v, the text *Ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur ut iterum fluant* [Eccl. 1:7] (edited here as Appendix G), is explicitly

festive meals, CUP II-1, n. 912, p. 344: “Cum ex eo quod magistri et bacellarii Parisienses expensas faciunt in suis principiis notabiliter excessivas graventur ipsimet facientes, et paupertas nostra non sine gravi scandalo difformetur, precipit magister Ordinis in virtute sancte obedientie de diffinitorum consilio et assensu, quod supradicti magistri et bacellarii nullas pictantias faciant in die aule sue, nec in diebus quibus incipiunt lectiones, et volumus quod priores provinciales in suis provinciis consimiles excessus lectorum quorumcumque in suis principiis studeant refrenare.” This call was repeated in other years, notably in 1343, CUP II-1, n. 1071, p. 538.

⁸ W. DUBA and C. SCHABEL, “*Ni chose, ni non-chose: The Sentences-Commentary of Himbertus de Garda, OFM*”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232, at pp. 185–186; S. METZGER, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2013, pp. 60–63; N. SPATZ, *Principia: A Study and Edition of Inception Speeches Delivered before the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, ca. 1180–1286*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1992, pp. 39–50.

⁹ Specialists in sermons refrain from referring to theological *principium* speeches as sermons primarily on the basis of extrinsic factors: sermons were given in association with the mass and had a theme bearing some connection to the liturgy. Theologians gave *principium* speeches on specific occasions, namely at the beginning of a series of lectures, and they did not give them in a church. Yet, on the other hand, they also called these speeches *sermones*, these *sermones* closely follow the conventions of medieval *artes praedicandi*, and they are often preserved in collections of sermons. So, while they were not sermons given in a church, they were at least sermonic enough to be lumped together with them. On the structure of medieval sermons (and therefore, of *principium* speeches), see S. WENZEL, *Medieval Artes Praedicandi: A Synthesis of Scholastic Sermon Structure* (Medieval Academy Books 114), Toronto 2015.

labelled William of Brienne's *principium in theologia* and corresponds to the conventions of the genre. The surviving manuscript is an apograph, yet some indications suggest that it too was produced as a *reportatio*. Finally, while the content does not appear exceptional, it does provide an excellent example of how an average medieval theologian used the tools at his disposal to produce a speech or sermon.

In addition to the *principium*, the manuscript, Borgh. 105 contains 51 sermons, 48 of which are entirely anonymous.¹⁰ Two of the three sermons with identified authors are by Franciscans and the third probably is as well. In addition to the sermon attributed to William of Brienne (which will be treated below), the Franciscan Cardinal Bertrand de La Tour is named as the author of the sermon *Fratres gaudete perfecti estote* [2 Cor. 13:11], on ff. 90v–93r.¹¹ Moreover, a marginal annotation assigns to a *dominus ber.* the Septuagesima Sunday sermon *Voca operarios et redde illis mercedem* [Matt. 20:8] on f. 15v.¹² The sermons in the codex have been carefully copied and corrected: in some cases, the corrections have been erased (to surface as a palimpsest) and recopied (e.g., f. 71v, where a 63-word omission *per homoioteleuton* from *regis assiriorum* to *regis assiriorum* has been filled in twice in the margin; or f. 54v, where the two-letter *nobis* was erased and rewritten). Some of the sermons appear to have been copied at different times. The last sermon in the fourth quire, on Saint Catherine, *Ingrederet in medio rotarum que sunt subtus cherubim et imple manum tuam prunis que sunt inter cherubim et effunde super civitatem* [Ezek. 10:2], was apparently copied across the quires, and possibly by multiple hands: it runs from the top of f. 33r

¹⁰ A. MAIER, *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 170), Vatican City 1952, pp. 135–139, notes (p. 139) that it was already in the 1369 catalogue of the Papal Library at Avignon as no. 2056. To her description of the manuscript should be added the sermon on the Feast of Saint Martin, “*Nec mihi nec tibi set dividatur*” [3 Reg. 3:26] on f. 3v. The Vatican Library has recently made available on their website digital imagery of this manuscript: http://digi.vatlib.it/view/mss_borgh.105 (last accessed August 10, 2016).

¹¹ P. NOLD, “Bertrand de la Tour O.Min., Manuscript List and Sermon Supplement II”, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 95 (2002), pp. 3–52, at p. 12; the sermon is J.B. SCHNEYER, *Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 43), vol. 1, Münster 1969, p. 529, no. 326.

¹² Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., Borgh. 105, f. 15v, *mg.*: “*dominica in lxxa domini ber.*”; MAIER, *Codices*, p. 136, suggests that this might be by Bertrand as well; it appears similar to the sermon “*Ite in vineum meum*”, in SCHNEYER, *Repertorium*, v. 1, p. 537, no. 433.

to seven lines above the end of f. 35v. Some blank space intervenes, precisely at the change of quires: the last lines of the fourth quire (34v) are blank (with the annotation “nihil deficit”), and the series of lines preceding that has been expanded to fill up the space. This suggests that the last two pages of the sermon, occupying the first folio of the fifth quire in the collection (ff. 35r–v), were copied first or at least at the same time as the first part; the copyist estimated where the page break would be, and erred slightly. Yet this sermon was, in turn, already present when the sermon before it was copied.¹³ That sermon, *Amice, ascende superius* [Luke 14:10], begins at the top of 32r (31v is blank), and, at the end of 32v, instructs the reader to “*require residuum ad tale signum*”, followed by a symbol resembling a majuscule Y with a line across the top, turning it into a triangle on top of a minim. The next part of the sermon (and the matching symbol) is found on f. 89r, that is, right after the *principium* speech by William of Brienne. In fact, this part of the sermon only occupies 89r; at the end of the page, a note states “*residuum post tria folia*”, indicating the mutilated f. 93, the last folio in the current codex.¹⁴ Moreover, the first seventeen lines on 89r are written over a palimpsest; only the initial, rubric Q has not been

¹³ In private correspondence, Patrick Nold notes that the sermon on St. Catherine is also a Sunday sermon, a conjunction that occurred precisely in 1330; other possible dates are 1319, 1324, and 1341.

¹⁴ In fact, the target folio has almost certainly been removed. The last gathering in the codex (XI) has only three bifolios; all the others are quaternions or quinternions. While almost the entirety of f. 93 has been torn off, enough survives to see that the text only covered half the recto side, and that the verso was blank. Bertrand de la Tour’s sermon on the Trinity *Fratres gaudete perfecti estote* continues past f. 92v, and from another copy of Bertrand’s sermon survives in Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., Vat. lat. 1242, ff. 245vb–247ra, the amount and quality of missing text can be determined: from the first line of 247ra to the end of the sermon, roughly two-thirds of a column, which would correspond to two thirds of a page in Borgh. 105, exceeding the actual written space on f. 93r. In any case, the last lines of f. 93r do not match Bertrand’s sermon. They do, however, come directly from the *Manipulus florum*, “anima a”, which in this case is a composite of several passages by different authors, but attributed to Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*, THOMAS HIBERNICUS, *Manipulus Florum*, ed. C. NIGHMAN, <http://www.manipulusflorum.com> (last accessed August 10, 2016). A bifolio then was originally between folios 88–89 and 92–93. As an aside, the *Manipulus florum* is a source used both in Bertrand de la Tour’s sermon (e.g., at the top of f. 92v, the quote from Augustine appears as “Fides sive fidelitas b”) and in the anonymous one (f. 32r, following the theme comes an *auctoritas* from Augustine that is “Predicacio f”, and, at the end of the page, one from Gregory that is “Gloria eterna r”).

scratched out. Only the first word is still legible: *Queritur*. Somebody has deemed some of the sermons in this manuscript worthy of copying: in the margin by the beginning of a few sermons one reads *scribe*, as is the case on f. 57v, for a sermon on Saint Claire; other sermons are rejected (*non scribe*), e.g., on f. 56r. Neither indication occurs for William of Brienne's speech.

William of Brienne's speech, therefore, was originally followed by at least the beginning of a *quaestio*, which was then erased and copied over with part of a sermon. Although someone made explicit marks for some sermons to be copied, Brienne's speech receives no annotations beyond corrections of the text. What few indications there are suggest a Franciscan origin: the two positively identified authors are Franciscans; of the eight sermons on non-biblical saints, two concern Saint Claire.¹⁵ Moreover, the *themata* of sermons traditionally are taken from the day's liturgy, and for many of the sermons *de tempore* in the codex, the *themata* correspond to the Franciscan Missal.¹⁶

Given the focus of this study on an original *reportatio*, it should be underscored that the version of William of Brienne's sermon in Borgh. 105 is not the original but a copy. First, an initial attempt to copy the sermon was made on f. 83v. Currently, a Passion Sunday sermon ("Ego novi eum") begins at the top of the page. Yet both the first lines of the sermon and marginal label were written over an earlier text; the palimpsest of the text is barely visible, but under the current label "dominica de passione", one can easily make out "principium in # G. | de brenna." Two sermons later, William of Brienne's sermon can be found, with the marginal note (f. 86v): "Principium in theologia Magistri Guillelmi de Brenna." Some of the corrections are consistent with being an apograph, that is, being copied from a written exemplar. For example, the second section of the sermon [§2] introduces a subdivision, breaking Isaiah 2:3 into five parts (*ista quinque*). The reconstructed text reads:

confidentiam inexpugnabilem, quia *mons Domini*
evidentiam inobfuscabilem, quia *docebit nos*
influential infatigabilem, quia *(et ambulabimus in semitis eius)*

¹⁵ The sermons are: Saint Martin, f. 3v; Saint Clement of Rome, f. 4r; Saint Catherine, f. 35v; Saint Claire, f. 36r; Saint Claire, f. 57v, Saint Catherine, f. 62v; Saint Nicholas, f. 65r; and Saint Stephen, f. 69v.

¹⁶ M. O'CARROLL, "The Lectionary for the Proper of the Year in the Dominican and Franciscan Rites of the Thirteenth Century", in *Archivum Fratrum Predicatorum* 49 (1979), pp. 79–103. I am grateful to Patrick Nold for this observation.

\efficaciam irrefragabilem/, quia *de Syon exhibit lex*
 permanentiam indefectibilem, quia *verbum Domini de Ierusalem*.

The rhetorical technique known as homeoteleuton (*similiter desinens*), beloved by medieval sermonists, induces the scribal error also known as homeoteleuton (indicated in the present work as an ‘omission *per homoioteleuton*’ to avoid confusion), and in this case, the text copied jumped from the *quia* after *infatigabilem* to the one after *irrefragabilem*. The lacking member was evident: not only did William announce five parts immediately before, but this division provides the articulation for the second section of the text. Therefore, a marginal correction adds the missing part: *efficaciam irrefragabilem*, but not the corresponding biblical passage.

Further signs of being an apograph can be found, such as the repetition of eight words in [§4.1], or the obvious confusion over *ex utraque parte* of the Bible in [§1.2.1]. From these cases, it is apparent that the sermon was copied from some other source.

Although an apograph, was the original a composed version of William’s speech or a *reportatio*? While the evidence is insufficient to determine the matter, some elements suggest that it is a *reportatio*. Most notably, while the speech as it survives captures the *auctoritates* in detail and the descriptive part of the *divisiones*, it lacks the same care with the Biblical passages. Medieval sermons have as one of their most distinctive features the use of *divisiones*, where a passage from the Bible is broken into parts and each part is assigned a descriptive, rhyming, phrase, as in the case above where William takes *Mons Domini docebit nos et ambulabimus in semitis eius, quia de Syon exhibit lex, verbum Domini de Ierusalem*, breaks it into five pieces and gives each a noun phrase, ideally based along the model: *–entiam –abilem*. In the surviving sermon, the phrases of the division appear, but the corresponding Biblical passage is often missing. For a *reportator* working fast, the division of the Biblical passage could be reconstructed later much more easily than the words of the phrases used in the *divisio*. Moreover, there is some variation among those words in the *divisio* that suggests either mistakes in the recitation or the reportation. At the division of the theme, for example, William repeats the division four times, each time around four fourth-declension nouns, but seven separate nouns appear.¹⁷ In addition, the sections corresponding to the divisions repeat

¹⁷ Classified according to the four *divisiones* in the division of the theme (I–IV) and

the words of the division at times approximately. For example, the second section [§2] should correspond to *motus supernalis*, as it is *altior in eminentia*, and the *locus unde egreditur*, yet the section, as it appears in the manuscript reads: “Secundo ostenditur Sacre Scripture locus supernaturalis a quo egreditur, per quem ostenditur cunctis aliis altior, quia dicitur *unde exeunt*.” Similarly, the subdivision in section [1] is based on the superlatives *mundissima*, *fecundissima*, and *profundissima*, but only the first subsection [1.1] uses the superlative form; the other two do not [1.2, *fecunda*; 1.3, *profunda*].

Preaching was an integral part of the duties of a university theologian. As a counterweight to university lectures, sermons were the opportunity for a theologian to display his skill as a speaking, decorating his speech not merely with rhyming inventions and clever divisions, but with the whole range of rhetorical ornamentation at his disposal. It therefore is fitting that a sermonic speech by William of Brienne should survive. The speech itself follows the classic structure for a medieval university sermon (or “thematic sermon”): it begins with a biblical citation, the theme (Ecclesiastes 1:7, *Ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur ut iterum fluant*, “Unto the place whence the rivers come they return, to flow again”), followed by an introductory exposition (the protheme), and a division of the theme into four parts. The protheme and each of the four parts of the theme are then further divided as well.

***Ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur ut iterum fluant* (Eccl. 1:7)**

(protheme)

[0.1] *ortus*

[0.2] *motus*

[0.3] *potus*

[0.4] *fluxus*

(Division of the Theme)

[1] *latior in continentia*: flumina

[1.1] *mundissima sine erroribus*

[1.2] *fecundissima variis virtutibus*

Ex utraque parte fluminis lignum vite afferens fructus

duodecim (Apo. 22:2).

[1.2.1] *<tot?>alis <inund?>atio*: Ex utraque parte flumi-

nis

[1.2.2] *universalis restauratio*: lignum vite

[1.2.3] *mentalis consolatio*: afferens fructus duodecim

position, these words are: *ortus* Ia, IIb; *motus* Ib, IIb; *potus* Ic (*a.c.*), IIc; *portus* Ic (*p.c.*), IIc, IVc; *cursus* Ic, IIc, IIIc; *typus* IIa, IIIa, IVa; *fluxus* IVd.

- [1.3] *profundissima misteriis et sensibus*
- [2] *altior in eminentia*: unde exeunt
 Venite ascendamus ad montem Domini et ad domum Dei
 Iacob et docebit nos vias suas et ambulabimus in semitis eius, quia
 de Syon exhibit lex et verbum Domini de Ierusalem (Is. 2:3).
 - [2.1] *confidentia inexpugnabilis*: mons Domini
 - [2.2] *evidentia inobfuscabilis*: docebit nos
 - [2.3] *influentia infatigabilis*: et ambulabimus in semitis eius
 - [2.4] *efficacia irrefragabilis*: de Syon exhibit lex
 - [2.5] *permanentia indefectibilis*: verbum Domini de Ierusalem.
- [3] *potior in efficacia*: ad locum unde exeunt revertuntur
 Lustrans universa in circuitu pergit spiritus et in circulo
 suo revertitur (Eccl. 1:6).
 - [3.1] *supplet omnem defectum*: Lustrans universa
 - [3.2] *replet omnem affectum*: pergit in circuitu
 - [3.3] *complet omnem profectum*: in circulo suo revertitur
- [4] *uberior in affluentia*: ut iterum fluant
 Surge, aquilo, et veni auster: perfla ortum meum, et fluent
 aromata eius (Cant. 4:16).
 - [4.1] *animorum purgativa*: Surge, aquilo
 - [4.2] *afflictorum linitiva*: veni auster: perfla ortum meum
 - [4.3] *exemplorum diffusiva*: fluent aromata eius

In effect, the sermon features a fourfold division in the protheme, a fourfold division of the theme, and each of those divisions is subdivided into groups of three, except for the second, which is a fivefold division. The second subdivision of the first division appears to be in three parts, but something has gone wrong with the text at this point.

The sermon praises Holy Scripture for its contents, nobility, efficacy, and wealth. The author brings in a range of *auctoritates*, certainly Augustine, Bernard and Jerome, but also more exotic authors, such as Hugo de Folieto. Yet behind that diversity lies a common source: of the eleven explicit citations of non-biblical *auctoritates*, eight come from Thomas of Ireland's *Manipulus florum*. A secular master at the Sorbonne, Thomas of Ireland compiled some 6000 *auctoritates* from Church Fathers, Moses Maimonides, and others, and arranged them according to topic, assigning each authority a letter from a to z, then from aa to az, and so on. Whatever purpose Thomas may have intended his work to serve, it rapidly became a useful aid for preachers in composing sermons.¹⁸

¹⁸ THOMAS HIBERNICUS, *Manipulus florum*, ed. C. NIGHMAN, <http://www.manipulusflorum.com> (last accessed August 10, 2016). On the role of the *Manipulus*

That eight *auctoritates* that William uses in his commendation of Holy Scripture are also in the *Manipulus* is no coincidence; seven of them appear under the rubric *Scriptura sacra*. Moreover, William's usage reflects the same variations from the original source as do those found in the *Manipulus*. Most notably, William follows the *Manipulus florum* in ascribing to Augustine's *De vera religione* a passage from Thomas Aquinas' *De potentia* [§1.3]. To the eight *auctoritates* he pulls from the *Manipulus florum*, William adds one (*ad sensum*) from Jerome's *Epistola ad Paulinum* (used in the Middle Ages as a sort of preface to the Latin Vulgate), one from a sermon of Augustine, and one from Gregory the Great. In addition, he implicitly refers to the words of St. Lucia from the *Legenda aurea*¹⁹ and might have borrowed a turn of phrase (*ascendit ut videat*) from Hillary of Poitiers [§4.3].

Much of William's rhetorical artifice builds around these *auctoritates*, to the point that one suspects that many of the sermon's shortcomings could be attributed to forcing the *auctoritates*. The protheme explains the theme by the authority of Gregory (*Manipulus florum*, *Scriptura sacra* ag) comparing Scripture to a river, which, according to its use and user, confers a range of benefits; could the theme itself have been chosen to fit the authority? In the body of the text, to explain how Holy Scripture is "the most clean without errors", William produces one of his most ornate passages:

Therefore like the waters of a river, Holy Scripture is most clean without errors. For it reaches everywhere because of its cleanliness; for [wisdom] is a vapor of the power of God and a pure emanation of almighty God's splendor, and therefore no defiled thing enters it. For it is the brightness of eternal light, and a spotless mirror, Wisdom 7[:25–26]. Whence it is said, Ezechiel 36[:25]: *I will pour upon you clean water and you shall be cleansed*. And therefore it is symbolized well by that river of which it is said, Exod. 3[=2.5]:

florum, see C. NIGHMAN, "Commonplaces on preaching commonplaces for preaching? The topic *Predicacio* in Thomas of Ireland's *Manipulus florum*," in *Medieval Sermon Studies* 49 (2005), pp. 37–57; M. ROUSE and R. ROUSE, *Preachers, florilegia and sermons: Studies on the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland* (Texts and Studies 47), Toronto 1979. For a case study on how a preacher would make systematic usage of the *Manipulus florum*, see C. BOYER, "Un témoin précoce de la réception du «Manipulus florum» au début du XIV^e siècle. Le recueil des sermons du Dominicain Guillaume de Sauqueville," in *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 164 (2006), pp. 43–70.

¹⁹ [§2.5]: "‘Verba Dei cessare non possunt’ dixit illa sancta.” *Ille sancta* may be an artefact of a *reportatio*, and he actually said *sancta Lucia*.

The daughter of Pharaoh came down to wash herself in the river.
 The daughter of Pharaoh, namely knowledge discovered by study or the knowledge of natural reason, if she wants to be cleansed, if she wants to be had without suspicion, she must be washed in this river, and she must be proven in Holy Scripture, and, when approved she must be confirmed, when confirmed, made public, because what “does not have the authority of Holy Scripture, with the same ease is condemned as proven”, as Jerome says.

Holy Scripture also:

illuminates and contains every uncertainty
 dilamines and condemns every falsity
 examines and confirms every utility

Whence Saint Augustine says, *De doctrina Christiana*, book II:
 “Whatever man learns outside of Scripture, if it is hurtful, it is there condemned; if it is useful, it is there contained.” [§1.1]

This part of the speech begins with a pair of biblical passages where water is used for cleaning; it then bridges to the passage of the Pharaoh’s daughter going down to the water to wash herself (at which point she finds Moses). William uses this image for an allegory (*permutatio*):²⁰ the daughter is human knowledge, and the river is Scripture. Washing oneself in the river is being proven in Scripture. This allegory leads to a climax (*gradatio*):²¹ what is proven is confirmed, and what is confirmed is made public. The reason? Because, as Jerome says: anything not in Scripture can be just as easily proven as disproven – the use of *probo* ties the link between the climax and the authority. William then follows with a *divisio*²² on how Holy Scripture confirms the good and damns the false, which is then reinforced by a quote from Augustine asserting that relative worthlessness of non-Scriptural knowledge.

This is one of William’s most elaborate passages, and yet, beyond the weakness of the (admittedly, quite common) metaphor of a clean and unerring river, it suffers from a mismatch between the imagery and the authorities, even if one ignores the context of the authoritative arguments.²³ The authorities do not show that natural knowledge about the world must be proven in Scripture so much as assert that nothing

²⁰ PS.-CICERO, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV.34.46 in *De ratione dicendi ad C. Herennium libri IV*, ed. F. MARX, Leipzig 1894, pp. 342–343. On the figures of diction and the figures of thought in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* see J.J. MURPHY, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance*, second edition, Berkeley 1981, pp. 365–374.

²¹ PS.-CICERO, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV.25.34, ed MARX, pp. 326–327.

²² PS.-CICERO, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV.40.52, ed MARX, pp. 351–352.

²³ Jerome’s statement in particular occurs in the context of how to understand the

outside of Scripture can be proven (Jerome) and that human study is superfluous to the truth of Scripture (Augustine). If he were not tied to an epistemology that provided some scope for natural reason and bound to a theme involving *flumen*, William would have been better served not by Exodus 2:5, but rather Hebrews 11:29: *Fide transierunt mare Rubrum tamquam per aridam terram: quod experti Aegyptii devorati sunt!*

Nevertheless, even preachers considered among the best of the fourteenth century used the *Manipulus florum*. A few pages after William of Brienne's sermon appears one by Bertrand de la Tour, and that too makes use of the *Manipulus florum*. Bertrand, of course, was one of the great Franciscan preachers of the fourteenth century, and over a thousand sermons have been attributed to him.²⁴ Indeed, evaluating the aesthetic quality of a medieval sermon presents quite a challenge for the historian. Their rhetorical artifice and doctrinal paucity appear so alien to contemporary aesthetic sensibilities that sermons judged by contemporaries to be excellent receive condemnation in the twentieth century for their dismal quality.²⁵ Still, one could make the case that William of Brienne's colleagues did not consider his inception speech among the classics of the genre. Unlike other sermons in the codex, there is no indication that this speech was copied. While the sole copy provides a good account of the text of the authorities, the *divisiones* are a mess: the main *divisio* hacks the passage into out-of-sequence and overlapping pieces; the first subdivision [§1] lacks a biblical passage; as much as one tries to assign the variation in words to the vagaries of a *reportatio* origin and manuscript transmission, it may well be that they are authorial, as, for example, *portus* and *potus*: maybe William wanted to have his port and drink it too. In any case, much of his preparation for the sermon consisted in consulting the appropriate rubric of the *Manipulus florum* and adducing biblical passages, possibly with the aid of a concordance. In doing so, William was not being exceptionally lazy; on

Bible, specifically, he is discounting Origen's use of apocrypha to establish the identity of Zachariah.

²⁴ P. NOLD, *Pope John XXII and His Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy*, Oxford 2003.

²⁵ Such is the case, for example, with Peter Auriol, on whose sermons lamented N. VALOIS, "Pierre Auriol. Frère Mineur", in *Histoire Littéraire de la France* 12, Paris 1906, cols. 479–527, at col. 518: "Le philosophe s'y révèle a peine par de rares citations d'Aristote. Par contre, la subtilité et le mauvais goût... se reconnaissent en plusieurs passages." Also cited in W. DUBA, "Peter Auriol the Rhetorician A Recently Discovered Treatise on Rhetorical Figures", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 51 (2009), pp. 63–73.

the other hand, he does not give any reason to consider his contribution anything more than a typical example of the genre.

William of Brienne's *principium in theologia* shows another aspect of the theologian's life: his participation in the formal ceremonies of the University of Paris and his abilities as a preacher. Like with his *lectiones*, the form and content of his speeches and sermons depends on pre-existing written works. His major tools for discovering content appear to be a biblical concordance and the *Manipulus florum*. He constructs the speech in accordance with contemporary *artes praedicandi*. He decorates it using figures taken from the *Rhaetorica ad Herenniam*. The result is a speech that, across conventions, expresses William's identity as a theologian, a master capable of manipulating the tools of his trade to achieve a satisfactory effect.

Conclusion

The Material Residue of the Transmission of Ideas

As an original *reportatio*, every line of the Prague Codex of William of Brienne's *Sentences* commentary testifies to the reality of the study of theology at the University of Paris in the academic year 1330–31. William of Brienne's *principia* reveal the topics that the bachelors discussed, specifically the burning debates around the doctrines of Scotus; his *lectiones* show the Scotism of the Franciscan convent in Paris in its methodological and doctrinal inflections. The Prague Codex and the teaching William of Brienne are the support for the philosophy and the theology of the Franciscan School, and they furnish a unique perspective on intellectual life at Paris at the trailing end of the Zenith of Philosophical Theology.

The *reportatio* contained in the Prague Codex was almost certainly made by a friar in the Franciscan convent, possibly William's secretary. He wrote on sexterns, unbound quires of six double leaves, and copied the content of William's lectures and *principia* disquisitions. After the performance, he completed the notes, filling in spaces left blank and correcting mistakes. He most likely read the contents aloud to William and recorded further corrections and additions. The result constituted the official version of William's lectures; the individual sexterns containing the *principia* were loaned to the other bachelors reading the *Sentences* so that they could better react to William's doctrine. Were William to have made a revised version of his commentary for wider publication, he would undoubtedly have used this *reportatio* as the point of departure.

The Prague Codex enables a reconstruction not just of how *reportationes* were produced, but also of the intellectual rhythm of a bachelor of the *Sentences* at Paris. Reading the *Sentences* constituted an enormous task, requiring a steady pace of lectures on the topics found in Peter

Lombard's *Sentences*, and the steady pace favored a familiar structure. In William's case, he aimed to treat four questions per lecture and managed just under three. Punctuating this effort, *principia* disputations obliged the bachelor at the same time to prosecute a debate with his peers on a range of topics. Inside the school, bachelors worked systematically through the syllabus of philosophical theology; outside the school, they engaged polemically with representatives of other schools.

In their content, William's *principia* show how his adversaries quickly latched on to a familiar Scotist position, the formal distinction, and deployed common arguments against it, evincing a stock reply. They also provide a tantalizing glimpse into the doctrinal diversity of the other *sententarii*. Certainly, William's major adversary was Durand of Aurillac, and Durand's doctrines as reported by William correlate to those held by the famed critic of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Durandellus. Yet undoubtedly many of the positions that William cites belonged to his unknown *socii*, his colleagues, and his *principia* therefore provide a unique witness to lost doctrines, such as the one that holds the universal to be an aggregate of the thing and the concept.

Likewise, William's *Sentences* lectures reveal how he met the challenge of lecturing on the *Sentences*. For each class, the distinctions of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* provided the topic. Most commonly, William treated the philosophical and theological issues that previous *Sentences* commentaries associated with the distinction. His thought is inspired by Scotus, the ingenious Subtle Doctor. On less-controversial topics, such as the sacrament of *ordo*, he borrows directly from Scotus' *Ordinatio*, simplifying and synthesizing his master's opinion. When he engages issues that have been developed after Scotus' death, he draws upon more recent sources and presents what developments he deems useful (such as Meyronnes' classification of the types of distinction) for what he sees as a close adherence to Scotus' doctrine. His affection for Scotus sometimes affects his sincerity, and he will even subtly alter the argumentation so that he can present John Duns Scotus as triumphing posthumously over his critics.

Written works undergird William's spoken performances. He almost certainly attended his colleagues' *principia* on book I of the *Sentences*, but he parses their views in their written form; the written text has the authority. He assembled his lectures from the *Sentences* commentaries of his predecessors: Francis of Meyronnes, Francis of Marchia, Peter Auriol, and above all, John Duns Scotus. Even his speech in the bishop's

aula involved ordering written authorities in an aesthetically pleasing manner. When he spoke, as bachelor or master of theology, a *reportator* immediately put his words on paper.

Only once however, does William of Brienne directly mention a contemporary practice at Paris. In *lectio* 69, he asks the question “Whether someone can, by the power of the keys, grant absolution without restitution of what that person took away.” In the second article, he divides the possible ways in which wealth is transferred asymmetrically, enumerating which cases are just and which unjust.¹ Among those touching individuals (*de persona singulari*) are contractual transfers, which can involve the exchange of useful things, of money (*munerositas*) for useful things, or of money for money. Brienne’s interest clearly falls on the last case, with all its permutations of loans and usury, but the second case, of money for useful things, is not as straightforward as it might appear:

But the second case (exchange of money for something useful) can be performed justly and meritoriously, given that the thing is sold for more than it was purchased, as in the event where I have a thing that is useful for me and someone else wants it, I can sell it to him more dearly than it is worth; but if it is not useful to me, if I were to sell it more dearly to someone who needs it, that would not be done justly. Therefore it is true that a thing can be sold more dearly than it was bought for, if they bring it from land to land, because of the dangers of the road, and the work that they undertook for this gain, and if they did not sell for more, such things would not be brought into the country. And from this it is clear that those who immediately sell what they have bought do so

¹ GUILDMUS DE BRENNA, *lectio* 69, f. 91v: “Secundus articulus est de translacione diviciorum, et primo videndum quot modis fit translacio diviciorum. Et dico quod potest fieri iuste et a persona publica et singulari. Primum patet, quia aliquando potest fieri translacio a qua potest fieri de/terminari dominium realiter; sed ita est de persona communi, scilicet de lege nature, quia fit a iure positivo, et hoc potest fieri vel a persona communi iure politico vel iure paterno et yconomico, ut filiis a Patre, et ex hoc patet {nota de prescriptione} quod prescriptio in iure rationalis est quia causatur ex negligentia que est in detrimentum rei publice, ex qua posset oriri diverse contenciones. —Secundo dico quod fieri potest a persona singulari et est duplex: quedam fit per actum simpliciter liberalem, et est actus donacionis. Secundo quando fit per actum secundum quid liberalem, ut est actus contractus. Prima fit iuste a persona singulari que non subest voluntati superioris, nec prohibita est a superiori, et ideo monachus nihil potest donare sine licencia abbatis, neque canonicus de bonis ecclesie, *Extra*, “De cens. romana.” Similiter filiusfamilias non potest transferre dominium patris in alterum. Neque uxor sine licencia mariti, et hoc intelligitur nisi haberet de se multa bona et non cederet in detrimentum status mariti.”

unjustly, except in the case in which some merchant has to leave; then, if someone were to buy and afterwards sell more dearly, he would not sin; in every other case, he sins, as is clear from Parisian stationers at the fairs (*ut patet de pergamenariis Parisiensibus in nundinis*).²

The practice to which William alludes is likely that mentioned in the 1291 University of Paris statute on stationers, a statute that arose from a dispute that, in the words of the University, “These stationers perpetrated many frauds and numerous deceits to the detriment and damage of the University and the republic in buying and selling parchment.” For this reason, the University made the stationers take an oath to serve the University faithfully.³ The conditions of the agreement include that

² GUILIELMUS DE BRENA, *lectio* 69, ff. 91v–92r: “Sed quantum ad actum contractus quedam est translacio que fit per commutationem rei utilis pro utili, alia per commutationem munerositatis pro re utili. Tertia per \mutuacionem munerositatis et vocatur mutuacio/ ~~capsionem~~. Prima, que vocatur commutatio, est iusta quando servatur equalitas secundum exigentiam reservata equalitate in substantia, in quantitate et qualitate, et per oppositum iniusta. Sed secunda potest similiter fieri iuste et meritorie, dato quod vendatur res carius quam sit empta in casu, ut si habeo rem utilem mihi et alter vult habere, possum ei dare carius quam valeat; si autem mihi non esset utilis, si carius venderetur alteri qui indiget, illud non est iuste factum. Est ergo verum quod res possunt vendi carius quam empte sint, si transduxerunt de terra in terram propter pericula vie et labores que recuperantur per lucra ista, et si non fieret \ad/ patriam talia non ducerentur. Et ex hoc patet quod \qui/ statim empta vendunt iniuste faciunt nisi in casu in quo aliquem mercatorem oporteret recedere; si aliquis emeret et postea carius venderet, non peccaret; in omni alio casu peccatur, ut patet de pergamenariis Parisiensibus in nundinis.”

³ CUP II-1, n. 575, pp. 49–50: “Universis presentes litteras inspecturis et audituris universitas magistrorum et scolarium Parisius, salutem in eo qui est omnium vera salus. Scriptum est in Canone: *Divinus fructus est iustitiam sepius recenseri*. Nam summum bonum in rebus est iustitiam colere et unicuique sua iura servare, sive sit premio remunerandus, sive pena vel supplicio afficiendus. Cum igitur inter nos ex una parte et pergamenarios Parisius ex altera, iamdiu est, orta fuisset dissensio super eo videlicet quod ipsi pergamenarii multas fraudes et quamplurimas malicias in emendo et vendendo pergamenum commitebant in Universitatis et reipublice preiudicium et gravamen, ideo tunc temporis fecimus eos iurare quod ipsi in emendo et vendendo nullas fraudes committerent, immo fideliter emerent et fideliter venderent. Quod tamen, prout est de novo conpertum per inquestam, quod iuramento promiserant, legaliter non servarunt. Immo fraudem fraudi, maliciam malicie cumulantes in animarum suarum periculum et multorum lesionem et iacturam contra proprium iuramentum faciendo multipliciter attemptarunt. Et quia scriptum est, quod parum prodesset humilibus humilitas, si contemptus contumacibus non obsesset, et crimina undecunque claruerint, sint punienda, immo certum sit, quod non caret scrupulo societatis occulte, qui

stationers can only purchase parchment during the fairs (notably those of Saint-Lazare and the one at Saint-Denis) or at Saint-Mathurin, and, in both cases, must do so publicly, after a one-day wait for the masters and students of the University to purchase their own supplies.⁴

William of Brienne alludes to the practice of stationers buying parchment, a practice that for the last four decades had been carefully regulated at the University of Paris, in the recognition that the work of masters and scholars depended on the integument of cattle; the University needed a steady and inexpensive supply of parchment. In 1330–31, parchment still dominated Parisian books, but a new support for writing was in circulation: paper. Although paper was not as cheap as it would become, it cost far less than parchment did. For Parisian scholars, paper was the ideal complement to parchment. Parchment was tough, durable and expensive, ideal for books whose content would last centuries; by comparison flimsy, perishable and cheap, paper served more ephemeral needs: notes on lectures and disputations, outlines for sermons and courses, registers of the nations in the arts faculty, tax records, short written messages, and so on. It was not intended to last, and it usually did not last. But its mere availability changed the nature of the intellectual life at universities. The desire to compel bachelors to engage each other may have motivated the development of the *principia*

manifesto facinori desinit obviare; ideo nos volentes eorum tot versuciis et tantis quantum possumus obviare, quosdam articulos fecimus utilitate Universitatis pensata, quos eis prius in Romano seu Gallico expressos iurare fecimus in aperto.” The oath is also included in the CUP in French as n. 575a.

⁴ CUP II-1, n. 575, p. 50: “Item, quod non occurrant mercatoribus extra nundinas ad emendum pergamenum per se nec per alios, et quod non emant pergamenum in pellibus pro annis futuris ad suam placentiam, et quod nichil emant cum candela in occulto. —Item, quod cum mercatoribus foraneis tempore nundinarum vel quocunque alio tempore nullam conventionem facient ordinando vel taxando cum ipsis de pretio imponendo pergamenno. —Item, quod non ement pergamenum nisi apud S. Mathurinam vel in loco publico nundinarum. —Item, quod si pergamenarii Parisius emant pergamenum presente magistro vel scolari indigente pergamenno, quod dictus magister vel scolaris habeat partem illius pergameni pro illo pretio, pro quo emptum fuerit. Tenebitur tamen dicto pergamenario magister vel scolaris dare sex denarios de libra pro industria sua et labore. Intelligimus autem presentem esse ille qui est ibi, antequam pergamenum sit partitum... —Item, quod prima die nundinarum Landiti vel S. Lazari non emant pergamenum, antequam mercatores domini regis, domini Parisiensis episcopi et magistri et scolares emerint, nisi foranei mercatores dicta die emerint ante tempus predictum.” That statutes pertaining to the use of St. Mathurin can be found in CUP II-1, n. 574, 574a (pp. 48–49).

disputation, and it might have arisen out of a concern that the bachelors would otherwise, in their particular schools, simply rehearse the debates of their sources. Still, the availability of cheap writing support made it easier for bachelors to rehearse and rework those sources, and it made feasible a debate that, for the first time in the history of the university, was primarily a written debate; *principia* disputations, with their *replicationes* and *responsiones*, were truly ‘paper debates’.

All the original fourteenth-century *reportationes* discovered until now are on paper, and the earliest is that of William of Brienne. The cost of paper also meant that the number of distinct *reportationes* of the same lecture could increase; no longer would a lecturer need to have the stature of St. Bonaventure to attract more than one *reportator*. Not surprisingly, the scholastic fervor of Paris in the 1310s and 1320s is accompanied by a bewildering number of redactions; frequently, the same work, especially one designated as a *reportatio*, exists in multiple versions, occasionally to the point that more redactions survive than codices that contain them. Often, these redactions attest to the author’s revision of the same text on multiple occasions; just as often, they can be traced back to separate *reportationes*. This intense activity matches the early history of paper at Paris. In the early fourteenth century, written works could be composed on paper, revised on *cedulae*, and only at the end cast on the parchment leaves of a university codex.

As a Franciscan, William of Brienne had an advantage over most of the theologians at the University of Paris: he was part of a large community, the Franciscan school, and that school worked together to communicate, to defend and to propagate its doctrine throughout the Latin world and beyond. Ten years earlier, the Benedictine Pierre Roger paid a professional scribe to copy the *Quodlibeta* of the Carmelites Guy Terrena and Sibert of Beek, and bound the codex with his own *Replicationes* to Francis of Meyronnes.⁵ Nearly ten years after Brienne’s lectures, another Benedictine, Peter of Allouagne, paid a professional scribe to help prepare his *replicationes*. These manuscripts witness not just the texts but also the questionable quality of the copyists. For not even these Benedictine aristocrats could buy what the Franciscan school had: a team of scholars selected for their intelligence and bound by an oath of obedience. These men were students before being *reportatores*, and served as *reportatores* and secretaries before becoming bachelors of theology.⁶

⁵ Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 39.

⁶ W.J. COURTENAY, “Book Production and Libraries in Fourteenth-Century

They knew the material well, and, like the faithful horse of a drunken master, could even guide the debate to the desired conclusion, if need be. Indeed, reading the William's *reportatio*, it is not clear where William's teaching ends and the *reportator*'s reception begins. Mendicant *reportationes* fuse the intellectual contribution of student and teacher, and the Prague Codex represents not just the thought of William of Brinne, but of a whole school; and the school could bring the text to the proper conclusion, whether William himself ever read the *lectiones* after delivering them. The teacher and school cannot be entirely separated.

Et sic de illo.

Paris", *Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, ed. L. BIANCHI, (Textes et études du moyen âge 1), Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 367–380, at p. 371.

Appendix A:
Guilelmus de Brena OFM,
Reportatio in libros
Sententiarum
List of *Lectiones*

BOOK I

P1, ff. 1r–2r: Circa primum *Sententiarum* primo queritur **utrum summe simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius cognitionis scientifice**. Et arguitur quod non. Cui repugnat... [2r] sed necessitas \ad remotionem/ secundi; ideo etc. (Edited in Appendix B)

1, ff. 2r–4r: Consequenter queritur **utrum subiectum sit causa effectiva sue passionis**. Et arguitur quod sic: illud quod est in actu perfectiori... **Ad questiones de Deo, \scilicet utrum sit subiectum in theologia et sub qua ratione/**, pono tres articulos. Primus erit utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia... [4r] ut patet de angelo \qui est perfectior creaturis corporalibus et tamen non est causa effectiva earum, ymmo in hoc argumento est fallacia consequentis/. 5 10

2, ff. 4r–5v: Consequenter queritur **utrum theologia procedat ex principiis necessariis**. Et arguitur quod non, quia ex necessariis sequitur conclusio nonnisi necessaria... **Ad primam questionem** notandum hic est una opinio dicens theologiam procedere ex necessariis principiis et notat aliqua... [4v] {**secunda questio**} **Secundo queritur utrum theologia sit scientia**. Prima conclusio est quod scientia imperfectionem nullam intrinsece importat... [5v] sed theologia nostra est huiusmodi, ut patet ex predictis; ideo etc. 15

20 **3**, ff. 5v–7r: Consequenter queritur \primo/ utrum theologia sit
 subalternans scientia \sibi aliam vel subalternata alteri/; se-
 cunda est utrum sit una; tertia, utrum scientia et fides si(n)t
 respectu eiusdem; quarta, utrum scientia et opinio possint esse
 de eodem. De tertia dicitur sic. Quod non: tantum repugnat medium
 25 uni extremo quantum alteri... **Ad questionem primo propositam,**
utrum theologia, etc., \pono/ quatuor conclusiones... **De secunda**
questione sunt duo videnda. Primum a quo scientia dicatur una...
 [6v] **Ad tertiam questionem** dico pone\ndo/ 4 conclusiones... Sed
 contra hoc dicit unus socius {mg: Illa est opinio fratris Turandi, iam
 30 legentis sententias apud Predicadores}. Dicit quod theologia est scientia
 in nobis, sed non nobis; sed est nobis fides... [7r] semper perficitur
 et denominat etc. \materiam vel subiectum in quo est; scientia autem
 competens anime nostre competit ei ut est forma nostra, ergo denominat
 nos scientes esse/. (Edited in Appendix C)

35 **4**, ff. 7r–8r: ~~Consequenter queritur utrum.~~ Ad rationem socii, eidem
 competit noto et scientie notitie, etc. Ad hoc ego respondeo: conceda-
 tur maior, et quando dicitur in minore quod etc., dico quod est falsa
 quantum ad hanc partem, quod sit aliqua notitia in se maxime, et no-
 bis minima, nego istam... [8r] Item, quia sancti doctores adduxerunt
 40 ad multas conclusiones \fideles/ media topica \et opinabilia/. Ideo etc.
 (Edited in Appendix C)

5, ff. 8v–9v: **Consequenter queritur primo utrum scientia in-**
tuitiva sit sine obiecto presente; secundo utrum intuitiva et
abstractiva distinguantur specie ex obiectis; tertio utrum sit
 45 **tertia neutra, \id est aliqua scientia que sit nec intuitiva nec**
abstractiva/; quarta, utrum theologia sit intuitiva vel abstrac-
tiva. Ad primam arguitur quod sic, quia sicut notitia intuitiva respi-
 cit existentiam rei, ita abstractiva non-existentiam... **Circa primam**
questionem sic proceditur: {prima opinio} primo recitabitur una
 50 opinio que dicit quod sic... [9v] sed in alio non, quia determinat sibi
 obiectum presens ipsa intuitiva non autem abstractiva; ideo etc. Et sic
 de illo.

6, ff. 9v–11r: **Secunda questio est utrum noticia intuitiva et ab-**
stractiva distinguantur ex obiectis. Et videnda tres sunt: primo
 55 de ratione noticie utriusque, secundo quid est differre specificè, tertio
 de proposito quesito... [10r] Ad tertiam dicitur \secundum aliquos/

quod illa instantia concludit, et ideo dicitur quod illa condicio non est necessaria et hoc videtur secundum doctorem quem ego sequor. Dico tamen quod \non/, ut mihi videtur non est contra mentem doctoris ~~quia~~ unde notitia intuitiva uno modo est qualitas, alio modo ut specificata ab obiecto. Primo modo Deus posset facere eam sine obiecto, et sic accidentaliter non esset intuitiva; sed secundo modo, cum illo respectu, non; ymmo necessario requiritur presentia realis obiecti... [10v] **Tertia questio est utrum ille notitie sint sic quod non sit medium.** Dicunt aliqui quod est medium, quia rosa quando est presens tunc cognitio eius secundum rationem suam non ut presens est abstractiva... [11r] **Quarta questio est utrum \theologia nostra/ sit intuitiva.** Dico quod non. Illa notitia que non est de obiecto presente ut presens non est intuitiva; sed theologia nostra est huiusmodi, ut patuit; ideo etc.

7, ff. 11r–12v: Consequenter queritur de fine huius scientie et **primo utrum notitia de humanis actibus sit pratica; secundo utrum notitia pratica \dicatur/ intrinsece vel extrinsece, sie; tertia, utrum notitia sit pratica ex obiecto vel fine; quarto utrum theologia sit pratica.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia logica est de actibus humanis, quia intellectus... Intelligendum **circa primam questionem** quod de actibus possumus habere unam notitiam antecedentem nostros actus qua precognoscimus futuros et de eis deliberamus, alia est que est consequens actus nostros positos preteritos... [11v] **De secunda questione** dico primo ponendo unam opinionem que dicit quod habitus practicus dicitur practicus intrinsece et denominative... [12v] Ad quartam, ‘producit determinatum effectum ratione obiecti’, etc., dico quod illa ratio bene probat quod habitus \non/ concurrit in ratione principii ponentis in esse, quod est concessum, sed non primo modo.

8, ff. 12v–14r: **Tertia questio est utrum scientia dicatur pratica vel speculativa ex obiecto vel fine.** Et circa hoc primo videndum est utrum practicum et speculativum sint differentie essentielles vel accidentales... Contra hanc conclusionem est unus doctor, dicens aliter sensisse de illa \questione/ modernos doctores, ut dictum est in conclusionem \et aliter antiquos qui/ ~~sed antiqui~~ acceperunt mediatas illas differentias, et cum medio etc. Ideo ponit [13r] conclusionem antiquam et probat primo quod mechanice et \logica/ ~~terminales~~ sunt neutre, nulla notitia condivisa contra utrasque est speculativa et vel pratica; sed
59 doctoris] doctores *corr.*

mechanica et ~~terminales~~ \logica/ sunt huiusmodi. Illa patet, Hugo *De-*
 95 *discalion*, libro ultimo capitulo ultimo, dicens quattuor sunt scientiarum
 prima capita, ex quibus alie descendunt: speculativa, pratica, logica et
 mechanica... [14r] unde habitus speculativus est in intellectu specula-
 tivo, id est intellectus habens talem habitum denominatur speculativus,
 et similiter de pratico et sic de logica.

100 **9**, ff. 14r–16r: Secunda conclusio probatur: nullus respectus est for-
 malis... [16r] **Quarta questio est utrum theologia sit pratica.**
 Dico quod sic. Illa notitia est pratica cuius obiectum est assequibile
 aliter quam per solam speculationem; sed ita est \de subiecto theo-
 logie/ – patet, quia ibi est tensio et fruicio in patria de Deo; ideo
 105 etc.

10, ff. 16r–17v: Consequenter queritur **circa primam distinctionem**
 primo de obiecto fruitionis, secundo de actu, tertio de modo eius. De
 primo **queritur primo utrum ultimus finis sit primum obiectum**
fruitionis; secundo utrum \voluntas possit frui essentia divina,
 110 **non fruendo personis/; tertio utrum voluntas possit frui una**
persona et non alia; \quarto queritur utrum ea quibus frui-
mur convenient in una ratione fruibilis/. De primo arguitur quod
 non... Quantum ad questionem prima conclusio quod obiectum frui-
 tionis ordinate est finis ultimus verus \et rectus/... [16v] **De secunda**
 115 **questione et contra tertia: secunda est utrum voluntas possit**
\frui/ essentia divina non fruendo persona, et tertia posita est
 in principio, \scilicet **utrum voluntas possit frui una persona non**
fruendo alia/. Ad illas respondeo simul et est notandum primo dieo
 quod dupliciter potest accipi voluntas fruens, vel pro statu vie vel \pro
 120 statu/ patrie... [17v] **Quarta questio est utrum omnia quibus**
fruimur convenient sub una ratione fruibilis. Et dico quod sic,
 quia fruimur tribus personis... et est ultimus finis fruibilitatis.

11, ff. 17v–19v: Consequenter queritur de actu fruitionis et \de/ modo.
Prima questio est utrum fruitio sit actus voluntatis; secunda
 125 **est utrum, proposito fine ultimo in universali voluntati, ipsa**
ipso \necessario/ fruatur; tertia est utrum, eo in particulari
\voluntati ostenso/ obscure tamen, ipsa eo fruatur necessario;
quarta est utrum, eodem clare ostenso voluntati, per actum
caritatis elevata voluntas eo fruatur necessario. Ad primam que-
 130 stionem arguitur quod non. Id quod sequitur actum non est formaliter

actus... [18r] **De prima questione** primo unam distinctionem pono de actibus voluntatis quod, sicut in intellectu est quadruplex actus, ita in voluntate... [18v] **De secunda questione, utrum fine ultimo ostenso voluntati in communi ipsa eo necessario fruatur et de tertia et quarta \questione/ simul respondetur, \tertia: utrum/ fine \ultimo/ in particulari obscure tamen ostenso voluntati ipsa eo necessario fruatur; quarta: utrum, eo clare voluntati ostenso, ipsa voluntas elevata per actum caritatis necessario fruatur/**. Et pono quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod proposito \fine in particulari \in universali/ obscure ete: voluntas non necessario eo fruitur... [19v] pro eo quod consequenter dicit sed alia pro eo quod presentialiter dicit.

12, ff. 19v–21v: Consequenter queritur **circa secundam distinctionem**. Queritur primo de divina unitate, et quatuor questiones. **Prima est utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Secunda, utrum aliquid esse primum in entibus possit probari naturaliter. Tertia, utrum illud esse unum possit probari. Quarta, utrum infinitum intensive** {illud possit probari esse infinitum intensive}. Quantum ad primum arguitur quod non, Avicenna primo *Metaphysice*... [20r] **Ad primam questionem** tria sunt videnda. Prima de ratione propositionis per se note... [21v] Ad aliam, dico quod non ex notitia creature cognoscitur Deus nisi relatio cognoscatur, sed hoc non nisi cognitis extremis. Ad rationem in oppositum dico quod verum est de conceptu de Deo in via.

13, ff. 21v–23r: ~~Consequenter queritur~~ **De secunda questione, \scilicet/ utrum in entibus possit probari aliquid esse simpliciter primum**, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter, vel a priori, quod non... [22r] **Ad tertiam questionem utrum primum quod est simpliciter in entibus possit probari esse unum**, et differt a prima, quia, concessa prima posset illa secunda negari... [23r] Unde ratio eminentie est potissima ad probandum primum esse simpliciter unum.

14, ff. 23r–25r: **Ad quartam questionem**, que est **utrum primum esse infinitum intensive possit probari naturaliter et demonstrari, \modo dicendum/, et \cum/ eirea hoc queratur primo utrum eomunitas \unitas/ divine essentie possit stare cum pluralitate personarum**. Ad quam arguitur quod non... **Ad questionem**

152 cognoscatur] cognoscamus *corr.* **160** posset] possit *corr.*

primam de infinitate, et circa hoc primam ponam unam distinctionem de infinito. . . [24r] **De secunda questione, utrum cum unitas divine essentie possit stare cum Trinitate personarum**, circa hoc
 170 ~~est notandum~~ pono quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod in divinis est productio realis ad intra. . . [24v] ergo remanente illo quod est perfectionis natura divina; et tamen idemplitate [25r] omnimoda potest esse et est in pluribus suppositis.

15, ff. 25r–26v: Circa tertiam distinctionem quatuor queruntur:
 175 **primo \utrum/ ex creaturis in divinis cognoscatur ad intra productio; secundo utrum due \ad intra/ productiones; tertio \utrum/ [quod] in divinis non sint simul vera contradictionis; \quarto utrum/ possit ex creaturis probari.** Ad primam arguitur quod non. Ex creaturis non potest \aliquid/ repugnans sensibus
 180 cognoscere, sed ita est ad intra. . . **Circa primam questionem** primo ponam conclusionem veram, dicens quod sic. Probatur ab aliquibus sic: quicquid est perfectionis in natura intelligibili creata. . . [25v] **Secunda questio est utrum ex creaturis possit cognosci quod in divinis sit Trinitas personarum.** Dico quod sic, et probatur sic: ubicumque sunt productiones due tantum totales adequate \terminis/ ~~principiis~~
 185 productionis, et unum tantum principium productivum. . . [26r] **Tertia questio est utrum ex creaturis possit cognosci quod in divinis non sint simul extrema contradictionis vera.** Et dico quod sic. Divina natura non est deterioris condicionis quam alia. . . aliter tamen
 190 quod non sint ibi formalitates sed re formalitas paternitatis et essentiae idempticatur, sicut etc. {de hoc tamen alias videbitur plus}. . . [26v] ideo non sequitur ‘si non est idem formaliter, ergo est aliquo modo distincta’, sed bene ‘aliquo modo ~~distincta~~ non-idem’.

16, ff. 26v–27v: Consequenter queritur circa quartam distinctionem et ante hoc remansit **questio circa tertiam utrum Trinitas in divinis possit investigari per vestigium creaturarum**; et ~~primo~~
 195 ~~circa~~ **secundo circa distinctionem tertiam, utrum in anima nostra sit aliquid quo possit attingere Deum \objective/; prima circa quartam, utrum Deus possit generare Deum; secunda circa quintam, utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur.** De
 200 primo arguitur quod non, quia quicquid exemplaris est cognoscibile est naturaliter nobis cognoscibile. . . Ad primam questionem sunt duo articuli: primus videndo de ratione vestigii, quomodo per eam cognoscitur Trinitas in divinis. Primo ergo videndum quid sit vestigium. . . [27v]

sed in quantum unitas quia opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, ideo
etc. 205

17, ff. 28r–29r: Secunda questio erat utrum in anima nostra sit aliquid quo possit obiective Deum intelligere. Et arguitur quod non, quia non potest intelligi obiective ab anima quod non fuit prius in sensu. . . [29r] Ad auctoritate Augustini 9 *De Trinitate*, ‘liquide tenendum est’, etc., dico quod verum est terminative, non effective. Ad aliam de infinitate dico quod \ita bene/ concludit de partialitate sicut de totalitate, ideo etc. 210

18, ff. 29v–30r, 31v: Secundus articulus est in de comparatione potentie mediante actu ad obiectum, et circa hoc videndum est quomodo 215
etc., et sunt tria videnda. Primo ponatur conclusio, secundo arguitur contra eam, tertio aliqua inferantur. . . [30r] Quantum ad tertium patet primo quid est obiectum potentie intellective primitate generationis. Et est singulare, et hoc probatur sic: illud est primum, etc., quod primo causatur agentibus naturalibus approximatis et sufficienter dispositis. 220
Sed singulare est huiusmodi; illa patet ex dictis, quia sensus \intelligibilis/ est directe \ipsius/ singularis et mediante ipso universalis. Nec obviat hoc dicto doctoris ubi dicit quod prius est sensus. . . {Illa questio est de 4a distinctione} **Secunda questio erat illa: utrum illa sit vera: Deus generat Deum.** Et dico quatuor \propositiones ad 225
evidentiam huius/, primo quod concretum forme alicuius quod potest supponere pro forma et supposito eius stat pro veritate propositionis. . . [31v] **Tertia questio est utrum illa sit vera: essentia generat.** Et primo videndum est de veritate propositionis ~~conclusio certa est illa~~ una opinio katholica quod est ~~summa~~ \essentia \divina/ est una summa res/ 230
est que nec generat neque generatur; sed Ioachim hereticus hoc negavit; sed conclusio certa est Extra, De summa Trinitate, c. “Dampnamus”, ubi dicitur quod est una res summa que neque generat neque generatur et est divina essentia, et patet rationes in littera \Magistri *Sententiarum* distinctione 4/. . . Et quia sapientia est tale ~~probatur~~ quia appropriata 235
Filio et ideo dicitur sapientia nata sed non ~~genita~~ essentia genita; ideo etc.

19, ff. 32r, 30v–31r, 32v: Circa sextam distinctionem et septimam quatuor queruntur: **primo utrum divina essentia sit formalis terminus divine generationis; secundo utrum subiectum;** 240
tertio utrum Deus Pater genuerit Deum Filium voluntate vel

necessitate; **quarto utrum in Filio sit potentia generandi.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia terminus formalis generationis aliquo modo accipit esse... **Circa primam questionem** videndum est de
 245 generatione in creaturis et videndum de eius termino formali et secundo de termino tali in divinis... [32v] Quarta conclusio probatur, illa patet: id quod includitur per se in termino generationis et non est totalis terminus habet rationem per se aliquo modo; sed forma est huiusmodi et non est terminus totalis neque materialis, ideo formalis. \Et sic de
 250 primo articulo/.

20, ff. 32v–33v: Secundus articulus est de termino formali generationis in divinis. Et videndum est quis sit ille terminus, et pono quatuor conclusiones... [33v] Ad illam dico quod accipit aliquo modo; sic autem essentia divina accipit esse communicabile, et hoc non est inconveniens.
 255 \Et sic de prima questione/.

21, ff. 33v–35r: **Secunda questio** erat de subiecto divine generationis et est **utrum divina essentia sit subiectum vel quasi materia eius.** Et arguitur primo quod sic, quia quod presupponitur termino producto habet rationem materie... [35r] **Tertia questio est utrum Pater**
 260 **produxerit Filium voluntate.** De hoc primo et dico duo. Primo quod Pater produxit Filium volens, secundo quod illa \propositio/ non est vera: Pater produxit Filium voluntate... sed ille est necessitate immutabilitatis; ideo etc.

22, ff. 35r–36r: **Circa septimam distinctionem** questiones quatuor:
 265 **prima, utrum in divinis natura divina sit potentia generandi; secunda, utrum in Filio sit \potentia generativa/; tertia, utrum \potentia generativa illa/ dicat quid vel ad aliquid; quarta, utrum sub ea omnis potentia contineatur.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia vel esset communis vel propria... Ad illam **questionem**
 270 **primam,** dico quatuor: primo, quod in divinis est \generatio/... [36r] Ad argumentum in oppositum dico quod est communis et propria, propria quantum ad actum et communis quantum ad essentiam que includit omnem perfectionem, ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

23, ff. 36v–38r: **Secunda questio erat utrum Filius habeat potentiam generandi in divinis;** et arguitur **tertia, utrum \potentia generativa in divinis dicat quid vel ad aliquid; quarta, utrum sit omnipotentia/** etc. De hiis \tribus/ notandum est quod de potentia

dupliciter possumus loqui ~~dupliciter~~, uno modo ut obicitur actui, de qua Commentator primo *De anima* \dicit quod actus et potentia sunt prime differentie entis/ et dicitur obiectiva, VIII *Metaphysice*. . . [37v] Unde 280 dicit doctor unus \scilicet Schotus/ quod potentia generandi \absolute/ in divinis dicit perfectionem, ideo attribuitur \tribus personis/ et tamen \habitus ad/ suum terminum non, quia \non/ dicit perfectionem. Contra: illa potentia que verius est potentia quam quecumque alia continetur sub omnipotentia, [38r] si alia imperfectior \sub ea continetur/; 285 modo potentia creandi muscam cadit sub omnipotentia \que est imperfectior potentia generativa in divinis; ideo etc./ Ad illam dico ~~quod non in quantum dicit perfectionem~~ \negando maiorem. Non enim contineri sub omnipotentia dicit et arguit perfectionem nisi respectu productionis ad extra, quando producens et producta sunt distincta in natura. Et sic 290 potentia creandi muscam continetur sub omnipotentia que est communis tribus personis, non sic de potentia productiva unius persone respectu alterius; ideo etc./

24, ff. 38r–39r: Consequenter queritur circa **8am distinctionem primo utrum in divina natura sit veritas; secundo <utrum> sit ibi immutabilitas; tertio utrum simplicitas; quarto utrum solum in divina natura sit simplicitas.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia I *Perihermeneias* \dicitur/ quia falsitas et veritas consistit in compositione et divisione. . . **De illa prima questione** est notandum quod de veritate tripliciter possumus loqui, quedam enim est in re, quedam in 300 mente, quedam in voce. . . **Secunda \questio est/ utrum in divina natura sit immutabilitas.** Et dico primo quod sic, secundo quod in nulla alia. Primum probatur theologicè sic. . . [38v] **Tertia questio est utrum in Deo sit simplicitas.** Et pono tres conclusiones. Prima est quod Deus est omnino incompositus. . . **Quarta questio est utrum aliquid a Deo sit perfecte simplex.** Augustinus VI *De Trinitate* dicit quod nulla creatura est perfecte simplex, quia nullum est simplex perfecte quod est compositum ex partibus que simul sumpta sunt maiora quam unum solum et quodlibet recipit diversas variationes. . . [39r] Et ex hoc est composita ex esse et essentia; patet de se et ex dictis, ideo 305 etc.

25, ff. 39r–40r: Circa **8am distinctionem** adhuc 4 queruntur: **primo utrum possit naturaliter probari quod Deo repugnet omnis realis compositio; secundo utrum compositio generis et differentie;**

283 perfectionem] imperfectionem *corr.*

315 **tertio utrum omnis distinctio; quarto utrum magis distinctio
formaliter quam non-idemptitas.** De prima arguitur primo quod
non. Non potest naturaliter probari quod Deo repugnet perfectior condi-
cio entis. . . **De prima questione** est una opinio dicens quod, licet hoc
sit verum theologicè et probabile, \scilicet quod Deus non est realiter
320 compositus/, tamen non potest ratione naturali sufficienter probari. . .
[39v] Ex quo patet quod Doctor sumpsit propositionem falsam \et equi-
vocabat primitatem perfectionis/ quando dixit quod \etc./ Unde duplex
est primitas perfectionis, scilicet absolute et comparate. . . Ex quo pa-
tet quod dicta Doctoris \contra hoc/ non valet. . . [40r] Ex quo patet
325 **secunda questio.** Dico quod ~~non~~ \in divinis non esse compositionem
ex genere <et> differentiis potest probari supernaturaliter, quia/ natura
divina excludit omnem realem compositionem; sed compositio ex genere
et differentia est talis; ideo etc. Maior patet, et minor in 8 *Metaphysi-*
ce, ideo etc. Ad argumentum in oppositum ~~per rationem nego~~ \maior
330 concedatur et quando dicitur in minorem/, dico quod perfectiones in
creaturis non sunt infinite \simpliciter/, ideo in eis potest esse gradus;
sed non in divina natura, cum sit ibi infinita perfectio; ideo etc. Et sic
de illo.

26, ff. 40v–42r: Tertia questio est utrum divine simplicitati re-
335 **pugnet omnis distinctio.** Circa quam primo videndum est quid sit
distinctio, secundo quot modis dicatur, tertio quesitum. Quantum ad
primum dicit unus doctor quod distinctio est respectus intrinsecus ad-
veniens disquiparentie transcendens non determinati generis. . . [40v]
Quarta questio est utrum in divinis magis repugnet divine sim-
340 **plicitati distinctio formaliter quam non-idemptitatis.** Et est unus
modus dicendi, ~~est~~ ille dicens primo quod omnis quiditas omni compa-
rata alii quidditati vel est idem formaliter vel \distincta forma, quia ad
non-esse idem forma in proposito sequitur esse distinctum formaliter/
~~non idem~~ \formaliter/. . . [42r] illa patet, quia oppositum alicuius forme
345 plus excludit illam formam quam non-directe oppositum; sed distinctio
est huiusmodi ad idemptitatem; ideo etc. (Edited in Appendix D)

27, ff. 42r–43v: Consequenter queritur **circa 8am distinctionem primo**
adhuc circa divinam simplicitatem, quia ei videtur repugnare univocatio
cum aliis, ideo **questio prima est utrum omne nomen significati-**
350 **vum sit determinate univocum vel equivocum; secunda, utrum**
ens dicat conceptum univocum; tertia, utrum Deo sit commune
320 naturali] naturaliter *cod.* 341 quiditas] quidditatis *corr.*

univocum et creature; quarta, utrum substantie et accidenti.
 De primo arguitur quod non... **Ad illam primam questionem 3**
videnda: primum que sit differentia istorum \scilicet univoci et equi- 355
 voci/... [43r] **Secunda questio est utrum ens dicat aliquam in-**
entionem univocam. Dico duo: primo quod hoc nomen ens dicit
 conceptum univocum. Secundo quod \dicit illum conceptum/ unitate
 determinate rationis... [43v] Alio modo, quia in se indivisa neque forma-
 liter alia, ut lapis contra lignum, quando ergo dicit Doctor quod illa ratio
 est una unitate indeterminationis, dico quod, si primo modo intelligat, 360
 sic concedo, quia sic non est contracta ratio entis... Et sic conceptus
 entis est idem pro signatis omnium entium determinati generis. Et sic
 de illo.

28, ff. 43v–45r: Consequenter **circa 9am distinctionem** queruntur 2
 cum duobus remanentibus de 8va. **Primo utrum divina generatio sit** 365
eterna; et arguitur quod non, illa duratio non est eterna que habet prin-
 cipium... **Ad terciam \questionem/ relictam de 8a distinctio-**
ne, utrum divine simplicitati repugnet {unitas} conceptus uni-
tati\s/, quantum ad hoc dico primo quod Deo non repugnet unitas
 intentionis univoce... [45r] **Quarta questio est utrum repugnet** 370
substantie et accidenti \ens de eis dictum esse univocum/; di-
 co quod non, quia magis videretur repugnare Deo et creature quam
 substantie et accidenti; sed illis non repugnat, ut ostensum est; ideo etc.

29, ff. 45r–46r: Consequenter **circa 9am questionem distinctionem**
prima questio erat utrum generatio Filii Dei sit eterna. Et ad 375
 hoc pono aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod generatio Filii Dei dicitur
 ex natura rei ab essentia divina... [46r] dico quod duplex est principium,
 scilicet durativum et inchoativum. Tunc dico quod vera est maior de
 principio inchoativo, sed non ~~durativo~~ originativo, et sic in minore.

30, ff. 46r–47v: Consequenter queritur **circa 10am et 11am \et 12am** 380
et 13am/ distinctionem. Queritur **primo utrum Spiritus Sanctus**
procedat per modum voluntatis; secundo utrum, si non proce-
deret a Filio, distinguatur ab eo; tertio utrum a Filio et Pa-
tri procedat uniformiter; quarto utrum generatio \activa/ et
proecessio \spiratio/ sint idem. Arguitur de prima quod \non/, quia 385
 procedit necessario, ideo non per modum voluntatis... Dico primo **ad**
primam questionem ponendo duas conclusiones. Prima est quod mo-
 dus agendi voluntatis est libertas consequens ipsam ut est prior omni

actu suo... [47r] Ad secundam questionem, **utrum Spiritus Sanctus**,
 390 etc., dicunt aliqui quod illa questio est irrationalis, quia illa questio est
 irrationalis que ponit talia impossibilia que tollunt omnem modum di-
 sputandi... Et confirmatur, quia circumscripto quod Spiritus Sanctus
 procedit a Filio, adhuc spiratio passiva distinguitur a generatione. Ex
 hoc sic: impossibile est duabus totalibus passivis producentibus accipere
 395 eandem personam esse; sed generatio passiva et spiratio \passiva/ sunt
 huiusmodi, ideo etc. Maior patet, et minor. Utramque enim est tota-
 lis in suo ordine. Sed contra primam conclusionem arguitur – et sunt
 rationes Grecorum et sunt in littera \et solvuntur ibidem et vide ibi in
 distinctione 11a/. Contra secundam conclusionem [47v]... non tamen
 400 ut constitutus, sed ut perfecte idem. **Tertia questio est.** (*sic*)

31, ff. 47v–49r: Circa 14, 15, et 16 \distinctiones/ quero duo:
primo utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat temporaliter; secundo
utrum quilibet persona mittat et mittatur. De primo arguitur
 quod non, quia processio Spiritus Sancti et spiratio sunt idem realiter;
 405 sed \Spiritus Sanctus/ non spiratur temporaliter, quia eternaliter; ideo
 etc. Oppositum dicit Magister in littera. Ad **secundam istarum que-**
stionem primo respondetur, et de ea est una opinio, que videtur
 esse Magistri, ostendens primo quid sit missio, secundo quod quilibet
 persona mittatur, sed \tertio/ non quilibet mittatur... [48r] **De prima**
 410 **questione utrum** etc. **\utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat tempo-**
raliter/ est ~~autem~~ notandum quod processio uno modo est emanatio ab
 alio... **Ad quartam questionem dimissam \in precedenti que-**
stione 13 distinctionis/, utrum spiratio \activa et generatio
activa sint idem realiter/ etc. Et est notandum quod in divinis dicitur
 415 res ~~dupl~~^{tripliciter} \tripliciter/ \distinguitur:/ ~~vel~~ dicitur res essentialiter
 vel notionaliter vel personaliter... [48v] **Ad \tertiam/ quartam que-**
stionem circa 12 distinctionem, utrum Spiritus Sanctus proce-
dat uniformiter a Patre et Filio, dico quod hoc potest intelligi vel
 quia principaliter a Patre quam a Filio... [49r] Unde sunt duo spirantes,
 420 quia duo supposita, sed non duo spiratores, quia non sunt duo formalia
 spirativa.

32, ff. 49r–50v: Circa 17 distinctionem queritur primo utrum ha-
bitus caritatis sit necessarius \simpliciter/ ad merendum vitam
eternam, et [circa] arguitur primo quod sic: non minus est necessarius
 425 habitus caritatis quam fidei \ad merendum vitam eternam/. Citra
 (*sic*) **primam questionem** notandum quod aliquid esse necessarium

est dupliciter... [50v] **Secunda questio, utrum aliquis possit se scire esse in caritate.** Dicunt aliqui quod sic; sed est duplex scire, scilicet \vel/ evidenter vel ex certitudine fidei... nemo scit utrum amore vel odio dignus sit \evidenter. Et sic de secunda questione/. 430

33, ff. 50v–52r: 3a questio est. Circa distinctionem 18am primo \queritur/ utrum proprium sit Spiritus Sancti \esse/ donum. Et videtur quod non, quia non convenit sibi soli sed cuidam alteri, quia de Filio Dei quod Filius datum est nobis. Oppositum dicitur in littera. **Ad 3a questio distinctionis 17 \erat/ utrum habitus caritatis augeatur secundum suam essentiam. Quarta utrum possit diminui. Quantum ad questionem primam, que est secunda in ordine et tertia \de precedenti distinctione/, et pono 5 conclusiones.** Prima est quod omnis forma auctibilis habet latitudinem graduum in sua essentia... [52r] **Quarta questio est utrum \caritas possit diminui/, etc.,** dico quod non de facto, licet de possibili. Primum patet, quia non habet causam, quia neque Deum neque culpa, quia vel venialis, quod non, nec mortalis, quia totaliter tollit. \Secundum patet, quia cum sit forma intensibilis et remissibilis non est contradictio ipsam posse diminui/. 440 445

34, ff. 52r–53v: Circa 19am et 20am distinctiones queritur primo \utrum/ divine persone sint in se invicem; secundo utrum inter eas sit perfecte caritas. De primo arguitur quod non, quia si sic, eadem esset in se ipsa... **Ad questionem primam 18e distinctionis, utrum donum sit in Spiritu Sancto,** dico primo quod Spiritus Sanctus appropriate dicitur spiritus... [52v] **Quantum ad questiones hic propositas dico de prima, \scilicet utrum persone divine sint in se invicem/,** quod sic. Determinatum enim est in Iohanne, sed difficultas est de modo... **Quarta questio \circa 19 distinctionem/ est utrum persone divine sint equales.** Et est notandum quod in personis divinis sunt essentialia et \prima conclusio est/ \quod/ secundum hoc sunt persone divine perfecte equales... [53v] **Ad rationem in oppositum nego consequentiam,** quia una non est in alia ut continens in contento, sed sicut subsistens in subsistente, ideo etc. 450 455

35, ff. 53v–55r: Circa 21 distinctionem et 22am queritur primo utrum distinctio exclusiva addita \uni/ relato respectu predicati excludit aliud \relatum/ \distinctum ab eo/; secundo 460

453 Determinatum] determinatur *corr.* 456 essentialia] essentiales *corr.*

utrum **solus** tantus Pater \sit quantus Filius et quantus Spi-
 ritus Sanctus/; tertia est utrum Deus sit a nobis nominabi-
 465 lis; quarto utrum pluribus nominibus. De prima questione argui-
 tur quod sic: ubi est realis distinctio, \ibi/ distinctio \exclusiva/ ponit
 realem exclusionem; sed ita in divinis inter personas. Maior patet, et
 minor... **Ad primam questionem** ñ ponam aliquas conclusiones.
 Prima est quod unum relatum non est de conceptu quidditativo alter-
 470 rius... [54r] **Secunda questio est utrum tantus sit Pater quantus**
 \quantus Filius et Spiritus Sanctus/ [Spiritus Sanctus]. Dico quod
 illa distinctio 'solus' potest intelligi vel cathogoreumatice et sic tenetur
 in ratione subiecti \subicibilis/ vel personalis... [54v] **Ad tertiam que-**
 475 **stionem \et quartam simul/** et dico quod sic, quia est intelligibilis a
 nobis; ergo nominalis, et pluribus nominibus, licet non eque. Primo, quia
 quedam sunt absoluta, quedam relativa. Item, quedam propria Dei ut
 esse in latino in ebreo tetragrammaton, quod erat ineffabile, quia omnia
 alia nomina hebraea nominant, cum ratione alicuius operationis; sed illud
 nomen signat meram substantiam Dei. Sed contra: **quia** \quod/ non est
 480 a nobis distincte cognoscibile neque nominabile; sed Deus est huiusmodi.
 Maior est falsa, quia possumus aliquid distincte nominare quod tamen
 non distincte intelligimus, ut dato quod non intelligeremus distincte lit-
 teras hebraicas, tamen possemus eas distincte nominare, imponendo eis
 nomina. \Et sic de illo/.

485 **36, ff. 54v–56r: Circa 23 distinctionem 24 et 25 queritur primo**
utrum nomina attribuibilia significant rationem determinatam
in natura divina; secunda utrum in divinis sit numerus; tertia
questio est utrum persona dicat substantiam vel suppositum;
quarta utrum persona sit nomen intentionis prime vel secunde.
 490 De primo arguitur quod non; illud quod est commune indifferens creato
 et increato non dicit rationem determinatam; sed attributa sunt huius-
 modi; ideo etc. Oppositum: illud quod signat unum et \non/ plura dicit
 determinatam rationem; sed quodlibet attribuibile nomen est huiusmo-
 di; quia si plura est equivocum nomen; ideo etc. Ad primam questionem
 495 primo ponam aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod attribuibiles ratio-
 nes sunt formaliter in Deo... [55v] {Opinio Aureoli} Secunda conclusio
 probatur, et unus doctor dicit oppositum, quia dicit quod dicunt concep-
 tum indeterminatum, sed determinantur ex aliquo connotato, ut ratio
 iustitie in recto non dicit conceptum determinatum, sed solum conno-
 500 tans specificat. Et sic impositum \est/ nomen \ipsi iustitie/, scilicet
 470 tantus] tantum *corr.*

\unicuique/ reddere quod suum est. Ratio prima sua est illa... [56r]
Dico ergo quod ille doctor non concludit oppositum, sed bene vult quod
signat aliquem conceptum sub ente non alicuius generis determinati.

37, ff. 56r–57r: Tertia conclusio probatur sic et unus doctor dicit op-
positum, dicens quod in idem coincidunt rationes attribuibiles in re in 505
ratione... [56v] **Tertia questio est utrum in Deo sit numerus.**
Primo videndum est de numero... [57r] Ad illud dicit unus doctor...
ille doctor... aliter quod est unum per accidens, id est per aliquid quod
est sibi accidens et extrinsecum; ideo etc.

38, ff. 57r–59r: {**Alia lectio**} Secundus articulus est de numero et 3 510
facienda sunt: primo ponantur 6 conclusiones, secundo 24 obiectiones,
tertio solutiones. Quantum ad primum prima conclusio est quod nu-
merus requirit necessario multitudinem; secundo quod pluralitas illa est
pluralitas termini communis... [59r] Sed sunt realitates numeratorum et
ideo denominatione dicitur numerus realis realitate numeratorum scilicet 515
personarum.

39, ff. 59r–60r: **Circa 26 distinctionem et 27am queritur pri-**
mo utrum personales proprietates sint formaliter in Deo; se-
cunda, utrum paternitas et filiatio distinguantur; tertio utrum 520
supposita divina constituentur precise per relationes; quarta,
utrum in divinis sit aliquod suppositum absolutum. De primo
arguitur quod non, quia non manent ibi fundamentales rationes earum,
patet, quia 5 *Metaphysice* \dicitur/ quod fundamentum paternitatis est
genuisse; sed illud non est in Deo \cum nulla preteritio sit ibi/. Op-
positum dicit Magister et doctores. **Ad primam** questionem ponam 525
duas conclusiones. Prima est quod paternitas et filiatio in creaturis sunt
reales; secundo quod in Deo ille relationes sint formaliter... [60r] dico
quod ymmo quia genuisse non est fundendi ratio, ut dictum est, ideo
etc.

40, ff. 60r–61v: {**lectio sequens**} Tertia questio erat de **distinctio-** 530
ne precedente, cum quæ queritur circa 28am utrum ingenitum
sit constitutivum Patris; secunda questio \circa 29am/ {uni-
voce ad principium} utrum principium dicatur ad intra vel \et/
extra in divinis. Arguitur de prima quia esse genitum est constitui-
vum Filii, ideo et ingenitum Patris. Oppositum per Augustinum V *De* 535
Trinitate quod non est idem ingenitum esse et Patrem esse, ideo etc.
523 quod] quia *corr.*

**Ad questionem tertiam supra dimissam utrum persone divine
constituantur per relationes et quartam,** pono duas conclusiones.
Prima quod in divinis non est absolutum suppositum commune tribus;
540 secunda conclusio est quod persone in divinis constituuntur per relativas
proprietates... [61r] **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum ingenitum
ete. \sit proprietates constitutiva Patris/,** prima conclusio est quod
ingenitum et innascibilitas formaliter non dicit \aliquid/ positivum...
{de principio} **Quarta questio utrum principium dicatur univo-**
545 **ce ad intra et \ad/ extra \in divinis/.** Et principium dupliciter
consideratur, vel quantum ad substratum vel quantum ad rationem for-
malem... [61v] quia relatio principii ad intra est realis, sed ad extra
est rationis. ~~contra arguitur ete.~~ Ad rationem in oppositum, ingenitum
etc., dico quod esse genitum et esse Filium est una relatio, sed non est
550 ita de ingenito et esse Patrem, ut dictum est, ideo etc.

41, ff. 61v–62v: Consequenter queritur circa 30am distinctio-
nem, 31am et 32am primo utrum Dei ad creaturam sit relatio
realis; secunda est utrum relationes communes in divinis sint
reales; tertia est utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita; quar-
555 **ta, utrum Pater diligit Filium Spiritu Sancto.** De prima arguitur
quod sic. Ubi est realiter produciens et realiter productum, est realis
relatio... Ad illas questiones. **Ad primam,** dico quod Dei ad creatu-
ram non est relatio realis... [62r] **Ad secundam questionem utrum**
relationes communes \ut equalitas, similitudo, idemtitas/ in
560 **Deo sint realiter.** Prima conclusio est quod in creaturis sunt reales...
[62v] **Tertia questio et quarta est utrum,** etc. Dico quod illa que-
stio est de modo loquendi. Unde quando dicitur sapientia genita pro
tanto quia sapientia accipitur Filio... **De quarta questione** potest
dici quod diligere vel tenetur notionaliter sic non est concedenda \illa/:
565 ‘Pater diligit Filium Spiritu Sancto’, quia circumscripto Spiritu Sancto,
adhuc vera est, ~~quia~~ tunc esset sensus: ‘Pater diligit Filium, id est, spi-
rat’; si autem capitur essentialiter, sic est vera cum debito intellectu, et
sic dictum sit de istis 4 questionibus. Et sic de illo.

42, ff. 62v–64r: {dimissis 33 et 34} Consequenter queritur circa
570 **35am et 36am distinctionem et 37 primo utrum Deus cognos-**
cat alia omnia a se; secunda utrum ydee sint in Deo: tertia,
utrum in omnibus rebus sit Deus tripliciter \scilicet per po-
tentiam, presentiam et essentiam/; quarto utrum hoc possit
558 secundam] tertiam *corr.* 570 35am] 33 *corr.*

demonstrari. De prima arguitur quod non. Intellectus datus est homini ut perficiatur notitia de rebus; sed Deus nulla alia notitia perficitur nisi sue essentie. Oppositum: gubernans omnia habet scientiam omnium; Deus est huiusmodi. **Ad istas quatuor questiones simul respondendo** pono 4 conclusiones. Prima est quod Deus directe cognoscit alia omnia a se. Secunda quod in Deo sunt ydee. Tertia quod Deus est in omnibus rebus tripliciter. Quarta, quod illud non potest demonstrative probari. . . [63v] {Hec ratio invenitur in omnibus doctoribus tractantibus de illa materia.} Contra secundam conclusionem arguitur: si ydee ponuntur in Deo, vel sunt rationes in divina essentia[m] precedentes actum intelligendi divinam essentiam, vel obiecta secundaria, vel sunt relationes vel obiecta cognita; sed nullum horum potest poni. Non primum; dicit enim una opinio quod sunt quedam rationes determinate in divina correspondentis perfectionis specificis in creaturis per quam intelligit intellectus divinus illas perfectiones specificas in creaturis. Sed hoc stare non potest. Nulla perfectio limitata ponenda est in Deo. . . nec secundum patet; nec potest \stare/ scilicet \quod/ posteriores sint obiectis secundariis hæc non potest stare, quia omnis relatio est posterior suo termino; sed obiecta contraria sunt termini istarum relationum; ideo etc. Nec sunt obiecta secundaria in esse cognito, quod dicit doctor. Contra: quia nullum ens rationis potest esse ydea; sed obiectum cognitum est huiusmodi. . . [64r] Modo primo modo verum est si distans est positive, non autem si privative; sic autem est hic; ideo etc.

43, ff. 64r–65v: Consequenter queritur circa 38am et 39am, 40am et 41am distinctiones primo utrum Deus habeat certam notitiam \et determinatam/ de futuris contingentibus; secunda est utrum certam; tertia ut<rum> immutabilem; quarta utrum illa sit vera quod predestinatus possit dampnari. De prima arguitur quod non. Ubi non est determinata \veritas neque/ scibilitas non est determinata notitia. . . **Ad illas questiones respondetur**, et 3 videnda sunt. Primo quomodo contingentia est in rebus; secundo quomodo cum ea stat certa notitia in Deo de rebus; tertio solvendo obiecta. Quantum ad primum, dico primo quod in rebus est contingentia. . . [65v] Dico quod sicut Deus scit, ergo cum dicis: ‘ergo semper erit’, dico quod non, quia Deus non scit nisi-quando simpliciter; sed quia oppositum potest inesse; ideo etc. (Edited in Schabel, “William of Brienne”, pp. 163–168)

610 **44**, ff. 65v–66v: **Consequenter queritur ~~utrum~~ circa 42am, 43am**
44am, distinctiones primo utrum divina omnipotentia sit di-
divina voluntas formaliter; secunda, utrum possibilitas vel im-
possibilitas sumatur ex parte rei producibilis; tertia, utrum
615 **Deus aliquid possit de potentia absoluta quod non de ordina-**
ta. De primo arguitur quod non, quia velle in divinis non est posse;
ideo etc. . . **Ad illas questiones** pono quatuor conclusiones. Prima
est quod divina omnipotentia non est distincta a voluntate; secunda est
quod possibilitas vel impossibilitas accipitur formaliter ex parte rei, non
620 Dei; tertia est quod obiectum omnipotentie est omne possibile aliud ab
omnipotentia; quarto quod potentia Dei absoluta est alia ab ordinata.
Primum probant aliqui sic: illud est omnipotentia divina ad quod reditur
omnis causalitas extrinseca; sed ita est de voluntate divina. . . [66v] pre-
ter ordinem statutum de communi cursu, et sic intelligitur Deus absolute
625 agere. Et sic de illo.

45, ff. 67r–68r: **Consequenter queritur circa 45am distinctionem:**
prima, utrum in Deo sit voluntas formaliter; secunda, utrum
divina voluntas coagat omni cause secunde; tertia, utrum sit
causa peccati; quarta, utrum signa divine voluntatis sufficien-
630 **ter enumerantur.** De prima arguitur quod non, quia nihil mutabile est
in Deo formaliter; sed voluntas est huiusmodi. . . **Ad illas questiones,**
4 videnda sunt, ad primam questionem dico quod una opinio est
dicens quod voluntas sub ratione \potentie/ voluntatis non est formali-
ter \in Deo/ voluntas. . . **Ad secundam questionem, utrum divina**
635 **voluntas coagat omni cause secunde in omni actione sua.** Una
opinio est dicens quod sit immediate. . . [68r] **Tertia questio** est utrum
Deus sit causa peccati, dico quod non, quia cuius non est causa efectiva
sed defectiva non est causa voluntas divina; sed peccatum est huiusmo-
di. . . **Ad quartam questionem** dico quod illa signa voluntatis sunt
640 sufficienter enumerata a Magistro *Sententiarum*: precipit aut prohibet,
promittit, consulit, implet. \Ubi/ sufficientia, quia voluntas increata re-
spectu creaturarum videtur respicere principaliter, \et hoc/ vel respectu
boni – et sic impletio –, vel respectu mali – et sic prohibitio –, vel de
futuro, et hoc vel respectu boni, \et hoc dicitur/ vel necessarii vel con-
645 grui ad salutem. Si primo modo, sit preceptum; si secundo modo sit
consilium, vel respectu mali, sic prohibet.

635 omni] omne *corr.*

46, ff. 68r–68v: **Consequenter et ultimo circa 46am, 47 et 48am distinctiones, \primo/ utrum Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri; secunda, utrum voluntas Dei semper impleatur; tertia, utrum teneamur conformare voluntatem nostram \voluntati divine/; quarta est utrum teneamur conformare in volito et forma volendi.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia omnes homines non erunt salvi, Math. 22 \multi sunt vocati pauci vero electi/, ideo etc... 650
Ad primam questionem illam solvit Augustinus... **Ad secundam questionem,** istam solvit Augustinus et Anselmus per divisiones dic- 655
 tas... **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum teneamur conformare vo-**
luntatem nostram divine, et est notandum quod hoc potest intelligi
 vel quantum ad esse reale vel morale... [68v] **Ad quartam questio-**
nem, primo videndum est de ratione volendi et est caritas sed et ideo
 conformare \voluntatem nostram divine in forma volendi/ etc. est causa 660
 habere caritatem... Prima tamen opinio est satis rationabilis, et sic de
 hiis. Et in hoc terminatur *Sententia(rum)* primi libri \ad honorem Dei
 gloriosi qui est benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen/.

BOOK IV

47, ff. 69r–69v: **Circa quantum *Sententiarum* primo queritur utrum sacramentum possit diffiniri; secundo utrum diffinitio- nes sint convenientes; tertio utrum sacramenta sint causa gra- tie; quarto utrum effectus sacramentorum possint impediri.** De prima arguitur sic: nullum accidens potest diffiniri... **Ad primam** 5
questionem est notandum quod de diffinitione dupliciter possumus lo-
 qui, vel generaliter... [69v] **Ad secundam questionem** est notandum
 quod una est diffinitio ‘sacramentum est sacre rei signum’ et ibi non
 capitur signum universaliter sed ex ordine Dei... Quarta est Hugo-
 nis: sacramentum est elementum materiale sensibilibus propositum ex 10
~~institutione divina~~ ordinatione divina efficienter signans et ex sanctio-
 ne gratiam conferens. Illa est completa diffinitio. Quinta est Doctoris,
 \scilicet Scoti/, quod sacramentum est signum effectum Dei gratuitus ex
 ordine divina, efficienter signans ad salutem hominis viatoris ordinatum,
 et illa includit in se omnes causas et est proprissima diffinitio. 15

48, ff. 69v–71r: **Consequenter queritur primo utrum in quoli- bet statu fuit congruum instituere sacramenta; secundo utrum circumcisio conferabat \gratiam/. De prima arguitur quod non,**
 18 conferabat] conferat *corr.*

quia De consecratione, di. 4 quod apud nos facit *fides* \baptismus/ apud
 20 adultos per sacrificium; sed neque fides neque sacrificium fuerunt sacra-
 menta. **Ad questionem tertiam supra remanentem** et dico primo
 quod in instrumentis artificialibus non est aliqua virtus eis influxa ab
 agente principali... [70r] **Ad quartam questionem** Dico quod effec-
 tum sacramenti posse impediri est dupliciter: vel ex parte conferentis,
 25 ut si ab eo reciperetur qui non potest dare... **Ad questionem nunc**
propositam, utrum in quolibet statu, etc., dico \primo/ quod fuit
 congruum statuere sacramenta... [70v] Sed dicunt iuriste quod non licet
 aliquod sacramentum reiterare ne fiat eis irreverentia. dico tamen quod
 hoc est dupliciter, vel super eandem materiam, vel ~~secundum~~ \quantum
 30 ad/ recipientem. Primo modo non debet reiterari, sed secundo modo
 bene. **Ad quartam questionem**, utrum circumcisio conferebat gra-
 tiam, dico prima quid debebat originalem culpam... [71r] verum est
 cum speciali signo tamen instituto a Deo. Et sic de illo.

49, ff. 71r–71v: Circa **secundam distinctionem** primo queritur
 35 **utrum sacramenta habeant efficaciam a passione Christi; se-**
cundo utrum a Deo immediate sint instaurata; tertia, utrum
baptizati a \baptismo/ **Iohannis tenebantur ad baptismum**
Christi; quarta, utrum ille baptismus auferebat culpam \et
conferebat gratiam/. De primo arguitur quod non, quia passio Chri-
 40 sti non est in actu modo igitur neque modo potest esse ab eo sacramenti
 effectus qui modo est. Oppositum est Augustini 22 *De civitate Dei*, ca-
 pitulo 15 {recitat Magister in littera}. **Ad primam questionem** dico
 primo quod decuit legem Christi sacramentis specialibus ordinari... **Ad**
secundam questionem una est opinio, [et sint] \et videtur esse Ma-
 45 gistri in littera/, quod non omnia sacramenta immediate fuerint statuta
 a Christo, quia neque confirmatio neque extrema unctio... [71v] **Ad**
tertiam et quartam questionem dico primo quod baptismus Iohan-
 nis non dicitur proprie sacramentum... **Ad rationem in oppositum** dico
 quod passio Christi modo est in actu quantum ad acceptionem Dei, et
 50 sic per ipsam meritorie habent efficaciam ipsa sacramenta. \Et sic de
 illo/.

50, ff. 71v–72r: Consequenter circa **tertiam distinctionem** pri-
 mo queritur **utrum diffinitio baptismi Magistri sit conveniens;**
secunda, utrum aqua naturalis sit materia \conveniens bapti-
 55 **smi/; tertia, utrum illa sit forma: ‘ego’ etc.; quarta, utrum de**
 31 conferebat] conferret *corr.*

tempore institutionis utrum statim instituto baptismo cessaverit circumcisio. De primo arguitur quod non: illa diffinitio non est conveniens in qua pars predicatur de toto. . . **Ad primam questionem** primo videndum est de diffinitionibus baptismi. Una est Magistri. . . **Ad secundam questionem utrum naturalis aqua,** etc., dicitur quod sic, quia Salvator in aqua constituit, quia illud elementum est communissimum \et facillimum/ ad habendum. Sed difficile est videre que sit aqua naturalis, et dicit unus doctor quod non potest discrevi quod aquas naturalis excludatur propter diversitatem qualitatum ut aqua maris et fluviales. . . [72r] **Ad tertiam questionem, de forma ‘ego te’,** etc., dico quod sic secundum Romanam ecclesiam quam nunc tenet, sed in primitiva ecclesia pueri baptizarentur in nomine Christi. Sed secundum unum doctorem si modo sic baptizatur puer, non debetur rebaptizari nisi sub dubio si non esset baptizatus. . . **Ad quartam questionem, utrum statim instituto baptismo cessaverit circumcisio,** dicunt quidam \quod fuerint 3 tempora circumcisionis. Primum fuit/ [quia circumcisio fuit] quandoque sub precepto usque ad nativitatem Christi. . . Ad rationem in oppositum dico quod iste diffinitiones sunt magistrales, ideo non tenet in eis illa ratio.

51, ff. 72r–73v: **Consequenter queritur circa 4am distinctionem \et quintam/ primo utrum omnes teneantur ad sumendum baptismum; secundo utrum equaliter \omnes/ suscipiant effectum baptismi; tertia, utrum malus minister impediat effectum baptismi; quarta, utrum peccet aliquis suscipiendo sacramentum \baptismi/ a malo ministro.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia aliqui susciperent frustra. . . **Ad primam questionem** dico prima quod parvuli indigent baptismo. . . [72v] Contra illam conclusionem est opinio communis, quia si sic, vel post baptismum illi parvuli redderentur parentibus ~~quod~~ \vel/ non. \Si redderentur, tunc blasphemarent, et error posterior fietur peior priori/; si non, tunc fietur iniuria parentibus manifesta, quod non est licitum alicui. . . **Ad secundam questionem, utrum omnes equaliter,** etc. supponitur quod \gratiam \que est effectus baptismi// recipiunt omnes. . . [73r] **Tertia questio est utrum malus minister impediat effectum baptismi.** Determinatum est \ab ecclesia quod non/ [quod non]. . . [73v] **Ad quartam questionem, utrum peccet,** etc. Dico quod malus minister est duplex, vel notorie malus, vel occulte. . . si autem sit mancus et non potest, tunc debet baptizari ab illo preciso.

52, ff. 73r–74v: **Consequenter circa 6am distinctionem, primo**
 95 **utrum soli sacerdotes sint ministri istius sacramenti; secun-**
do utrum unus unum tantum simul \possit baptizare/; tertio
utrum possit reiterari \baptismus/; quarto utrum Deo impri-
matur caracter. De prima arguitur quod sic. De consecratione di. 4
 constat ubi hoc vult Ysidorus... **Ad questionem primam** primo vi-
 100 dendum que requiruntur ad collationem baptismum, et sunt tria... [74r]
Ad secundam questionem primo videndum est de unitate personali,
 et quantum ad hoc potest esse unus sensus... **Ad tertiam questionem**
utrum sacramentum \baptismi/ sit reiterabile. Dicitur quod non
 est reiterabile. Ratio est institutio Christi, quia sic instituit et congruen-
 105 tia... [74v] Sed de ignorantia facti est una opinio dicens quod recipiens
 baptismum ignoranter sit irregularis, De consecratione di. 4 \vide glo-
 sam de hoc quia Bar. ibidem dicit et exponit de ignorantia iuris/, “qui
 bis”. Illud videtur esse nimis durum quia non magis videtur obligatus ad
 penam recipiens sacramentum quam conferens... **Ad quartam que-**
 110 **stionem** de caractere, dico quod imprimatur caracter quia Extra, De
 hereticis, “abolentes”, quid tenet ecclesia tenendum. Modo ecclesia di-
 cit hic, Extra, De baptismo, “maiores”. Unde dicitur quod caracter est
 quoddam signum indelebile impressum in anima per quod efficitur quis
 in esse potestativo in ecclesia Dei. Et hoc est verum sive sit forma ab-
 115 soluta vel relativa, \de quo ad presens nichil, **alias forte videbitur** de
 hoc, et sic de illo/.

53, ff. 74v–75v: **Consequenter circa 7am distinctionem primo**
queritur utrum confirmatio sit sacramentum nove legis; secun-
do utrum confirmatio sit \sacramentum/ nobilius baptismo;
 120 **tertio queritur utrum soli episcopi sint ministri ydonei eius;**
quarto utrum omnibus debeat illud sacramentum conferri. Ad
 primum arguitur quod non, quia omnia sacramenta nove legis institu-
 ta sunt immediate a Christo... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo
 quod confirmatio est sacramentum nove legis... [75r] Sexta conclusio
 125 probatur, quia illud sacramentum maius confertur caracter est irreite-
 rabile; sed confirmatio est huiusmodi. Sed sciendum quod recipientes
 reiterantibus scienter secundum aliquos infligitur pena \irregularitatis/
 quamvis. Sed dicit doctor noster quod non est infligenda pena nisi que
 invenitur in iure scripta; modo non reperitur illa pena irregularitatis rei-
 130 terantibus, sed dicitur quod debent servire Deo in religione qui sic reite-
 rant. **Ad secundam questionem**, De confirmatione, di. 5, “scitote”,
 108 durum] durans *corr.* 127 reiterantibus] reinterantes *corr.*

dicitur quod \confirmatio/ preferitur baptismo... **Ad tertiam questionem, de ministro ydoneo**, et determinatum est Extra, De sacra unctione, c. “per frontis”, et De confirmatione, di. 5 “prespiteri”... **Ad quartam questionem, de suscipientibus**, dico quod est conferendum omnibus viatoribus. Patet primo De confirmatione, di. 5, “omnes fidelis”, ubi hoc dicitur... [75v] De confirmatione, di. 5, “ut ieiunis”, et a ieiunis debet conferri ut per ibidem. Et sic de illo. 135

54, ff. 75v–76r: Consequenter queritur circa 8am distinctionem. Primo queritur utrum sacramentum eucharistie sit \sacramentum/ nove legis; secundo utrum unum vel plura; tertio \utrum/ forma cantationis sit precisa; quarto utrum sit vera et quomodo. De prima arguitur sie quod non, sacramenta nove legis efficiunt quod figurant... **Ad primam questionem** primo videndum quid sit diffinitive, et ex hoc videtur intentum... Et ideo dicit ille doctor quod de essentia eius est verbum et usus... **Ad quartum etc.** dicit doctor \noster/ quod illud sacramentum habet unam prerogativam quod numquam separatur signum a signato, non sic in aliis... **Ad secundam questionem** et est una opinio quod est unum [76r] unitate omogenea, quia \rationis \ratio// totius habetur in parte et partis in toto, ut patet de corpore et sanguine Christi... **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum forma incantatione posita sit precisa**, et primo quantum ad consecrationem corporis, et dicitur quod est precisa... Quantum ad illa dubia, usque ad quem terminum ista verba sint necessaria, non est determinatum et ideo homo dicat attente propter securitatem maiorem \omnia ista verba. Et sic de illa tertia questione/. 140 145 150 155

55, ff. 76r–77v: Circa 9am distinctionem queritur primo utrum illud sacramentum debeat solum sumi a ieiunis; secundo utrum recipiens ipsum in peccato mortali peccet mortaliter; tertio utrum conferens peccatori mortali peccet mortaliter. De prima arguitur quod non, quia post dedit non ieiunis. Oppositum De \consecratione/, di. 2, “siquidem”. **Ad questionem quartam supra remanentem, utrum forma consecrationis incantationis posita sit vera**, et quod \non/ sit vera patet \arguitur/, quia hoc pronomen ‘hoc’ vel demonstrat corpus Christi, quod non... [77r] {quintus modus dicendi} et ideo est alius modus dicendi doctoris nostri quod non est necesse quod propositio habeat veritatem pro quolibet instanti pro quo habet suum signatum, quia patet de propositionibus de preterito vel futuro... **Ad secundam questionem, utrum illud sacramentum** 160 165

170 **debet sumi a ieiunis**, duplex est ieiunium: quoddam nature, quod-
dam ecclesie. Primo modo quando aliquis nichil sumpsit pertinens ad
cibum sumptum ab extra... **Ad tertiam questionem** est notandum
quod aliquem esse in peccato mortali est dupliciter: vel scienter et cum
proposito ibi standi et peccandi... et ideo dico sicut dictum est ad que-
175 **stionem primam. Ad quartam questionem** dicitur primo quod illud
sacramentum non dicitur dari pueris... [77v] si non, non debet dare.
Et sic patet ad istam questionem.

56, ff. 77v–78v: Consequenter queritur utrum circa 10am distinc-
tionem primo utrum corpus et sanguis Christi possint reali-
180 **ter \esse/ sub speciebus panis et vini realiter; secundo utrum**
corpus Christi sit in altari \facta consecratione sine mutatione
sui/; tertia est utrum sit ibi cum extensione quantitate; quarta,
utrum sit ibi virtute transubstantionis. Ad primam questionem ar-
guitur quod non corpus etc... **Ad primam questionem** conclusio est
185 determinata quod sit realiter et veraciter. Patet in Ewangelio Math. 26
et Luc. 22; sed heretici responderent... **Secunda questio est utrum**
corpus Christi sit in altari facta consecratione sine sui muta-
tionem, {prima opinio} et est una opinio dicens quod sine mutatione sui
\est in altari/ sed per solam mutationem alterius in ipsum... {secunda
190 opinio, primus modus dicendi eius} Et est alia opinio dicens duos mo-
dos. Primus est quod in relationibus mutuis est multiplicatio relationum
secundum multitudinem extremorum, ut patet de similitudine duorum ex-
istencium simul... [78r] {secundus modus dicendi} Et ideo ipse ponit
aliud modum dicens quod esse presens alicui \est dupliciter:/ vel positi-
195 ve per realem presentiam vel negative per ablationem distantie solius...
Et ideo dico aliter secundum doctorem \nostrum/ quod hoc non fit sine
mutatione, ratio: quod se habet aliter nunc quam prius vere mutatur;
sed corpus Christi est huiusmodi, quia nunc est realiter presens, et prius
non; ideo etc... Sed contra arguit doctor dictus, primo sic: quando
200 aliquid totaliter ponit infra continentiam alicuius, impossibile est quod
ponatur extra... **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum \corpus Chri-**
sti/ sit ibi secundum suam dimensionem extensivam, una est
opinio \dicens/ quod corpus Christi non est sub speciebus extensive...
[78v] Et ideo aliter dico secundum doctorem nostrum quod partes corpo-
205 ris possunt comparari vel ad partes \totum/ corpus \quod/ \et habitudo
illa est habitudo et potentia de genere quantitatis/ vel ad partes loci que
faciunt situm... et mutatio est modo quo dictum est. Et sic de illo.

57, ff. 78v–79v: **Consequenter** \adhuc/ circa 10am distinctionem primo queritur utrum corpus Christi possit simul esse in celo et in altari \sacramentaliter/; secundo utrum divina virtute possit simul esse in celo et alibi localiter; tertio utrum in sacramento possit tangi; quarto utrum quilibet Christianus teneatur qualibet die audire missam. Ad primam arguitur quod non. Invariata ratione formali alicuius manet illud invariaturum... **Ad primam questionem** conclusio eius est fidelis et certa secundum fidem, sed secundum communem opinionem ad corpus Christi est pro tanto in altari, quia aliquid convertitur in ipsum \virtute consecrationis/, et quod convertitur in alterum est ibidem ubi illud... **Quantum ad secundam questionem, utrum idem corpus**, etc, et primo circa hanc inducam difficultates in proposito, primo arguendo quod hoc est impossibile, \scilicet quod idem corpus numero possit simul esse in diversis locis/, quia, si sic, eadem ratione et in infinitis... [79v] **Tertia questio est – ad presens dimittitur. Ad quartam questionem** notandum quod missa dicitur eo quod celestis missus... sed aliqui dixerunt quod qualibet die clerici in statu tenentur audire missam, tamen communiter dicitur quod non peccant mortaliter, non audiendo quoddam cottidie.

58, ff. 79v–80v: **Adhuc circa 10am distinctionem primo queritur utrum omnes proprietates** \naturales/ que insunt Christo in celo insint sibi in sacramento \altaris/; secundo utrum omnes operationes immanentes \que insunt sibi in celo insint sibi etiam in sacramento/; tertio utrum corpus Christi possit moveri localiter; quarto utrum aliquid possit movere. Ad primam arguitur quod non... **Ad primam questionem dico 3.** Primo quod Christus habet 2 esse disparata, \scilicet esse naturale et esse sacramentale/, quorum unum non dependet necessario ab alio... [80r] **Ad secundam questionem**, actiones immanentes dicuntur intelligere, velle, \sentire/, etc... **Ad tertiam questionem** est notandum quod ~~immo~~ duplex est motus localis: uno modo capitur proprie, alio modo generaliter, scilicet pro omni potente reduci ad ipsum... [80v] **Ad quartam questionem** est notandum quod in corpore Christi sunt potentie quedam naturales motive habentes actus corporales, alie spirituales, ut intellectus et voluntas; tertie sunt medii... et tamen de necessitate illa non habet talem situm, ideo etc.

59, ff. 80v–82r: **Consequenter queritur circa 11am distinctionem. Primo queritur utrum** \illa/ transubstantiatio \substantie

- panis/ sit possibilis; secundo utrum quodlibet in quodlibet
 \transubstantietur/ possit transubstantiari; tertio, utrum **cōr-**
pūs Christi substantia panis \de facto/ transubstantietur **ete.**
 in corpus Christi; \quarta questio est utrum in illa transub-
 250 stantiacione substantia panis annichiletur/. De prima arguitur
 quod non. Omnis mutatio vel est generatio et corruptio vel motus...
Ad primam questionem primo dico primo quod \illa/ transubstan-
 tiatio fit in instanti... [81r] **Ad secundam questionem** dico primo
 quod nulla creatura potest converti in deitatem nec econverso... **Ter-**
 255 **tia questio, utrum de facto substantia panis transubstantietur**
in substantiam corporis Christi. Veritas determinata est, cum **se-**
cundum In(nocentiam?) ~~una~~ ~~autem~~ \de illa conclusione erant/ tres
 opiniones, quarum quilibet ponit corpus Christi esse presens in altari...
 [82r] **Ad quartam questionem utrum substantia panis annichile-**
 260 **tur,** dicitur quod non, quia ibi manet aliquitas panis, et hoc in corpore
 Christi. Contra, quia hic est transubstantio tocius in totum, ideo nichil
 manet. Item, non ante mansit in corpore Christi, ideo nec post. Et ideo
 dico quia omnis mutatio denotatur a termino ad quem; sed terminus
 ille in hac transubstantiatione est positivus; ideo non est annichilatio.
 265 Maior patet, et minor patet, quia est mutatio in corpus Christi, quod est
 terminus positivus. Et ideo unus doctor dicit quod, sicut in naturalibus
 est ~~quadruplex~~ \triplex/ mutatio, ita in superioribus: quedam est de
 non-esse ad esse, et est creatio, alia econverso, tertia de esse ad esse, et
 talis est illa transubstantiatio; ideo etc. Et sic de illo.
- 270 **60, ff. 82r-83r: Adhuc circa 11 distinctionem queritur primo**
utrum per se et primo terminus istius transubstantiationis sit
corpus vel compositum; secundo utrum materia eius sit panis
et vinum; tertio utrum panis triticcus; quarto utrum vinum
sit materia sanguinis. Ad primam arguitur quod ~~non~~ sit composi-
 275 tum, quia De consecratione di. 2, “mirabile”, tale corpus Christus...
Ad primam questionem sunt due opiniones dicentes quod in homine
 est tantum una forma, scilicet rationalis anima... [83r] **Ad secundam**
questionem, \scilicet utrum panis et vinum sit materia conve-
niens hoc sacramento/, dicitur quod sic. Ratio: quia Christus sic
 280 ministravit... **Ad tertiam questionem, \utrum panis confectus**
de tri(ti)co sit materia conveniens corpori Christi/, dicitur quod
 sic, et ratio quia Christus sic instituit... **Ad quartam questionem,**
de vino de vite, dicitur quod sic: ratio est institutio Christi... qui

vivuntur ipsi Christo in consecratione et sumpcione huius sacramenti.
sed de Et sic de illo.

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61, ff. 83r–84r: Consequenter queritur circa 12am distinctionem primo utrum accidentia possunt esse sine subiecto; secundo utrum \de facto/ sint ibi sine subiecto \in sacramento altaris/; tertio utrum eis separatis confertur novum esse; quarto utrum habeant virtutem supernaturalem qua sint sine subiecto. De
prima arguitur quod non, quia aliqua substantia non potest esse sine
accidente... [83v] **Ad primam questionem** est notandum quod de
accidente dupliciter possumus loqui vel quantum ad id quod signat vel
quantum ad id quod denominat... [84r] et sic de talibus passionibus
sunt scientie. **Ad secundam questionem, utrum,** etc., et dicunt ali-
qui quod sic, quia unicum esse est compositi... **Ad tertiam questio-**
nem, utrum accidenti, etc., dico quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter:
vel formaliter sibi inexistentem vel ipsum manutinentem. Modo pri-
mum non, quia non est substantia neque accidens, quia procederetur in
infinitum; sed secundo modo bene, quia non est actualiter in subiecto.
Ad quartam questionem dico quod sit aliqua, ut videtur. **Omnia**
videbuntur in sequentibus. Et sic de illo.

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62, ff. 84r–85v: Consequenter adhuc circa 12am distinctionem primo queritur utrum accidentia habeant entitatem terminatam in se; secundo utrum quodlibet \accidens in hoc sacra-
mento/ sit sine subiecto; tertio utrum quantitas possit esse subiectum qualitatis; quarta utrum variatione \quacumque facta circa istas species panis et vini desinat ibi esse corpus Christi/. Ad primam arguitur quod non: illa quod non habet... **Ad primam questionem** est una opinio dicens quod accidentia ex se non
habent entitatem terminatam, sed terminatur ad substantia, licet sint
secundum se distincta \a substantia/... [85r] **Ad secundam questio-**
nem, utrum omnia accidentia in corpore Christi sint sine subiecto, dico primo quod ita potest esse quantitas sine subiecto \quanto/ sicut quanti-
tas; secundo, quod unum accidens potest esse subiectum alterius; tertio
quod de facto non sunt omnia accidentia sine subiecto; \quarto quod
quantitas potest esse subiectum qualitatis/... [85v] Quarta \conclusio
est/ quod quantitas potest esse subiectum qualitatis, quia qualitas respi-
cit subiectum mediante quantitate idem respiciente; ideo etc... **Quarta**
questio: utrum facta quacumque variatione circa illas species
desinat ibi esse corpus de Christi. Dico quod non, nisi mutata specie
panis et vini. Et sic de illo.

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63, ff. 85v–86v: **Circa 13 distinctionem queritur** \prima questio est de 12 distinctione/ primo utrum accidentia in sacramento
 325 altaris habeant eandem actionem \alterativam/ quam prius; secundo utrum sacerdos possit hoc sacramentum conficere; tertio utrum laycus possit ministrare \hoc sacramentum/; quarto utrum omittens aliquod \pertinens/ ad consecrationem sacramenti huius sit irregularis. De prima arguitur quod non, quia agere
 330 presupponit esse... [86r] **Secunda questio est utrum quilibet sacerdos possit esse minister ydoneus huius sacramenti.** Dixerunt quidam, et videtur esse Magister, dicens quod non quilibet sacerdos... **Tertia questio est utrum secularis laycus possit hoc sacramentum ministrare.** Dicitur quod non modo, sed in primitiva ecclesia fuit
 335 commissa ~~sacer~~ dyaconibus, ut patet de beato Laurentio. Sed modo non \fit communiter, licet posset fieri/. **Ad quartam questionem** dico quod illa que requiruntur ad sacramentum, quedam \requiruntur/ ex parte ministri, aliqua ex parte loci, aliqua ex parte temporis... [86v] et hora tertia ut dictum fuit, etc. Et sic de illo.

340 64, ff. 86v–87v: **Consequenter queritur circa 12 et 13am distinctiones queritur adhuc primo utrum accidentia separata possint esse principium ~~productivum~~ \productivum substantie/; secundo utrum corruptivum substantie; tertio utrum ex eis possit substantia generari; quarto utrum ab agente naturali possint**
 345 **naturaliter corrumpi.** De prima arguitur quod sic, quia coniuncta accidentia sunt principium productionis substantie, ideo et separata... **Ad primas duas questiones** dico quod non... [87r] doctor noster... [87v] doctor \noster/... **Ad tertiam et quartam questionem** dico quod potest aliquid ex eis generari... quia illa esset annihilacio.
 350 (Edited in Appendix E)

65, ff. 87v–88v: {Hic incipit de penitentia} **Consequentur queritur circa 14 distinctionem de penitentia. Queritur utrum penitentia sit sacramentum; secundo utrum in nobis aliquid deleatur per eam; tertio utrum sit virtus; quarto utrum virtus iustitie.** De prima arguitur quod non, quia ei non competit diffinitio sacramenti... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod penitentia est sacramentum nove legis... [88r] **Ad secundam questionem** dico primo quod cessante actu peccandi non remanet nobis aliquid absolutum debile per penitentiam... [88v] **Ad tertiam questionem et**

quartam dico primo quod penitentia est virtus... sed hoc competit penitentie, scilicet punire quod male commissa et reddere debitum pene et punicionis de peccato commisso. 360

66, ff. 88v–89v: **Consequenter queritur circa distinctionem 15 queritur primo utrum homo possit de peccato mortali satisfacere Deo; secundo utrum de uno et \ita quod/ non de alio possit satisfacere; tertio utrum partes satisfactionis sint sufficienter \enumerate/; quarto utrum cuilibet peccato correspondeat propria satisfactio.** Ad primam questionem arguitur quod non. Maius est peccatum actuale mortale quam originale... **De prima questione** primo videndum est quid est satisfactio, et est notandum quod capitur dupliciter... [89r] **Ad secundam questionem**, primo videndum \est/ quot modis potest intelligi \satisfacere de uno peccato ita quod non de alio/... [89v] **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum partes satisfactionis sufficienter enumerentur \dicendo ipsas esse tres, scilicet orationem, ieiunium et elemosinam/,** dicitur quod sic... **Ad quartam questionem**, \dicendum quod/, si loquimur de satisfactio primo modo dicta, sic una satisfactio sufficit pro pluribus peccatis, \scilicet ut est redditio voluntaria equivalentis alias indebiti/; si secundo modo, sic distinctis peccatis distincte satisfactiones sunt dande et correspondende. ~~Et sic de illis.~~ \Aliam enim facit satisfactionem luxuriosus, quia per carnis maceracionem, aliam avarus, scilicet per bonorum temporalium erogacionem, et aliam superbus per sui respectu Dei humiliacionem, et hoc fit in ordine et reverentia Dei. Et sic de illo/. 365 370 375 380

67, ff. 89v–89bisv: **Consequenter queritur circa 16am distinctionem \et 17am/ primo utrum contritio, confessio et satisfactio sint partes penitentie; secundo utrum confessio sit de \precepto nature/; tertio utrum confessio sit necessaria ad salutem; quarto utrum quilibet teneatur confiteri quando se sentit esse in peccato mortali.** De prima arguitur quod non. Totum non potest esse sine suis partibus; sed penitentia potest esse sine hiis tribus. Probatio, quia quando peccatum removetur est vere penitentia... Oppositum dicit Magister. **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod illa 3 non sunt partes penitentie ut est virtus... [89bisr] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum sit de precepto nature preventio,** et dico primo quod confessio non solum est ex universali traditione ecclesie... **Ad tertiam questionem** primo videndum quis tenetur ad confessionem... 385 390 395

394 preventio] *lege* confessio

Ad quartam questionem dicit unus doctor qui dicit quod sic. Probat sic: quia querit quare non confitetur... [89bisv] Quia sic ecclesia instituit, Extra, De penitentiis et remissionibus, c. “omnis utriusque sexus”, etc. Et sic de illo.

68, ff. 89bisv–90v: **Circa distinctiones 16 et 17 adhuc queritur primo utrum penitentiam in extremis \facta/ valeat; secundum utrum sacerdos teneatur tenere omnia secreta sibi \in confessione dicta/; tertio \utrum bona facta in gratia postea per culpam deleta reviviscant per penitentiam/; quarta utrum mala preterita redeant \per culpam/.** Ad primam arguitur sic: illa penitentia que fit illo tempore quo peccatum dimittit hominem et non homo peccatum non valet... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod penitentia \facta/ in extremis, si sit vera, valet ad salutem, si non vera, non valet... **Secunda questio est utrum audiens confessiones semper teneatur servare secretum confessionis.** Primo videndum de secreto, secundo de materia eius... [90r] **Tertia questio est utrum mala \bona/ mortificata per culpam redeant per penitentiam.** Dicunt aliqui quod sic. Bona autem facta... [90v] **Quarta questio, utrum mala deleta per penitentiam redeant per culpam commissam.** Dico quod hoc potest intelligi vel quantum ad eadem in numero vel per equivalentiam... mala autem non redeunt per novam culpam, ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

69, ff. 90v–92r: **Consequenter queritur circa 18 \et 19/ distinctiones primo utrum in ecclesia sint claves; secundo utrum quilibet \sacerdos/ equaliter habeat usum earum; tertio utrum per potestatem clavium possit aliquis alium absolvere absque restitutione eius quod abstulit; quarto utrum quilibet teneatur ad restitutionem cuilibet ablati.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia si sic, vel ad aperiendum \regnum celorum/ vel ad claudendum... **Ad primam questionem** dicendum est primo/. Et primo videndum quid sit clavis, et sumitur hic methaphorice ad clavem materiale potentem apperire et est quedam potestas concessa prelati qua potest celum aperiri vel claudi \peccatoribus/... **Secunda questio/ que est utrum quilibet sacerdos \equaliter/ habeat eas claves in ecclesia.** \Et/ pari modo dico quod non de facto, immo valde dissimiliter \et extensive et intensive/; quantum ad extensionem, non quia quilibet non potest quemlibet absolvere nisi in articulo mortis, immo sic **419–420** distinctiones] distinctionem *corr.* **427** clavis] claves *corr.* **433** nisi] non *corr.*

solus summus pontifex habet... **Tertia questio est utrum virtute clavium possit aliquis alium absolvere absque restitutione eius quod abstulit.** Et est notandum quod habere \aliquid/ de alieno supponit [91r] aliquid esse proprium... Multi enim philosophantes posuerunt omnia esse communia, ut Plato et Socrates, II *Politice*. Et ideo alia est opinio {et est Schoti} dicens quod distinctio dominiorum non est de iure nature, sed communitas. Probatio: illud videtur esse de iure nature quod convenit nature institute pro statu innocentie. Sed communitas dominiorum est huiusmodi *ideò* \et/ non distinctio. Ideo etc... [92r] **Quarta questio est utrum,** etc. Dico quod aliquis potest \alteri/ auferre vel bona corporalia vel spiritualia vel bona fame... si autem secrete debet restituere secrete etc. Et sic de illo.

70, ff. 92r–93v: Consequenter circa 20am distinctionem, 21am et 22am queritur \primo/ utrum satisfaciens de pena secundum arbitrium sacerdotis sit liberatus; secundo utrum anime purgentur in purgatorio; tertio utrum indulgentie valeant; quarto utrum tantum valeant quantum sonant. De primo arguitur quod sic, quia sacerdos est medians inter Deum et peccatorem... **Ad primam questionem** videndum de potestate sacerdotis, ad quid se extendat... [92v] Et ideo dicit unus doctor quod duplex est absolutio, scilicet secundum quid et condicionata... [93r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum sit consonum \rationi quod anime purgentur in purgatorio/,** etc., et videndum est primum utrum aliquod peccatum potest dimitti post hanc vitam... Unde secundum doctores antiquos peccatum veniale dimittitur post hanc vitam propter motum meritorium voluntatis; sed dicunt alii quod in alia vita non est motus voluntatis meritorius, quia non est viator... **Ad tertiam questionem de indulgentiis et quantum utrum valeant,** et est notandum quod indulgentia valent ad remissionem pene... [93v] **De quarta, utrum tantum valeant quantum sonant,** dicunt aliqui quod valent solum quod recipiens indulgentias non tenetur facere penas iniunctas in illa vita... Ad secundum quod iste qui recipit sit contritus de peccato et confessus et non sit in mortali.

71, ff. 93v–94v: {De extrema unctione} Consequenter queritur circa 23 et 24 \et 25 distinctiones/. Queritur primo utrum sacramentum extreme unctionis sit necessarium ad salutem; secunda, utrum in ecclesia sint 7 ordines; tertia, utrum episcopus fame] fama *corr.* 22am] 21am *corr.*

depositus possit conferre ordines; quarta, \utrum etas impedi-
 diat susceptionem \ordinis//. De prima arguitur quod non, quia
 sine extrema unctione potest haberi salus, patet, ideo etc... **Ad pri-**
 475 **nam questionem** videndum est primo quid sit illud sacramentum...
 [94r] **Ad secundam questionem circa 24 distinctionem, utrum**
in ecclesia sint 7 ordines, primo videndum quid est ordo, secundum
 utrum sit sacramentum... **Ad tertiam questionem**, dico quod \vel/
 episcopatus est ordo vel non. Si primo modo et imprimatur \in eo/ ca-
 480 **acter**... [94v] **Ad quartam, utrum etas impediatur susceptionem**
ordinis, dico quod sexus impedit a susceptione ordinis, quia Christus
 sic instituit et est congruentia, quia ordo est gradus eminentie in eccle-
 sia... sed requiritur etas cum qua stat usus rationis, votum continentie
 et obligatio voluntaria. (Edited in Appendix F)

72, ff. 94v–95v: {de matrimonio} Consequenter circa 26am distinc-
 485 **tionem queritur primo utrum sacramentum matrimonii sit a**
Deo sit a Deo institutum; secundum utrum sit sacramentum;
tertio queritur utrum cadat sub precepto; quarto utrum sit de
lege nature. De primo arguitur quod non. Illud non est a Deo in-
 stitutum quod necessario habet peccatum annexum – illa patet... **Ad**
 490 **primam questionem** primo videndum quid sit matrimonium, secundo
 utrum licitum... [95r] **Secunda questio est utrum ipsum sit sa-**
cramentum. Et quantum ad hoc ~~dicitur aliqui~~ \dicitur communiter/
 quod sic, et oportet hoc tenere. Sed \secundum aliquos/ non univoce
 cum aliis... {credo tamen prime vie melius quam isti}... [95v] **Ad ter-**
 495 **tiam questionem, \utrum matrimonium cadat sub precepto/,**
 dico primo quod cadit sub precepto... **Ad quartam questionem**, di-
 co matrimonium potest accipi vel pro mutuo consensu et indissolubili
 copula, vel pro coniunctione maris et femine. Dicitur ergo primo quod
 accipiendo matrimonium secundo modo est de dictione legis naturalis in
 500 decretis* naturalis ut conclusio, quia sine eo non habetur bonum prolis,
 familie et civitatis; ideo etc. Ista probata sunt superius; ideo etc.

73, ff. 95v–96v: Consequenter queritur adhuc de 26 distinc-
tionem de matrimonio quantum ad causam materiale, efficientem
et finale. Queritur primo utrum ad matrimonium requiri-
 505 **tur consensus verus utriusque \coniugii/; secundo utrum con-**
sensus sequens apprehensionem errantem \sufficiat ad matri-
monium/; tertio utrum coactus; quarto utrum in matrimonio
sint aliqua bona excludentia \excusantia/ actum maritalem. De

primo arguitur quod non, quia illud non requiritur ad matrimonium. . .

Ad primam questionem primo \notandum/ quod de consensu dupliciter possumus loqui in generali: vel per verba de futuro vel per verba de presenti. . . [96r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum consensus sequens \apprehensionem erroneam faciat matrimonium/,** etc., dico quod error potest intelligi vel in persona vel in condicione persone. . . **Ad tertiam questionem** primo videndum quomodo potest esse consensus coactus; ~~secundo quod~~ consensus \enim/ est actus voluntatis quo libere voluntas consentit alii. . . [96v] **Ad quartam questionem videndum est que sint bona matrimonii** et sunt 3. . . et tunc istum actum ista bona excusant. Et sic de illo.

74, ff. 96v–97r: Consequenter 26 di. \et circa totam materiam de matrimonio/ adhuc queritur primo utrum consanguinitas impediatur matrimonium; secundo utrum affinitas \impediatur/; tertio utrum cognatio spiritualis; quarto utrum legalis. De primo arguitur quod non, quia illud quod est compossibile perfecto matrimonio sed non impedit ipsum. . . **Ad primam questionem** primo quid est consanguinitas est videndum. Et dicitur quod \est/ vinculum personarum ab eadem persona descendentium carnali copula contractum. . . **Ad secundam questionem** primo videndum de affini\ta/te proprie dicta, secundo de publice honestatis iustitia que est large affinitas. . . [97r] **Tertia questio est utrum cognatio spiritualis** etc. \impediatur matrimonium/. Et videndum primo quid sit, et dicitur quod est affinitas \vel proximitas/ contracta inter personas ex amministrazione sacramenti ~~extensione~~ \baptismi vel confirmationis/. . . **Ad quartam questionem.** Et videndum primo quid sit cognatio legalis, et est quedam proximitas contracta ex lege et legislatore. . . quia in statu innocentie illud matrimonium non habuisset rationem sacramenti.

75, ff. 97r–98r: Circa 43 distinctionem, queritur primo utrum resurrectio generalis hominum sit futura divina virtute; secundo utrum possibilis virtute nature; tertio, utrum anime separate reuniantur corporibus; quarto utrum eisdem corporibus. De primo arguitur quod non; Iob 14 homo, *cum dormierit, non resurget donec atteratur celum*. . . **Ad primam questionem** primo videndum de possibili, secundo de facto. Quantum ad primum. . . [97v] **Ad secundam questionem.** Et una est opinio \extrema secundum beatum Augustinum/ 12 *De civitate Dei*, capitulo 13, et dicit \illa opinio/ quod per naturam est possibilis reditio eiusdem effectus. Dicunt enim quod omnia redibunt eodem numero post magnum annum et imponitur Platoni. . .

- [98r] Tertia est opinio dicens quod aliqua possunt redire virtute nature,
 \quia/ manentibus eisdem principiis essentialibus intrinsicis et manente
 550 eadem materia et eodem agente potest redire idem effectus – illa patet;
 sed hoc est possibile de multis, quia \materia potest eadem numero man-
 nere, et forma/. {Istam opinionem dimitto tamquam mihi non sapien-
 tem} VA-Ad illam rationem dicitur quod maior non est vera affirmative,
 sed bene vera negative. Ad istam dico quod, licet Aristoteles non dicat
 555 affirmativam, potest tamen haberi ex suo modo loquendi, et ~~probat~~^{ur}
 quia sicut se habet idemplitas specifica ad idemplitatem specificam, sic
 numeralis ad numeralem; sed ad primam ydemplitatem effectus suffi-
 cit idemplitas materie, forme et efficientis secundum speciem; ideo etc.
^{va}-Secundo sic: aliquod agens \quod/ contineat effectum quem potest
 560 producere in quolibet tempore, \ut in A et in B etc./^{-cat} Secundo vel est
 possibile vel non. Si non simpliciter ergo neque Deus potest; si possibile,
 ergo habetur intentum. Ad rationes in oppositum. Ad primam, quorum
 substantia etc. dico quod hoc potest intelligi vel quantum ad materiam
 vel quantum ad formam, etc. ~~ad rationem primam~~ -CAT
- 565 **76, ff. 98r–99v: Consequenter queritur circa 44 distinctionem
 primo utrum anima rationalis possit se effective reunire corpori
 disposito; secundo utrum resurrectio omnium sit in eodem
 instanti.** De primo arguitur \quod sic:/ ubi est maior inclinatio ibi est
 maior consecutio effective. . . **Ad tertiam questionem precedentem,**
 570 **utrum anime rationales reuniantur corporibus suis in resur-**
rectione, et fuit opinio hereticorum quod non, et quia moriuntur cum
 corporibus, ideo etc. Contra hoc Salvator noster *Nolite timere eos qui*
corpus occidunt, \animam autem occidere non possunt, ideo etc./ etc. . .
Ad quartam questionem, utrum reuniantur eisdem corporibus,
 575 Augustinus ibidem 10 *De civitate* 30 c. quod quidam dicebant quod ani-
 me non reunientur corporibus suis, sed \quibusdam novis corporibus/ a
 Deo creatis; sed illud non videtur rationale, ut patet ibidem, quia de-
 terminata perfectio \magis unitur suo/ determinato perfectibili \quam
 alieno/; ideo etc. **Ad primam questionem hic propositam**, et est
 580 una opinio dicens primo quod inter materiam et formam est realis unio
 \que/ respectus \est/ realis previus composito. . . [99r] **Ad secundam
 questionem, \utrum resurrectio omnium sit in eodem instanti/**,
 et unum hic supponitur \scilicet/ quod omnes resurgent. Et veritas est
 determinata quod sic. . . [99v] alii dicunt quod non et exponunt media
 585 nocte, id est hor incerta, ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

77, ff. 99v–100v: **Consequenter** ⟨circa⟩ **45 distinctionem \et 46/ queritur primo utrum bona hic facta prosint animabus in purgatorio; secundo utrum ignis infernalis sit corporeus; tertio utrum demones ab eo crucientur; quarto utrum corpora dampnatorum patiantur ab eo.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia mala hic facta non nocent eis, ideo non bona eis prosint, ideo etc. . . **Ad primam questionem** est notandum quod mortui et viventes quadruplices sunt: quidam valde boni, quidam valde mali, quidam mediocriter. . . **Ad secundam questionem, et alias duas,** videndum est primo de loco inferni, secundo de igne. . . [100v] Sed per quem modum nescio. Et sic de isto.

78, ff. 100v–102r: **Consequenter circa 47 distinctionem \et 48/ queritur primo utrum sit futurum generale iudicium omnium; secundo utrum Christus iudicabit in forma humana; \tertio utrum mundus sit purgandus igne/; quarta, utrum post iudicium cessabit motus celi.** Ad primam arguitur quod non, quia tunc omnes generaliter iudicarentur, hoc falsum. . . **Ad primam questionem** primo videndum est propositum, secundo utrum sit notum cuilibet cuiuslibet alterius conscientie secretum. . . [101r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum Christus iudicabit in forma humana,** et primo videndum de proposito, secundo utrum in forma gloriosa, tertio utrum ipse sit solus iudicans. . . **Quantum ad tertiam questionem, utrum mundus sit purgandus igne \caliginoso/,** et primo videndum utrum sit purgandus. . . [101v] **Ad questionem quartam** dico primo quod motus celi non est naturalis ~~secundo quod non~~ accipiendo naturale ex parte passivi cuius oppositum est contra naturam. . . patet primo quia est articulus condemnatus. . . [102r] sed solum dicta probabiliter sunt et theologicæ. Et sic de illo.

79, ff. 102r–102bisr: **Consequenter queritur circa 49 distinctionem. Queritur primo utrum natura humana humana natura sit capax beatitudinis; secundo utrum voluntas omnia appetat in ordine ad beatitudinem; tertio utrum homo possit in hac \vita acquirere beatitudinem/; quarto utrum naturaliter homo possit acquirere beatitudinem.** De prima arguitur quod non, quia huius perfectionis natura humana non est capax quam non potest in se naturaliter acquirere. . . **Ad primam questionem** prima conclusio est quod natura humana est capax beatitudinis. . . [102v] **Ad** 593 mediocriter] mediocres *corr.*

secundam questionem, utrum voluntas appetat quicquid appetit in ordine ad beatitudinem, et est notandum quod duplex est
 625 appetitus... \et tunc stante rectitudine rationis voluntas non posset
 oppositum velle, quod est condemnatus articulus/... [102bisr] **Ad**
tertiam questionem est notandum quod ~~duplex~~ est \de/ beatitudi-
 ne \dupliciter possumus loqui:/ vel quantum ad potencias beatificabiles,
 alio modo ut includit ~~omnem~~ omnia bona ~~includens~~... Patet antecedens,
 630 quia mortalitas que non potest esse sine tristitia; ideo etc.

80, ff. 102bisr–103v: Consequenter adhuc circa 49 distinctionem
queritur primo utrum beatitudo sit immediatius in potentia
quam in essentia anime; secundo utrum consistat in operatio-
ne; tertio, utrum in una vel pluribus; quarto utrum intellectus
 635 **vel voluntatis**. De primo arguitur quod in essentia anime, quia nobi-
 liori perfectioni correspondet... **Ad** ~~primam questionem~~ **questionem**
quartam heri remanentem, utrum homo ex naturalibus possit
acquirere beatitudinem, dico primo quod causa quare homo non po-
 test... [102bisv] **Ad primam questionem propositam** videndum est
 640 primo de beatitudine quid est, secundo in quo est immediatius... [103r]
Ad secundam questionem, utrum beatitudo consistat in ope-
ratione, et dicit unus doctor quod operatio potest accipi vel secundum
 se \et/ absolute, vel in quantum exhibitiva obiecti... [103v] secundum
 attingentiam realem obiecti et potentia.

81, ff. 103v–105r: Circa 50 distinctionem primo queritur utrum
 645 **dampnati vid. salvati videant penas dampnatorum; secundo**
utrum pena omnium dampnatorum sit equalis. De prima argui-
 tur quod non, quia, si sic, vel letarentur, quod non... **Ad tertiam**
questionem supra remanentem, utrum beatitudo consistat in
 650 **pluribus operationibus, et ad quartam, utrum principalius**, etc.,
 prima conclusio est quod non consistit in unica \operatione/... [104v]
Ad primam questionem hic propositam et secundam prima con-
 conclusio est quod beati vident penas dampnatorum. Secundo quod de
 penis per se non gaudent. Tertio quod per se non tristantur \de eo-
 655 rum penis. Quarto quod pena dampni non est in dampnis equalis/...
 [105r] secundum eundem gradum attingentie; ideo etc. Et sic de illo.
 \Expliciunt questiones quarti libri Sententiarum/.

627–628 beatitudine] beatitudo *corr.*

BOOK II

P2a, ff. 105r–106r: {Principium bacalarii minorum super 2m librum}
Circa secundum librum queritur primo utrum divina voluntas
aliquo modo ab essentia divina distincta sit immediatum prin-
cipium alicuius productivum. Et arguitur quod non, quia neque
 nostra... [106r] **Quantum ad secundum**, scilicet quod humana vo- 5
 luntas est aliquo modo non idem cum essentia anime \videbitur alias/.
 \Θ Vide residuum in sequenti sexterno in penultimo et ultimo folio, ubi
 simile signum ponitur/. (Edited in Appendix B)

P2b, ff. 117v–118v: {Ista questio continuatur cum questione precedentis
 sexterni in ultimo folio, ubi ponitur tale signum Θ} **Circa secundum** 10
articulum, scilicet quod voluntas distincta est \ex natura rei/
ab essentia anime in creaturis, ratio prima erat illa: operationes
 essentialem ordinem ad se invicem habentes... [118v] sed quod est extra
 primum modum dicendi per se, ut dictum est. Et sic de illo. (Edited in
 Appendix B) 15

82, ff. 107r–v: **Circa primam distinctionem secundi libri *Senten-***
tiarum, primo queritur utrum creatio sit possibilis; secundo
 utrum sit de totaliter nichilo; tertio utrum omnia sint creata
 a Deo; quarto utrum creatio sit medium inter Deum et crea-
 turam. De prima dicitur \quod non/ quia, si sic, esset transitus de 20
 contradictorio in contradictorium sine mutacione... **Ad primam ques-**
tionem dico primo quod creatio non includit contradictionem... **Ad**
secundam questionem dico primo quod creatio est productio totalis
 rei quantum ad totale esse suum. Secundo quod est de nichilo... [107v]
Ad tertiam questionem et potest intelligi utrum hoc potest intelligi 25
 \possit probari/ philosophice \et de hoc nichil ad presens/, secundo
 modo utrum de facto sit ita factum. Dico quod hoc potest intelligi vel
 secundum esse numerale, et sic non, quia multa sunt creabilia, vel se-
 cundum esse specificum, et sic omnia creata sunt, ut patet in Scriptura
 Sacra, Gen. primo, *In principio Deus creavit celum et terram*, etc. 30

83, ff. 107v–108v: **Consequenter queritur circa 2am distinctio-**
nem primo utrum productio angeli de necessitate presuppo-
nat productionem personarum \divinarum/ ad intra; secun-
do utrum illa productio angeli in esse intellecto \presupponat
32–33 presupponat] pro-supponat *cod.*

35 **realem productionem personarum divinarum ad intra/; tertio
utrum respectus creature ad Deum sit realiter creatura; quarto
utrum creatio sit medium inter Deum creantem et creaturam.**

De prima arguitur quod non, quia sicut principium operationis \vel productionis/ ad principium, ita productio ad productionem... **Ad quartam questionem que est \fuit/ supra dimissa, utrum creatio sit medium,** etc., primo videndum de intellectu questionis... [108r] Et sic de prima questione, que erat ultima \inter questiones hic propositas/. **Ad primam hic propositam, et ad secundam, que erat utrum productio angeli in esse intellectu presupponat realem productionem personarum divinam ad intra,** prima conclusio est quod productio extrinseca omnium creaturarum presupponit productionem personarum divinarum ad intra/... [108v] quia principium creaturarum non est in dispositione ad productionem nisi ut stat sub productione personarum divinarum ad intra; ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

50 **84, ff. 108v–110r: Consequenter adhuc circa 2am distinctionem queritur primo utrum angelus post suam creationem indigeat conservatione divina; secundo utrum creatio et conservatio eius sint idem; tertio (*spat. vac.*); quarto utrum relatio angeli ad Deum creantem sit idem cum angelo.** Ad quartam arguitur sic
55 quod non. Que distinguuntur genere non sunt idem... [109r] **Ad quartam questionem respondetur primo** et est notandum quod ille respectus dupliciter potest accipi: quidam enim se habet per modum actus secundi... [110r] Ad aliam dico quod illa ~~dependencia~~ \inherencia/ dependet eadem dependentia qua entia absoluta dependent; ideo etc. Et
60 sic de illo.

85, ff. 110r–110v: Ad primam questionem \supra propositam, utrum angelus \vel creatura/ post suam creationem indigeat continuatione divina/, dico quod sic, quia cause intrinsece non continent causalitatem cause efficientis prime; sed hoc necessario requiritur
65 si \effectus conservari debetur per causas intrinsecas/... ~~Ad 3am.~~ **Ad 2am questionem, utrum conservatio et creatio sint idem,** et est notandum quod \creatio et conservatio/ dupliciter capiuntur... [110v] **Ad tertiam questionem,** dico quod est alia habitudo Dei ~~ad creaturam~~ et creature ad Deum \ut ad causam efficientem et alia ut ad causam finalem. Ratio, quia ille relationes distinguuntur que habent distinctos terminos; sed ita est de istis duobus habitudinibus/, ~~dico quod sic~~ quia
70 **44** presupponat] prosupponat *cod.* **66** 2am] 3am *corr.*

Deus terminat dependentiam creature in ratione efficientis ratione essentie, sed in ratione finis \sub ratione bonitatis/. Item, quia ex una non necessario infertur alia evidenter, quia ex ratione finis non infertur necessario habitudo efficientis, ideo ille habitudines sunt alie et alie in Deo; 75 ideo etc. Unde multi dixerunt in Deo esse causam\litatem/ finalem, sed non efficientem.

86, ff. 110v–111v: Consequenter \adhuc/ queritur circa 2am distinctionem primo utrum Deus potuerit angelum creare ab eterno; secundo utrum homines; tertio utrum hominem motum ab eterno; quartum utrum tunc universum ab eterno. De primo arguitur quod sic Deus potuit angelum creare in tempore, ideo etc. Consequentia, quia eque potens est ad utrumque. Oppositum, quod non potest esse infinitum in duratione non potest esse eternum – illa patet; 80 sed angelus est huiusmodi. Maior probatur, quia quod est factum habet principium durationis; sed angelus est factus. Maior patet ex ratione Mellissi in I *Physicorum*: quia non esse factum ~~non~~ arguit non habere principium durationis, ideo et esse factum arguit habere principium durationis; ideo etc. Minor patet similiter, ideo etc. Secundum Aristotelem quedam sunt problemata que sunt de neutro modo opinandi, ut 90 est eternitas mundi, et ideo sic procedam, quod primo recitabo rationes pro una parte, secundo pro alia, tertio respondebo ad omnes. Quantum ad primum ostendam quod mundus potuit esse ab eterno... [111r] alii tenent oppositum, dicens quod non potest aliqua creatura esse ab eterno... Quantum ad tertium, respondeo ad omnes illas rationes. Ad 95 primam prime vie... [111v] Similiter ad alias rationes. Ad primam... et sic Deus posset creare mundum ab eterno, tamen non stellam vel hominem, vel aliquid aliud, etc.

87, ff. 111v–112v: Consequenter queritur circa 3am distinctionem. Primo queritur utrum angelus et anima distinguantur specie; secundo utrum in existentiali \existencia/ angeli sit aliqua mensura; tertio de evo, \utrum distinguatur realiter ab eviterno/; quarto de tempore, utrum sit aliquid extra animam. De primo arguitur quod non, quia operationes angeli et anime non distinguuntur... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod ratio distinctionis specifice non est unibilitas vel non inter angelum et animam... [112r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum in existencia angeli sit successio formaliter**, et circa hoc est opinio una probabilis quod in existencia angeli est formaliter successio... [112v] **Ad tertiam** 105

110 **questionem, utrum evum distinguitur realiter ab eviterno**, prima conclusio est quod evum non est formaliter duracio... Et per hoc patent & solutiones ad argumenta, \quia capiendo duracionem pro eo quod principaliter signat non est nisi substantia angeli; sed capiendo denominationem extrinsecam comparatur tempori/.

115 **88, ff. 113r–114r: Consequenter adhuc circa tertiam distinctionem primo queritur ~~utrum~~ de tempore, utrum \h/abeat esse extra animam**, que fuit supra proposita. Et est notandum quod secundum Commentatorem IV *Physicorum* de illis quorum esse est latens primo videndum est quid sunt, secundo si sunt et quomodo sunt; et secundum Augustinum temporis esse est latens. Et ideo primo videndum
120 est quid est tempus, et quale esse habet; secundo utrum sit ens in anima vel extra. Quantum ad primum... [114r] et numerus ibi accipitur pro numero numerato.

89, ff. 114r–v: Circa 4am distinctionem queritur primo utrum
125 **angeli sint in loco; secundo <utrum> possint se movere localiter in loco; tertio utrum plures \sint/ sub eadem specie; quarto utrum tales sint hodie quales creati sunt**. De primo arguitur quod non, quia substantie immateriales non sunt in loco... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod \angelus/ non est in loco circumscriptive. Secundo quod est ibi vere diffinitive... Secunda conclusio est quod angelus est in loco vere diffinitive. Probatio: illud est in loco diffinitive quod loco diffinitur \et determinatur/– illa patet primo *Sententiarum*, di. 37; sed angelus est huiusmodi... **Ad secundam questionem**, et videndum est primo si aliquis se possit movere localiter; secundo propositum... [114v] **Ad secundum articulum** dico quod angelus potest se
130 movere, quia minus videtur de gravibus hoc, et tamen est, ideo etc.

90, ff. 114v–116r: Ad tertiam questionem, utrum possint esse plures angeli solo numero differentes sub eadem specie, et videndum sunt tria. Primo utrum possit probari esse plures \angelos/...
140 [116r] **Ad quartam questionem, utrum \angeli/ sint hodie \tales/ quales fuerint creati**, dico primo quod nec mali sunt creati in culpa nec boni in gratia... mali autem erant in miseria in illa quarta mora, ideo etc. Et sic de istis.

121 secundo] tertio *corr.* 125 secundo] secundum *corr.*

91, ff. 116r–117r: **Consequenter circa 5am \et circa 6am/ distinctionem primo queritur utrum angelus potuit peccare; secundo utrum in primo instanti sue creationis; tertio utrum primum peccatum fuerit superbia; quarto utrum primus malus fuerit de supremo ordine.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia angelus est perfectior celo... [116v] **Ad primam questionem** \primo dico/ quod ad hoc quod angelus peccaverit non est necesse \errorem precedere in intellectu/... Primum probatur, et tamen unus doctor dicit quod ~~omnis~~ omnem maliciam \in affectu/ precedit error \in intellectu/; sed duplex est notitia, \scilicet/ enunciativa, ut est sillogismi pratici, alia imperativa qua intellectus vel ratio \et voluntas/ imperat aliquid esse faciendum... **Ad secundam questionem** est opinio dicens quod non. Prima ratio: primus actus ~~creature~~ nature imputatur ~~creandi~~ \producenti naturam/; sed ~~privationis~~ actus \primum peccatum/ creature non potuit imputari de Deo... [117r] **Ad quartam questionem, dimissa pro nunc tertia**, dicunt aliqui antiqui primo de quolibet ordine ceciderunt aliqui angeli. Ratio, quia ad quemlibet ordinem assumuntur electi; sed hoc non esset, nisi etc. Sed secundum Hugonem hec non fuit precisa causa creationis ~~angelorum~~ hominum; \ymmo, si angeli non cecidisset, adhuc Deus homines creasset/. Secunda conclusio, quod Lucifer fuit de supremo ordine. Secundum Gregorium ipse est principium viarum Dei. Tertia conclusio, quod non omnes sunt decursi in infernum, sed habitantes in aere usque ad diem iudicii. Sed tunc retruduntur ad infernum. Sed Lucifer et aliqui alii sunt iam ad infernum decursi.

92 (apograph), ff. 117r, 118v–119v: **Circa 7am distinctionem, cum questione tertia demissa de 6a, queritur primo utrum angeli potuerint appetere divinam equalitatem; secundo utrum angeli mali sint obstinati; tertio quid sit causa obstinacionis.** Ad primam arguitur quod sic. Ysaie 14: *in celum ascendam super astra exaltabo solium meum*... **Ad questionem tertiam distinctionis 6e dimissam, scilicet utrum primum peccatum angeli fuerit superbia**, duo videnda sunt: primum erit de malicia angeli; secundum erit ad quod peccatum reducatur illa malitia... [119r] **Secunda questio est utrum angelus potuit appetere equalitatem Dei.** Circa quam primo videndum est de facto, secundo de possibili... [119v] nec directe nec indirecte capiendo electionem secundo modo, ideo etc. Et sic de illo. \Hic nichil deficit/.¹

¹The last half-page of 119v is blank.

93, ff. 120r–v: **Consequenter queritur circa 8am \distinctionem/ primo utrum angeli habeant corpora sibi naturaliter unita; secundum utrum \habeant/ voluntarie assumpta.** De prima arguitur \quod sic/. Apulleus *De deis Sacratiss* dicens demones sunt animalia
 185 mente passiva corpore aerea, etc. Ideo etc. . . **Ad questionem tertiam supra propositam, scilicet utrum angeli mali sint obstinati**, [et] \et ad quartam de causa obstinacionis/ \circa hoc/ videndum est primo utrum omnis actus mali angeli sit malus. . . [120v] Ad rationes. Ad primam respondet unus doctor illud quod inducunt, etc., duplex est
 190 potentia: quedam habens finitum conatum, et sic finitum obiectum, ut potentia motiva obiecti, alia que non habet limitem obiecti, licet ipsa \in se/ sit finita, et talis est voluntas, quia totum ens est obiectum suum. . . Aliter dicit unus doctor quod una libertas est in nobis est essentialis et respicit agere et non agere precise, alia accidentalis, quia respicit agere
 195 tale vel tale. . . Quarta conclusio est quid sit causa, et dicit unus doctor quod est manutenentia divina eius in actu malo. Illud non videtur esse necessarium, quia esset miraculum, et ideo dico quod illa non est positiva sed privativa. Unde, quia Deus non coagit angelo malo ad actum bonum, ideo neque potest facere ~~angelum~~ \actum bonum/ ~~malum~~, et
 200 quia se privavit libertate agendi actum bonum. Et sic de illo.

94, ff. 121r–122r: ~~Consequenter queritur circa 8am.~~ **Ad primam questionem 8e distinctionis superius motam, utrum angeli habeant sibi corpora naturaliter unita**, et primo videndum est de facto, secundo de possibili. . . Si autem capiatur forma secundo modo, [121v] sic
 205 doctor primus \dicit/ quod neque angelus potest esse forma materie, quia quecumque talis unio forme cum materia est mutua dependentia. . . **Ad secundam questionem, utrum angeli habeant corpora vel possit habere voluntarie assumpta**, et primo videndum utrum possint assumere, secundo que sit illa assumptio. . . [122r] et potentia executiva in angelis distincta ab intellectu et voluntate eius exercet illas
 210 operationes.

95, ff. 122r–v: **Circa 9am distinctionem queritur primo utrum in angelis sit ordo; secundo utrum distinctio ordinum; tertio utrum angeli possint scire cogitationes nostras; quarto utrum nostras volitiones.** De prima arguitur quod non, quia secundum Augustinum ordo est eorum in quibus est distinctio locorum. . . **Ad primas duas questiones** videndum primo est quid est yerarchia et ordo. . .
 215
 200 libertate] libera *corr.* 201 8am] 9am *corr.* 203 naturaliter] naturalia *corr.*

Ad tertiam et quartam, loquendo de facto dicitur quod non. Ratio: quia in Sacra Scriptura expressum est quod angeli non cognoscunt cogitationes... [122v] Nec hoc non cognoscere non est miraculum, sed Deus sic statuit. Et sic de illo. 220

96, ff. 123r–124r: **Consequenter \adhuc/ queritur circa 9am distinctionem. Primo queritur utrum angelus alteri possit loqui; secundo utrum in ipso cui loquitur aliquid causet; tertio utrum unus alium possit illuminare; quarto utrum \inferior possit illuminare superiorem/ superior-inferiorem.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia, si poneretur, frustra poneretur, ideo non est ponenda... **Ad primas duas questiones dicendum est simul.** Prima questio solvitur, quia ita est de facto. \Ratio:/ quia quod est perfectionis... Quantum ad modum loquendi dicit \predictus doctor/ quod angelus loquendo alteri causat in eo aliquod obiectum intelligi\bile/ non permanens, sed in esse fluxibile sicut etiam quando unus homo alteri loquitur... [123v] Ad primum, dico quod non deficit in proposito in quo assumit, neque in generali. Dico quod ratio ~~videtur~~ \fit/ contra Doctorem qui ponit actionem in agente. Modo dico quando dicitur agens etc., dico quod non\ nisi/ ut producibilem in se continet effectum agens ~~sed ut producibilem in alio;~~ actio autem non est producibilis, sed est quo alterum producitur; ideo, etc. Et ideo dico aliter secundum doctorem quem magis intelligo et propositio sua est illa: quod angelus loquens alteri causat immediate actum intelligendi illius rei quem concipit \in ipso/. Ratio: loquens alteri immediate imprimit quod primo intendit, si potest... Et ideo illa ratio non currit contra Doctorem. Intellectio autem, cum sit qualitas, bene habet rationem effectus producibilis, non sic de actione. Ad secundum, pupilla unius, etc., verum est. Et quando dicis ‘potest causare speciem in alio, ergo in se’, respondeo: dico quod propositio Doctoris est vera generaliter; esse tamen aliqua eiusdem rationis est dupliciter: vel per comparisonem ad formam quam recipiunt vel ad agens in quo recipi\unt/, et si utroque modo, tunc propositio semper est vera... [124r] Unde non est ibi talis prioritas neque duplicitas forme, ideo etc. 225 230 235 240 245

97, ff. 124r–v: **Consequenter circa 10 distinctionem \et 11am/ queritur primo utrum angeli mittantur a Deo; secundo utrum homines ab angelis custodiantur.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia ille frustra mittit nuncios qui presens est ubique... **Ad questionem** 250

233–234 generali] generale *corr.*

tertiam supra motam, utrum angelus unus possit alium illuminare, et \primo/ videndum penes quid sumuntur actus yerarchichi, scilicet illuminare, purgare et perficere. . . [124v] **Ad quartam, utrum inferior \angelus/ superiorem possit illuminare**, dicitur quod non propter essentialem ordinem, quia angeli sunt ordinati secundum superius et inferius. Sed de possibili non est repugnantia, quia Deus potest
 255
 260 revelare sibi notum alicui de infimo ordine, non revelato superiori, ideo etc. Et hoc non videtur esse contradictio. Unde, licet de lege communi sic non fiat, tamen de possibili potest, ideo etc. **Ad primam questionem \hic/ propositam**, dico \primo/ quod \angeli/ mittuntur a Deo; secundo quod omnes; tertio \quod nihil perit de beatitudine eorum ex tali missione/. . . **Ad secundam questionem, utrum angeli sint deputate \ad custodiam hominum/**, etc., prima conclusio est quod sic; secundo quod \non/ fuerunt \aliqui deputati custodie Christi/; tertia quod \aliquis erit deputatus custodie/ et Antichristi; quarta quod non dimittunt hominem propter peccata. . . licet non possunt eos
 265
 270 reducere ad bonum sed expectant gratiam Dei.

98, ff. 125r–126r: Consequenter circa 12am distinctionem primo queritur utrum materia sit natura pure potentialis; secundo utrum distinguitur realiter a forma; tertio utrum per quamcumque potentiam possit fieri sine forma; quarto utrum sit eiusdem rationis ubicumque sit. De primo arguitur quod sic, quia
 275 quando aliqua duo sunt extrema contradictionis unius. . . **Ad primam questionem dico** primo quod materia est ens rationale vere positivum. . . [125v] Secunda conclusio probatur, et dicit unus doctor oppositum, ut sibi imponitur. . . sed quantum mihi apparet illa conclusio
 280 non est contra doctorem secundum distinctionem supra positam, quia solum probat quod non est natura determinata determinate speciei; est tamen natura determinata in genere entis. [126r] Quarta conclusio probatur, quia est natura potentialis de genere substantie ordinata ad actum simpliciter, scilicet substantialem; ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

99, ff. 126r–127r: Ad secundam questionem et aliarum duarum solutionem primo dico quod entitas materie est realiter distincta ab entitate forme; secundo quod Deus entitatem materie potest deus facere sine forma; tertio quod materia, ubicumque est, est eiusdem rationis secundum se. . . [127r] Modo primo modo capitur in celo, sed secundo
 285
 290 modo non. Et sic de illo.

100, ff. 127r-v: **Consequenter queritur circa 13am \et 14am/ distinctionem. Queritur primo utrum lux sit \corpus/ ~~forma~~ corporalis; secundo, utrum lumen sit realiter in medio; tertio de luce creata prima die, utrum fuerit solaris; quarto utrum suo motu \causaverit/ esset diem et noctem.** De primo arguitur quod sic, quia ei conveniunt proprietates corporis; ideo est corpus... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod lux est forma realis; secundo quod non est forma substantialis... [127v] **Ad secundam questionem** ~~dicō~~ ~~primo~~ primo videndum si lumen educitur per de potentia medii, secundo utrum sit multiplicabile in instanti. \Tertio utrum lumen in medio habeat esse reale vel intentionale/. Quantum ad primum dicunt aliqui quod lumen \est/ effectus lucis in medio et non est nisi per multiplicationem speciei in medio \ita quod non educitur de potentia medii/. Sed contra arguitur... \Quantum ad secundum, de multiplicatione eius in medio/, ~~Sed~~ dicunt perspectivi quod multiplicatur in tempore \im/perceptibili; sed tenet Aristoteles quod in instanti, quia, \si in tempore/, tunc ~~non~~ lateret nos per tantum spatium. Et secundo sic: \ratio est illa: agens continens sufficienter effectum in virtute potest inducere effectum in instanti in subiectum in quo nulla est indispositio, ymmo est summe dispositum ad ipsum recipiendum. Illa patet de se/ ^{va-}quia agens ~~hæc~~ ~~non~~ est sufficienter continens lucem et medium est in ultimata dispositione potest effectum inducere in instanti^{-cat}; sed corpus luminosum est huiusmodi et medium non est indispositum; ideo etc... **Ad tertiam et quartam questionem simul**, dicitur quod lux solaris non fuit prima lux, quia dicitur in Gen. primo quod quarta die fuit facta, sed secundum aliquos illa lux non fuit nisi natura angelica; sed secundum sensum literalem non sic... Potest etiam teneri quod sol fuit creatus de ex illa nubecula, neque ex hoc generabilis vel corruptibilis esset sol. Et sic de illo.

101, ff. 127v-128v: **Consequenter queritur circa dictam materiam primo utrum celum sit substantia simplex vel \com/posita; secundo utrum \sit compositum ex corpore et anima/ ~~ex corpore et anima~~; tertio circa 15 distinctionem utrum elementa maneant in mixto formaliter; quarto, dato quod non, utrum aliquo modo maneant ibi.** De prima arguitur quod sit simplex, quia quanto aliquid est superius, tanto simplicius; sed celum ordinatur super omnia elementa; ideo etc... **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod celum non est substantia spiritualis, sed corporalis. Secundo quod est substantia corporea alterius rationis a mixta et elementari. Tertia quod

330 est compositum ex substantia et accidente. Quarto quod est substantia
composita vere ex materia et forma. . . [128v] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum sit compositum ex corpore et anima**, celum componi
sic est dupliciter: vel sic \quod/ ex ipsa natura celi et intelligentia fiat
per se unum, ut ex anima et corpore, vel quia intelligentia est causa
335 posteriorum perfectionum in eo. . . Ad tertium dico quod isti effectus
reducuntur non in celum sed in aliam causam superiorem, ideo etc. Et
sic de illo.

102, ff. 128v–129v: Ad tertiam questionem, utrum elementa manent in mixto realiter secundum suas formas et ad quartam.
340 Et primo videndum est de hoc secundum doctores et philosophos; secundo quid veritatis in istis continetur. . . [129v] Sed hic est difficultas: quomodo elementa manent in mixto, et ideo quantum ad secundum articulum \hic videndum est/.

103, ff. 129v–130v: Circa 16, 17 et 18 distinctiones queritur primo utrum homo sit creatus ad ymaginem Dei; secundo utrum anima rationalis sit forma \substantialis/ hominis; tertio utrum sit immortalis; quarto utrum in Adam et Eva sit una anima. De primo arguitur quod non; ymaginis et ymaginati est aliqua
345 proportio – illa patet. . . **Ad secundum articulum de precedenti questione remanentem, scilicet quid sit de dictis opinionibus verum**, ut videtur mihi, et dico primo quod miscibilia non possunt esse
in mixto salvis suis essentiis cum remissione qualitatum. Probatio. . .
[130v] Ad alias rationes alterius doctoris, elementa sunt in mixto in
potentia propinqua, etc., dico quod non sequitur. . . sed secundo modo
355 capiendi fundamentum, quia miscibilia manent unita in suo effectui, sicut dictum est. Et sic de illo.

104, ff. 131r–132r: Ad primam questionem heri propositam, utrum homo sit creatus ad ymaginem Dei. Et primo videndum quid sit ymago, et est similitudo producta alicuius perfecti ducens
360 \expresse/ in cognitionem ymaginati. . . **Ad secundam questionem, utrum anima rationalis sit forma hominis**, videndum est primo quid sit secundum Philosophum, secundo quid secundum veritatem et fidem. . . [132r] Et hoc tenendum est inconcusse secundum fidem et veritatem.

355 suo] suis *corr.*

105, ff. 132r–133r: **Consequenter circa 19 distinctionem \et 20/ queritur primo utrum Adam in statu innocencie, si stetisset, fuisset incorruptibilis; secundo, utrum in Paradiso potuisset perpetuo vivere; tertio, utrum filii generati fuissent cum originali iustitia; quarto utrum soli electi \fuissent tunc nati/.** De prima questione arguitur quod non, si quia in eo \non/ fuisset causa corruptionis, quia mors \est causa corruptionis/ et illa ibi non fuisset, quia nec peccatum neque culpa... **Ad primam questionem.** Et videndum primo de incorruptibilitate anime \rationalis/, secundo de incorruptibilitate corporis, tertio de proposito... et ideo secundum unum doctorem ~~scilicet quod~~ Aristoteles et Commentator dicunt contradictoria in diversis libris, et hoc non videtur inconveniens, quia hoc etiam dixerunt katholici doctores... et ideo dicunt aliqui quod non potest probari demonstrative \animam rationalem esse incorruptibilem/... sed alii dicunt oppositum, quod potest demonstrative probari, licet non demonstratione potissima... [132v] Sed ego teneo conclusionem quod anima rationalis est incorruptibilis per naturam. Utrum possit demonstrari, non credo. Ad rationes ergo ad primam... [133r] Tertia est quod non potuisset perpetuo vivere, quia in illo statu fuisset debilitatio, quia actio et passio naturalis et omne agens naturale agendo patitur, et passio \ista non fuisset/ ~~non~~ afflictiva, sed passio alterativa et obiectiva. Et exponitur ‘in eternum’: id est prolixissimo tempore vixissent, non simpliciter.

106, ff. 133r–134v: **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum stante statu innocentie fuissent parvuli nati cum originali iustitia; quarta, utrum tunc fuissent soli electi nati et non reprobi.** Prima conclusio est quod in statu innocentie fuisset propagatio filiorum sicut modo. Ratio: unius nature secundum speciem est unus modus multiplicationis secundum speciem... **Alia questio erat \mota/ secunda: utrum in Adam et Eva fuisset una anima.** Et hoc intelligitur vel quod una secundum numerum vel secundum speciem... [133v] Et dicunt aliqui quod \naturam specificam habere unitatem specificam est dupliciter, quia/ una est unitas privativa, quia sibi propriam nihil habet; alia est positiva, que est alicuius existentis in re, quod habet sibi propriam. Modo dicit unus doctor quod Doctor Subtilis solum probat materiam specificam esse unam unitate privative, et ideo ipse probat quod habet etiam unitatem positivam extra animam... {Nota} Alius doctor facit talem rationem: in omni consequentia necessaria \inconvertibili/, si antecedens est ex natura rei, et consequens – illa patet... {Nota rationes

Scoti}... [134v] Quantum ad secundum articulum patet ~~illa~~ ex dicto,
 405 \videlicet utrum in Adam et Eva fuerit una anima secundum speciem,
 et dicendum est quod sic, ut in precedenti articulo patet. Et sic de illo/.

107, ff. 134v–135v: **Consequenter circa queritur circa 21 distinctionem et 22am et 23am primo utrum dyabolus fuerit motus ad temptandum primos parentes ex invidia; secundo utrum primum peccatum fuerit gravissimum; tertio utrum Deus potuit facere creaturam impeccabilem; quarto \utrum/ fuerit congruum quod Deus hominem permetteret temptari.** De primo arguitur quod non. Invidia non est nisi respectu boni possibilis haberi ab eo ~~qui~~ \cui/ invidetur... **Ad primam questionem, utrum dyabolus,** etc., et videndum primo quid sit invidia; secundo utrum sit grave peccatum; et tertio de principali... **Secunda questio erat utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit gravissimum.** Prima conclusio quod peccatum primorum parentum fuit mortale... [135r] **Ad tertiam, utrum Deus possit,** etc. dicunt doctores quod non. Rationes assignantur, prima talis: omnis creatura que non est sua regula potest deficere et peccare... [135v] **Ad quartam questionem, utrum fuerit congruum quod Deus permetteret hominem temptari,** {utrum vellet obedire sibi} dicitur quod ~~non~~ \sic/, quia congruum est quod superior experietur de inferiori, datis tamen sibi quibus poterat
 415 ~~resta~~ restituere; sed ita erat de homine ad Deum. Item, propter hoc congruum fuit ut suum premium, si stetisset et restitisset ipsi temptationi, maius et gloriosius fuisset; ideo etc.

108, ff. 135v–136r: **Consequenter queritur circa 24am, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29am distinctiones. Primo queritur utrum in nobis portio superior \et inferior/ sit una potentia vel plures; secundo utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia simplex; tertio utrum homo sine gratia possit vitare peccatum mortale; quarto utrum iustitia originalis sit donum supernaturale.** De primo arguitur quod distincte potentie distinguuntur per actus, et actus per
 435 obiecta... **Ad primam questionem,** et est notandum quod potest dupliciter intelligi, ~~questio~~ vel quod portio superior sit una potentia tantum et inferior una tantum, et queritur utrum sint eadem inter se; sed hoc est falsum secundum Augustinum 12 *De Trinitate*... Secunda conclusio probatur, et tamen unus doctor hoc dicit quod superior est circa eterna,

424 experietur] experietur *corr.* quibus] que *corr.* 425 restituere] *p.c., lege* resistere 426 restitisset] *lege* resistisset

inferior est circa temporalia, ~~primum~~ \superior/ circa vitam contemplativam, inferior circa agibilia... **Ad secundam questionem, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia simplex**, primo dico quod ~~ad~~ liberum arbitrium non est ~~sillogismus~~ solus intellectus... Tertia conclusio probatur [136r] et tamen unus doctor hoc ponit, ratio: ~~\sua est quia/~~ illud non est liberum \arbitrium/ quo posito excluditur libertas, sed posita tali proprietate ex complexione voluntatis et intellectus est huiusmodi, \id est excluditur libertas/ – patet, quia sunt entia in se naturalia sicut et alie res naturales... sed intellectus et voluntas que non sunt una sola potentia.

109, ff. 136r–v: **Consequenter queritur \circa/ 30, 31, 32, 33 distinctiones. Queritur primo utrum homines naturaliter propagati ab Adam habeant peccatum originale; secunda, utrum illud peccatum naturaliter transfundatur per actum propagationis; tertio utrum debeatur per baptismum; quarto utrum \illa culpa originalis sit in omnibus equalis/**. De prima arguitur quod non, quia peccatum omne est voluntarium; sed illud non est huiusmodi. Oppositum per Apostolum *per peccatum mors \intravit/*; ideo etc. **Ad tertiam questionem supra dimissam, utrum liberum arbitrium**, etc. Et videndum est primo de gratia in se. Secundo de eius necessitate. Quantum ad primum dico primo quod gratia est qualitas positiva \absoluta/ existens in anima... Tertia conclusio probatur, et tamen dicit unus doctor quod est eadem virtus cum omnibus virtutibus theologicis sicut et in corporalibus ~~p~~ integritas virtutum corporalium dicitur gratia corporalis, sic et spiritualium virtutum \integritas/ etc... [136v] **Ad quartam questionem, utrum iustitia originalis \fuerit donum supernaturale/**, etc., primo dico quod homo non fuit creatus in gratia gratum faciente... **Ad primam questionem nunc propositam et ad secundam**, et ~~die~~ primo videndum quid sit peccatum originale. Quantum ad hoc secundum Anselmum peccatum originale \non est/ nisi nuditas iustitie originalis \debitae inesse/ per inobedientiam Ade, per quam omnes nascimur filii ire, et sic privatio est formale in illo peccato... **Ad tertiam questionem**, de hoc visum est **in 40**, dicendo quod sic, quia homo efficitur per baptismum non debitor culpe originalis; sed fit debitor gratie, et tenetur ad eam. Et confirmatur, ~~p~~ quia per baptismum datur aliquid impossibile iustitie \culpe/ originali, ideo etc. **Ad quartam questionem, utrum \illa gratia/ sit**

462 eadem] eiusdem *corr.* **464** spiritualium virtutum] spirituales virtutes *corr.*

equalis in omnibus habentibus eam, dico quod hoc potest intelligi quantum ad essentiam ~~est~~ sit equalis in omnibus – et sic dicitur quod sic – ~~et~~ vel quantum ad sequelas – et sic non de omni sequela, sed so-
 480 lum de directa sequela, que est concupiscentia cuius frenum erat iustitia originalis, sed tamen illa est maior in aliquibus, in aliis minor, et etiam quia diversi habent inclinationes ad diversa peccata.

110, ff. 136v–138r: **Consequenter queritur circa 34 et sequentes primo utrum peccatum dicat aliquid positivum; secundo utrum**
 485 **bonum sit causa mali; tertio utrum peccatum sit pena peccati; quarto utrum sit a nobis totaliter.** De primo arguitur quod sic positivum formaliter, quia eius diffinitio est positiva, quia secundum Augustinum... [137r] **Ad primam questionem** est notandum quod peccatum, defectus, malum et culpa differunt, quia defectus est carentia
 490 cuiuscumque perfectionis sive debite inesse vel non, et sic omne creatum citra Deum dicitur defectuosum... **Secunda questio erat que est utrum bonum sit causa peccati.** Primo videndum sie si peccatum sit causa peccati... [137v] **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum peccatum sit pena peccati**, et est notandum quod aliquid \potest intelligi/
 495 esse pena alterius \multipliciter/: primo \enim/ per modum privationis, quia privat aliquid sibi conveniens... **Ad quartam questionem, utrum peccatum sit totaliter a voluntate, et non a Deo.** Illa questio difficultatem habet, supposito quod Deus concurrat ad omnem actum secundum, quia est causa volitiva illius actus positivi, difficile est
 500 quod non peccati... [138r] Sed tamen **Doctor \noster/** tenet quod Deus concurrit cum voluntate \ad causationem actus/, quia, si non, tunc non posset impedire voluntatem ab actu nisi violentando, quod non est verum, ideo etc... Ad aliud dico quod non est ibi antecessio neque posteritas temporalis, ideo etc.

111, ff. 138r–139r: **Consequenter circa peccatum actuale queritur primo \utrum/ intendere sit actus voluntatis \vel intellectus/; secundo utrum sit actus humanus indifferenter \se habens ad hoc quod sit bonus vel malus/; tertio utrum \con/scientia sit in intellectu vel voluntate; quarto utrum sinderesis sit ac-**
 510 **tus voluntatis vel intellectus.** De primo arguitur quod ~~voluntatis~~ \intellectus/, quia Math. 6: *Si oculus tuus*, \glosse:/ id est intentio \tua/ lucida fuerit etc.; \ille autem oculus intellectus est; ideo etc./ Oppositum: quia Magister dicit quod est actus voluntatis, ideo etc.

477 equalis] equales *corr.* **487** sic] dicit *corr.*

Ad primam questionem primo videndum quid sit intentio; secundo de principali; tertio si ex intentione finis actus dicatur bonus... **Ad secundam questionem, utrum sit aliquis actus humanus indifferens ad maliciam et bonitatem**, primo videndum a quo actus habeat hoc, secundo de proposito. Quantum ad primum dicunt quidam quod actus humanus habet maliciam et bonitatem ex ratione... [138v]

Quantum ad secundam, utrum sit dare ad aliquem actum humanum indifferenter \se habentem ad esse bonum et malum/, in illa questione est aliquid certum, \scilicet/ quod \aliquis/ est actus ~~incertum~~ \talís, scilicet indifferens/, ut actus procedens ex inadvertentia... **Ad consentiam tertiam questionem, de conscientia, et ad quartam, de sinderesi**, dicunt aliqui quod conscientia est quidam habitus et similiter sinderesis circa principia practica \ita quod sunt unus habitus/. Alii dicunt quod non dicunt unum habitum existentem precise in intellectu vel voluntate, sed ad utrumque \pertinent/, et hoc patet ex nomine. [139r] Quando enim intellectus dictat aliquid agendum et voluntas sequitur, dicitur conscientia ~~vel~~; sed quando remurmurat voluntas, sic dicitur sinderesis. ~~vel~~ Unde, si conformiter \voluntas vult dictatum vel iudicio intellectus/, dicitur conscientia; si difformiter et cum displicentia, dicitur sinderesis et remorsus conscientie. Et sic de illo.

112, ff. 139r–140r: Consequitur queritur circa dicta primo utrum voluntas eodem actu \v/elit finem et que sunt ad eum \ordinata/; secundo utrum (*spat. vac.*); tertio utrum peccatum mortale et veniale distinguantur specie; quarto utrum septem sint tantum mortalia peccata. De primo arguitur quod sic. Quando unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum... **Ad primam questionem**, primo videndum est de ipsa voluntate respectu aliarum potentialium utrum eas moveat aliquid in eas imprimendo... {Vide que solutio tibi magis placet} [140r] Ad rationem in oppositum, ‘ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum’, verum est finaliter, sed non formaliter et quidditative, et sic est hic. **Ad secundam questionem (*sic*)**

113, ff. 140r–141r: Circa 34am distinctionem queritur utrum potestas peccandi sit immediate a Deo ~~hoc falsum et probatur quia quod est causa cause et et arguitur quod non, quia tunc peccati erit causa quod est falsum.~~ Oppositum dicit Magister in littera. **Ad secundam questionem superius dimissam, utrum actus exterior addat aliquam bonitatem ad intelligere**, illa questio dupliciter potest intelligi,

quia actus exterior uno modo comparatur ad actum intelligere voluntatis a quo non procedit; secundo modo ad illum a quo procedit. . . [140v] **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum peccatum mortale et veniale differant specie**, dicunt quidam quod non: illa que precise distinguuntur per illud quod est accidens non distinguuntur specie. . . Alius est modus dicendi quod illa peccata possunt considerari secundum esse naturale, secundo secundum esse mortale, tertio theologicē. . . Sed alius doctor bene tenet illam terciam partem, sed dicit ~~quod~~ etiam quod distinguuntur secundum esse morale. . . et sic istis doctores possunt concordari. **Ad quartam questionem, utrum sint 7 mortalia peccata**, dico quod sunt 7. . . **Ad primam questionem hic propositam**, primo videndum utrum respectus potentie ~~illius~~ \peccandi/ fundetur super liberum arbitrium. Dicit unus doctor quod non fundatur super liberum arbitrium in quantum huiusmodi, quia si sic, \tunc/ Deus haberet potestatem peccati, et beati; hoc falsum. . . [141r] sed illa potestas est ~~huiusmodi~~ ~~quod~~ in quantum est defectibilitas vel posse deficere nichil est formaliter; ideo non est a Deo. Et sic de illo. \Explicit super 2o libro Sententiarum/.

BOOK III

P3, ff. 141r–142r: {**Principium minoris de 3o libro sententiarum.**} **Questio est utrum incarnatio-actio sit distincta ab incarnante et incarnato.** Quod \sic:/ ~~hæc~~ illa non sunt una res quorum unum manet, altero non; sed incarnatum et incarnans manent, incarnatione non \manente/; ideo etc. . . Unde secundum doctorem nostrum in ratione obiecti concurrat ratio motivi et terminativi, nec oportet quod in quolibet actu intelligendi concurrat utraque ratio, quia in cognitione Dei vel divine esse(ntie) non concurrat ratio motiva, quia illa est necessaria sed terminative \solum/. . . [142r] **Ad casum respondi primo probando** quod includitur contradictio in dictis; omne illud cuius factio est in instanti habet primum instans sui esse; sed omne illud (*sic*). (Edited in Appendix B)

114, ff. 143r–144r: {**Questiones 3i libri Sententiarum**} **Circa primam distinctionem tertii libri *Sententiarum*, primo queritur utrum unio humane nature ad Verbum sit aliquid positivum; secundo utrum sit possibilis ex parte nature assumentis; tertio utrum ex parte nature assumpte; \quarto utrum illa unio sit**

possibilis secundum se/. De primo arguitur quod non. Illud cuius ratio diffinitiva est privativa, et ipsum; sed ipsius unio ratio est huiusmodi... **Ad primam questionem** est hic aliquid certum, quod quidquid est unio, est tamen novum, quia in ea requiritur humana natura et Verbum Dei; sed humanitas est nova; ideo et unio. [143v] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum illa unio sit possibilis ex parte divine nature**, dicitur quod sic, et probatur primo ex parte divine nature ut assumit effective... **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum sit possibilis ex parte nature assumpte**, dicitur quod sic. Ratio secundum aliquos: quia omne prius potest Deus separare a suo posteriori; sed natura singularis est prior personalitate \et suppositione/ sibi adducte, ideo etc. \Item, quia sicut accidens habet modum substantie in sacramento altaris, ita substantia potest habere modum accidentis, scilicet alteri inniti, scilicet Verbo assumpto naturam singularem hominem/. ^{va}-Item, quia in natura humana non ponitur nisi modus accidentis, quia dependentia ad aliud, ideo etc.^{-cat}... [144r] Ex hoc patet **quarta questio, utrum illa unio sit possibilis absolute loquendo**. Patet quod sic, quia et ex parte extremorum est possibilitas, et ex parte assumentis, et nature assumpte, ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

115, ff. 144r–145r: Circa secundam distinctionem queritur primo utrum Deus potuit assumere naturam irrationalem \in unitatem suppositi/; secundo utrum generaliter omnem substantialem naturam; tertio utrum naturam angelicam; quarto utrum assumpsit totam naturam humanam. De primo arguitur quod non, quia \quod/ inconveniens est Deo \est simpliciter/ impossibile... **Ad primam questionem** est unus modus dicendi dicens quod non potest. Ratio prima: cui non potest communicari quod est minus, neque quod est maius... **Ad secundam questionem, utrum generaliter Deus potuit**, etc., dico quod sic. Ratio: eadem ratio videtur de quacumque \natura substantiali/ que e(s)t de rationali, cum possit suppositari suppositione aliena... [144v] **Ad tertiam questionem**, prima conclusio quod potuit, secundo quod non decuit... **Ad quartam questionem, utrum Deus**, etc., videndum \primo/ quomodo se habet totum ad partes... [145r] dico quod verum est; non divisit potentialiter, quia semper remansit in partibus, ideo etc. Et sic de illo.

116, ff. 145r–v: Consequenter queritur circa 3am distinctionem \et circa 4am/ primo utrum beata Virgo concepta fuerit in originali; secundo, utrum eius conceptio debeat celebrari; tertio,

- utrum Christus potuit dici filius Spiritus Sancti; quarto, utrum beata Virgo potuit dici mater Christi.** De primo arguitur quod sic, auctoritate Augustini, omnes ex illa radice prodeunt... **Ad illam primam questionem**, aliqui dicunt quod sic, aliqui quod non... [145v]
- 60 **Ad secundam questionem, utrum conceptio, etc.,** De con(secra-
 tionem) di. \3/, “sollemniter”, dicitur quod non eius conceptio ~~fuit~~ est
 celebranda... similiter de conceptione eius \beate virginis/ ut secun-
 dum se non est sollemnitas, sed in ordine ad Christum debet celebrari;
 ideo etc. Et sic de illo.
- 65 **117, ff. 145v–146v: Circa 5am distinctionem, primo queritur**
utrum natura divina separata a personis possit assumere natu-
ram humanam; secundo utrum persona divina possit assumere
personam humanam. De primo arguitur quod sic, quia persona divi-
 na assumpsit naturam humanam... **Ad tertiam questionem supra**
 70 **remanentem, utrum beata Virgo vere dicatur mater Dei,** dico
 primo quod beata Virgo potest dici mater \univoce/ cum aliis matri-
 bus... [146r] **Quarta questio erat utrum Christus potuerit dici**
vere filius Spiritus Sancti. Difficultas est ex hoc quod Luc. 1 dicitur
Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te, etc... **Ad primam questionem**
 75 **modo motam,** est notandum quod naturam divinam separari a perso-
 nis est dupliciter, vel quod in nulla persona subsistat... **Ad secundam**
questionem, utrum suppositum divinum, etc., conclusio est certa, dico
 \tamen/ primo quod illa assumptio non terminatur ad unitatem natu-
 re... [146v] Item, ratio suppositi consistit in negatione communicabili-
 80 tatis; sed illud quod assumitur includit communicabilitatem, ideo illud
 quod assumitur remanet in ratione suppositi.
- 118, ff. 146v–147r: Circa 6am distinctionem \et circa sequentes**
usque ad 13am queritur primo/ et-a utrum in Christo sint plura
esse; secundo utrum virtute unionis illa \predicatio/ sit vera:
 85 **‘Deus est homo’; tertio utrum in Christo sint filiationes plu-**
res; quarto utrum illa propositio sit concedenda: \‘Christus
est creatura’/ Deus est homo. De primo arguitur quod non, quia tunc
 Christus esset plura entia, quod est falsum... **Ad primam questio-**
nem notandum quod de esse uno modo possumus loqui capiendo pro
 90 esse essentie, alio modo quod consistit in compositione predicati cum
 subiecto, tertio modo pro esse subsistentie, quarto modo pro esse exi-
 stentie... **Ad secundam questionem, utrum ex illa unione illa**
- 83 13am] 10am corr.

propositio sit vera: ‘Deus est homo’, illa conclusio est determinata, quia secundum Augustinum libro *De Trinitate** per illam unionem Deus factus est homo... **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum in Christo sint plures filiationes reales**, primo dico quod filiatio est proprietas relativa consequens generationem \passivam/ similis a simili in natura \vivente/ intellectuali per modum nature et naturaliter... [147r] **Ad quartam, utrum illa sit concedenda: Christus est creatura**, primo dico quod Christus est adorandus adoracione latrie... Item, quia tunc Christus esset a Deo osus, quod est falsum; ideo etc. 95 100

119, ff. 147r–148r: Consequenter queritur circa 13am et 14am et 15am et 16am distinctiones, primo utrum in Christo fuerit summa gratia; secundo utrum anima Christi eodem actu viderit omnia que vidit Verbum; tertio utrum in Christo fuerit summus dolor; quarto utrum fuerit eum necesse mori. De primo arguitur quod non, quia in Christo non fuit \in/finita gratia, ideo etc. Antecedens: quia habuit gratiam creatam. Oppositum dicit Magister in littera et Io. primo *plenum gratie et veritatis*. **Ad primam questionem** dico primo quod in anima Christi fuit gratia creata formaliter informans. Secundo quod gratia capitis... [148r] **Ad secundam questionem**, et illa questio includit quod anima Christi videt omnia que videt in Verbo, secundo includit quesitum \scilicet utrum unico \actu/ videat omnia que videt in Verbo/... sic anima Christi movetur a divina essentia ad intelligendum omnia. Et sic de illo. 105 110 115

120, ff. 148r–149r: Consequitur queritur circa 17 et 18am \distinctiones/ primo utrum voluntas Christi semper fuerit conformis voluntati Dei; secundo utrum Christus in primo instanti sue conceptionis potuit mereri. De primo arguitur quod non, quia discordabant in volito, quia voluntas Christi Dei voluit Christum mori, sed ipse orabat oppositum... **Ad tertiam questionem supra dimissam, utrum dolor passionis \Christi/ fuerit intensissimus**, primo videndum utrum fuerit in eo dolor quantum ad sensum, secundo utrum quantum ad interiorem affectum... [148v] **Ad quartam questionem, utrum Christus necessario debebat mori**, et est notandum prima quod natura humana Christi potest considerari uno modo in supposito in quo est, secundo modo secundum quod illud quod sibi inesset... **Ad primam questionem hic positam**, primo videndum est utrum in Christo fuerit duplex voluntas... [149r] **Ad secundam** 120 125

100 latrie] lata *corr.*

130 **questionem** primo videndum si Christus meruerit. Dicitur quod sic...
sed non meruit pro omnibus quoad efficaciam, quia non ~~omnis~~ omnes
consecuti sunt premium et gloriam. Et sic de illo.

121, ff. 149r–v: **Consequenter circa 19am, 20, 21 et 22am distinctiones** primo queritur utrum passio Christi fuerit necessaria ad redemptionem humani generis; secundo utrum corpus Christi fuisset incineratum si resurrectio non fuerit accelerata; tertio utrum anima \Christi/ retardata fuerit a sua beatitudine; quarto utrum in triduo fuerit homo. De primo arguitur: quia oportuit Christum pati in Luca... **Ad primam questionem**, pro
140 illa questione Anselmus fecit librum *Cur Deus homo*. Prima ergo sua \conclusio/ est quod necesse fuit humanum genus reparari... [149v] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum corpus Christi sit fuisset**, etc., dico \primo/ quod corpus Christi erat corruptibile, secundo quod non fuisset ~~eorr~~ putrefactum... **Ad tertiam questionem, \utrum, si resurrectio non fuisset accelerata, anima Christi fuisset retardata a sua beatitudine/**, videtur aliquibus quod sic, quia hoc convenit aliis animabus intellectivis que sunt eiusdem rationis cum anima Christi et alie anime retardate sunt a beatitudine propter separationem a corporibus... **Ad quartam questionem** primo videndum si in morte Christi
150 remanserit aliqua forma substantialis que prius erat, secundo de principali... sed unionem earum ad invicem bene divisit in qua consistit formaliter humanitas. Et sic de illo.

122 (apograph), ff. 150r–v: **Consequenter circa 23 distinctionem** primo queritur utrum preter virtutes morales et intellectuales
155 indigeamus virtutibus theologicis; secundo utrum de obiecto supernaturali sit nobis necessaria fides \infusa/; tertio utrum spes sit virtus theologica. Ad primam questionem arguitur quod non, quia si sic, superfluerent... **Ad primam questionem** primo videndum est de proposito, secundo de sufficientia virtutum theologicarum... **Ad**
160 **secundam questionem, utrum de obiecto supernaturali nobis sit necessaria fides infusa**, dico circa hoc 3: primo quod de obiecto supernaturali est ponenda in nobis fides... [150v] **Ad tertiam questionem, utrum fide spes sit virtus theologica**, dico quod spes uno modo capitur pro certitudine et sic capitur ab Apostolo Petro in canonica
165 sua, quod *patientia operatur spem*, etc. Alio modo capitur pro re sperata, et sic capitur hic, cum dicitur *expectantes beatam spem*. Tertio modo pro passione appetitus sensitivi, et sic est una de 4 passionibus, scilicet

timor, spes, gaudium, tristitia. Quarto modo capitur pro actu tendendi in non habitum. Quinto modo capitur pro habitu inclinante potentiam ad talem actum, et isto quinto modo spes dicitur virtus theologica, quia perficit potentiam circa obiectum supernaturalem, ideo etc. 170

123, ff. 150v–151v: ~~Consequenter queritur~~ **Quarta questio, utrum in voluntate Christi sit habitus aliquis inclinans ipsam ad diligendum Deum super omnia. Consequenter queritur utrum caritas et gratia sint idem habitus realiter; secundo utrum sit habitus caritatis quo diligitur Deus et proximus; \tertio/ quarta utrum caritas evacuetur in patria.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia determinant sibi diversa... **Ad questionem quartam {supra dimissam}, utrum in voluntate sit habitus inclinans ad diligendum Deum super omnia,** et dico quod una est opinio quod voluntas sine habitu supernaturali infuso non potest Deum super omnia diligere... [151r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum habitus caritatis,** etc., quantum ad hoc est unus modus dicendi est quod habitus caritatis et gratie sunt duo habitus distincti realiter... [151v] **Ad tertiam questionem** dico quod sic, quia dilectio proximi caritativa est propter dilectionem Dei; ideo etc. 175
 Modo dico quod non est unus habitus unitate indivisionis et simplicitatis, sed est bene unus habitus unitate connexionis et ordinis, quia quando unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum. **Ad quartam questionem** dico quod sic; quia caritas imperfectionem adiunctam non habet, ideo manet in patria. Item, quia beatus est magis gratus Deo quam creatura aliqua hic in via, sed hic in via est creatura grata Deo per habitum caritatis et gratie, ideo et in patria beatus; ideo etc. 180
 185
 190

124, ff. 151v–152r: ~~Consequenter utrum~~ **circa 33 et sequentes primo queritur utrum virtus dicat aliquid absolutum; secundo utrum purum respectum; tertio utrum utrumque; quarto utrum sit ens per accidens.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia constituitur in respectu ad alterum... **Ad illas questiones.** Prima conclusio quod essentialiter est qualitas... [152r] et ideo dico quod virtus non est ens per accidens, etc. 195

125, ff. 152r–153v: ~~Consequenter~~ **circa materiam de virtutibus moralibus primo queritur utrum virtutes morales acquirantur in nobis per nostros actus; secundo utrum sint formaliter in appetitu sensitivo vel voluntate; tertio utrum sint connexe cum prudentia; quarto utrum omnium sit una prudentia secundum** 200

205 **speciem.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia vel per actus viciosos – quod non, quia magis corruptum... **Ad primam questionem, utrum habitus,** etc., primo videndum utrum \in/sint nobis a natura... [153r] **Ad secundam questionem, utrum sint in appetitu sensitivo vel in voluntate,** unus modus dicendi est quod sunt in appetitu sensitivo, 210 saltem plures... [153v] modo primo modo capit Aristoteles rationale per participationem et non secundo modo; ideo etc. Et sic dictum sit de illo.

126, ff. 153v–154r: Consequenter circa 37 distinctionem primo queritur utrum precepta decalogi sint de dictamine legis nature; 215 **secundo utrum sint dispensabilia.** De primo arguitur quod non, quia si sic, frustra data fuissent. Hoc falsum... **Ad tertiam questionem supra manentem ~~utrum~~ et ad quartam** prima conclusio est quod non est una prudentia secundum speciem specialissimam omnium virtutum moralium... [154r] **Ad primam questionem nunc propositum et ad secundam** dicitur quod sic est in speculabilibus sicut in 220 agibilibus... Ut sunt illa que sunt iuris positivi et circa illa potest papa vel prelatus dispensare et sic dictum sit de illo. {Explicit reportacio super 3o libro Sententiarum a fratre gwilli'mo minore apud minores.}

Appendix B:

Guilelmus de Brena OFM,

Reportatio in libros

Sententiarum

Principia

⟨Principium in I *Sententiarum*⟩

[1r] Circa primum *Sententiarum* primo queritur utrum summe simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius cognitionis scientifice.

[1.1] Et arguitur quod non. Cui repugnat omnis componibilitas, ei repugnat esse subiectum in scientia – illa patet, quia in subiecto scientie est compositio cum predicato; sed summe simplici repugnat; hoc patet. 5

[1.2] Oppositum: illud non est causa repugnantie quod stat cum opposito eius; sed simplex est huiusmodi \ut patet in Deo, qui est summe simplex et est tamen subiectum in theologia/; ideo etc.

⟨Articulus primus: quid est summe simplex⟩

[1.3] {inostendatio} Primus articulus erit quid est summe simplex. Et Augustinus XI *De civitate Dei* 10 dicit summe simplex est Deus, quia est 10
quidquid habet, excepto eo quod relative dicitur. Et quando dicitur quod
‘est quidquid \habet’, verum/ est in abstracto \ultimata abstractione/
secundum aliquos, quia non in concreto. Et quando dicitur ‘quidquid
habet’ aliquid dicitur aliquid habere \uno modo formaliter/, alio mo-
do virtualiter, tertio modo terminative. Quando igitur dicitur etc. est 15

10 Augustinus: AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 10, (CCSL 48), p. 330: “sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur.”

verum formaliter. Et ideo dictum Augustini sic intelligitur formaliter.

[1.4] Sed contra hoc arguitur, primo contra primum dictum, querendo ~~en~~ vel tu intelligas ultimo abstractum ita quod includit illud quod habet vel non. Si primo modo, hoc modo homo esset summe simplex, quia
 20 includit in se \ea/ ex quibus componitur et idemtpificat sibi illa, \et tamen non dicitur summe simplex/. Si secundo modo, scilicet quod adhuc recipit predicationem \et habitudinem terminorum/ eius quod habet, contra: quia hoc est solius rationis, scilicet recipere predicationem.

[1.5] Secundo, quia in essentia divina hoc verum est, ~~et tamen~~ scilicet
 25 quod idemtpificat sibi spirationem \et paternitatem et filiationem, sed tamen unum non idemtpificat sibi aliud/, ~~sed contra~~ quia, si Pater idemtpificaret sibi spirationem, vel ratione essentie – quod non, \quia pari ratione et filiationem/ – nec ratione paternationis etc.

[1.6] Sed tenendo dictum potest respondi ad illa, dicendo quod intelligitur utroque modo. Et quando dicitur quod non, ~~unde~~ sciendum quod
 30 illud in quo idemtpificantur aliqua potest dupliciter se habere ad ea: vel in ratione prioris et presuppositi, et sic idemtpificat ratione perfectionis, et hoc secundum nostrum modum intelligendi; alio modo in ratione posterioris \et presupponentis/, et sic idemtpificatio fit in ratione compositionis, \quo modo totum compositum idemtpificat sui partes/. Et
 35 inter illa duplex est differentia: prima, quia in primo \modo/ idemtpica sunt in actu, in secundo non in actu, sed in potentia. Secunda differentia est quia primum recipit predicationem cuiuslibet et e converso, sed secundum non, proprie loquendo. Ratio est quia illud, scilicet compositum,
 40 est aliquid aliud ab omnibus partibus simul sumptis, et ideo non est predicatio formalis, sed solum causalis.

[1.7] Ad secundum dico quod in notificatione duo sunt: unum ex parte \propositionis/ notificantis, aliud ex parte rei. Unde, licet sit ibi habitudo terminorum propositionis ad actum intelligendi, tamen hoc non
 45 sufficit. Et quando dicis ‘propositio non esset vera’, dico quod ymmo illa propositio est vera: ‘pater\nitas/ spiracio est’, \licet illa non sit vera: ‘paternitas est filiatio’/, et hoc ratione essentie. Quando enim essentia idemtpificat sibi paternitatem, est extranea a se ut idemtpificat sibi filiationem, non sic de spiratione, \cum secundum aliquos ipsa sit constitutiva Patris, saltem Patri non repugnant/. Exemplum: ratio creationis et illimitationis ad locum \celum/ competit divine essentie, et tamen ratione unionis ipostatice de Christo verum erat de illo: ‘homo creavit celos’, et tamen non illimitatio ad omnem locum \sibi compete-
 50 bat;

52 illo] ille *corr.*

28 paternationis: *lege* paternitatis.

ymmo quando erat in uno loco, erat verum [erat] dicere quod non erat in alio/. Sic suo modo est in proposito.

55

⟨**Secundus articulus: quid est subiectum in scientia**⟩
 ⟨**Pars prima: definitiones materiae, obiecti et subiecti in scientia**⟩

[1.8] Secundus articulus est de ratione subiecti. Et est notandum primo quod, ~~secundum~~ licet materia, obiectum et subiectum pro eodem sumantur, tamen proprie materia potest dici omne cadens sub consideratione scientie, sed obiectum dicitur conclusio demonstrata, subiectum vero pars conclusionis, et primum subiectum \in scientia/ pars prime conclusionis. Hoc declaratur in naturalibus.

60

⟨**Materia scientie est omne cadens sub consideratione scientie**⟩

[1.9] Primum probo de materia, quia, sicut in rebus naturalibus \materia/ non presupponitur aliquo actu, sed trahitur ad actum, sic in consideratione scientifica \materia cadit sub actuali consideratione scientie/. Et sicut subiectum in naturalibus presupponitur in actu simpliciter et in potentia secundum quid, sic de subiecto scientifico, quia presupponitur in actu simpliciter et inquiritur secundum quid. Et similiter, sicut terminus generationis est compositum, sic~~et~~ terminus demonstrationis est compositum, quod est conclusio.

65

[1.10] Contra hoc arguitur. Primo, contra primum, primo, quod materia non sit talis, sic: in quocumque est distinguere causam materialem, formalem, etc., omne tale non est materia; sed in omni consideratione scientifica est sic. Maior patet, et minor conceditur ab omnibus.

70

[1.11] Secundo sic: illud non habet rationem materie quod presupponit materiam; sed modus considerandi est huiusmodi. Maior patet; minor I *Ethicorum*, “ser⟨mones⟩ \exquirendi sunt secundum materiam subiectam/.”

75

[1.12] Tertio: illud non habet rationem materie cuius questio non cessat ratione sua posita; sed questio de ~~materia~~ \omni/ \considerato \scilicet materie/ in scientia/ est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior patet, II *Posteriorum*.

80

76 Ethicorum: ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nichomachea* II, c. 2 (1104a3); trans. BURGUNDII PISANI (AL 26.1.1, p. 7): “secundum materiam sermones inquirendi”; rev. ROBERTI GROSSETESTI (AL 26.2.1, p. 165): “secundum materiam sermones expetendi”; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (Ethica I), (ed. HAMESSE, p. 232, n. 7): “sermones inquirendi sunt secundum materiam de qua sunt.” **81** Posteriorum: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* II, c. 2 (90a24–28; AL 4.4, p. 322): “Quod autem sit medii questio, manifestant quorumcumque medium sensibile est. Querimus enim non sentientes, ut defectum, si est aut non.”

- [1.13-9] Ad illa, et notandum quod aliquid pertinere ad considerationem
 eense scientificam est quadrupliciter, scilicet antecedenter et presuppo-
 sitive – et hoc modo requiritur causa efficiens – secundo modo conco-
 mitanter et determinative – et hoc modo modus considerandi – tertio
 85 modo coexigenter \et correlative – et sic/ requiritur omne scibile – quar-
 to modo consequenter et complete – \et sic/ finis et causa simul. Ex
 quo patet quod in argumentis predictis est fallacia consequentis, quia
 prima propositio vera est coexigenter et coexigitive, sed de aliis non.
 90 [1.14-10] Ad secundum dico quod verum est illo modo non, etc. [1v]

⟨Obiectum scientie est conclusio demonstrata⟩

- [1.15] Contra secundum dictum de obiecto arguitur: vel conclusio accipi-
 tur in voce, vel in scripto, vel in re, vel conceptu; non in re, quia sic non
 sunt \conclusiones/, nec in voce vel in scripto, quia sine hiis conclusio
 scientifica est vera, \quia mentalis/; nec in conceptu, quia tunc idem
 95 esset obiectum sui ipsius. Probatio, quia ipsa ut sic non est nisi cognitio
 scientifica.
 [1.16] Secundo sic: illud est obiectum scientie cui primo ascendimus; sed
 ascendimus rebus non conceptibus; ergo conclusio non est pro conceptu.
 [1.17] Tertio: nullum accidens est obiectum de Deo vel substantia, illa
 100 patet; sed conclusio pro conceptu est accidens; ideo etc.
 [1.18] Ad illa respondet unus socius exponendo: unumquodque, scilicet,
 obiectum quod est universale, quod non est res extra neque conceptus,
 \sed est aggregatum ex re et conceptu/, quia in hiis terminatur demon-
 stratio. Et patet \exemplum/, quia in processu vocali vox significativa
 105 est aggregata ex ipsa \voce/ et signata \re/. Et ideo sic in conceptibili
 ex re et conceptu.
 [1.19] Sed contra arguitur dupliciter, primo sic: illud est obiectum scien-
 tie quod est causa veritatis in scientia; sed non aggregatum ex re et
 conceptu, sed res solum est huiusmodi. Maior patet, quia scientia est
 110 habitus veridicus; minor in *Predicamentis*: “ab eo quod res est vel non,
 oratio vera vel falsa est.”
 [1.20] Secundo sic: quero quomodo conceptus capitur, vel pro se vel pro
 actu intelligendi; sed neutro modo concurrat ad integritatem obiecti; ideo
 etc. Maior patet sufficienti divisione; minor – illud primum – probatur:
 115 nullum presuppositum apud intellectum actu intelligendi attingitur actu

97 ascendimus: *lege* assentimus *hic et infra*. **110** *Predicamentis*: ARISTOTELES, *Categoriae* 5 (4b8–10, AL 1.3, p. 96); Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. HAMESSE, p. 303, n. 17): “Ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio dicitur vera vel falsa.”

intelligendi; sed omne quod complet obiectum attingitur ab actu intelligendi; sed species intelligibilis non attingitur; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia actus intelligendi mediat inter obiectum et potentiam, et minor de specie patet per te, quia est causa efficiens actus intelligendi, ideo presupponitur ei. Nec secundum patet, quia impossibile est idem esse obiectum sui ipsius eodem modo; sed hoc sequeretur; ideo etc. 120

[1.21] Tertio sic: illud quod non potest intelligi nisi actu reflexo non facit ad obiectum actus recti; sed conceptus est huiusmodi; ideo etc.

[1.22-18] Nec illud quod dicit de universali valet, \quando dicit/ quod non est res extra, quia universale \etc./, dico quod simpliciter illud quod est in anima est singulare. Et exemplum non valet, quia quod vox significativa sit aggregata ex voce et re signata. 125

[1.23-15] Et ideo aliter ad rationes dico quod obiectum in scientia, scilicet conclusionem, accipimus sicut Aristoteles VI *Ethicorum*. Unde notandum quando agitur de scientia, ipsa est subiective in anima, et ideo subiectum, conclusio, etc., quandoque capiuntur in ordine ad intellectum. Et quando dicis quod conclusio non est in re, dico quod quandoque conclusio accipitur pro notitia, quandoque \pro/ propositione, quandoque pro re denominata. Unde conclusio formaliter non est in rebus, et sic patet solutio ad rationes. 130 135

⟨Subiectum scientie est pars conclusionis⟩

[1.24] Contra tertium dictum de subiecto arguitur: illud non est de ratione subiecti quod \non/ est precognitum in scientia.

[1.25] Secundo sic: illud est subiectum in scientia quod continet primas veritates; sed hoc non est \illud quod est pars conclusionis demonstrate/. 140

[1.26-24] Ad primum dico quod subiectum quandoque capitur in habitudine ad intellectum \absolute; aliquando vero in habitudine ad predicatum notum simpliciter de subiecto/. Et sic patet ad rationes.

⟨Pars secunda: tres propositiones de subiecto in scientia⟩

[1.27] Secundo de hoc articulo, prima propositio est quod subiectum in scientia totum habitum virtualiter continet. \Secunda est quod subiectum scientie est in tota scientia evidens/. Tertia propositio est quod subiectum scientie est principaliter pertinens, et omnia alia in habitudine ad ipsum. 145

130 subiective] subicere *corr.*

129 Aristoteles: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nichomachea* VI:3 (1139b18–36; AL 26.3, p. 480). **132** dicis: Cf. supra, n. 1.17

(Subiectum in scientia totum habitum virtualiter continet)

[1.28] Primam probatur: illud quod continet virtualiter ~~tunc~~ \omnes/
propositiones et conclusiones habitus continet totum illum habitum \vir-
150 tualiter/ – illa patet; sed ~~conclusio est huius~~ subiectum est huiusmodi.
Probatur, quia primum subiectum continet primum predicatum. Et
propositio mediata continetur virtualiter in immediata, et conclusio in
premissis. Et confirmatur, quia omnia considerata in scientia resolvun-
tur ad subiectum vel mediate vel immediate, quia conclusiones ad prin-
155 cipia quasi ad terminos. Item, quia continet adequate ~~omnem~~ habitum
scientificum – adequate, quia omnia alia continet in virtute sua.

[1.29] Contra hoc arguitur sic: quia scientia ‘quia’ est vere scientia, et
in illa \propositiones non continentur in subiecto, ymmo in effectibus et
signis/.

160 [1.30] Secundo, quod neque in scientia ‘propter quid’, quia scientia una
est unius subiecti \partes et passiones considerans/ etc.; sed passiones
partium non continentur in primo subiecto; ideo etc.

[1.31] Tertio, quia subiectum dependet ab alio in concipiendo. Probatio:
quia dependet a principiis et signibus et ideo non primo continet sed \in
165 virtute principiorum/. [2r] \Confirmatur/ [item], quia continet virtute
dignitatum, ideo non primo continet.

[1.32-29] Ad illa. Ad primum, ‘continere totum habitum’ est dupliciter:
vel simpliciter, alio modo quoad nos. Modo subiectum, etc., verum est
simpliciter, sed quod per signa et effectum contineat, hoc est ex parte
170 nostra. Aliter dico quod ‘quia’ et ‘propter quid’ non sunt distinctarum
scientiarum, \ymmo eiusdem scientie/, sicut ratio supponit. Aliter di-
co quod subiectum continet directe, sed effectus et signum indirecte et
arguitive.

[1.33-30] Ad secundum, de passionibus partium subiecti, dico quod ~~con-~~
175 ~~clusiones~~ in scientia passiones vel habent se respectu subiecti prius pri-
mo, et sic continet eas. Alio modo, secundum ordinem quod una sit prior
alia, et sic una potest probari per aliam, et sic reducitur ad subiectum,
quia quod est causa cause, et causati; ideo etc. Tertio modo, si passio
respicit aliquid et subiectum disparate, sic non continetur virtualiter in
180 subiecto.

[1.34-31] Ad tertium, ~~deus~~ ‘non continet’, etc., dico, accipiendo princi-
pia proprie, principia non continent nisi ratione subiecti, quia ratione
terminorum, inter quos subiectum est primus terminus.

161 considerans: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, c. 28 (87a38; AL 4.4, p. 316):
“Una autem scientia est que est unius generis, quecumque ex primis componuntur et
partes sunt aut passiones horum per se.”

⟨Subiectum scientiae est in tota scientia evidens⟩

[1.35] Secunda propositio est illa: quod subiectum scientie s est in tota scientia evidens, quia cause notitia precedit notitiam effectus; sed tota 185
scientia est effectus subiecti; ideo etc.

[1.36] Contra hoc arguitur: illud non est primo cognitum in scientia cuius cognitio debet dependet in scientia ex alio; sed ita \est/ de subiecto, quia a passione. Probatur, quia omnis mutatio facit scire materiam, que est passio ~~mat~~erie, et similiter caliditas facit cognoscere ignem, et operatio 190
formam.

[1.37] Item, illud non est primo cognitum in scientia quod non est notum, noto aliquo in ea; sed subiectum est huiusmodi in naturali scientia, quia, noto motu, subiectum scientie naturalis est ignotum. Et confirmatur, quia multi sciunt multas conclusiones naturales et tamen ignorant 195
subiectum scientie naturalis.

[1.38-36] Ad illa. Et est notandum quod obiecta in scientia dupliciter considerantur: vel intelligibilia simpliciter, vel sub latitudine scientie. Accipiendo utroque modo dico quod procedunt. Ad primum, maior rationis est vera, [capiendo suo modo] \uniformiter capiendo/, sed arguendo de uno ordine ad alium, non oportet; ymmo oportet notitiam subiecti prehaberi quocumque modo ad cognitionem scientie. Quando ergo dicis materia non est nota, dico quod verum est, comparando ad ea alia subiecta; \sed tamen comparando ad suas passionem est nota; sed ille 200
passiones sunt quoad nos notiores materia/. 205

[1.39-37] Ad secundum, dicendum concedendo maiorem in eodem modo. Et quando dicitur, dico quod impossibile est quod scientifice sit motus cognitus et non sit notum subiectum; sed bene alio modo, non in ordine ad subiectum. Neque etiam aliquis potest aliquam conclusionem scientifice scire sine notitia subiecti. 210

⟨Subiectum in scientia pertinet principaliter ad eam⟩

[1.40] Tertia propositio est quod subiectum in scientia pertinet principaliter ad eam, quia omnia alia considerata in scientia reducuntur ad eam ratione subiecti.

Hoc de secundo articulo.

**⟨Articulus tertius: quod summe simplex potest esse
subiectum in scientia⟩**

[1.41] Tertius articulus de principali quesito, \scilicet quod summe simplex potest esse subiectum in scientia/. Et dico quod sic, quia cui non 215

repugnant rationes subiecti, \illi/ non repugnat \esse/ subiectum; sed summe simplici non repugnant. Probatio, quia nulla istarum dicit imperfectionem; ideo etc. Continentia enim virtualis non dicit limitationem, 220 \et alie due condiciones non dicunt aliquam imperfectionem, ideo/ etc. [1.42-1] Ad rationem in oppositum, “summe simplici”, etc., dicunt aliqui quod hoc non est ratione infinitatis, sed necessitatis, quia non posita infinitate, adhuc stat simplicitas, quia paternitas est ita simplex sicut essentia, et tamen non est infinita. ~~Confirmatur, quia infinitas non est.~~ 225 Aliter tamen dico quod ad compositionem duo requiruntur, scilicet limitatio partium et potentialitas unius respectu alterius. Et ideo duo illa faciunt ad hoc; sed infinitas facit ad ablationem primi; sed necessitas \ad remocionem/ secundi; ideo etc.

227 ablationem] innui^{tem} corr.

221–222 aliqui: Non invenimus; cf. R.L. FRIEDMAN, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 108), 2 vols., Leiden 2013, pp. 383–84.

⟨Principium in II Sententiarum⟩

⟨Prima pars⟩

[105r] {Principium bacularii minorum super 2m librum}

Circa secundum librum queritur primo utrum divina voluntas aliquo modo ab essentia divina distincta sit immediate principium alicuius productivum.

[2a.1] Et arguitur quod non, quia neque nostra. Est enim solum principium operativum. Et consequentia, quia conveniunt in una ratione communi, ideo quod negatur ab una, et ab alia. 5

[2a.2] Oppositum: quia ad eam reducitur omnis contingentia ut ad primum principium contingentie; ideo etc. Et in Ps. *quaecumque fae voluit fecit*. 10

[2a.3] Primus articulus erit de supposito, ¶ \scilicet/ quomodo \divina/ voluntas se habeat ad essentiam divinam. Secundus est de principali.

⟨Articulus primus: quomodo divina voluntas se habeat ad essentiam divinam⟩

[2a.4] Quantum ad primum, conclusio prima erat quod voluntas omnis aliquo modo distinguitur ab essentia {divina}. Secunda, quod illa distinctio sufficit exp ad rationem scientie. Tertia quod Deo non repugnat esse subiectum scientie. 15

⟨Conclusio prima: voluntas omnis aliquo modo distinguitur ab essentia divina⟩

[2a.5] Prima conclusio probatur, primo in Deo sic: voluntas divina et intellectus divinus distinguuntur aliquo modo, et a se invicem et ab essentia divina; ergo ex natura rei. Antecedens probatur, et consequentia. Et probatur antecedens. Quod non per rationem solum, quia distinctio intellectus et voluntatis presupponitur reali distinctioni emanationum personarum, ideo non est secundum rationem solum. 20

[2a.6] Secunda ratio erat illa: que ex suis rationibus formalibus distinguuntur ex natura rei ubicumque ponantur ~~habent~~ salvis suis rationibus formalibus habent non-idemptitatem ex natura rei; sed ita est de voluntate et intellectu, et sunt in Deo sic; ideo etc. 25

19 probatur] patet *corr.*

9 Ps.: Ps. 115:11.

⟨Obiectiones sociorum⟩

[2a.7] Sed contra illam conclusionem arguit unus socius sic: primo, quia, si intelligere et velle distinguerentur ex natura rei, hoc esset quia presupponuntur ~~distinctioni~~ emanationi personarum; sed hoc non, quia nulla
 30 distinctio ex natura rei presupponitur emanationi personarum. Probatio, quia \essentia divina/ habens eminenter illa duo potest producere Filium et Spiritum Sanctum ita bene sicut si essent distincta, quia illa continentia virtualis et eminentie non diminuit de ratione principiorum istorum. Item, quia sufficit quod effectus sit virtualiter in causa, et sic
 35 est hic; ideo etc.

[2a.8] Secundo sic: quecumque habent indistinctionem ex suo formali completivo \non/ habent aliquam distinctionem formalem; sed intelligere et velle sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet, et minor per Anselmum 16 *Monologion* – dicit quod illa summa natura, quando dicitur bona, non
 40 quale sed quid sit monstratur; ideo ~~ete~~. rationes formales ibi non manent \distincte/.

[2a.9] Contra illam conclusionem arguit \etiam/ alter socius: nullum infinitum simpliciter \et formaliter/ patitur distinctionem alicuius a se formalem ~~distinctionem~~; sed essentia divina est huiusmodi. Maior patet,
 45 et minor ~~q~~ similiter, ideo etc.

[2a.10] Secundo sic: natura que formaliter sumpta est universaliter perfecta includit in sua ratione formali omnem perfectionem simpliciter; sed divina essentia est huiusmodi; ideo nulla perfectio formaliter est ab ea distincta formaliter. Maior patet; et minor, quia, si non, nulla natura es-
 50 set simpliciter et formaliter perfecta. Et confirmatur, quia, si non, Deus non esset quo maius cogitari non posset, quod est falsum; ideo etc. Et confirmatur, quia propter hoc omnis creatura dicitur imperfecta, quia caret ~~omni~~ aliqua perfectione simpliciter; ideo etc.

[2a.11-5] Et per hoc patet ad rationes meas. Ad primam dicit quod in
 55 minori accipitur falsum, scilicet quod distinctioni emanationum personarum ~~dis~~ presupponatur distinctio formalis, quod non. Nec secunda ratio valet, quia omnia attributa sunt una ratio formalis que est summe perfecta et infinita.

29 emanationi] emanationum *cod.* **33** diminuit] dimittit *cod.*

29 emanationi: Cf. infra, §13: “presupponitur eorum distinctio distinctioni emanationum.” **39** Monologion: ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, c. 16 (ed. SCHMITT, p. 31): “Quidquid igitur eorum de illa dicatur: non qualis vel quanta, sed magis quid sit monstratur. Sed palam est quia quodlibet bonum summa natura sit, summe illud est.” **50–51** Deus – posset: ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion*, c. 4 (ed. SCHMITT, p. 104): “Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest.”

[2a.12-6] Ad secundum principale dicit quod antecedens est falsum quantum ad hoc quod voluntas et intellectus distinguuntur secundum rationem, ymmo dicit quod Pater et ~~Filium~~ producit Filium et Spiritum Sanctum eadem \ratione/ ~~emanatione~~ formaliter, licet non eminenter; ideo etc. 60

⟨Ad rationes sociorum⟩

[2a.13-7] Ad illas rationes respondeo. Ad primam, ‘si intelligere et velle, ~~habent~~ etc., hoc esset quia presupponitur eorum distinctio distinctioni emanationum’. Primo ostendo quod illa ratio accipit [105v] in maiori, \scilicet/ non-causam ut causam. Probatio: illud non est maxime causa distinctionis aliquorum quod presupponit distinctionem illorum; sed habitudo ad distinctionem emanationum est huiusmodi \ad distinctionem velle et intelligere/. Probatio: quicquid presupponit rationem formalem alicuius presupponit distinctionem eius a non-ipso – illa patet, quia eadem sunt principia essendi et distinguendi; sed omnis habitudo presupponit rationem formalem eius cuius est habitudo; ideo etc. 65 70

[2a.14] Secundo, ostendam quod in illo prosillogismo accipitur utraque propositio falsa. Prima propositio fuit: ‘quod continet eminenter aliqua duo principia duarum emanationum potest in illas emanationes; sed intelligere et velle sunt huiusmodi ad essentiam divinam’. Patet, primo quia illa minor non continetur sub maiori, ideo non concludit, \ymmo illa: ‘sed Pater vel essentia divina continet eminenter duo principia duarum emanationum’; ideo ~~ete~~ non concludit ad propositum/. Dico \tamen/ primo quod prima propositio est falsa; illud quod totaliter excludit ordinem non eodem ordine ponit actiones quo ponuntur per principia distincta et secundum ordinem ponentia; sed eminentia \vel continentia unitiva/ est huiusmodi; ideo etc. ~~ideo etc.~~ Sed intellectus et voluntas ubi distinguuntur ex natura rei habent ordinem suarum operationum, ut patet. Ideo etc. Et minor etiam est falsa et debet esse illa: ‘quod Pater vel divina essentia continet eminenter voluntatem et intellectum’. Contra: quia continens illa principia est ex se et natura sua determinatum ad agendum et ex se, non de necessitate nature, determinatum ad agendum; sed Pater, per te, vel essentia divina est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Conclusio falsa, et non maior, ideo minor, que fuit tua. Maior probatur, quia intellectus est ex se de necessitate determinatus ad agendum et voluntas ex se non est ex necessitate determinata ad agendum; ideo etc. Ad formam ergo rationis. Ad maiorem, ‘si intelligere’, etc., 80 85 90

- 95 'hoc maxime esset', etc., dico quod hoc non esset maxime sed arguitive
solum a posteriori. Sed ratio formalis utriusque est in hoc causa.
[2a.15] Ad primam prosillogismi, 'conticens eminenter perfectiones duo-
rum principiorum', \etc./, dico quod duplex est continentia: una emi-
nentie perfectionalis, alia inexistentie formalis; modo conticens eminen-
100 ter, etc., dico quod duplicia sunt principia: quedam quorum actiones sic
se habent quod non requirunt in suis principiis modum oppositum prin-
cipiandi. Alia autem sunt quorum actiones hec requirunt. Quando igitur
dicitur 'conticens', dico quod conticens eminenter duo principia actio-
num primo modo potest in illa duo, ut patet de sole respectu caloris et
105 illuminationis; sed, si sint principia actionum secundo modo, nego illam.
Ratio est quia illa continentia unitiva simpliciter excludit ex ordinem.
Modo quando dicitur in minori 'Pater continet', etc., dico quod quedam
sunt perfectiones primarie, ut quidditates rerum, alia secundarie, ut esse
sapientem, etc. Modo Deus continet utroque modo, scilicet eminenter
110 perfectiones primarias, sed formaliter et inexistenter secundarias, ut esse
volentem ¶ et intelligentem.
[2a.16] Ad probationes maioris. Prima fuit 'quia illud quod non tollit
perfectionem, sed magis augeat'. ~~non ideo etc.~~ Contra: arguitur capiendo
illam propositionem 'quod non diminuit', etc., non diminuit de produc-
115 tione; sed s esse angelum non diminuit \de entitate respectu asini; ideo
neque de productione/; ideo etc. Ideo angelus potest producere asinum,
quod est falsum. Ideo altera falsa; non minor, ideo etc. Tamen respon-
deo quod perfectio principiorum \duplex/ est: quedam quidditativa, alia
secundum habitudinem eius ad suam productionem. Modo maior est
120 vera, si utroque modo non diminuit, sed minor est falsa de secundaria,
quia tollit ordinem producendi, ideo etc.
[2a.17] Ad aliam probationem, 'sicut sufficienter', etc., dico quod se-
cus est de comparatione cause ad suum effectum et de comparatione
~~duarum~~ duorum principiorum respectu suarum productionum. Ad mi-
125 norem, 'Pater continet eminenter intellectum et voluntatem', dico quod
non unitive, sed per inexistentiam formalem voluntatem et intellectum.
[2a.18] Ex hoc patet quod ratio mea stat, scilicet quod intellectus et
voluntas secundum omnes aliquo modo sunt non-idem, \ergo ex natura
rei/ et non secundum rationem solum, ut patet, [106r] quia talis non
130 presupponitur distinctioni reali; ideo etc.
[2a.19-8] Ad secundam rationem suam, ~~que~~ 'illa que habent indistinctio-
nem ex suo formali completivo', etc., dico primo quod illa ratio fundat-
ur in falso. Probatur: prima propositio erat illa: illa que \del>que habent

indistinctionem ex suo formali completivo non habent aliquam distinctionem formalem, illam capiam/, etc.; sed partes essentielles in toto habent indistinctionem formalem in suo toto; ideo et inter se, quod est falsum. 135

[2a.20] Secundo ostendo quod decipitur de termino equivoco. Quero quid intelligis per ‘formale completivum’: vel divinam essentiam vel formales rationes illarum rationum accidentalium, et sic equivoce. Si primo modo, sic propositio erat falsa; si secundo modo, sic minor in nullo probabatur. Similiter, actor quem adducit {Anselmus} est contra eum, quia in minori mea accepi quod illa accidentia habent non-idemplitatem ex suis rationibus formalibus. Probabatur, ~~quia secundum se~~ et hoc non accepi ab Anselmo, sed illud: quod in Deo sunt secundum rationes suas formales, et probavi \primum/ sic, quia Anselmus \Omol./ 16 c. inquit que sunt existentia in creatura que possunt esse in divina essentia, et distinguit quod perfectiones in esse primario in creaturis non sunt formaliter in Deo, ut patet de auro, sed secundarie que sunt in creatura sunt in Deo, et non unitive, sed secundum existentiam formalem, salvis suis rationibus formalibus. Et ideo videtur mihi quod Anselmus est pro me et non pro ipso. 140 145 150

[2a.21] Ad rationem ergo suam. Ad primam propositionem, ‘illa que habent’ etc., dico quod vel accipis illam formalem completivam rationem essentiam divinam vel rationem formalem uniuscuiusque. Primo modo nego maiorem; sed ~~im~~ in minore dico quod indistinguitur in ratione formali completiva, que est divina essentia; sed non in suis rationibus formalibus. 155

[2a.22] Ad confirmationem de Anselmo, ‘quia ille perfectiones non dicunt quale, sed quid’, dico quod, si vis quod ille perfectiones propter hoc sint in primo modo dicendi per se \quod dicunt quid/, hoc est falsum, quia tunc, \per oppositum/ quale, non \langle quid \rangle, quod non, \quia differentia est in primo modo dicendi per se, quod tamen non sequeretur/. Dico quod dicuntur quid, quia sunt perfectiones essentie et non suppositi, non quod illud quid sit de primo modo dicendi per se. 160 165

[2a.23] Ad aliam, ‘quia essentia divina est simpliciter et formaliter infinita, ideo etc’, per illam rationem probaretur quod relationes different quid, quod non est secundum Anselmum; sunt ergo infinita realiter; sed illa infinitas non excludit rationes formales, et ex hoc patet quod ratio secunda mea stat adhuc. 170

- [2a.24-9] Ad rationes secundi socii. Ad primum, ‘infinite simpliciter non permittit distinctionem alicuius a se ipso; sed divina essentia est huiusmodi; ideo etc’. Ad illam arguo sic: illud permittit distinctionem ex natura rei alicuius a se quod permittit rationem quidditativam alicuius
 175 quod est in ipso; sed infinitas est huiusmodi; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia manente ratione diffinitiva, manet distinctio ex natura rei; minor, quia, si ens esset infinite, non minus esset bonum quam modo; sed secundum Commentatorem ens, bonum, verum distinguuntur rationibus propriis. Dico ergo quod una est distinctio realis que facit hoc non esse
 180 hoc simpliciter, alia formalis que non facit hoc non esse hoc simpliciter. Maior est vera primo modo; sed non secundo modo.
 [2a.25-10] Ad confirmationem, ‘illa natura que est universaliter perfecta, sumpta formaliter includit omnem perfectionem simpliciter’, concedo illam, ~~et quando dicitur~~ quod includit ~~illam distinctionem~~, sed non formaliter. Et quando confirmatur, ‘quia, si non, Deus non esset quo maius excogitari non posset’, dico quod, si formaliter esset pertinens ad perfectionem simpliciter, tunc verum esset. Unde si accipias eum precise illius formalitatis a realitate, sic non dico perfectionem, ideo etc./
 185 [2a.26] Ad confirmationem aliam, dico etc. \quod propter hoc creatura dicitur imperfecta, quia caret aliqua perfectione reali/.
 190

⟨Articulus secundus⟩

[2a.27] Quantum ad secundum, scilicet quod humana voluntas est aliquo modo non-idem cum essentia anime \videbitur alias. Vide residuum in sequenti sexto in penultimo et ultimo folio, ubi simile signum ponitur Θ/.

⟨Principium in II Sententiarum⟩

⟨Secunda pars⟩

[117v] {Ista questio continuatur cum questione precedentis sexterni in ultimo folio ubi ponitur tale signum Θ .}

⟨Conclusio prima: intelligere et velle non reducuntur ad idem principium⟩

[2b.1] Circa secundum articulum, scilicet quod voluntas distincta est \ex natura rei/ ab essentia anime in creaturis, ratio prima erat illa: operationes essentialem ordinem ad se invicem habentes que habent ex 5 suis principiis rei modum oppositum principiandi non reducuntur ad idem principium; sed intelligere et velle in nobis sunt huiusmodi; ideo etc.

[2b.2] Sed contra illam conclusionem arguit unus socius, \probando quod potentie anime distinguantur ab essentia anime, non solum ex natura rei, 10 sed etiam realiter/, primo sic: quia, si potentie anime distinguerentur ab essentia anime solum ex natura rei et non realiter, sequeretur \quod/ ~~tunc~~ idem esset simul activum et passivum; hoc falsum, V *Metaphysice*, et consequentia, quia idem esset agens et patiens, quia intellectus agens et possibilis. 15

[2b.3] Secundo, idem moveretur motibus oppositis, et probatur, quia motus incontinentis sunt ad contraria; ideo etc.

[2b.4] Tertio sic: propria passio distinguitur realiter a subiecto; sed potentie anime sunt huiusmodi.

⟨Responsio (in Principium in IV Sententiarum?)⟩

[2b.5-2] Ad illas respondi. Ad primam dixi quod non est inconueniens 20 idem realiter diversum formaliter, quia idem potest in se agere, ut angelus.

[2b.6-3] Ad secundam respondi quod $\&$ sensitiva et intellectiva, si sunt una forma, tunc moveri motibus oppositis est vel executive vel allici- 25 tive. Primum non convenit, secundum bene, quia allective non est

13 *Metaphysice*: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* V, c. 10 (1018a20–25; AL 25.3.1, p. 105): “Contraria dicuntur que non possunt simul adesse eidem differentium secundum genus... alia vero contraria dicuntur hec quidem in talia habere, alia in talium susceptiva esse, alia in activa aut passiva esse talium...” **17** motus – contraria: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nichomachea*, I, c. 13 (1102b21; AL 26.3, p. 394): “ad contraria enim motus incontinencium.”

inconueniens aliquid simul moveri ad opposita; sic hic. Si autem distincte, tunc non est inconueniens, quia tunc appetitus sunt distincti realiter.

[2b.7-4] Ad tertiam negavi assumptum.

⟨Obiectiones⟩

- 30 [2b.8-5] Sed contra illa arguitur. Contra primam solutionem primo sic: si sic, tunc sequeretur quod idem esset magis idem sibi quam ipsummet; hoc est falsum {V *Metaphysice*, quia non est media propositio huius: ‘homo est homo’, neque causa}, et consequentia, quia activum \in actu/ respicit passivum in actu mediante ~~passione~~ \actione/, sed medium
35 \magis/ est idem extremis quam extremum extremo.
[2b.9] Secundo, quia tunc idem referretur ad se relatione reali.
[2b.10] Tertio, quia vel ut omnino idem – et tunc contradictio – vel non ut omnino idem – et tunc quero de illo: vel est absolutum – et sic habetur intentum; si respectivum – hoc non; nec valet dicere quod hoc
40 est quia est virtualiter in actu et in potentia formali, quia quero de illo esse virtuali: vel est idem, etc., et sic idem quod prius.
[2b.11-6] Contra secundam solutionem arguitur, quia secundum primam solutionem conceditur propositum, quia ille habilitates sunt potentie anime, et sic habetur intentum.
45 [2b.12] Sed secundum secundam solutionem adhuc est contra me capiendo intellectum et voluntatem, \quia/ moventur motibus oppositis.
[2b.13] Item, quod distinguitur realiter probatur, quia unum determinat alterum, ut voluntas intellectum.
[2b.14-7] Contra tertiam solutionem, illud quod non indicat quid est
50 esse subiecti est distinctum realiter a subiecto; sed propria passio est huiusmodi, V *Thopicorum*.
[2b.15] Secundo sic: illud quod differt diffinitione data per additamentum per alterum non est idem sibi realiter; sed propria passio est huiusmodi ad subiectum; ideo etc.

32 *Metaphysice*: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* V, c. 15 (1021b3–b11; AL 25.3.1, p. 114). **51** *Thopicorum*: ARISTOTELES, *Topica* V, c. 3 (131b37–132a6, AL V.1–3, p. 95): “Deinde destruendi quidem si diffinitionem ut proprium assignavit; non enim erit bene positum proprium; non enim oportet indicare quid est esse proprium; ut quoniam qui dixit hominis proprium animal gressibile bipes quid est esse significans assignavit hominis proprium, non erit hoc hominis proprium bene assignatum. Adstruendi autem si quod conversim quidem praedicatur assignavit proprium, non indicans autem quid est esse. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium.”

⟨Ad obiectiones⟩

[2b.16-8] Ad illa. Ad primum, quando dicitur ~~idem~~ ‘aliquid esset magis’,
 etc., nego consequentiam, nec ratio sua concludit hoc, quia concludit
 quod actio mediat inter activum et passivum, et sic illa ratio probaret
 quod aliquid magis idem cum alio quam cum seipso, quia \est/ actione
 activum e etc. Unde nego quod idem esset magis idem seipso quam
 ipsum cum seipso. Et quando probatur ‘medium est magis idem cum
 extremo’, etc., dico quod quoddam est medium per participationem,
 quoddam per abnegationem, quoddam per connexionem. Exemplum de
 primo patet de fusco et de illo concederetur; sed de medio secundo et
 tertio modo non conceditur. Ratio, quia tale medium et extrema sunt
 diversorum generum; sic autem actio se habet ad activum et passivum.
 [2b.17-9] Ad secundum, ‘tunc sequeretur quod idem referretur relatione
 reali’, ad illam dico quod relatio duplex est: quedam intrinsecus adveni-
 ens \que dicitur respectus/, quedam extrinsecus, {quia actio et passio
 sunt respectus extrinsecus advenientes}. Modo, quando dicitur, ‘si sic’,
 etc., dico quod verum est de relatione que non est intrinsecus adveniens.
 Modo Aristoteles ibi \in V/ loquitur de talibus relationibus que sunt
 intrinsecus advenientes.
 [2b.18] Item, diceretur quod relatio realis requirit extremum reale, sed
 non distinctionem extremorum realium. Unde relatio secundum suam
 naturam est ad aliud quod est aliud realiter ab ipsa reali existente. Vel
 posset dici quod primum non est inconveniens \de/ aliqua relatione reali
 idem referri ad se.
 [2b.19-10] Ad tertium dico uno modo quod esset omnino idem, et quando
 dicitur ‘sequeretur contradictio’, nego. Et quando probatur ‘quia esset
 in actu et non in actu’, dico affirmatio et negatio non contradicunt nisi
 ut referruntur ad idem. Modo sic non esset in proposito. Quia idem
 esset in actu virtuali et non in actu formali, sic non est ibi contradic-
 tio. Si autem diceretur quod non esset ~~non~~ omnino idem, et illud ‘non
 omnino’ ~~idem~~ esset est absolutum et est res que est essentia anime, ali-
 ter potest dici quod ad contradictionem requiritur quod sit eiusdem \ad
 idem secundum ide(m)/ similiter etc. Modo hic non accipitur similiter
 ut in actu virtuali [118r] et in potentia formali.
 [2b.20-11] Ad aliud, de istis inclinationibus que sunt quedam habilitates
 et sunt potentie anime, dico quod istas habilitates non pono aliquid di-
 stinctum ab anima additum ipsi. Unde diversa obiecta inclinare possunt
 intellectum, non per diversas inclinationes que sunt in essentia anime.

[2b.21-12] Ad aliud dico quod, etsi \pos/sint motibus oppositis moveri, tamen non distinguuntur realiter.

95 [2b.22-13] Ad aliud dico quod idem realiter \et formaliter/ determinat se, ut patet de voluntate, que se ipsam determinat; \ideo multo magis idem realiter, quod tamen non est idem formaliter, sicut voluntas intellectum/.

[2b.23-14] Ad aliud, ~~proprie~~ 'illud quod non indicat', nego, quia nihil proprie dicit quid nisi in primo modo dicendi per se; sed non omnia que
100 sunt in secundo modo dicendi sunt distincta realiter.

[2b.24-15] Ad aliud, quod diffiniri per additamentum est dupliciter: vel quod illud additum sit res distincta vel secundum conceptum, et sic propria passio se habet ad subiectum. Aliter, quod hoc fit pro tanto quia semper ad propriam passionem communicetur subiectum.

**⟨Conclusio secunda: distinctio ex natura rei sufficit ad
rationem scientie⟩**

105 [2b.25] Secunda conclusio fuit quod illa distinctio ex natura rei sufficit ad rationem scientie. Illa distinctio que permittit predicatum esse de secundo modo dicendi per se sufficit ad rationem scientie; sed ita est.

[2b.26] Secundo sic: distinctio minor permittens predicatum mediatum de subiecto plus sufficit quam maior; sed distinctio ex natura rei est
110 huiusmodi; ideo etc.

⟨Obiectiones socii⟩

[2b.27] Contra istam conclusionem arguit unus socius: illa distinctio non sufficit ad rationem scientie que non ponit predicatum extra primum modum dicendi per se; sed distinctio ex natura rei est huiusmodi; maior patet, et minor probatur per me, quia dixi quod diffinitio et diffinitum
115 distinguuntur ex natura rei, \et tamen distinctio inter diffinitionem et diffinitum est in primo modo dicendi per se/; ideo etc.

[2b.28] Et confirmatur, quia illa distinctio non ponit predicatum extra primum modum dicendi per se que ~~p~~ semper concomitatur modum primum dicendi per se; sed ita est in proposito; ideo etc.

120 [2b.29] Tertio: illa distinctio que non ponit predicatum in esse \subiectivo/, sed solum in \idem/ non sufficit ad rationem scientie; sed distinctio ex natura rei est huiusmodi.

⟨Ad obiectiones⟩

[2b.30-27] Ad primum dico quod indistinctione ex natura non est idem gradus, sed diversi, quia quedam est que ponit predicatum extra primum modum dicendi per se, quedam que non ponit. Modo socius male ex hoc arguit contra me; ideo etc. Et patet solutio. Diffinitio enim et diffinitum distinguuntur ex natura rei, ymmo etiam que distinguuntur diffinitionibus distinguuntur ex natura rei. Unde in argumento illo est fallacia consequentis. Unde quedam sunt magis nota secundum naturam rei, quedam quoad nos. Modo ex natura rei diffinitio est notior quam diffinitum, et e converso de passione respectu subiecti. 125 130

[2b.31-28] Ad secundum dico quod illa propositio non est vera, quia non oportet quod eodem modo comparentur aliqua inter se ut comparantur in tertio, ut patet de personis divinis. Similiter genus et differentia distinguuntur ex natura rei, et tamen ut comparantur ad diffinitionem, etc. 135

[2b.32-29] Ad tertium, ‘illa distinctio que non ponit predicatum in esse sed esse idem non sufficit ad rationem scientie’, dico quod, si illud sit extra illud in primo modo dicendi per se, sufficit ad rationem scientie; sic est hic. 140

⟨Conclusio tertia: Deo non repugnat esse subiectum scientie,
quia Deo competit habere conceptum quidditativum et
qualitativum, et esse Deum et esse sapientem⟩

[2b.33] Tertia conclusio erat quod Deo non repugnat esse subiectum scientie, quia Deo competit habere conceptum quidditativum \et qualitativum, et esse Deum et esse sapientem etc./ [etc.]

⟨Obiectiones socii⟩

[2b.34] Contra arguitur: cui repugnat talis distinctio que sufficit ad rationem scientie, illi etc. \repugnat esse subiectum in scientia; sed Deo hoc repugnat, quia conceptus qualitativus/. 145

[2b.35] Secundo sic: cui repugnat esse conceptus quidditativus et qualitativus, ei repugnat esse subiectum in scientia; sed Deus est huiusmodi. Probatio, quia illa attributa que dicunt quid. Et ostendit iste socius primo quid sit conceptus quidditativus. Et est quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per ‘quid’. Et qualitativus, quod respondetur ad interrogationem factam per ‘quale’. Ex hoc probatur: de eo de quo non potest attingi aliquid quod de eo dicat diminutum vel imperfectiorem, 150

non potest esse ~~subiectum~~ ⟨attingi⟩ conceptus qualitativus; sed Deus
 155 est huiusmodi. Item, quia in Deo non potest esse resolutio conceptus
 qualitativi, ideo etc.

[2b.36] Tertio, quia de Deo non potest esse conceptus differens realiter
 ab ipso; ideo etc.

[2b.37] Quarto, ~~¶~~ ille conceptus vel erat accidentalis, quod non, vel
 160 substantialis, quod non, quia illud non est demonstrabile de Deo.

⟨Ad obiectiones⟩

[2b.38-34] Ad illa. Ad primum, dico quod conceptum quidditativum pos-
 sumus accipere vel totalem vel partialem. Modo non possumus accipere
 de Deo conceptum quidditativum ~~totalem~~ \partialem/, sed \totalem/,
~~non partialem~~ et sic etiam negat Damascenus. Et iterum conceptus qua-
 165 litativus vel capitur proprie, ut est qualitas, vel pro omni eo quod est
 extra primum modum dicendi per se, et hoc secundo modo capitur in
 divinis conceptus qualitativus et non primo modo. Et quando decla-
 rat conceptus istos, dicens conceptum quidditativum esse perfectionem
 simpliciter et qualitativum quod non est perfectio simpliciter, secundum
 170 Anselmum, *Omol.*, quedam est perfectio primaria, quedam secundaria;
 et tamen ‘vult’* [118v] est perfectio simpliciter, et sic conceptus quali-
 tativus non est distinctus, sed quod inest rei secundo. Et ideo male
 accipit conceptum qualitativum, et ex hoc rationes solute sunt.

[2b.39-35] Ad illud de resolutione dico quod de ratione conceptus quali-
 175 tativi universaliter non est talis resolutio, sed solum \ut/ est de genere
 qualitatis; ideo ratio non concludit. Item hoc inesse hoc est vel per rea-
 lem idemnitatem vel per inherentiam; modo primum Deo non repugnat,
 sed secundum bene.

[2b.40-36] Ad illud quod conceptus non est differens, etc., Commentator
 180 in XII *Metaphysice* commento 39 non vult quod in Deo sint conceptus
 compositi, sed bene sunt ibi plures conceptus, quia dicta de Deo non
 sunt idem omnibus modis ut synonyma.

[2b.41-37] Ad ultimum dico quod est in quale non accidentale, sed quod
 est extra primum modum dicendi per se, ut dictum est.

185 Et sic de illo.

163 conceptum] conceptus *corr.* quidditativum] quidditatem *corr.*

164 Damascenus: IOANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 4 (ed. BUYTAERT, p. 19): “Quid vero est secundum substantiam et naturam, incomprehensibile est hoc omnino et ignotum.”; (p. 21): “Quecumque autem dicimus in Deo affirmative, non naturam, sed ea quae sunt circa naturam ostendunt.” **170** Anselmum: Cf. supra, n. 2a.22. **180** Metaphysice: AVERROES, *Metaphysica* XII, comm. 39 (ed. Iuntina, 322vaI-323rbD), e.g.: “Multiplicitas igitur in Deo non est nisi in intellectu differentia, non in esse.”

⟨Principium in III Sententiarum⟩

[141r] {Principium minoris de tertio libro Sententiarum}

Questio est utrum incarnatio-actio sit distincta ab incarnante et incarnato.

[3.1] Quod \sic/ ~~non~~: illa non sunt una res quorum unum manet, altero non; sed incarnatum et incarnans manent, incarnatione non \manente/; 5
ideo etc.

[3.2] Oppositum: incarnatio-actio est relatio; sed nulla relatio est distincta res a fundamento et termino; ideo etc. Minor per unum socium hoc dicentem.

[3.3] Quia incarnatio-actio est divina operatio cuius principium est divina 10
voluntas, et ideo primo videndum de voluntate, quomodo se habet \ad intellectum et/ ad essentiam; secundo de relatione, quomodo se habet ad fundamentum; tertio de principali.

⟨Articulus primus: quomodo voluntas se habet ad intellectum et ad essentiam⟩

[3.4] Quantum ad primum dixi alias quod distinguitur aliquo modo ex 15
natura rei ab eo cuius est. Ratio erat: operationes circa idem obiectum, ordinem habentes, requirentes oppositum modum principiandi non requirunt ~~obiectum~~ principium totaliter indistinctum; sed ita se habet de operationibus voluntatis et intellectus.

⟨Obiectiones socii⟩

[3.5] Ad rationem istam respondet unus socius dicens quod non probat 20
intentum, quia eadem anima cum specie causat actum intelligendi et similiter \ipsa cum specie et actu intelligendi causat/ actum volendi, et ideo bene concurrentia ad unum distinguuntur a concurrentibus ad aliud sed \hoc/ bene: idem indistinctum potest esse naturale et liberum, \ut patet de voluntate/ [de voluntate]; ideo et hic similiter. Secundo probat 25
conclusionem oppositam, arguendo sic: omnis ~~inte~~ voluntas est indistincta formaliter a voluntate; essentia est voluntas; ideo est indistincta a voluntate; ideo etc.

(Ad obiectiones socii)

- [3.6] Sed ego excludam primo suam responsionem, secundo solvam suam rationem. Quantum ad primum probo quod ratio mea probat intentum.
- 30 Probatio, quia queritur utrum intellectus et voluntas aliquo modo etc., et non quero de nominibus sed de signata re per voces, et hoc concludit questio et hoc probatur sufficienter ex ratione mea, quia, si non, tunc duo contradictoria extrema verificarentur de eodem; ideo etc. Unde est distinctio in signato per vocem.
- 35 [3.7] Sed socius in instantia premitit unum quod est falsum, et est quod anima cum specie causat actum intelligendi, et cum actu intelligendi actum volendi. Hoc est falsum, III *De anima*: “Dico autem ~~anima~~ que intellectum quo anima opinatur et intelligit”, et hoc est aliud a voluntate qua anima vult. Et ideo inconveniens est hoc et est falsum. Patet
- 40 IX *Metaphysice*, et \ibidem/ 16^o commento, Commentator <dicat> quod intelligere et velle sunt actus immanentes quibus nihil extra producitur; ratione sic: quod est simpliciter determinatum ad unum non potest concurrere in ratione principii ad actus oppositos circa idem – illa patet ex terminis, quia dicere oppositum est implicare <contradictionem>; sed ac-
- 45 tus intelligendi est determinatus ad unum; sed actus voluntatis respectu eiusdem possunt esse oppositi; ideo etc.
- [3.8] Item, si sic, sequitur quod actus intelligendi essent eque liberi sicut volendi. Hoc falsum, quia tunc esset ita laudabile intelligere verum vel falsum sicut velle bonum vel malum. Hoc falsum. Probatio consequen-
- 50 tie: quia, quando ad aliqua duo concurrunt omnino eadem, uno solo accepto, sunt equaliter laudabilia et vituperabilia; sed <in> ~~aetus~~ anima ~~de~~ species actus intelligendi sunt huiusmodi, accepto actu intelligendi ad actum volendi; ideo etc.
- [3.9] Ulterius dicit ipse quod, ex eo quod operationes habent modum
- 55 oppositum, non arguitur distinctio in principiis, quia eadem voluntas potest esse principium liberum et naturale, et sic negando maiorem meam. Sed non respondet ad probationem, que erat quod idem ageret

37 De anima: ARISTOTELES, *De anima* III, c. 1 (429a22): “Dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima.” **40** Metaphysice: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* IX, c. 8 (1050a34–b1, AL 25.3.1, p. 190): “Quorum vero non est aliud aliquod opus preter actionem, in ipsis existit actio, ut visio in vidente et speculatio in speculante et vita in anima.”; cf. *Auctoritates Aristoteles* (ed. HAMESSE, p. 134, n. 226): “Duplex est actio: quaedam est transiens in materiam extra ut aedificatio et illa dicitur factio vel operatio factiva, quaedam est imminens sive intus manens in operante et est visio vel intellectio et illa dicitur actio activa.” **40** Commentator: AVERROES, *Metaphysica* IX, comm. 16 (ed. Bürke, p. 61): “Omnia vero quae non habent acta, sed finis eorum est actio, actiones eorum existunt in eis ut videre in visu et vita in anima et fortuna in ea.”

naturaliter et non naturaliter. Sed ipse accipit falsum, quod voluntas
 concurrat necessario ad causandum actum volitionis in alio, quia voluntas
 semper concurrat contingenter ad actum volendi, licet non quoad actum
 intelligendi. Unde obiectum concurrat ad actum intelligendi, sed non
 volendi, quia intellectus est determinatus ad unum sicut et obiectum,
 non sic de voluntate; ideo etc. Unde secundum doctorem nostrum, in
 ratione obiecti concurrat ratio motivi et terminativi, nec oportet quod in
 quolibet actu intelligendi concurrat utraque ratio, quia in cognitione Dei
 vel divine esse^(ntie) non concurrat ratio motiva, quia illa est necessaria,
 sed terminative solum. [141v] Sic in voluntate ut habet rationem ob-
 iecti concurrat ratio obiecti terminativa, et non motiva, quia determinat
 modum agendi contingenter. Sed concessa tota deductione, nihil habet
 contra me, quia in maiori mea sunt due condiciones: prima, quod ille
 operationes ex natura sua habeant ordinem, et sic non reducuntur ad
 idem principium omnino indistinctum. Secunda condicio quod requirant
 oppositum modum principiandi.

[3.9] Contra hoc nihil facit instans, quia volitio in quocumque determi-
 nat sibi modum liberum agendi, sed actus intelligendi determinat sibi
 modum agendi necessarium; volitio enim ex natura volitionis determinat
 sibi modum agendi contingentem, sed non sic de actu intelligendi. Et sic
 concesso, quid voluerit adhuc? Instans non est contra maiorem meam.

[3.10] Ad rationem suam contra conclusionem – ratio est illa: omnis
 intellectus vel voluntas est indistinctus vel \indistincta/ formaliter ab
 intellectu vel voluntate; sed essentia etc. – alias respondi ad illam ra-
 tionem sufficienter et induxi instantias; sed ipse intendit excludere eas.
 D\ixi/ sic \in prima instantia:/ omnis homo est homo in primo modo
 dicendi per se; sed risibile est homo; ergo est in primo modo dicendi per
 se. Conclusio est falsa; ideo etc. Sed ipse dicit quod maior est incon-
 veniens quia et non intelligibilis, quia homo est homo in campo, etc.,
 sed non in primo modo dicendi per se, quia signum universale distribuit
 eum per omnibus signatis que sunt particulares homines, et sic designat
 propositio quod predicatum insit cuilibet particulari, quod est falsum in
 primo modo maior non est vera sicut dicit.

[3.11] Sed illa responsio non excludit instantiam, primo quia non ca-
 pit meum modum arguendi. Sed sicut ipse arguit, \sic ego argui/, sic,
 scilicet omnis homo est indistinctus formaliter a homine; ‘formaliter’

89 particulari] particularem *corr.* 93 a] ab *corr.*

63 doctorem nostrum: E.g., IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio I*, d. 35, q. un. (ed. Vaticana, v. 6, p. 268): “obiectum in quantum motivum et in quantum primo terminativum (et per hoc dupliciter necessario requisitum vel coexactum ad actum) est aequae illimitatum.”

enim vel est condicio forme existentis in supposito vel ut est modificatio
 95 propositionis, et sic causat primum modum propositionis, et sic capien-
 do arguitur sic: omnis homo est indistinctus formaliter ab homine. Ex
 hoc dico quod sua ratio non valet, quia non est intelligibilis sicut et ipse
 arguit contra me. Et quando dicit quod ‘signum universale distribuit’,
 etc., concedatur. Et quando dicitur quod hoc est falsum hic, dico quod
 100 ipse inepte accipit predicatum, quia deberet accipere hominem predi-
 catum cum modificatione, sed accipit absolute. Sed ego accipio cum
 modificatione.

[3.12] Et quando argui quod idem est esse in primo modo dicendi per
 se et formaliter esse idem ~~sunt~~, arguit sic: ‘homo est animal’ est vera in
 105 primo modo dicendi per se; ergo res que est animal est idem formaliter
 homini, illa patet. \Ex hoc ultra:/ ~~homo~~ animal est idem formaliter
 homini; sed non in primo modo dicendi per se, quia non de omni, et
 tamen per se presupponit de omni. Ex hoc sic: si animal non est idem
 formaliter homini, ergo nec homo idem formaliter animali, et tamen idem
 110 in primo modo dicendi per se. Ideo non sunt idem esse idem formaliter
 alicui et esse in primo modo dicendi per se.

[3.13] Sed ego excludam istam instantiam, confirmando primo dictum
 meum, quod est esse ~~idem~~ in primo dicendi per se est esse idem forma-
 liter, quia I *Posteriorum* illud dicitur esse in primo modo dicendi per se
 115 quod est diffinitio vel pars diffinitionis, et hoc est esse \idem/ formaliter,
 \quia partes diffinitionis forme sunt/. Ex hoc, quod est idem alicui sicut
 diffinitio vel pars diffinitionis est idem sibi formaliter, sed ~~et~~ illud quod
 est in primo modo dicendi per se est huiusmodi; ideo etc.

[3.14] Ad rationem suam, ipse facit multas consequentias. Prima est:
 120 ‘homo est animal’ est in primo modo dicendi per se, ergo res que est
 animal est idem formaliter homini. Antecedens conceditur, sed ~~de~~ con-
 sequentia non sequitur, quia tunc esset convertibile antecedens et conse-
 quens, quia in terminis convertibilibus, sicut indefinita infert indefinitam
 et universalis universalem in eisdem terminis. Illa patet, quia si non, ter-
 125 mini non essent convertibiles. Ex hoc sic: illa propositio indefinita ‘homo
 est animal’ est in primo modo dicendi per se; infert illam ~~homo est res~~
 ‘animal est idem formaliter homini’; ideo e converso; ideo etc.

[3.15] Item, illa instantia peccat secundum sua dicta, quia est fallacia
 figure dictionis: ‘per se primo modo’ est condicio propositionis ut est

97 intelligibilis] intelligis *corr.*

114 Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Posteriora analytica* I, c. 4 (73a34–37; AL 4.4, p. 290); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. HAMESSE, p. 314, n. 38): “Per se primo sunt quaecumque in ratione dicente quod quid est insunt, ut triangulo inest linea et punctum lineae (substantia enim horum est in his).”

in anima, ergo ex hoc inferre de re extra ~~est~~ est fallacia accidentis, et tamen ipse sic arguit. 130

[3.16] Secunda consequentia fuit illa: ‘animal est idem homini formaliter, sed ita non-idem idem in primo modo dicendi; ideo, etc. ~~et-ete-~~ Sicut dictum est prius, quando dicit ‘animal est idem homini formaliter’ consideretur predicatum quod ponitur in recto et modificatio in concreto; idemptitas enim in concreto non est in aliquo modo dicendi per se, sed est attributum; sic autem non est de animali et homini, quia non habent substantiam communem in qua idemptificentur. Et quando dicit ultra ‘ergo, si animal non est idem formaliter’, etc., illa consequentia nulla est; species non predicatur de genere, ergo neque econverso. Nulla est consequentia, et tamen ipse sic capit. Et sic patet quod instantia mea non excluditur, sicut dictum est. 135 140

[3.17] Secunda instantia fuit. Argui enim sic: voluntas est indistincta \vocaliter/ a voluntate; anima est voluntas; ergo est indistincta vocaliter a voluntate. Conclusio est falsa; ideo etc. Ipse dicit quod ~~quando~~ ego male accepi, quia in alio tempore [142r] protuli illa. Sed ego accipiendo secundum speciem concludo contra eum. 145

⟨**Articulus secundus: quomodo relatio se habet ad
fundamentum**⟩

[3.18] Quantum ad secundum articulum, et dixit socius quod nulla relatio est res distincta a fundamento; sed ego dixi oppositum contradictoria quod aliqua sit. 150

[3.19] Ego ostendam primo quod rationes socii nihil valent contra me facte ~~pro~~ nunc. Ipse enim ponit talem casum: ponamus quod Deus suspendat actionem solis per unum instans et tunc si, etc., idem erit et non, arguendo sic: illa res erit, scilicet illuminatio solis, quia nonnisi per unum instans, et numquam erit, quia pro nullo instanti. Probatio: actio non erit post quam lux generata est; sed pro omni instanti \futuro accepto/ lux est generata. Probatio, quia pro quocumque futuro et accepto erit instans medium; ideo etc. Et confirmat rationem suam, et primo suppositum quod Deus solem suspendat per solum instans, quia nulla creatura eam cogit ad oppositum, ideo etc. Et confirmat, quia lux est res nata tota fieri simul; ideo Deus potest eam suspendere uno solo instanti; ideo erit et numquam erit. 155 160

[3.20] Ad illam confirmationem respondi, primo arguendo per simile: suppositum scilicet quod Deus potest influere per solum instans, et tunc

165 arguendo sicut tu, quia vel in instanti immediate sequenti vel in tempore,
 etc., sicut tu.

[3.21] Ad casum respondi primo probando quod includitur contradictio
in dictis; omne illud cuius factio est in instanti habet primum instans
sui esse; sed omne illud

170 [ends abruptly]

Appendix C:

Guilelmus de Brena OFM,

Reportatio in libros

Sententiarum

Lectioes 3–4

⟨Lectio 3⟩

[5v] Consequenter queritur \primo/ utrum theologia sit subalternans scientia \sibi aliam vel subalternata alteri/; secunda est utrum sit una; tertia utrum scientia et fides si(n)t respectu eiusdem; quarta utrum scientia et opinio possint esse de eodem.

[1] De tertia arguitur [sic] quod non: tantum repugnat medium uni extremo quantum alteri; sed fides est medium inter scientiam et opinionem; ergo etc. Minor: Hugo, *De sacramentis* libro I, dicens quod fides est supra scientiam et infra opinionem. Ideo etc. Sed fides et opinio non possunt esse simul, quia habent rationes repugnantes \formalis oppositionis/. 5 10

[2] Oppositum: perfectiones alterius perfectio rationis non repugnant eadem nisi ratione repugnantie adinvicem; sed fides et scientia sunt alterius rationis et non formaliter opponuntur, ut patet; ideo, etc.

13 rationis] rationes *corr.*

7 De sacramentis: HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis fidei Christianae*, I, 10, ed. R. BERNDT, p. 226: “Sic itaque fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, quia per eam iam quodammodo quae futura sunt subsistunt in nobis, et argumentum non apparentium, quoniam per ea quae occulta sunt approbantur a nobis. Sed quia in hac descriptione non quid sit fides, sed quid faciat fides ostenditur, nec ea quae de praeteritis vel de praesentibus habetur fides diffinitur, si quis plenam ac generalem diffinitionem fidei signare voluerint dicere potest: fidem esse certitudinem quamdam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam.”

⟨Q. 1: Utrum theologia sit subalternans scientia⟩

[3] Ad questionem primo propositam, utrum theologia, etc., \pono/ quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod theologia nostra non est subalterna respectu \theologie/ beatorum. Secunda, quod posito hoc, adhuc non esset scientia. Tertia est quod nulli alii subalternatur. Quarta, quod nullam sibi subalternat.

[4] Probatur prima conclusio, quia habet idem subiectum cum theologia beatorum sub eadem ratione, et cum hoc requiritur ad scientiam subalternam, \scilicet quod sub alia ratione subiectum considerent subalternans et subalterna/, I *Posteriorum*. Et antecedens patet ex precedenti.

[5] Secunda conclusio probatur: nulla notitia dicitur proprie scientia que non potest conclusiones suas reducere ad immediatas causas \et simpliciter notas et notiores scienti/ – illa patet I *Posteriorum*; sed theologia nostra hoc non potest facere – patet ex dictis, quia causa immediata est divina voluntas, et illa non est nobis nota.

[6] Sed una opinio communis dicit contrarium \contra istas duas conclusiones, ponendo oppositum earum/. Contra primam \conclusionem/, quod sic, quia accipit pro principiis conclusiones demonstratas in theologia beatorum, ideo etc. Antecedens patet, quia accipit articulos fidei, qui sunt scientifice ibi noti.

[7] Contra secundam probatur \sic/: quia theologia subalternata est vere scientia \ut patuit iam in prima conclusione, quia theologie beatorum. Et declaratur in simili de perspectiva reducens suas conclusiones ad geometriam/. Ergo est vere scientia.

[8] Et VI *Ethicorum* dicit quod, cum principia fuerint aliquantulum credita, tunc per ea scitur scientifice; sed ita est de articulis fidei.

35 scientia] scientie *corr.*

22 Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, c. 13 (78b34–79a13; AL 4.4, p. 300). **26** Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, c. 2 (71b20–22; AL 4.4, p. 286); Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. HAMESSE, p. 312, n. 12): “Necesse est demonstrativam scientiam ex primis, veris, immediatis, prioribus, notioribus, causisque conclusionis.” **29** opinio communis: THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia pars, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Leonina, p. 9): “Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmetica notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” **38** Ethicorum: ARISTOTELES, *Ethica ad Nichomachum* VI, c. 3 (1139b32–33; AL 26.3, p. 480): “Cum enim aliquantulum credita et cogniti ipsi sint principia, scit.”

[9-6] Ad illa. Ad primum, nego. Et quando probatur, dico uno modo 40
quod, si theologia nostra est habitus distinctus a fide, non capit articulos
pro principiis. Aliter, quod non sufficit hoc, sed accipit subiectum cum
condicione non egrediente \a quidditate subiecti/.

[10-7] Ad aliam, nego. Et quando probatur de perspectiva scilicet, dico 45
quod, si perspectiva suas conclusiones ad per se nota non posset redu-
cere, \non/ esset scientia. Unde sine geometria, perspectiva non est
scientia, capiendo proprie scientiam. \Sed sic non est de theologia no-
stra respectu theologie beatorum, cum non posset reducere conclusiones
suas ad per se nota/.

[11-8] Et ad Aristotelem, VI *Ethicorum*, dico quod verum est proportio- 50
naliter, quia, sicut creduntur, ita erit scientia \conclusionum/, scilicet
credulitas.

[12] Tertia conclusio probatur: illa scientia nulli alteri subalternatur que
nullius alterius accipit conclusiones pro principiis; sed theologia nostra
est huiusmodi. Maior patet, quia hoc necessario requiritur; minor patet 55
de se.

[13] Quarta conclusio probatur, quia illa scientia nullam subalternat sibi
cuius nullis principia nulla alia accipit pro principiis – illa patet; sed ita
est de theologia.

**⟨Q. 2: Utrum theologia sit una
Articulus primus: a quo scientia dicatur una⟩**

[14] De secunda questione sunt duo videnda. Primum: a quo scientia di- 60
catur una. Et est notandum quod de scientia tripliciter possumus loqui.
Uno modo capitur pro noticia partiali, \scilicet, solius effectus seu con-
clusionis/. Secundo modo pro totali noticia, scilicet principii et effectus,
et hoc modo Commentator sumit IV \Physicorum/ \et I/ *Metaphysi-*
ce: nihil scimus vera scientia nisi cum cognoscamus rem cum sua causa. 65
Tertio modo pro habitu universali integrato ex omnibus conclusionibus
in ipsa congregatis. Tunc dico quod \non/ intendo hic loqui de primis
duobus modis \scientie/, sed \de/ tertio modo.

64–65 Metaphysice: AVERROES, *Metaphysica* IV, comm. 3 (ed. Iuntina, f. 67vaH–I):
“Manifestum etiam quod unius scientiae est consyderatio de omnibus istis formis et
de propriis eis, et consequentibus ipsas” et forsitan comm. 4; *Physica* I, comm. 1 (ed.
Iuntina, f. 6raA); *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. Hamesse, p. 143, n. 42): “Scientiarum
quaedam est perfecta et est illa quae fit per causam, quaedam est imperfecta et est
illa quae fit sine causa. . .”

⟨Opinio prima⟩

[15] Et quantum ad hoc primo recitabo opinionem unam, et est illa
 70 probabilis dicens quod unitas obiecti scibilis attenditur penes appro-
 priationem scibilitatis et unitas scientie penes unitatem modi \consi-
 derandi/ scibilitatis. Ratio prima: [6r] quia de illo dicitur primo una
 \scientia/ quo distinguitur primo a qualibet alia; sed hoc est scibilitatis
 75 \scientiarum/ attenditur penes demonstrationem quia et propter quid;
 sed modi procedendi scibilitatis sunt quia et propter quid. Maior patet
 I *Posteriorum*, et minor.

[16] Et tu diceres quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet utrumque. – Di-
 citur quod quia et propter quid uno modo \considerantur/ ut in eadem
 80 demonstratione sunt, et sic non diversificant ~~demonstrationem~~ scientias,
 alio modo ut sunt in diversis \demonstrationibus adinvicem tamen or-
 dinatis/, tertio modo ut pertinent ad disparatas demonstrationes, et sic
 sunt prime differentie scientiarum, \primis autem duobus modis non/.

[17] Secundo sic: sicut est ordo in ꝑ obiectis respectu potentiarum, sic
 85 subiectorum respectu scientiarum; sed potentie diversificantur inter se
 propter diversum modum obiectorum – illa patet, quia lux tantum con-
 venit cum colore sicut cum calore, et tamen lux et calor non pertinent
 ad eandem scientiam, sed lux et color, quia habent eundem modum
 immutandi.

[18] Et patet auctoritate Aristotelis in VI de *Metaphysice*, ubi distin-
 guit scientias propter diversum modum cognoscendi et abstrahendi, et I
Posteriorum Ethicorum {ubi inducit distinctionem inter scientias propter
 diversitatem modi considerandi, dicens “par peccatum esse demon-
 strare rethoricum et mathematicum persuasionibus esse contentum”}.
 95 Et Commentator, II *Metaphysice* 15 commento, dicit quod dividuntur
 artes secundum diversitatem modi procedendi et dicit quod quilibet

69 opinionem unam: PETRUS AUREOLI, *Reportatio in I Sententiarum*, Prol., q. 7
 (Utrum ratio formalis unius subiecti scibilis consistat in appropriatione unius modi
 scibilitatis determinati et specifici), a. 2, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. 123, f. 12ra:
 “Nunc de secundo articulo respondeo ad formam questionis et teneo quod formalis
 ratio unius subiecti scibilis consistit in appropriatione unius modi scibilitatis.” **77**
 Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, c. 13 (78a22–23; AL 4.4, p. 299);
Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. HAMESSE, p. 316, n. 64): “Duplex est scire, scilicet quia
 est et scire propter quid est.” **90** *Metaphysice*: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* VI, c. 1
 (1025b3–1026a30; AL 25.3.2, pp. 125–127). **93–94** par – contentum: Cf. ARISTO-
 TELES, *Ethica* I, c. 1 (1094b25–27; AL 26.1.2, p. 67): “Par enim [peccatum] videtur
 mathematicum probabiliter dicentem placere, et rethoricum demonstrationem experi-
 ri.” **95** *Metaphysice*: AVERROES, *Metaphysica* II, comm. 15 (ed. DARMS, p. 78): “Et
 ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod necesse est, ut homo instruatur in cognitione viae cuius-
 libet rei, quam vult declarare. Et dixit hoc, quia ars logica quaedam est universalis
 omnibus scientiis et quaedam propria unicuique scientiae.”

scientia appropriat sibi determinatam logicam, et illa est modus procedendi. Et 2 commento VI *Metaphysice*. Ista est opinio.

⟨Opinio secunda (propria)⟩

[19] Sed est alia opinio dicens quod unitas subiecti scibilis et unitas scientie attenditur ex unitate formali\um obiectorum/ in ordine ad pas- 100
siones. Ratio prima est: ab eo habitus habet unitatem a quo habet suos actus unitatem; sed actus est talis ratione obiecti; ergo et habitus. Maior patet, quia se habent ad invicem sicut primum et secundum. Minor probatur, quia vel ab obiecto vel \a/ potentia; non secundum; ergo etc.

[20] Secundo sic: ab eodem habitus habet unitatem a quo entitatem; sed 105
hanc habet ab obiecto et non \a/ potentia. Maior patet, et minor patet ex dictis, quia continet virtualiter totum habitum subiectum.

[21] Et patet etiam auctoritate \Aristotelis/, VI *Metaphysice*, ubi loquitur ex intentione de diversitate scientiarum inter se. Dicit “Oportet enim non latere quod quid erat esse et rationem \quomodo se habet/, 110
tamquam sine eo nihil sit facere”, scilicet ad distinctionem scientiarum et unitatem. Et II *Physicorum*, Commentator, commento 9, dicit: “Consideratio materie in respectu ad formam est naturalis, sed ut est unum entium est primi philosophi.” Ex hoc sic: penes aliam habitudinem materie ad aliam passionem est alterius scientie; hoc autem non est 115
nisi ratione formali subiecti.

[22] Et ad solutiones rationum in oppositum est notandum quod aliqua plura dici unum est ~~dupl~~tripliciter \tripliciter/: uno modo propter unitatem finis terminantis, secundo ratione \unitatis/ modi conformantis, tertio propter unitatem medii colligantis. Primo modo plures homines dicuntur 120
unus exercitus \propter unum finem ad quem ordinantur/. Secundo modo plures homines dicuntur una religio propter unum modum in quo conformantur. Tertio modo dicuntur plures amici esse una anima ratione medii colligantis.

[23] Ad propositum, illo triplici modo scientia dicitur una, et unitate finis 125
\terminantis/, et modus \conformantis/, ~~terminans~~ et medii colligantis. Quod primum sit verum, patet sic: illa scibilia dicuntur esse unius scientie que intellectum perficiunt in consideratione veritatis uno modo; sed 128
que] qui *corr.*

98 *Metaphysice*: AVERROES, *Metaphysica* VI, comm. 2 (ed. Iuntina, f. 148raA–B).

108 *Metaphysice*: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* VI, c. 1 (1025b28–30, AL 25.3.2, p. 126): “Oportet autem quid erat esse et rationem quomodo est non latere, tamquam sine hoc querere nihil facere sit.” 112 *Physicorum*: AVERROES, *Physica* II, comm. 21 (ed. Iuntina, f. 56raG): “Consyderatio enim de materia in respectu formae est consyderatio naturalis, et consyderatio de illa, secundum quod est unum entium, est consyderatio primi Philosophi.”

omnia naturalia sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet, et minor, quia, cum finis
 130 {speculative} scientie sit perficere ~~veritatis~~ intellectum in consideratio-
 ne veritatis, \et cum omnia naturalia hoc faciunt ut conveniunt sub una
 ratione, scilicet motus, patet illa minor de scientia naturali. Et similiter
 de mathematica et divina/. Et \ut/ hoc aliter convenit in considera-
 135 tione naturalium et aliter mathematicarum et aliter methaphysicalium
 propter diversitatem complexionis hominum et ex diversitate delectionis
 diversorum in diversorum consideratione. Unde ex hoc non sunt nisi isti
 tres habitus speculativi, et hoc vult Commentator.

[24] Secundum patet, scilicet quod ratione modi conformantis, quia di-
 stinguatur scientia naturalis a mathematica, quia naturalia aliter si-
 140 bi conformantur ad se invicem et aliter mathematicalia, quia natu-
 ralia conveniunt in materia; mathematicalia autem aliter. Et aliter
 methaphysicalia.

[25] Et tertium patet ratione medii \colligantis/, ~~eum~~ quia, sicut est in
 potentiis \per comparationem ad sua obiecta/, ~~sicut~~ in scientiis \per
 145 comparationem ad subiecta/; sed obiecta pertinent ad unam potentiam,
 quia conveniunt in una ratione obiectali; ideo etc. Et est prius facta illa
 ratio. [6v] Et ideo dicit Aristoteles I *Posteriorum* quod “una scientia est
 que est unius generis subiecti”, etc.

[26-15] Modo prima opinio, si aliquid valet, non est hoc nisi quantum
 150 ad ~~primam~~ secundam reducitur. Quando enim {in prima ratione} dicit
 ‘illud est’, etc., verum est; sed quando dicitur ‘quia et propter quid’,
 etc., illa est falsa. Sed, si sic, hoc est ratione formali obiecti vel subiecti.
 Quod autem quia et propter quid non distinguant scientias patet, ~~quia~~
 \quia capiendo conclusionem eandem que demonstratur quia per me-
 155 dium naturale et propter quid per medium astronomicum et ut habeat
 conclusionem, scilicet terram esse spericam. Et queram:/ vel totus habi-
 tus scientie naturalis distinguatur a toto habitu ~~me~~? astrologi \ponentis
 illud medium/, vel non. Non primum, patet esse falsum; si partialiter,
 non est ad propositum omne.

160 [27-17] Similiter secunda ratio non convenit nisi propter nostram. Quod
 enim lux et color convenient in uno modo immutandi, hoc nonnisi in-
 quantum conveniunt in una ratione formali, et hoc modo vadunt aucto-
 ritates Aristotelis et Commentatoris.

[28-18] Et in primo *Ethicorum* moralia habent modum determinatum,
 144 per²] pro *cod.* 157 habitu] habito *corr.*

137 Commentator: E.g., AVERROES, *Physica* II, comm. 71 (ed. Iuntina, f. 74raC–rbF).

147 Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, c. 28 (87a38; AL 4.4, p. 316):
 “Una autem scientia est que est unius generis.”

quia habent rationem formalem obiecti determinatam, et II *Metaphysice* 165
 Commentator est in contrarium, quia quod quelibet scientia habeat modum proprium considerandi, hoc est [ratione] ~~distincta~~ ratione formali subiecti, et sic vadunt omnes.

[29] Dico ergo quod scientia dicitur una que omnes conclusiones reducit ad unam rationem subiecti per quam \subiectum ~~eum~~ respicit omnes suas passiones et per quam/ omnes sue conclusiones sub uno modo determinato perficiunt intellectum. 170

⟨Articulus tertius: ad quaestionem⟩

[30] De tertio articulo dico quod theologia \nostra/ non est scientia una quantum ad istas condiciones, quia illa scientia non est una in qua omnes conclusiones non connectuntur in ratione formali \unius/ obiecti; 175
 sed theologia nostra est huiusmodi, {quia obiectum eius est Deus et non omnia considerata in theologia nostra sub illa ratione considerantur}; secundo dico quod potest dici aliquo modo una, quia habet unum subiectum et perficere intellectum habet uno modo in virtute unius principii formalis, ~~illa~~ et hoc sufficit ad unitatem aliquo modo. Assumpta 180
 patet, quia est de Deo et habet medium procedendi unum, scilicet a medio quod est revelatum a prima veritate.

⟨Q. 3: Utrum scientia et fides sint respectu eiusdem⟩

[31] Ad tertiam questionem dico, pone\ndo/ 4 conclusiones. Prima est quod impossibile est \unum et/ eundem habitum numero esse \fidem et scientiam/ ~~utrumque~~. Secunda conclusio, quod possibile est de eodem esse \utrumque/. ~~\Tertia conclusio quod impossibile est eundem habitum numero esse fidem et opinionem/. Quarta est quod impossibile est de eodem esse fidem et opinionem.~~ {Tertia conclusio est quod quod scientia et opinio compossibiles de eodem obiecto possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto. Quarta conclusio est quod possibile est eidem subiecto 190
 simul inesse fidem et opinionem}.

⟨Conclusio prima: impossibile est unum et eundem habitum numero esse fidem et scientiam⟩

[32] Prima conclusio probatur sic: ex actibus distinctis specie non causatur idem habitus numero – illa patet. Sed \actus/ fidei et scientie

173 tertio] tertia *corr.* 193 fidei] fides *corr.* scientie] scientia *corr.*

sunt huiusmodi. Illa que se habent sic quod uni repugnat unum quod
 195 necessario requiritur ad alterum \differunt specie/. Sed ita se habet de
 actu credendi et sciendi, quia actui sciendi repugnat hoc quod est non
 esse evidens de subiecto; sed hoc competit actui credendi, quia hoc est
 de ratione sua. Ideo etc.
 [33] Secundo sic: ille due notitie non sunt idem habitus numero que
 200 habent diversa media illativa eorum specie; sed ita est de hiis. Probatio:
 quia medium scientie \est/ demonstratio; sed medium secundi est notitia
 ex auditu; ideo etc.

⟨Opinio Durandi de Aureliaco⟩

[34] {Illa est opinio fratris Turandi, iam legentis *Sententias* apud Pre-
 dicatores} Sed contra hoc dicit unus socius. Dicit quod theologia est
 205 scientia in nobis, sed non nobis; sed est nobis fides. Et ratio sua prima
 erat illa: sicut se habet \de/ noto et notitia, sic in scito et scientia; sed
 idem numero potest in se esse maxime notum et non nobis; ideo etc.
 Maior patet de se, quia quod dicitur de superiori dicitur et de inferiori.
 Minor patet de se de divina essentia; \illa enim est maxime nota de qua
 210 est theologia nostra, et tamen non nota nobis/.

⟨Contra opinionem Durandi⟩

[35] Sed contra arguitur primo quod suum dictum contradicit hiis que
 ille alibi dicit. Dicit enim quod theologia etc. \est notitia in nobis, que
 tamen non est per causam/. Contra: nulla notitia est scientia proprie
 dicta que non sit notitia per causam; sed theologia in nobis non est talis;
 215 ideo etc. Sed hoc contradicit dictis suis, quia dicit quod nulla cognicio
 scientifica est que non sit acceptiva cause in esse; sed minor est sua. Si
 enim ~~negat~~ dicit quod est per causam, contra: ubi non est notitia \a
 priori/ ex natura rei, ibi non est deductio per causam; sed ita est in
 theologia; ideo, etc. Et hoc etiam ipse concedit.
 220 [36] Secundo ostendo quod secundum dictum contra[7r] dicit primo, \sci-
 licet quod sit scientia in nobis sed non nobis/, sic: cuicumque repugnat
 effectus cause formalis respectu subiecti apti nati ad illum effectum \re-
 cipiendum/, illi repugnat esse \habere/ illam formam; illa est vera de
 albedine \et subiecto, cui, si repugnat esse album, ei repugnat habere
 225 albedinem/. Sed per eum ~~scientie theologiee~~ \nobis/ repugnat effectus
 formalis scientie \theologie/ respectu subiecti \apti nati/, etc. Ideo,

199 que] qui *corr.*

etc. Probatur illa, quia effectus formalis scientie est dare esse sciens; sed illud ~~speeie~~ \nobis/ repugnat, quia dicit quod nobis non est scientia, et tamen nos sumus apti nati esse scientes.

[37] Ad illam diceret quod quedam sunt forme in materia \non excedentes capacitatem eius/, alie autem excedunt ratione sue perfectionis materiam et capacitatem sue materie. Modo, maior est vera de primis, de secundis non, ut patet de anima, que est spiritus et incorruptibilis, \et tamen illa corpori natura largitur; sic de theologia illa propter suam excedentiam non facit suum subiectum formaliter sciens/. 230 235

[38] Ex hoc contra eum: impossibile est quod in aliquo sit incorruptibilitas et spiritualitas \formaliter/ et non sit incorruptibile et spirituale, et in quo est formaliter anima, et non sit animatum; ergo similiter impossibile est quod in aliquo sit formaliter scientia et non sit sciens. Unde, quia incorruptibilitas et spiritualitas non insunt formaliter \et inexistenter/ corpori, sed anime secundum se; ideo etc. Sed ita non est de scientia, que inexistit in nobis formaliter, et ideo illa distinctio non valet pro eo. Unde anima accepta quoad id quod sibi competit inquantum forma semper perficit et denominat ~~ete-~~ \materiam vel subiectum in quo est; scientia autem competens anime nostre competit ei ut est forma nostra; ergo denominat nos scientes esse/. 240 245

⟨Lectio 4⟩

[39] [Ad 34] ~~Consequenter queritur \primo/ utrum~~ Ad rationem socii, quod competit noto et ~~scientie~~ notitie, etc., adhuc ego respondeo: concedatur maior, et quando dicitur in minore quod, etc., dico quod est falsa quantum ad hanc partem, quod sit aliqua notitia in se maxime et nobis minima – nego istam. Licet de obiecto sit ita, tamen eadem notitia non potest esse maxima et minima. Licet enim forma possit participari secundum magis et minus, tamen hoc sibi non competit nisi secundum quod est in subiecto. Sic, licet fides et scientia sint eiusdem rationis, tamen in eodem subiecto hoc solum esset verum, \quod non ponitur ab eo/. 5 10

(Conclusio secunda: scientia et fides possunt esse in eodem intellectu de eodem)

- [40] ~~Tertia~~ Secunda conclusio probatur, scilicet quod scientia et fides ~~non~~ possunt esse ~~de eodem~~ in eodem intellectu de eodem. Illa que nullam repugnantiam \habent/, neque formaliter et intrinsece nec \ratione subiecti/ extrinsece, illa possunt simul esse in eodem et de eodem; sed
- 15 scientia et fides sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet sub illa forma. Minor probatur, quantum ad primum, primo: omnis formalis ratio ab intrinseco repugnantia reducitur ad aliquod genus oppositionis; sed inter scientiam et fidem non est aliquid genus oppositionis – non contradictio, quia utrumque ens est; neque privativa, propter idem; nec relativa, primo
- 20 quia non posita se ponunt; secundo, quia sunt de genere absoluto; nec contraria, quia unum uni contrarie opponitur, sed non est ita \de scientia cui opponitur ignorantia; ergo non fides/. Item, quia opposita earum, scilicet ignorantia et heresis, sunt simul, ergo et illa; sed contraria non; ideo etc. ~~nee~~
- 25 [41] Secundum patet, quia, si haberent repugnantiam ab extrinseco, vel ratione subiecti in quo sunt, vel obiecti de quo, vel medii per quod, vel modi quo sunt. Nullum horum; non ~~primum~~ secundum – de quocumque obiecto possunt esse duo habitus simul ~~de~~ \in/ diversis, de eodem possunt esse \illi iidem habitus/ in eodem; sed de eodem obiecto sunt
- 30 fides et scientia in diversis, patet; ideo etc. Nec ex parte subiecti in quo sunt est repugnantia, \quia/ nulle due forme compossibiles inesse eidem subiecto successive repugnant eidem inesse simul nisi forme repugnant \inter se per suas rationes formales/, vel subiectum alteram harum sibi determinant, ~~illa patet~~ vel quod neutra sibi sit possibilis inesse – illa
- 35 patet de se; sed fides et scientia sunt possibles intellectui nostro successive, et tamen omnes iste dicte condiciones competunt. Non enim repugnant subiecto inesse successive etc., \neque subiectum alteram sibi determinat, neque repugnant per suas rationes formales/. Nec ex parte medii; quorum \enim/ mediorum forme acquisite per ea non habent
- 40 repugnantiam, nec illa media – illa patet; sed scientia et fides non, etc. \habent aliquam repugnantiam, ut prius probatum fuit; ergo etc./; ergo neque media earum. Et confirmatur, quia demonstratio et auctoritas, \que sunt media scientie et fidei/, non repugnant.
- [42] Neque ratione modi vel circumstantiarum, scilicet \que sunt/
- 18 fidem] fides *corr.*

20 ponunt: ARISTOTELES, *Categoriae*, c. 7, (7b15–20; AL I.1-5, p. 20); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, (ed. HAMESSE, p. 303, n. 27): “Relativa sic se habent quod posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt.”

evidentia et credulitas \seu inevidentia/. Probatio: quero quomodo ine- 45
videntia fidei accipitur: vel negative et privative, vel in comparatione
ad maiorem evidentiam. [7v] Primum non potest esse, quia per fidem
intellectus noster illuminatur; ergo de ratione eius non est inevidentia
\simpliciter/. Antecedens patet, X *De civitate Dei* dicit \Augustinus/:
“hic fidem habemus de rebus quas ignorare non expedit”, ideo etc. 50
Nec secundum, \quia/ tunc quero: vel per comparationem ad evidentiam
maiorem eiusdem rationis vel alterius. Si primum, tunc quero que est
evidentia maior: vel visionis in patria – hec non est ad propositum, quia
sic ~~facta~~ evidentia scientie respectu eius est inevidentia sicut et \ine-
videntia/ fidei; ideo non est ad propositum – vel est \respectu/ scien- 55
tie – hoc non, quia quando aliqua dicuntur magis et minus ~~in eadem~~
~~ratione~~ \in forma eiusdem rationis/, quanto magis augetur forma, tanto
magis accedit ad perfectionem forme; sed fides quantumcumque aug-
mentata numquam accedit ad rationem scientie; ideo etc. Nec alterius
rationis est evidentia maior; tunc quero enim sicut prius: si enim \re- 60
spectu visionis/ patrie, non est ad propositum; nec scientie, hoc non
tollit impossibilitatem essendi simul, quia inevidentia fidei et evidentia
scientie non plus repugnant inesse simul intellectui quam \et cognitio
alterius/ premissarum \et conclusionis/ simul inesse \in intellectu/. Si-
cut enim scientia dicitur evidens magis quam fides, sic et premissa quam 65
conclusio; et tamen premissa et conclusio simul esse possunt in intellectu,
\I *Posteriorum*/; ideo etc.

[43] Sed contra hanc conclusionem arguitur sic: illi habitus sunt incom-
possibiles quarum formales rationes repugnant; sed ita de fide et scientia.
Probatio: quia inevidentia ponitur in diffinitione fidei, ergo est de intrin- 70
seca ratione, et per oppositum evidentia de ratione scientie est. Item,
fides distinguitur de formali ratione a scientia per inevidentiam; non
enim possunt distingui sub ratione veri vel falsi, cum utraque sit veritas;
neque per necessarium et contingens, quia utrumque est de necessario;
ergo per rationem evidentis et inevidentis; ideo etc. 75

55–56 scientie] scientia *corr.*

50 expedit: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 3 (CCSL 48, pp. 322–323): “Hic prius per prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per apostolos, quantum satis esse iudicavit, locutus etiam scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de his res, quas ignorare non expedit, nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus.” 67 Posteriorum: ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora* I, passim, e.g., c. 34 (89b10–15; AL 4.4, p. 320): “Sollertia autem est facilis coniecturatio quedam in non perspecto tempore medii, ut si quis videns quod luna splendorem semper habet conversa ad solem, statim intellexit propter quid hoc sit, quia propter id quod illustratur a sole; aut disputantem cum divite cognovit quoniam accommodatum est; aut propterea quod amici sunt, aut quia inimici eiusdem. Omnes enim causas medias videns cognovit et ultimas.”

[44] Secundo sic: illa que sic se habent quod unum tollit perfectionem quam alterum ~~tollit~~ ponit sunt impossibilia; sed ita est, quia scientia ponit certitudinem, fides autem tollit.

[45] Item, quia habent impossibilitatem ex obiectis, mediis et actibus.

80 Quod ex obiectis patet, quia impossibile est quod idem obiectum sit in eodem intellectu causativum notitie \sui/ et non \sui/, et tamen \hoc contingit in scientia et fide/ est.

[46] Secundum patet, quia effectus istorum mediorum sunt impos-
sibiles, quia effectus medii scientie est causare ascensum cum eviden-
85 tia et oppositum effectus \medii/ fidei. Item, [tertium] patet, quia
~~im~~perfectissima ratio medii scientie est, scilicet demonstratio, sed im-
perfectissima ratio medii fidei, scilicet auctoritas. {Item, adveniente
perfecto cedit imperfectum; sed fides est cognitio imperfecta et scientia
est cognitio perfecta; ideo etc.} Item, quia effectus istorum mediorum
90 sunt sicut perfectissimum et imperfectissimum; ideo etc.

[47] Item, tertium patet: actus scientie requirit presentiam obiecti; sed actus fidei latentiam obiecti; ideo etc.

[48-43] Ad rationes \istas dico/. Ad primam concedo maiorem et mino-
rem nego. Et quando probatur, dico quod fides dicit formaliter eviden-
95 tiam. Et quando probatur per Apostolum qui diffinit per inevidentiam,
\dicens quod *fides est substantia rerum sperendarum, argumento non
apparentium*/, dico quod fides capitur uno modo secundum se, alio mo-
do ut est annexa spei. Primo modo inevidentia non est de ratione fidei,
sed secundo modo, et hoc modo vult Apostolus. Aliter, duplex est non
100 apparens, vel ex terminis, et sic verum est, alio modo ex dictis, et hoc
modo \fides non/ est non apparentium. Ad aliam nego. Distinguun-
tur enim per evidentias formaliter. Et quando probatur quod non veri
sub ratione veri, et simul, etc., verum est; sed per inevidentiam relative
\quia ~~ine~~videntia fidei est minor quam scientie, et sic relative dicitur
105 inevidentia/, etc.

[49-44] Ad aliam, 'dico quod fides etc.' Unde, licet fides non ponat evidentiam ex terminis, \non tamen sequitur/: 'ergo tollit omnem' ~~non~~, sed ponit aliquam*.

[50-45] Ad aliam nego minorem ~~primò~~ de obiecto. Dico quod obiectum
110 comparatur ad potentiam in ratione moventis vel terminantis, et una

84 ascensum: *lege assensum hic et infra*. **88** imperfectum: Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, Super I Cor., cap. 13 (reportatio vulgata), lectio 3 (ed. Marietti 1953, p. 123): "Inducit ergo primo ad probandum propositum talem rationem: adveniente perfecto cessat imperfectum", super illud I Cor. 13:10: *cum autem venerit quod perfectum est evacuabitur quod ex parte est*. **95** Apostolum: Ad Hebraeos [11:1]: *est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium*.

separabilis est ab alia. Quando ergo dicitur quod obiectum, [8r] etc., dico quod non est repugnantia quod sit aliqua notitia causata ab eo et terminata ab eo, et quod sit de eo notitia causata ab alio terminata a se; sic autem est in proposito. {Obiectum enim fidei in nobis terminat cognitionem sui, sed non movet, cum sit improportionatum nobis}. 115

[51-46] Ad aliam dico quod \non/ repugnant ratione mediorum. Et quando dicis contra, dico quod alia evidentia et alia est in ascensu fidei et scientie, ut dictum est. Et sic non est contradictio. Aliter ad probationem ‘adveniente perfecto cedit imperfectum’, dico quod hoc est verum quando perfectum et imperfectum sunt eiusdem rationis; sic autem non est hic; ideo etc. Ad aliud, quando dicis: ‘demonstratio est perfectissima’, etc., et ‘auctoritas imperfectissima’, verum est humana, sed non divina. 120

[52-47] Et quando probatur quod sunt impossibiles ratione actuum, dico quod de latentia obiecti dupliciter possumus loqui uno modo ut opponitur presencie facili, et sic concedo; alio modo \ut opponitur presencie/ obiectali, et sic nego, quia sic presens habet obiectaliter suum obiectum, sicut scientia. \Unde ad scientiam non sequitur presencia facialis, quia hec cum abstractiva cognitione esse non potest/. 125

⟨Conclusio tertia: scientia et opinio sunt compossibiles de eodem obiecto et in eodem subiecto simul⟩

[53] Tertia conclusio probatur, scilicet quod scientia et opinio sunt compossibiles de eodem obiecto et \in eodem/ subiecto simul. Illa duo, quorum unum potest inesse alicui subiecto, altero non existente, et manere et non corrumpi alio adveniente \in idem/, \possunt simul esse in illo subiecto – illa patet/; sed ita est \de scientia et opinione/. Probatio: quia superveniente demonstratione de aliquo potest prius fuisse opinio et manet, quia oblita demonstratione, adhuc ~~magis~~ \manet/ cognitio topica prius existens. 130 135

[54] Secundo sic: habita notitia demonstrativa de aliqua conclusione et postea subveniat topica, vel etc. \ille due manent simul vel non; si primum, habetur intentum; si secundum, hoc est falsum, patet deducendo/. 140

[55] Contra: quia rationes formales opinionis et scientie sunt impossibiles, \ergo etc. Probatur antecedens/, quia de ratione \scientie est/ certitudo sine formidine ~~probatio~~. Sed de ratione opinionis est ~~opinionis~~ \cognitio vel adhesio/ ~~sibi~~ cum formidine; illa probatur/, quia obiectum eius potest aliter se habere, patet. 145

[56] Item, quia ei potest subesse falsum, ideo etc.

[57] Tertio sic: de ratione conclusionis topice est formido; sed ita est ~~per~~ conclusio opinata. Maior patet, quia in hoc distinguitur a demonstrativa; ideo etc.

150 [58] Quarto: quia si non, tunc non distingueretur inter fidem, scientiam, opinionem, suspicionem, et ambiguitatem, quia ~~fides dicit~~ ambiguitas dicit indifferentiam ad utramque partem, sed scientia determinatam partem; sed opinio est medium; ideo etc.

[59] \Item, Aristoteles, I *Posteriorum*, dicit quod opinio est cum formidine et in hoc distinguit eam a scientia/.

155 [60-55] Ad illa nego. Et quando probatur de opinione, nego quod de ratione opinionis sit formido. Ratio: quia non dubitans de conclusione non formidat de ea; sed quidam opinantes non ~~formidant~~ \dubitant de conclusione opinata/, ut dicit Aristoteles VI *Ethicorum*, ubi dicit quidam opinantes credunt se scire quia non ~~formidant~~ \dubitant, etc./

160 [61-55] Ad probationes \contra/. Ad primam dico quod, licet obiectum possit aliter se habere, tamen non sequitur \quod sit cum formidine/, ymmo nec obiectum opinionis est semper possibile aliter se habere.

[62-56] Ad aliam nego quod ei possit subesse falsum, quia ut sic non est opinio.

165 [63-57] Ad aliam, non [enim]* conclusio topica distinguitur a demonstrativa in hoc, sed in illo quod demonstrativa facit evidentiam ex natura rei, alia non.

[64-58] Ad aliam dico adhuc distingueretur, quia fidei ut fides non convenit

169 ut] ut *scripsi* unde *cod.*

154 Posteriorum: Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Expositio Posteriorum analyticorum*, I, lectio 1, n. 6 (ed. Leonina 1989, p. 6): “Unde de his, quae inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur. Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur topica sive dialectica. Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro topicorum. Quandoque vero, non fit complete fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc ordinatur rhetorica. Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem.” Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V, c. 1 (ed. VAN RIET, p. 79): “Sententia autem est conceptio definita vel certissima, opinio vero est conceptio ad quam acceditur cum formidine alterius partis.” Et nota 46 ibidem: “formidine: le latin correspondrait à un mot de la racine *kh w f*; l’arabe *tajwiz* se rattache à la racine *j w z*, *possible est*.” 159 Aristoteles: ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nichomachea* VII, c. 5 (1146b25–26, AL 26.3, p. 498): “Quidam enim opinancium non dubitant, sed existimant certe scrire.”

formido; sed opinioni quandoque competit formido, et in hoc distinguuntur. 170

[65–59] Ad auctoritatem Aristotelis in I *Posteriorum* dico quod ibi accipit aliquam opinionem cui adest formido.

⟨Conclusio quarta: non est repugnantia eidem inesse fidem et opinionem⟩

[66] Quarta conclusio est quod non est repugnantia eidem \simul/ inesse fidem et opinionem. \Circa quam conclusionem est notandum/ sed 175
 \quod/ fides capitur \quandoque/ philosophice \et sic est vehemens adhesio rei/ \quandoque/ ~~vel~~ theologicice \et sic est habitus quo invisā credimus/. Unde dico quod fides primo modo non est simul cum opinione, quia opinio est sicut dispositio ad talem fidem, et ita non potest simul esse cum eo cuius est. Sed fides theologicice sumpta stat cum fide 180
 \opinione/, quia nullam formalem repugnantiam includit ut patuit ex dictis.

[67] Item, quia sancti doctores adduxerunt ad multas conclusiones \fideles/ media topica \et opinabilia/, ideo etc.

Appendix D:
Guilelmus de Brena OFM,
Reportatio in libros
Sententiarum
Lectio 26

⟨**Lectio 26**⟩

⟨**Q. 3: Utrum divine simplicitati repugnet omnis distinctio**⟩

[40v] Tertia questio est utrum divine simplicitati repugnet omnis distinctio.

[1] Circa quam primo videndum est quid sit distinctio. Secundo, quot modis dicatur. Tertio, que sint.

⟨**Articulus primus: Quid sit distinctio**⟩

[2] Quantum ad primum dicit unus doctor quod distinctio est respectus intrinsecus adveniēns disquīparantie transcendens, non determinati generis. 5

[3] Et quod sit respectus probatur sic: omne quod secundum suam rationem formalem est ad aliud est respectus; sed distinctio est huiusmodi. Maior patet de se; minor patet, quia distinctio secundum rationem formalem dicitur ad aliud. 10

[4] Secundo sic: quecumque duo opposita sunt simul compossibilia in eodem, respectu alterius et alterius, sunt relativa – illa patet, quia hoc

5 doctor: FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum (Conflatus)*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43rbH–vaK); cf. *Reportatio in I Sententiarum* (“Summa simplicitate”), d. 33, q. un., “Utrum in divinis sit distinctio”, a. 1, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 91, f. 60va–vb; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Rkps. 53/102, f. 181va–vb.

- repugnat absolutis; sed idemptitas et distinctio sunt huiusmodi – illa
 15 patet, quia aliquid in se indistinctum potest \esse/ distinctum ab alio
 et idem alteri.
- [5] Secundo quod sit respectus disquiparantie: omnis habitudo que est
 \inter/ extrema alterius rationis est disquiparantie – illa patet, quia inter
 extrema eiusdem rationis est respectus equiparantie; sed distinctio est
 20 huiusmodi – illa patet, quia que sunt eiusdem rationis non distinguuntur.
- [6] Tertio quod sit intrinsecus adveniens: quia positis extremis duo-
 bus oritur inter ea distinctio, et omnis talis respectus dicitur intrinse-
 cus adveniens; in hoc enim differt ab respectu extrinsecus adveniente.
 Antecedens ~~patet~~ de se, quia duobus positis statim distinguuntur.
- 25 [7] Quarto quod non determinati generis: omne ~~quod~~/ quod convenit
 enti antequam descendat in decem predicamenta est transcendens – il-
 la patet; sed distinctio est huiusmodi – probatur, quia antequam ens
 distinguitur in decem predicamenta distinguitur a suis passionibus et
 differentiis, et una ab alia distinguitur. ¶
- 30 [8] Sed hic sunt duo dubia: primum est quod dicitur quod distinctio
 est respectus realis. Contra arguitur: illud non dicit respectum realem
 cuius directe oppositum non est positivum reale; illa patet, quia en\ti
 reali/ non opponitur ens rationis, sed reale. Sed distinctio et idemptitas
 sunt opposita capiendo utramque secundum rationem generalem; sed
 35 idemptitas secundum rationem suam \generalem/ non dicit reale aliquid,
 quia eiusdem ad se ipsum non est idemptitas nisi rationis.
- [9] Et confirmatur secundo: vel distinctio accipitur ut opponitur idempti-
 tati formaliter vel fundamentaliter. Si primum, contra hoc est argumen-
 tum factum; si secundum, tunc arguitur: unitas opponitur pluralitati,
 40 ergo ~~idemptitas~~ distinctio ut sic non est nisi pluralitas; sed illa non dicit
 respectum realem.
- [10] Secundum est dubium, \scilicet/ quod sit respectus disquiparantie.
 Contra: omnis ille respectus est equiparantie secundum quem relata
 mutuo \super/ se convertuntur; sed distinctio est huiusmodi; ideo etc.
- 45 [11] Dico ergo aliter, primo quod distinctio proprie est respectus \ad-
 veniens/ intrinsecus et realis. Secundo quod potest accipi pro sola
~~habitudine~~ \denominacione/ extremorum. Tertio, quod sumendo eam
 generaliter dicit ad aliquid. Quarto quod \dicit/ ad aliquid, scilicet
 respectum equiparantie.
- 50 [12] Primum probatur: opposita proprie sumpta sunt eiusdem generis.
 Sed distinctio et idemptitas sunt opposita; sed idemptitas est relatio
 25 quod³] quantum *corr.* convenit] commune *corr.* 34 utramque] partim *sed*
mut. in utrumque 44 convertuntur] convertantur *corr.*

realis intrinseca. Maior patet, et minor quantum ad secundum patet, et quantum ad primum; ideo etc.

[13] Secundum probatur: distinctio realis distinguitur realiter ab extremis; vel ergo \distinguitur distinctione/ \qua(dam)/ sola denominatione extremorum, vel mediante media \reali/ – quod non, quia tunc procederetur in infinitum; ideo etc. 55

[14] Tertium probatur sic: omnis vox significativa que constituit intellectum non in ordine ad se sed ad alterum est \ad/ aliquid; sed ita est de distinctione. 60

[15] Quartum probatur, quia extrema eius convertuntur super se invicem.

[16-3] Ad rationes contra. Ad primam, ‘cuius ratio formalis est ad alterum’, etc., concedatur. Et quando dicitur in minore, dico quod distinctio non habet rationem unam formalem, sed est terminus equivocus qui de relatione intrinsecus adveniente proprie dicitur; sed generaliter \dicitur/ \quadam denominatione/ de omnibus extremis que non habent convenientiam. Vel aliter ad minorem \potest dici/ quod dicitur ad [41r] aliquid generaliter. 65

[17-4] Ad secundum, dico quod verum est eo modo quo sunt ad alterum, et patet. 70

[18-5] Ad aliud, ‘omnis respectus qui est’, etc., dico extrema esse alterius rationis est dupliciter, vel absolute secundum se extrema, vel in quantum relata. Primo modo non oportet inter extrema esse respectum disquiparantie. Secundo modo concedo bene. Et quando dicitur in minori, dico quod verum est secundum se considerata, sed non in quantum relata vero super se convertuntur. 75

⟨Articulus secundus: Quot modis dicatur distinctio⟩

[19] Quantum ad secundum dicit unus doctor quod distinctio quadrupliciter accipitur. Quandoque pro essentiali, ut Deus distinguitur a creatura et res unius predicamenti a re alterius, que non habent convenientia intra. Secundo pro reali, et hoc \modo/ distinguuntur persone in divinis, sed non essentialiter, quia sunt una essentia et una natura. Tertio modo capitur pro distinctione formali et quiditativa, sicut homo in potentia et asinus in potentia; non enim sunt res, sed quiditates eorum sunt diverse. Et similiter paternitas et essentia, quia quiditas unius non 85

78 unus doctor: FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum (Conflatus)*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 43vbO–P); cf. *Reportatio in I Sententiarum* (“Summa simplicitate”), d. 33, q. un., “Utrum in divinis sit distinctio”, a. 2, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 91, f. 60vb; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Rkps. 53/102, f. 181vb.

est ~~formaliter~~ \quiditas/ alterius. Quarta est distinctio formalis \quiditatis a suo gradu perfectionali intrinseco/ ~~a ratione gradus~~ [intrinsic], ut patet de albedine intensiore et minus intensa.

- [20] Modo quantum ad tres primos modos concedendo, non intelligo
 90 quantum modum distinctionis, arguendo sic: illa distinctio non est ex natura rei que est per actum considerationis ab\strac/tive. Sed distinctio quiditatis et sui gradus est huiusmodi; probatio: inter illa est distinctio, etc., que actui intuitive \considerationis/ precise obiciuntur omnino indistincta – illa patet de se. Sed quiditas et suus gradus perfectionalis
 95 sunt huiusmodi; probatio: quia non habent rationem duorum obiectorum formalium, aliter quiditas posset intueri sine perfectione, quod est falsum. Et ideo in talibus formis non est aliud et aliud obiectum quiditas et gradus perfectionalis.

⟨Articulus tertius: Quae sint distinctiones in divinis⟩

- [21] Quantum ad tertium articulum, dico 5 \4/ conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod accipiendo distinctionem ut dicit relationem positivam
 100 inter extrema \mediantem/ ~~medientes~~, non est distinctio in divinis, nec ad extra neque ad intra. Non ad extra, quia a quo removetur genus remonentur omnes species eius; sed ad intus ~~ad extra~~ negatur totum genus relationis \realis/ ad extra et ideo quelibet eius species. Sed distinctio,
 105 etc., est species quedam huius relationis realis; ideo etc. Minor supponitur nunc. ~~Secunda conclusio~~ Secundo probatur secundum, ubi ponitur unum oppositorum perfecte, ibi negatur alterum – illa patet; sed in divinis ad intra oppositum talis distinctionis ad intra ponitur. Probatio, quia illa sunt perfecte idem que sunt perfectissime unum in substantia;
 110 \sed omnia que sunt ~~unum~~ in divinis sunt huiusmodi/; ideo etc.

[22] Secunda conclusio \est/ quod capiendo eam pro denominatione extremorum \tantum/ est distinctio realis \in divinis/, quia ubi est vere generatio est isto modo distinctio realis; sed ita est in divinis.

- [24] Tertia conclusio, quod capiendo distinctionem formalem ut dicit
 115 denominationem extremorum est in divinis. Probatio: ubi sunt aliqua secundum rationes suas formales in actu que non habent omnimodam idemplitatem, ibi est talis distinctio; sed in divinis est huiusmodi – illa patet, quia ~~illa~~ ibi est vera ratio formalis essentie et relationis \quarum una non est alia/.

- [25] Quarta conclusio est quod capiendo distinctionem que est per actum cognitionis abstractive est in divinis. Ratio, quia ubi est forma habens

perfectionem graduum, ibi potest esse distinctio in conceptu – illa patet, quia talis potest movere intellectum \humanum/ ad considerationem sui modo perfecto et imperfecto; sed ita est in divinis.

**⟨Q. 4: Utrum in divinis magis repugnet divinae simplicitati
distinctio formalis quam non-identitas⟩**

[26] Quarta questio est utrum in divinis magis repugnet divine simplicitati distinctio formaliter quam non-idemtitas. 125

⟨Primus modus dicendi⟩

[27] Et est unus modus dicendi, ~~est~~ ille dicens primo quod omnis quiditatis \quiditati/ omni comparata alii quiditati vel est idem formaliter vel \distincta formaliter, quia ad non esse idem formaliter in proposito sequitur esse distinctum formaliter/ ~~non idem~~ \formaliter/. Ratio est: sicut se 130
habet distinctio realis ad rem, et essentialis ad essentiam, et personalis ad personam, ita formalis ad formalitatem; sed omnis realitas comparata alteri vel est idem realiter vel distincta realiter \et omnis essentialitas ad omnem essentialitatem vel est eadem essentialiter vel distincta essentialiter, et similiter de personalitate/ [etc.]; ergo etc. Maior patet ex 135
simili proportionem; minor est evidens.

[28] Secundo sic: omnis per se passio subiecti convertitur cum eo, et sibi universaliter inest; sed distinctio et idemtitas [41v] sunt huiusmodi ad ens; sed \similiter/ formalis idemtitas vel distinctio. \Sed formalitates sunt entia. Ergo vel sunt eadem formaliter vel distincta formaliter/ [sunt 140
entia; ideo etc].

[29] Tertio sic: negatio alicuius habitus respectu subiecti apti nati et pro tempore equivalet privationi – illa patet de cecitate pro tempore, etc.; sed formalitates sunt subiecta apte nate ad ~~et~~ negationes ~~distinctionis~~ \idemtitatis; ergo pro tempore pro quo apte nate sunt recipere priva- 145
tiones huius idemtitatis. Sed privationes sunt distinctiones formaliter. Ideo etc./ [ideo etc.]

[30] Quarto sic: omne excedens fit equale excessu dempto illo in quo excedit; sed ille due propositiones sic se habent, \scilicet/ ‘non sunt idem formaliter’, et ‘sunt distincta formaliter’, quia prima excedit \secun- 150
dam/ ~~formaliter~~, quia prima habet tres causas veritatis, \scilicet quia ambo extrema possunt esse non-entia, vel alterum est non-ens vel ambo sunt entia in actu/; sed secunda non habet nisi unam causam veritatis,

150 distincta] -e corr. 151 veritatis] veritates corr.

- 155 quia utrumque ens in actu; ergo demptis duobus causis veritatis, ~~enim~~
~~dicitur~~ quod fit in proposito comparando duas quiditates ad invicem,
 \fit equalitas/. Ideo etc.
- [31] Quinto sic: secundum Aristotelem quecumque non habent distinc-
 tionem, ut sic sunt indivisa; sed ille quiditates non habent distinctionem
 formalem per te; ideo indistincta formaliter, quod est contra te.
- 160 [32] Sexto sic: omni propositioni negative correspondet aliqua distinctio
 inter predicatum et subiectum; sed illa est negativa: ‘essentia non est
 formaliter paternitas’; ideo etc.
- [33] \Dicit iste doctor/ secundo quod non est possibile ponere non-
 idemptitatem formalem sine distinctione \copulante/ inter extrema \non-
 idemptitatis/ capiendo \duas propositiones, quarum una est affirmativa,
 165 alia negativa. Prima est:/ ‘A ~~non~~ est A formaliter’ et \secunda:/ ‘A non
 est B formaliter’. \Si nulla est distinctio copulans inter A et B, tunc non
 magis A dicitur a B quam A a se ipso; sed A est A formaliter; ergo A
 erit B formaliter, quod est contra dictum/.
- 170 [34] \Secundo/. Item, ‘A est A formaliter’ et ‘B non est A formaliter’, ille
 due non sunt eadem propositio, ergo oportet vel omnes partes \earum/
 sunt alie \ab invicem/ vel quod \aliqua/ una sit alia ab alia. Non primo
 modo, quia A ponitur \unum/ in utraque formaliter; ergo aliqua pars
 unius distinguitur ab alia.
- 175 [35] Tertio sic: quidquid convenit A secundum rationem formalem A
 convenit omni stanti sub \A secundum/ rationem formalem A; sed B
 stat sub \A secundum/ rationem formalem A \per te, qui dicis quod B
 non distinguitur formaliter ab A; ideo etc., quod est contra te/; ideo etc.

⟨Alius modus dicendi⟩

- 180 [36] Alius modus dicendi \est/ quod non est necessitas quod ponatur di-
 distinctio \copulativa/ in extremis formaliter, ponendo non-idemptitatem
 \formaliter/. Ratio: quando aliqua forma habet plures gradus et mo-
 dos, non sequitur ad negationem eius sub uno modo positio oppositi sub
 alio modo; sed ita est de idemptitate, \quia realis, formalis, etc.; ergo
 185 non sequitur, si sunt aliqua non-eadem formaliter, quod sint distincta
 formaliter/; ideo etc.
- [37] Sed est notandum quod distinctio dupliciter capitur, \vel/ ut dicit
 habitudinem ~~real~~ extremorum \ad invicem/ realem; secundo modo, ut

170 ille] illa *corr.* 177 quod] quid *cod.*

dicat mihi solam denominationem extremorum. Primo modo non credo quod sit distinctio inter talia extrema \que sunt solum non-eadem formaliter/. Secundo modo bene concedo. 190

⟨Ad rationes primi modi⟩

[37-27] Nec rationes \contrarie/ probant hoc. Ad primam, ‘omnis quidditas’ etc., ‘sicut se habet’, etc., dico quod illa denominatio, \scilicet esse/ idem formaliter \vel esse distinctum formaliter/ potest capi vel ab extremis \huius denominationis/ vel a modo essendi \eius/ ~~idem formaliter~~. 195
Modo hæc quando dicitur ‘sicut distinctio realis’, etc., dico quod verum est, capiendo denominationes ut sumuntur ab extremis, quia erit idem formaliter ab extremo, sed non sequitur ‘ergo idem formaliter dictum a modo’, {scilicet quod sunt realitates distincte sed non realiter, et personalitates distincte sed ⟨non⟩ personaliter, et essentialitates distincte sed non ~~simpliciter~~ essentialiter; similiter formalitates distincte sed non formaliter}.

[38-28] Ad secundam, ‘omnis passio’, \etc./, concedo ut se habet passio de subiecto; modo passio non dicitur de subiecto ut hic, quia in primo modo dicendi per se; sed idemtitas etc., concedo. \Notandum totus 205
processus rationis \huius/ conceditur preter quam in fine. Cum dicitur ‘eadem esse formaliter vel distincta formaliter sunt passionis entis ut ille denominationes sumuntur a modo essendi’, negatur, quia sunt de primo modo dicendi per se; sed passio est de secundo modo dicendi per se/
~~et quando dicitur ‘formalitas sunt entia’, etc., dico quod in divinis~~ 210
~~formalitas essentie et paternitatis sunt idem, non tamen sequitur quod idem formaliter, neque non idem formaliter.~~^{cat}

[39-29] Ad tertiam, ‘negatio circa subiectum’, etc., concedo. Et quando dicitur ‘illa non sunt distincta formaliter, ergo indistincta’, dico quod passio vel privatio non dicuntur formaliter de subiecto de quo dicuntur in primo modo dicendi per se. Modo absolute bene negatio infert privationem habitus, sed non formaliter in primo modo dicendi per se. 215

[40-30] Ad quartam, ‘omne excedens’, etc., concedatur. Et quando dicitur ‘non-idem formaliter’, etc., dico quod in alio, quia vere sunt idem, sed non omni modo sunt idem. Sed postea tu tollis unum gradum idemtitatis. 220

[41-31] Ad quintam, ~~quando~~ ‘quecumque, etc.’, concedatur. Et quando dicitur ‘illa sunt indistincta in formalitate, ergo etc.’, dico quod, sicut realitas idemtitatur ~~idem~~ realitati, ita formalitas formalitati. Ergo non sequitur ‘ergo sunt unum formaliter’, sed bene in formalitate. 225

[42-32] Ad sextam, ‘omni propositioni’, etc., dico quod dupliciter capitur propositio: secundum esse formale \terminorum/ vel pro ~~terminis~~ \rebus/ pro quibus supponunt \termini/. Modo ~~primo~~ dico, si capiatur predicatum et subiectum pro vocibus vel conceptibus, sic est distinctio;
 230 sed pro rebus non oportet, sed sufficit [42r] quod rationes formales sint alie, quod una negetur ab alia.

[43-33] Quantum ad aliam partem, dico quod \ille doctor/ non posuit distinctionem ~~pro~~ positam, \scilicet in quantum est habitudo medians/. Unde utraque est vera: ‘A est A’ et ‘A est B’, \sed non formaliter/.
 235 Mo- do extremum bene facit secundum rationes formales, sed non sumptum cum distinctione, quia \formalis/ non-idemptitas est prior distinctione formali. Ideo, etc.

[43-34] Ad aliud, ‘ille due ~~et~~ propositiones non sunt una propositio’, verum est. Et quando dicitur ‘vel partes omnes’, etc., nego illud sumendo
 240 partes pro rebus pro quibus supponunt termini.

[44-35] Et quando dicitur tertio ‘quidquid’, etc., dico quod verum est eo modo. Et quando dicitur ‘A est A formaliter’, etc., dico quod B est A realiter, ergo non sequitur nisi realiter, sed non formaliter.

⟨Solutio⟩

[45] Quando igitur queritur utrum \in divinis plus repugnet non-idempti-
 245 tas quam distinctio/, etc., dico quod sic. Ratio est: illud quod plus excludit de ratione idemptitatis magis repugnat simplicitati divine; sed distinctio est huiusmodi ad non-idemptitatem – illa patet, quia oppositum alicuius forme plus excludit illam formam quam ‘non’ directe oppositum; sed distinctio est huiusmodi ad idemptitatem; ideo, etc.

227 esse] *iter*.

245 distinctio: *lege* distinctio quam non-idemptitas.

Appendix E:
Guilelmus de Brena OFM,
Reportatio in libros
Sententiarum
Lectio 64

⟨Lectio 64⟩

[86v] Consequenter ~~queritur~~ circa 12 et 13am distinctiones queritur ad-
huc primo utrum accidentia separata possint esse principium ~~productivum~~
\productivum substantie/. Secundo utrum corruptivum substantie. Ter-
tio utrum ex eis possit substantia generari. Quarto utrum ab agente
naturali possint naturaliter corrumpi. 5

[1] De prima arguitur quod sic, quia coniuncta accidentia sunt princi-
pium productionis substantie, ideo et separata. Consequentia tenet, et
antecedens II *De anima* de calore.

[2] Oppositum: accidentia coniuncta non sunt principium productivum
substantie; ideo etc. Antecedens probatur, quia sunt imperfectiora sub- 10
stantie, ideo etc.

⟨Qq. 1–2: Utrum accidentia separata possint esse principium
productivum substantiae vel corruptivum substantiae⟩

[3] Ad primas duas questiones dico quod non, quia si sic, vel inquantum
instrumenta substantie, vel per modum sequele, vel quia sunt activa
\substantie/, et ideo ut perfectiora \licet secundum entitatem sint im-
perfectiora/ substantiis; sed nullo horum modum, neque coniuncta neque 15
separata; ideo etc. Maior patet per sufficientem divisionem secundum
diversas opiniones, que sunt tres; minorem probo.

8 De anima: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima* II, c. 4 (416b25–30).

⟨Non inquantum instrumenta substantie (Opinio Thomae)⟩

[4] Quod non primum sit verum, scilicet quod sint instrumenta productionis substantie, [5] et ratio tamen ad eam est quia calor anime introducit formam carnis, II *De anima*. [6] Et confirmatur, quia in virtute propria possunt producere accidentia; ergo in virtute substantie plus, et hoc non est nisi substantiam, etc. [7] Et quia coniuncta hoc poterant, ideo et separata.

[8] Contra arguo primo: in virtute illius quod nullam virtutem activam habet nihil potest agere; sed secundum eos substantia de se nullam virtutem activam habet; ideo etc.

[9] Item, illa opinio includit contradictoria, quia nihil possunt accidentia nisi in virtute substantie; sed separata illam virtutem non habent; ideo separata nihil ~~habent~~ possunt in virtute substantie, cuius oppositum tamen ipsi dicunt, ideo etc.

[10] Item, \queritur/ quid importat illud verbum ‘agens in virtute substantie’: vel quia sunt virtus substantie ~~ete~~: vel agunt virtute ~~precedente~~ \subiective existente/ in substantia, \vel virtute procedente a substantia, ut incendiarius mediante igne comburit/. Si primum, habetur intentum meum, quia tunc sua virtute agunt; si autem secundo modo, hec est contradictio \de separatis/; si autem tertio modo, \ut incendiarius mediante igne comburit domum, quia supponit ignem quem applicat agere, et sic accidentia presupponunt substantiam agere/, hoc non, ymmo magis substantia agit in virtute eorum, ut patet, quia \~~substantia~~/ presupponunt virtutem activam, ideo etc. Et sic primum membrum non est verum.

[11-5] Ad auctoritatem Aristotelis de calore, dico quod calor est instrumentum anime, sed non ad introductionem forme substantialis, sed alicuius dispositionis accidentalis.

[12-6] Ad aliud, ‘plus possunt accidentia’, dico quod illud ‘plus’ potest vel referri ad terminum immediatum, vel remotum. Si primo modo, non est vera; si secundo modo, sic bene concedo ~~quod~~. Accidentia enim separata non causat dispositionem ad formam substantialem, sed coniuncta bene, et hoc modo bene concedo.

[13-7] Ad tertium dico quod ~~neg~~ hoc dicere est implicatio contradictionis.

39 substantia¹] substantie *corr.*

20 De anima: Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima* II, c. 4 (416b25–30).

⟨Non per modum sequelae (Opinio Aureoli)⟩

[14] Nec valet secundum membrum, licet unus doctor dicat quod mutatio \simpliciter/ et alteratio non distinguuntur nisi ratione terminorum. \Dicit enim quod generatio et alteratio non distinguuntur ex parte principii effectivi – est enim idem, scilicet accidens – sed ex parte terminorum, quia ~~terminus~~ accidens est terminus immediatus alterationis, sed per modum sequele terminus est forma substantialis/. Ratio: quia forma substantialis diversa requirit diversam materiam propinquam, et ideo coexigitive forma substantialis determinatum accidens tale in materia. Sed aliter \se habent/ accidentia ad formam substantialem, quia per modum [87r] sequele. 55 60

[15] Ratio \pro illa opinione prima est:/ quando\que enim/ due mutationes se habent \ad invicem/ quod inseparabiliter sunt connexe et una prior \est/, alia posterior, quidquid potest in priorem, et posteriorem; sed ~~acciden-~~ a generatio et alteratio sunt huiusmodi, \et alteratio est prior generatione, et accidens effective potest in alterationem; ideo etc./ 65

[16] Secundo sic: impossibile est idem duabus producentibus produci; sed hoc sequeretur nisi esset idem principium. Probatio: \quia \substantia/ ~~accidens~~ semel produceretur ab accidente alteratione et semel a forma substantiali ipsa generatione, quod est inconveniens/. Et ideo sicut coniuncta poterunt, sic etiam separata. 70

[17] Contra arguitur sic: illud quod est simpliciter altero prius non potest esse sequela illius essentiali ordine; sed substantia est simpliciter prior accidente; ideo etc. Maior patet, quia sic idem esset essentialiter prius et posterius; minor VII *Metaphysice*.

[18] Et confirmatur: terminus simpliciter posterior et accidentalis non est perfectior \et principium in/ quacumque mutatione simplici substantiali; sed accidentalis est huiusmodi ad substantialem; ideo etc. 75

[19] Tertio sic: illud quod dependet ab alio quantum ad suum esse a \et/ est natura posterius illo et duratione {non potest esse principium productivum eius}; sed accidens est huiusmodi ad substantiam, quia substantia \est prior accidente natura, tempore et ratione VII *Metaphysice*/. 80

[20-15] Nec rationes valent. Ad primam, ‘quando due mutaciones’, etc., dico quod actiones esse coniunctas est dupliciter: vel ratione rei

76 simplici] simplex *cod.* 81 tempore] tempori *cod.*

74 *Metaphysice*: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* VII, c. 1 (1028a30–33, AL 25.3.2, pp. 132–133). 82 *Metaphysice*: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* VII, c. 1 (1028a32–33, AL 25.3.2, p. 133); *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. HAMESSE, p. 128, n. 159).

85 intrinsece, vel ratione connectentis extrinsece. Primo modo concedo maiorem, sed non secundo modo. Sed minor est vera secundo modo et non primo modo, quia ratione principiorum sunt annexe alteratio et generatio.

[21-16] Ad aliam, 'idem non potest', etc., verum est; et quando dicitur
90 'sequeretur hoc', nego. Numquam enim in virtute principii alterantis forma substantialis accipit esse.

⟨Non quia sunt activa ut substantie (Opinio Burlei)⟩

[22] Nec tertium valet, licet unus doctor hoc dicat, quia dicit quod potest aliquid esse eminens secundum entitatem et non secundum activitatem, ut patet de speciebus \ordinatis essentialiter adinvicem, quarum tamen
95 superior non est semper activior inferiori, licet sit eminentior in entitate/. Et ideo dicunt quod accidens potest esse principium productivum substantie et sic nobilius secundum activitatem, licet non secundum entitatem. Et potest sic argui: quod potest introducere dispositionem necessitantem ad aliquam formam substantialem etiam potest illam formam
100 introducere – illa patet; sed accidens est huiusmodi; ideo etc.

[23] Et confirmatur. Potens in totam alterationem precedentem formam substantialem potest et in terminum, scilicet in formam substantialem; sed accidens est huiusmodi. Patet illa minor, quia \alteratio/ ipsa est tota eiusdem rationis, et ideo secundum omnes gradus suos potest esse
105 ab accidente; ideo etc.

[24] Tertio, potens introducere aliquam dispositionem impossibilem alicui forme potest illam corrumpere – illa patet; sed accidens separatum est huiusmodi ad formam substantialem. Probatio de calore \in summo/ separato, quod potest in aqua tantum calorem introducere quantus ipse
110 est, \qui est impossibilis forme substantialis aque/.

[25] Quarto, si $\frac{1}{2}$ non, tunc totus calor spere ignis non posset unam guttam aque corrumpere, et sunt multa exempla alia, \scilicet/ de collisione lapidum, ex quibus \recte motus/ generatur ignis. Et patet de generante ubi est virtus formativa, que est accidens producens formam
115 substantialem fetus.

[26] Contra illud arguo sic, et capiam illam propositionem quam doctor noster reputat necessariam: nullum principium productivum totale alicuius effectus potest esse imperfectius \simpliciter/ illo toto producto \vel effectu/; sed accidentia quecumque sunt imperfectiora \simpliciter/ quacumque substantia. Maior patet de se et probatur: si non, tunc
120

86 secundo¹] primo *corr.* 109 ipse] ipsa *corr.* 111 totus] tota *corr.*

capiam illum effectum \excedentem causam suam totalem in perfectione/ et dividamus ipsum in gradu equato suo principio, et secundum illum in quo excedit, quia vel secundum illum est ab aliquo, vel a nullo; non ab aliquo, non a principio productivo – patet; vel a se ipso, quod non, nec a nullo, patet. Ideo maior est vera.

125

[27] Sed diceretur quod non oportet quod sit commensuratio principii productivi ad illum effectum quantum ad sui quiditatem, sed solum quantum ad sui activitatem. Unde diceretur quod non excedit unum alterum \entitative/, cum sint alterius generis, et sint equivoce dicta. {Licet sic dici posset ab aliqui<bu>s}, et tamen adhuc ratio videtur stare, quia queram de activitate quid sit: vel est substantia, \et/ tunc entitas rei producentis, et tunc venit ratio prima; si accidens, tunc est simpliciter imperfectius, ideo ~~ratio stabit~~ \sequitur oppositum/. Nec est simile de productivo [87v] partiali \quale est albedo respectu intellectionis sicut de totali/.

130

135

[28] Secundo sic: nullum principium potest dare perfectius esse productivum quam dando se ipsum entitative et formaliter – illa patet in omnibus; sed, si aliquod accidens sic se daret, non daret perfectius esse quam forma substantialis; ideo etc. Maior propositio videtur esse nota, quia producibilitas activa consequitur entitatem, ideo etc. Minor patet, quia entitas accidentis non est perfectior entitate substantie. Illa enim activitas, cum sit accidens, non est perfectior subiecto in quo est, et ideo perfectius in activitate arguit perfectius in entitate ceteris paribus.

140

[29] Tertio sic: effectus non potest esse perfectior causa sua univoca, ideo neque equivoca equivocus; ideo etc.

145

[30-22] Ad primam ergo rationem, quando enim dicis de activitate et entitate, dico quod potest comparari natura \accidentis/ ad naturam \substantie [a]/ absolute, sic non sunt comparabiles; sic non sequitur ‘que sunt perfectiora in entitate sunt perfectiora etiam \in/ activitate’; sed comparando naturam \accidentis ut/ causam ad naturam effectus, sic consequuntur specie. Et quando probatur quod ‘potest introducere’ etc., dico quod dispositionem necessitare, etc., est vel ex natura rei – et sic concedo maiorem – vel ex natura principii producentis – sic non concedo. Modo sic accidens potest in dispositionem forme substantialis. Non primo modo, ideo etc.

155

[31-23] Ad aliam, ‘potens in totam’, etc., dico quod alteratio vel accipitur ut est motus et via, vel ut includit terminum. Modo primo modo non est necessaria maior de potentia absoluta Dei, sed secundo \modo/

151 consequuntur specie] *forsitan lege consequentia sequitur*

160 bene. Et tu dicis quod ymmo quia ille ultimus gradus disponit ad formam substantialem, ideo etc., dicitur quod gradus esse eiusdem rationis est dupliciter, vel in se, vel respectu substantie. Modo isti gradus sunt eiusdem rationis secundum se, sed non respectu subiecti. Modo, licet calor separatus posset introducere gradum sibi equalem, tamen non posset corrumpere gradum quem sibi determinat forma substantialis que plus
165 resistit quam quantitas separata possit agere.

[32] Contra: arguitur quia \plus/ potens est subiectum in resistendo ~~quod~~ in principio quam in fine; sed illud subiectum in principio non resistebat, ideo etc.

[33] Item, quia motus naturalis in fine est fortior quam in principio, ideo
170 etc.

[34-32] Ad primum dico quod non, quia non est simile de coniunctis accidentibus et separatis.

[35-33] Ad secundum de motu dico quod verum est si resistantia esset debilior; sed ita non est; ideo etc.

175 [36-25] Et ideo 'si tota spera', etc., dicit doctor \noster/ quod ille calor non posset corrumpere guttam aque in virtute sua; ideo etc.

[37] Ad alia, exempla de igne generato per collisionem corporum, dicit quod ille ignis non generatur absolute ratione motus, sed ratione corporum collisorum que in se habent talem virtutem.

180 [38-24] Ad aliud, dico quod nullum accidens potest introducere dispositionem impossibilem; sed hoc est virtute forme substantialis.

⟨Qq. 3-4: Utrum ex accidentibus separatis possit substantia generari; utrum accidentia separata possint corrumpi⟩

[39] Ad tertiam et quartam questionem dico quod potest aliquid ex eis generari, quia facta alteratione in eis virtute forme substantialis, introducit a Deo compositum substantialem immediate. Similiter possunt
185 corrumpi corruptione que est qualiter sed non quantum, quia illa esset annihilacio.

Appendix F:
Guilelmus de Brena OFM,
Reportatio in libros
Sententiarum
Lectio 71

⟨**Lectio 71**⟩

[93v] Consequenter queritur circa 23 et 24 \et 25 distinctiones/. Queritur primo utrum sacramentum extreme unctionis sit necessarium ad salutem; secunda, utrum in ecclesia sint 7 ordines; tertia, utrum episcopus depositus possit conferre ordines; quarta, \utrum etas impediat susceptionem \ordinis//.

5

[1] De prima arguitur quod non, quia sine extrema unctione potest haberi salus, patet; ideo etc.

[2] Oppositum, quia sacramentum extreme unctionis est ordinatum in remedium ad salutem ordinatam a Christo, quia ~~contra~~ \ad/ deletionem peccatorum venialium.

10

⟨**Q. 1: Utrum sacramentum extreme unctionis sit necessarium ad salutem**⟩

[3] Ad primam questionem, videndum est primo quid sit illud sacramentum, secundo de principali quesito.

⟨**Articulus primus: Quid est sacramentum extreme unctionis**⟩

[4] Quantum ad primum describitur sic: quod est unctio hominis infirmi penitentis facta in determinatis partibus cum oleo \sanctificato ab episcopo, per sacerdotem cum intentione debita certa verba \proferente

15

14 sanctificato] sanctidificato *corr.*

- efficaciter signans ex institutione divina purgationem peccatorum venialium//. Dicitur enim quod est ‘unctio \infirmi/’. Ex hoc debet solum dari infirmis, et non sanis, et hii sunt materia susceptiva eius, nec in eadem infirmitate debet dari bis, licet in pluribus infirmitatibus. Et dicitur
- 20 ‘penitentis’, quia supponit quod homo sit in gratia. Unde penitentia debet precedere; neque pueris debet dari, quia non sunt penitentes, neque furiosis, nisi prius apparentibus signis penitentiae in eis. Et dicitur ‘facta in determinatis partibus corporis’. Illud enim sacramentum datur in remedium peccatorum venialium; per ~~quas~~ \istas autem partes/ homo
- 25 peccat venialiter, et sunt extremitates organorum exteriorum, ut sunt oculi, aures et manibus. Secundum enim Gregorium “luxuria in lumbis est virorum, in umbilico in mulieribus.” Et additur s ‘per episcopum sanctificato’, et est materia, et est oleum olivarum, sine tamen balsamo. Oleum enim designat ~~odorem~~ \nitorem/ consciencie, sed balsamus
- 30 odorem bone fame quo homo de cetero non indiget sicut in confirmatione sanctificato per episcopum, quia requiritur materia benedicta in omnibus sacramentis preterquam in baptismo. Et debet ministrari ‘per sacerdotem’, qui est eius minister. Et additur ‘cum intentione debita verba certa proferente’, et forma eius est ~~q~~ ‘per istam sanctam’, etc.
- 35 \‘unctionem ~~deleat~~ \dimittat/ tibi dominus peccata qui commisisti per visum vel auditum vel olfactum’, etc./ [parcat tibi dominus quod in oculis commisisti, etc]. Et additur ‘efficaciter signans ex institutione divina purgationem peccatorum venialium’. Et est finis huius sacramenti, quod confertur contra desperationem.
- 40 [5] Et illud sacramentum constitutum est a Christo, March. 6, ubi discipuli inungebant infirmos, quod nonnisi de auctoritate Christi.

**⟨Articulus secundus: Utrum sacramentum extreme unctionis
sit necessarium ad salutem⟩**

[6] Quantum ad secundum, [94r] \scilicet utrum sacramentum extreme unctionis sit necessarium ad salutem/, dico quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter, vel in facto vel in voto. Primo modo non est necessarium

25 exteriorum] exteriores *corr.* 26 manibus] monibus *corr.*

26 Gregorium: GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Homiliae in evangelia*, l. 1, hom. 13, n. 1, ed. ETAIX (CCSL 141), p. 89. 29–30 Oleum – fame: *Decretalium d. Gregorii Papae IX compilatio* (= *Liber Extra*) I, tit. XV, “De sacra unctione”, cap. 1, in *Corpus Iuris Canonici, Pars Secunda: Decretalium Collectiones*, ed. E. FRIEDBERG, E.L. RICHTER, E.L., Leipzig 1879 (Repr. Graz 1959), col. 132: “Per oleum enim nitor conscientiae designatur, iuxta quod legitur *Prudentes virgines acceperunt oleum in vasis suis cum lampadibus*; per balsamum autem odor famae exprimitur, propter quod dicitur *Sicut balsamum aromatizans, odorem dedi*.” 40 March. 6: Mc. 6:13.

ad salutem, quia sine eo de facto potest haberi salus; ideo etc. Sed
 secundo modo est necessarium, ita quod homo habeat ipsum in voto,
 quia contemptus eius esset peccatum mortale, quod impedit salutem.

⟨Q. 2: Utrum in ecclesia sint 7 ordines⟩

[7] Ad secundam questionem circa 24 distinctionem, utrum in ecclesia
 sint 7 ordines, primo videndum quid est ordo, secundo utrum sit sacra-
 mentum, tertio utrum \sint/ 7, quarto si in quolibet imprimitur character, 50
 quinto de utrum inter eos sit ordo.

[8] Quantum ad primum ordo capitur ~~vel~~ \primo modo/ pro relatio-
 ne \vel/ habitudine relatorum adinvicem; secundo \modo est/ gradus
 eminentie respectu relatorum; tertio \modo capitur/ pro ordinatione ad
 talem gradum eminentie. Primo modo secundum Augustinum 19 *De ci-* 55
uitate \c. 13/ dicit quod “ordo est parium rerum et disparium, unicuique
 sua loca tribuens congrua dispositio”, et sic capit Aristoteles ordinem
 XII *Metaphysice*. Secundo modo capiendo ordinem: ordo est gradus
 eminentie disponens aliquem ad aliquem dignitatis actum ad quem alias
 non esset dispositus de congruo. Patet in politia, ut patet de balivo et 60
 ceteris presidentibus. ~~tertio modo ea~~

[9] Et sic ordo est in ecclesia primo modo – patet, quia sicut in processu
 nature est, sic in ecclesia ubi est processus gratuitus {quod est [est] habi-
 tudo relatorum ad invicem, quorum unum est prius alio}, et ideo est ibi
 ordo primo modo. Similiter secundo modo, quia ibi est gradus eminentie 65
 disponens aliquem ad aliquem actum ad quem alias non esset dispositus,
 ut patet de sacerdote, dyacono et subdyacono. Ac patet \similiter/ de
 tertio modo ordinis, et capitur pro ordinatione ad gradum eminentie,
 per quem efficitur quis dignus, etc., et sic est in ecclesia militante et de
 illo ordine est maxime sermo. Et diffinitur sic, quia est sacramentum 70
 nove legis consistens in ordinatione facta per ministrum ydoneum ~~et fit~~
 per certa verba aliquo signo sensibili \per quam aliquis ponitur in gradu
 eminentie disponens aliquem ad aliquem actum dignitatis ad quem alias
 non esset dispositus de congruo ex institutione divina signans effectum
 gratie/ etc. 75

[10] Et sic patet \quantum ad secundum/ quod ordo isto tertio modo
 est sacramentum. Ratio: quia designat sub signo visibili si effectum
 invisibilem a summo Deo institutum; ideo etc.

70 illo ordine] illa ordinatione *corr.*

55–56 De civitate: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De civitate Dei* XIX, c. 13 (CCSL
 48, p. 679; CSEL 40/2, p. 395). 58 Metaphysice: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* XII,
 c. 1 (1069a18–30; AL 25.3.2, p. 246).

[11] Quantum ad tertium, utrum sint septem ordines, et dico quod sic,
 80 et distinguuntur, quia sunt 4 non sacri, et sunt minores: hosti\arius/,
 lec\tor/, exor\ciste/, acol\itus/; et sacri sunt 3. Primi non sacri dicun-
 tur, alii sacri. Dicuntur sacri, quia actus eorum versatur circa materiam
 consecratam; secundo, quia istis \tribus/ sacramentis \sacris/ est an-
 nexa castitas, per oppositum de aliis non sacris. Sufficientia capitur,
 85 quia ministri ecclesie sunt mediatores populi et Dei et hec unio \qua
 populus unitur Deo spiritualiter/ fit per eucharistie sacramentum, et
 per eius ~~sumptionem~~ \confectionem/. et Ideo ~~vel~~ aliqui materiam reci-
 piunt a ~~p~~le* et ministrant aliis, et sic est subdiaconus, \qui panem et
 vinum ministrat dyacono/; secundo \dyaconus/ capit materiam prepa-
 90 ratam \a subdiacono/ et offert sacerdoti, et est officium dyaconi; tertio
 e illa materia consecrata offertur Deo, et est officium sacerdotis.

[12] Sed ad susceptionem huiusmodi sacramenti disponunt inferiores et
 hoc vel removendo impedimenta; homo autem impeditur \et/ ab ho-
 mine malo, et hoc removet hostiarius, vel a Dyabolo, et hoc removet
 95 exorcista. Sed ad dispositionem convenientem, et est duplex: quedam
 illuminatio intellectus et secunda inflammatio affectus; ordo acoliticus
 illuminat intellectum, sed \lector/ disponit ad inflammationem affectus;
 ideo etc.

[13] Quantum ad quartum articulum, de caractere, dicitur quod sic, quia
 100 in quolibet sacramento irreiterabili imprimitur caracter; sed quilibet
 ordo est huiusmodi.

[14] Quantum ad quintum, inter istos characteres non est ordo, quia posset
 aliquis accedere ordines dyaconatus sine precedentibus, \ut patet Extra,
 “De clerico per saltum promotu”/.

⟨Q. 3: Utrum episcopus depositus possit conferre ordines⟩

105 [15] Ad tertiam questionem dico quod \vel/ episcopatus est ordo, vel
 non. Si primo modo, et imprimitur \in eo/ caracter, sic potest dici vel
 de facto vel de iure. De iure non potest. Si autem de facto, sic dicunt
 aliqui quod sic, quia similiter sacerdos posset consecrare degradatus.
 Si autem dicatur quod non est ordo, dicitur quod non ~~quia non habet~~
 110 ~~materiam subiectam, quia illa est sibi ablata~~. Sic dicitur quod non potest
 conferre de iure, tamen de facto bene, quia consecratio est indelebilis.
 Sed utrum sit ordo vel non sunt opiniones. [74v] Et potest dici quod est
 ordo, et si sunt plures ordines 7, non est magna vis.

83 quia] que *corr.* 85 qua] que *corr.*

103 Extra: *Liber Extra* V, tit. 29, “De clerico per saltum promotu”, cap. un., cols.
 833–834.

⟨Q. 4 Utrum etas impediatur susceptionem ordinis⟩

[16] Ad quartam, utrum etas impediatur susceptionem ordinis, dico quod
sexus impedit a susceptione ordinis, quia Christus sic instituit et est 115
congruentia, quia ordo est gradus eminentie in ecclesia; sed hoc magis
competit viris quam mulieribus, et beatus Apostolus prohibet mulieres
docere. Secundo dico quod de \iure/ ~~facto~~ etas impedit susceptionem
ordinis; sed de facto dicunt aliqui quod non impedit etas, quia non de
necessitate executio sequitur ordinem. Tamen videtur quod illud non 120
esset cautum, quia multa sunt isti ordini annexa, scilicet castitas et usus
rationis, etc., que in infante et puero non sunt in actu, sed requiritur etas
cum qua stat usus rationis, votum continentie et obligatio voluntaria.

Appendix G:

Guilelmus de Brena OFM,

Principium in theologia

MS. Città del Vaticano, B.A.V., Borgh. 105, ff. 86v–88v.

[86v] Principium in theologia magistri Guillelmi de Brenna

Ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur ut iterum fluant,
Eccl. primo capitulo [1:7]. Gregorius, in prologo *Moralium*, loquens de
divina Scriptura dicit sic: “divinus enim sermo sicut prudentes intus ex-
ercet, sic plerumque superficie simplices refovet. Habet in publico unde
parvulos nutriat servat in secreto unde mentes sublimium in admiratio-
ne suspendat. Quasi quidam fluvius est, ut ita dixerim, planus et altus,
in quo et agnus pedicet et elephans natet.” Hec ibi.

Ubi apparet expresse quod beatus Gregorius Scripturam Sacram fluvio
comparat, et non immerito, nam sicut fluvius habet a fonte: 10

ortum et productionem
motum et diffusionem
gradum et distinctionem
statum et durationem,

sic sermo divinus habet a fonte: 15

ortum generosum
motum virtuosum
potum saporosum
et **fluxum** copiosum.

[0.1] Ista patent. Audi enim ipsam de suo **ortu** dicentem et se iactantem: 20
Ego ex ore altissimi prodii primogenitus ante omnem creaturam, Ecclus.

1 Principium – Brenna] *mg. cod.*

3 *Moralium*: GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Moralia in Iob* (CCSL 143), Epist. ad Leandrum,
p. 6; *Manipulus florum*: Scriptura sacra ag.

24[:5]. Et ibidem capitulo 1[:1] *Omnis sapientia a domino Deo est et cum illo fuit et est ante evum.*

[0.2] Audi ipsam de suo **motu** proferentem: *Omnibus mobilibus mobilior sapientia* Sap. 7[:24]. Sunt enim alie scientie mobiles ut sit predicatio causalis et effectiva, quia quedam movent:

ad litigiosam decertationem ut sunt scientie logicales
ad curiosam percuntationem ut sunt scientie naturales
ad ambitiosam occupationem ut scientie legales.

30 Sed ista Sacra Scriptura movet:

motu alterationis quia facit de vicioso modestum
motu augmentationis quia facit de imperfecto perfectum
motu generationis quia facit de non amico amicum.

Et ideo omnibus istis mobilior est, quia perfectior in movendo eo quod
35 movet ad virtuosam operationem. Ipsa enim *per nationes in animas sanctas se transferens* et *amicos Dei et prophetas instituit* dicitur, Sap. 7[:27]. Numquam tamen movet motu corruptionis, quia *clara est que numquam marcessit sapientia*, Sap. 6[:13].

[0.3] Audi etiam ipsam nos suo **potu** recreantem Ecclus. 15[:3]: *Cibavit illum Dominus pane vite et intellectus et aqua sapientie salutaris potavit illum.*

Sacra namque Scriptura non solum potum tribuit, verum etiam dat cibum. Ipsam enim “aliquando potus aliquando cibus est: cibus in locis obscurioribus, que quasi exponendo frangitur, manducatur, glutitur; set
45 potus est in locis apertioribus, quia sorbitur sicut invenitur”, Gregorius in *Moralibus*.

[0.4] Vide ultimo Sacram Scripturam suo **fluxu** cuncta irrigantem. Ipsa namque est ille *fons qui ascendebat de terra irrigans universam superficiem terre*, Gen. 2[:6].

⟨Divisio thematis⟩

50 Quia igitur Sacra Scriptura habet a Deo sicut fluvius a fonte:
ortum
motum
po\r/tum
cursum.

27 ad] quedam *praem. mg. cod.* 39 ipsam] potu *add. sed abrasit cod.* 41 illum] *exp. cod.*

46 *Moralibus*: GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Moralia in Iob* (CCSL 143), p. 40; *Manipulus florum*: Scriptura sacra ai.

Ideo ipsam – non solum Gregorius, ut dictum est, verum etiam Sapiens 55
Ecclesiastes ipsam nobis sub typo fluminis circumloquitur, cum proponit
in verbis thematis preassumpti, dicens *Ad locum unde exeunt*, etc.
In quibus verbis iuxta predicta possumus advertere:

typum figuralem
motum supernalem 60
potum salutarem
cursum regularem.

Habet namque:

typum aptissimum
ortum dignissimum 65
portum tutissimum
cursum rectissimum.

Et in istis quattuor Sacra Scriptura omnibus scientiis humanitus inventis
antefertur.

Ipsa namque 70

est **latior in continentia**, quod probat **typus quo circumloquitur**,
cum dicitur *flumina*

est **altior in eminentia**, quod probat **locus unde egreditur**, cum
dicitur *unde exeunt*

est **potior in efficacia**, quod probat **portus in quem revertitur** 75
reducitur, quia *revertuntur*.

est **uberior in affluentia**, quod probat **fluxus per quem discen-**
ditur, cum dicitur *ut iterum fluant*.

[1] Ergo primo premittitur Sacre Scripture **typus figuralis quo cir-**
cumloquitur per quem ostenditur cunctis aliis **latior in continentia**, 80
quia *flumina*.

Est enim, sicut patet per experientiam, aqua fluminum aqua:

emundans sordida
fecundans arida
profundans intima. 85

Et propter hec tria Scriptura aptissime fluminibus comparatur. Ipsa
namque:

clara est et **mundissima sine erroribus**
plena et **fecundissima variis virtutibus**
alta et **profundissima misteriis et sensibus**. 90

75 potior in efficacia] *scripsi* perfectior in existentia *cod.* 80 latior] *scripsi* altior
cod.

[1.1] Est igitur Sacra Scriptura ad modum aque fluminis **mundissima sine erroribus**. Attingit enim ubique propter sui mundiciam; *vapor enim est virtutis Dei et emanatio quedam claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera, et ideo nihil inquinatum in illam incurrit; candor est lucis eterne, et speculum sine macula*, Sap. 7[:25–26]. Unde dicitur Eze. 36[:25]:
 95 *Effundam super vos aquam mundam et mundabimini*. Et ideo bene figuratur per illum fluvium de quo dicitur, Exod. 3[=2:5]: *Descendebat filia Pharaonis ut lavaretur in flumine*. Filia Pharaonis, 〈scilicet〉 scientia inventa studio vel scientia naturalis rationalis, si vult mundari, si
 100 vult sine suspitione haberi, oportet quod lavetur in isto flumine, [87r] et quod in Sacra Scriptura probetur, approbata confirmetur, confirmata publicetur, quia quod “de Scripturis Sacris non habet auctoritatem, eadem facilitate contempnitur qua probatur”, sicut dicit Ieronimus. Ipsa etiam Scriptura Sacra:
 105 omne cecum illuminat 〈et consanat?〉
 omne falsum dilaminat et condempnat
 omne bonum examinat et confirmat.
 Unde dicit beatus Augustinus *De doctrina Christiana*, libro 2: “Quicquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi dampnatur, si utile est, ibi
 110 invenitur.”

[1.2] Secundo Sacra Scriptura ad modum aque fluvii est **fecunda variis virtutibus**. *Est enim in ea spiritus intelligentie scientiarum, multiplex, unicus, subtilis, disertus, mobilis, incoinquinatus, certus, suavis, amans bonum, et nihil vetat benefacere, humanus, benignus, stabilis, securus, omnem habens virtutem, omnia prospiciens*.
 115 Ipsa enim nos fecundat virtutibus istis:
 preceptorum obligatione
 consiliorum persuasione
 exemplorum propositione
 120 tormentorum cominatione
 premiorum repromissione.
 Et ideo figuratur per fluvium qui *egrediebatur de 〈loco voluptatis ad irrigandum paradysum〉 qui inde dividitur in quattuor capita*, Gen. 2[:10]. Dicitur enim fluvius non absolute, set *igneus rapidusque* Dan. 7[:10].
 125 Dicitur inquam
 fluvius, quia irrigativus humane devotionis

103 Ieronimus: HIERONYMUS, *Commentarii in evangelium Matthaei*, CCSL 77, p. 220; *Manipulus florum*: Scriptura sacra ae. **108** De doctrina Christiana: AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De doctrina Christiana* II, c. 42 (CCSL 3, p. 76, ll. 6–12); *Manipulus florum*: Scriptura sacra f. **112–115** Est enim – prospiciens: Sap. 7:22.

igneus, quia illuminativus splendoris cognitionis
 et igneus etiam, quia inflammativus fervoris dilectionis
 rapidusque, quia roborativus vigoris operationis.

Et ideo bene de ipsa dicitur Apo. 22[:2] *ex utraque parte fluminis lignum vite* 130
<afferens fructus duodecim
<tot?>alis <inund?>atio – ex utraque parte fluminis
universalis restauratio – lignum vite
mentalis consolatio – afferens fructus duodecim.>

[1.2.1] Primo vide **<totalem inundationem?>**, quia *ex utraque parte.* 135

Primo ex parte corporis ostendit:

primordiale formationem

finale consumptionem

totalem reparationem

eternalem conservationem. 140

Secundo, ex parte anime ostendit:

decorem incomparabilem, quia *ad ymaginem Dei*

valorem impreciablem, quia redempti *precioso sanguine agni immaculati Christi*

dulcorem indefectibilem, quia capax Dei est, eo quod *ad ymaginem Dei* est. 145

Item, ex utraque parte Novi \et Veteris/ Testamenti. <Ipsa namque ex parte Veteris Testamenti> ostendit ipsum:

penosum sacrificiis

onerosum in cerimoniis 150

rigorosum in iudiciis

defectuosum in premiis.

Set ex parte Novi Testamenti ostendit:

novitatem operis in incarnatione

unitatem federis in copulatione 155

dignitatem muneris in retributione

levitatem operis in observatione.

Item, ex utraque parte, scilicet vite presentis et future. Ipsa namque ex parte presentis ostendit:

exilium lacrimosum 160

fastigium tediosum

periculum ruinosum

excidium dolorosum.

142 ad ymaginem Dei: Gen. 1:27. 143–144 precioso – Christi: I Pet. 1:19.

Ex parte vite future ostendit:

- 165 facultates que non deficiunt
voluptates que non inficiunt
dignitates que non decipiunt
ubertates que nos reficiunt.

Bene ergo dicit *ex utraque parte*.

- 170 [1.2.2] Secundo vide **universalem restaurationem**, quia *lignum vite*, scilicet politice, quia docet honeste vivere
vite, scilicet heroyce, quia docet cuncta relinquere
vite, scilicet angelice, quia docet Deum cognoscere
vite, scilicet deifice, quia docet Deum diligere.

- 175 Et ideo *lignum vite est hiis qui apprehenderint eam, et qui tenuerint eam beatus*.

- [1.2.3] Tertio vide **mentalem consolationem**, quia *afferens fructus duodecim*. Fructus duodecim sunt illi quos enumerat Apostolus ad Galatianos 5[:22–23] et sunt *fructus Spiritus* qui sunt: *caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia, longanimitas, bonitas, mansuetudo, fides, modestia, continentia, castitas, benignitas*. Vel potest dici fructus duodecim beneficia que nobis Sacra Scriptura recitat, quattuor se tenent ex parte omnium communiter, scilicet beneficium:

- creationis
185 conservationis
gubernationis
redemptionis.

Alia quattuor se tenent ex parte peccatorum tantum, scilicet beneficium expectationis

- 190 adiuvationis
reprehensionis
et condonationis.

Alia quattuor se tenent ex parte electorum, scilicet beneficium predestinationis

- 195 vocationis
iustificationis
et magnificationis.

Et sic patet quod Scriptura Sacra ad modum fluminis est **fecunda variis virtutibus**.

175–176 lignum – beatus: Prov. 3:18.

[1.3] Tertio Sacra Scriptura est **profunda** ad modum fluminis **miste- 200**
riis et sensibus. Unde Augustinus *De vera religione*: “Ad dignitatem”
 inquit “Divine Scripture pertinet ut sub una litera diversos sensus con-
 tineat ut sic, diversis in cunctis conveniens, unusquisque miretur se in
 divina Scriptura invenire veritatem quam mente conceperat; ac per hoc
 facilius contra infideles deffendatur, dum simul aliquid quod quisque velit 205
 intelligere falsum apparuit ad alium sensum recursum possit habere.”

Et beatus Ieronymus in Epistola ad Paulinum dicit “Singula verba
 plena sunt sensibus” et infra: “quot sint verba, tot sunt misteria. Parum
 dixi in quolibet latent multiplices sensus intelligentie.”

Et ideo ipsa est illud flumen de quo dictum est in Ps. [65:10]: *Flumen 210*
Dei repletum est aquis; parasti cibum illorum, quoniam ita est preparatio
eius.

[2] Secundo ostenditur Sacre Scripture **locus supernaturalis a quo**
egreditur, per quem ostenditur cunctis aliis **altior** **(in eminentia)**,
 quia dicitur *unde exeunt*. Quod verbum, si ex modo loquendi proferatur 215
 interrogative, ipsa respondet, Ecclus. 24[:41]: *Ego quasi fluvijs Dorix*
eivi a Paradyso, qui est locus:

tutior ad residendum
 clarior ad intuendum
 potior ad influendum 220
 gratior ad convivendum
 firmior ad permanendum.

Sacra Scriptura contrahit:

tutam confidentiam
 claram evidentiam 225
 magnam efficaciam
 summam permanentiam.

Pro quo possumus exponere illud quod scribitur Ys. 2[:3]: *Venite ascen-*
damus ad montem Domini et ad domum Dei Iacob et docebit nos vias
suas et ambulabimus in semitis eius, quia de Syon exiit (lex) [87v] et 230
verbum Domini de Ierusalem. Ubi vide Sacram Scripturam habentem a
 loco sue originis ista quinque, scilicet:

201 De vera religione: THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*,
 q. 4, a. 1, ed. P.M. PESSON, Rome 1965, p. 105 (in cunctis cod.] intellectis *fons*);
Manipulus florum: Scriptura sacra k, “Augustinus ibidem [=De vera religione]” **207**
 Epistola ad Paulinum: HIERONYMUS, *Epistulae*, epist. 53, vol. 54, par. 8, pag. 455:
 “singula in eo verba plena sunt sensibus.” **208** infra: Cf. HIERONYMUS, *Epistulae*,
 epist. 53, p. 463: “Apocalypsis iohannis tot habet sacramenta quot verba. Parum dixi
 et pro merito voluminis laus omnis inferior est; in verbis singulis multiplices latent
 intelligentiae.”

confidentiam inexpugnabilem, quia *mons Domini*
evidentiam inobfuscabilem, quia *docebit nos*
 235 **influentialiam infatigabilem**, *⟨quia et ambulabimus in semitis eius⟩*
\efficaciam irrefragabilem/, quia *de Syon exibit lex*
permanentiam indefectibilem, quia *verbum Domini de Ierusalem*.

[2.1] Primo dico quod Scriptura Sacra est *mons Domini*. Mons, in-
 quam, ille de quo dicitur Gen. 19[:17] *ne stes in omni circa regionem,*
 240 *set in monte salvum te fac*. Habet namque Scriptura regiones contra se
 inpugnantes, in tria differentia, scilicet:

philosophos per rationem philosophicam loquentes de creaturis
 iudeos intentionem propheticam non videntes in figuris
 hereticos oppinionem fantasticam extorquentes de Scripturis.

245 *Ne stes ergo in omni circa regionem* – Non moreris:
 in philosophicis sillogisticationibus
 in iudaicis expectationibus
 in fantasticis adinventionibus.

Sed *in monte salvum te fac*, in altitudine et firmitate Scripturarum
 250 Sacrarum, quia ibi non opprimit:

philosophica ratio autenticam auctoritatem
 iudaica deceptio evangelicam claritatem
 fantastica oppinio ecclesiasticam veritatem.

Venite ergo ascendamus ad monte Domini.

255 [2.2] Sequitur secundum: *et docebit nos vias suas*, ubi apparet quod
 Scriptura a loco sue originis trahit **evidentiam inobfuscabilem**. Illa
 namque docet qui dicitur:

via recte proficiens
 veritas numquam decipiens
 260 vita numquam deficiens.

Sibi namque convenit quod dicitur Mt. 22[:16] *Magister, scimus quia*
verax es et viam Dei in veritate doces. Ubi patet quod iste doctor habet
 doctrinam altam, claram et sanam.

[2.2.1] Ipse namque docet **subtiliter et ingenio⟨se⟩**, *Magister*
 265 *\a Deo/* licentiatus eternali generatione
 ad legendum deputatus temporali habitatione
 in legendo occupatus supernali conversatione.

Ideo possumus dicere cum Nichodemus *Scimus quia a Deo venisti Magi-*
ster [Johannes 3:2].

241 tria differentia] *sic!*

[2.2.2] Docet iterum ~~subtiliter~~ **salubriter et non suspitiose**, quia 270
verax; nomen eius *Fidelis et Verax*, dicitur Apoc. [19:11].

[2.2.3] Docet etiam **utiliter, non fastidiose**, quia *viam Dei*. Illas vias
 quas petebat David, dicens [Ps. 25:4] *Vias tuas Domine demonstra mihi*
et semitas tuas edoce me, scilicet:

vias mundas affectione sincera 275
 rectas intentione directa
 tutas consolatione quieta.

Istas inquam *\e/ doce me*, quia *vie eius, vie pulchre et omnes semite*
illius pacifice (Prov. 3:17).

[2.2.4] Docet ultimo **sinceriter et affectuose**, *in veritate doces*, quia 280
 docet:

superiori revelatione
 interiori inspiratione
 exteriori manuductione.

Unde dicitur Neh. 9[:20]: *Spiritum tuum bonum dedisti eis Domine qui* 285
doceret eos. Et videte claritatem:

superius increatam, quia dicitur *spiritum tuum bonum. Spiritus est*
Deus, Io. 4[:24]; *Deus autem lux est*, et tenebre in eo non sunt ulle, I Io.
 1[:5].

interius inspiratam, quia *dedesti eis*, Bar. 4[=3:34]: *Stelle dederunt* 290
lumen suum in custodiis suis.

exterius demonstratam, quia *ut doceret eos*, Io. 14[:26] *Spiritus Sanc-*
tus docebit vos omnia et suggeret nobis omnia quecumque dixero vobis.
 Sic ergo patet Scripture Sacre **evidentiam inobfuscabilem**, quia *do-*
cebit nos vias suas. 295

[2.3] Sequitur tertio *et ambulabimus in semitis eius*, ubi ostenditur quod
 Sacra Scriptura trahit a loco sue originis **influentiam infatigabilem**, et
 dicitur expresse Ys. 40[:31] *qui sperant in Domino mutabunt fortitudinem*
et assument pennas ut aquile current et non laborabunt, ambulabunt et
non deficient. Istius autem infatigabilis ratio redditur, quia fatigabilis 300
 potest esse triplex causa, scilicet:

potentia naturalis que patitur
 influentia virtualis que dimittitur
 reverentia liberalis que contranitur.

305 Et quia Sacra Scriptura:

nostram infirmitatem coadiuvat inducendo ad patientiam, *curramus ad propositum nobis certamen aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum*

nostram activitatem corroborat extollendo perseverantiam, Ad Heb. 2[:7]: *In disciplina perseverate tanquam filiis se offert vobis Deus*

nostram perversitatem rectificat refrenendo concupiscentiam: *omnis enim qui in agone contendit ab omnibus se abstinet* I Ad Cor. 9[:25].

Ideo bene Sacra Scriptura dicitur habere **influentialiam infatigabilem**, cum dicitur *ambulabimus in semitis eius*.

315 [2.4] Sequitur quarto, quia *de Syon exibit lex*. Ubi ostenditur quod ipsa trahit a loco sue originis **efficaciam irrefragabilem**, cum dicitur *⟨lex⟩*. Lex enim a legislatore robur habet et efficaciam; illius autem legislator est ille cuius:

potentia cuncta sunt effecta
320 scientia cuncta sunt prospecta
prudentia bona sunt disposita
sententia mala sunt corrupta.

Ideo bene dicitur habere **efficaciam irrefragabilem**, et de hoc ipsa se iactat Prov. 8[:15]: *per me reges regnant et conditores legum iusta decernunt*. Ipsa namque immediate premisit [8:14] *meum est consilium, mea est prudentia*. Set quale consilium? Certe

non pervertivum sententie
non acquisitivum pecunie
non turbativum conscientie.

330 Querant qui volunt tale consilium. Set pro medico *in consilium eorum non veniat anima mea* Gen. 49[:6], set consilium legis evangelice, quod est

fraterne condescensionis: *dilige proximum tuum sicut te ipsum*
interne quietatis: *in mundo pressuram habentis habebitis in me autem*
335 *pacem*

terrene abdicationis: *si vis perfectus esse, vade vende omnia que habes*, etc. Mt. 19[:21].

Hac est consilium legis Christi, illius inquam legis de qua dicitur Ps. [18:8] *Lex Domini immaculata convertens animas de Syon*, id est de speculatione Paradysis, *exibit ista lex*.

340

306–308 curramus – iesum: Ad Heb. 12:1–2. **333** dilige – ipsum: e.g., Mt. 19:19. **334–335** in mundo – pacem: Io. 16:33.

[2.5] Sequitur *et verbum Domini de Ierusalem*, ubi ostenditur quod Sacra Scriptura trahit a loco sue originis **permanentiam** [88r] **indefectibilem**. “Verba Dei cessare non possunt”, dixit illa sancta. Et Salvator ait: *Celum et terram transibunt, verba autem mea non transibunt*, Luc. 21[:33]. “Verbum enim Domini Filius est Patris” dixit Gregorius. Qui Filius est verbum: 345

expressivum plene veritatis
productivum cuncte universitatis
purgativum nostre pravitatis.

Propter primum dicitur *fons sapientie verbum Dei in excelsis*, Ecclus. 1[:5]. 350

Propter secundum: Io. 1[:1]: *In principio erat verbum*, etc. Et in Ps.[32:6] *Verbo domini celi firmati sunt*.

Propter tertium Hebr. 1[:3] *qui cum sit splendor glorie, portans omnia verba virtutis sue purgationem peccatorum faciens*. 355

Hoc est illud verbum de quo Hugo *De archa Noe* ait: “Scriptura Sacra est liber vite, cuius origo eterna incorruptibilis essentia et paucis interpositis, cuius innumerabilia verba et tamen unum verbum omnia hec.”

Et sic patet de secundo principali ubi ostenditur Sacre Scripture **locus supernalis** a quo **egreditur** per quem redditur cunctis aliis **altior in eminentia**, cum dicitur *unde exeunt*. 360

[3] Tertio principaliter ostenditur Sacre Scripture **portus salubris ad quem reducitur**, per quem ostenditur cunctis aliis **potior in efficacia**, quia *ad locum unde exeunt revertuntur*. Figura circularis reddit in idem a quo recedit. Scriptura Sacra recte figure sperice comparatur; est enim figura sperica aliis: 365

capacior in mensura
simplicior in statura
prior in natura. 370

Sic Sacra Scriptura:

est pre aliis speculationis magis dilatate. Ipsa *enim omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei*, I Cor. 2[:10].

est etiam abstractionis magis elevate. *Ego in altissimis habitavi et*

343 sancta: IACOBUS DE VORAGINE, *Legenda Aurea*, c. 4 (De sancta Lucia virgine), (ed. GRAESSE 1850, p. 31; ed. MAGGIONE, v. 1, p. 58): “Cui Lucia dixit: verba Dei cessare non possunt.” **345** Gregorius: GREGORIUS MAGNUS, *Homiliae in evangelia*, CPL 1711, lib. 2, hom. 30, par. 7, pag. 264, l. 211. **356** De archa Noe: HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De archa Noe*, l. 2, c. 9 (CCCM 176, p. 48); *Manipulus Florum*: Scriptura sacra bd.

375 *tronus meus in columpna nubis*, Ecclus. 34 [=24:7].

est etiam comparationis magis comprobate. Unde Sap. 7[:29]: *est enim speciosior sole et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata invenitur*.

Et ideo ad modum figure sperice in idem revertitur a quo recedit. Et hoc
380 est quod dicit: *Unde exeunt flumina revertuntur*. Pro quo posset exponi quod scribitur Ecclesiastices 1[:6]: *Lustrans <universa> in circuitu pergit spiritus et in circulo suo revertitur* a quo recedit. Ubi apparet Sacra Scriptura aliis scripturis **potior in efficacia**:

ex dono collationis proprie
385 ex modo condicionis intime
ex facto operationis optime.

Ipsa namque:

supplet omnem defectum *lustrans universa*
implet omnem affectum *pergit in circuitu*
390 **complet omnem profectum** *in circulo suo revertitur*.

[3.1] \Est/ igitur Sacra Scriptura ceteris **potior in efficacia**, quia supplet omnem defectum quia dicitur *Lustrans universa*. Ubi est advertendum quod in nobis est triplex defectus, scilicet:

cecitatis et ignorantie
395 tarditatis et negligentie
levitatis et insolentie.

Istos autem defectus supplet Sacra Scriptura, quia

nescientes prudenter <erudit>
negligentes ferventer arguit
400 insolentes potenter corrigit.

Ista tria tangit Apostolus II Thim. 2 [=3:16]: *Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, arguendum et corrigendum*, quia:

doctrina et erudicio reppellit omnem ignorantiam
pungens argumentatio compellit ad diligenciam
405 potens correctio expellit insolentiam.

Asculata igitur dicit ipsa sermones meos et ad eloquia mea inclina aurem tuam. Vita enim sunt invenientibus eam et universe carnis sanitas, Prov. 2[=4:20, 22].

[3.2] Secundo est **potior aliis in efficacia**, quia **replet omnem affectum**, quia *pergit in circuitu*. Figura circularis suo motu vel dimittit
410 doctrina et] *leg docens?*

409 replet: Cf. §3 supra, “**implet omnem affectum** *pergit in circuitu*.”

vacuum, et propter hoc, dum Sacra Scriptura in circuitu pergere dicitur, quia tante sufficientie est, ut in ea quilibet inveniatur quicquid desiderat. Est enim Sacra Scriptura ad modum cuiusdam reffectorii, ubi cibus in tertio ferculo ministratur. Servit namque Sacra Scriptura:

primo de cibo communi in sensu ystorico et literali 415

secundo de cibo subtili in sensu typo et figurali

tertio de \cibo suavi in/ sensu mistico et spirituali.

Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo, III libro *De anima*, “In refectorio Sacre Scripture tres mense parantur, id est, tres sensus divine Scripture ponuntur, Ystoricus, mysticus et moralis: 420

Prima mensa simplicibus

secunda doctoribus

tercia communis est omnibus.

In prima cibus est grossior

in secunda subtilior 425

in tertia suavior.

Prima continet saporem exemplorum

secunda vim misteriorum

tertia suavitatem morum.”

Et ideo de \studentibus/ in ea possumus <dicere> filii tui sicud novelle 430
oliviarum in circuitu mense tue. Ps. [128: 3].

[3.3] Tertio ipsa est **potior in efficacia**, quia **complet omnem profectum**, quia *in circulo suo revertitur*. Motus enim circularis inter alios est perfectissimus, et ita motus Sacre Scripture est perfectissimus. Et ideo dicitur moveri circulariter. 435

Incipit enim motus ipsius a Deo, ostendens ab ipso cuncta esse producta.

Et transit per creaturas, ostendens per Deum omnia esse reducta.

Et in circulo suo revertitur, ostendens ad Deum omnia esse perducta.

Et hoc precepit Dominus Moysi, Exod. 25[:12], quod faceret *quattuor circulos* et poneret eos in *quattuor angulos archae*. Archa ista Sacra Scriptura est in qua sunt: 440

tabule sacre eruditionis

manna mentalis consolationis

virga regularis correctionis. 445

In circuitu arche sunt quattuor circuli aurei, quattuor, scilicet amorosi

418 De anima: HUGO DE FOLIETO, *De claustris animarum libri quatuor* III, c. 8 (PL 176, 1097D–1098A); *Manipulus florum*: Scriptura sacra bg.

motus, quorum duo sunt ex parte tui, et duo ex parte Dei. Ex parte tui:

Primus circulus est quia docet Scriptura considerare vitam tuam, quomodo vivens, vadis ad mortem, deinde post resurrectionem redibis in
450 idem.

Secundus est quia docet te formatum de pulvere modicum [88v] durans, et statim redibis in idem, corrupto corpore.

Duo alii sunt ex parte Dei:

Primus est quia docet Scriptura Deum qui precipit, et homo exequitur.
455 Et iterum ad eundem Deum qui retribuit.

Secundus est quia docet permittentem et hominem peccantem, et reddit ad eundem Deum punientem.

Hic est portus salubris ad quem reducit Sacra Scriptura, per quem ostenditur Sacra Scriptura ceteris **potior in efficacia**, cum dicitur
460 *revertuntur*.

Hec de tertio principali.

[4] Quarto principaliter ostenditur Sacra Scriptura ceteris **uberior in affluentia**, quod probat motus regularis per quem diffunditur, cum dicitur *ut iterum fluant*. Ad regularem motum Sacre Scripture pertinet
465 non solum fluere, set etiam refluere, quia Dominus talentum dat non ut abscondatur, set ut accipiens operetur. Sunt enim quidam, ut dicit Bernardus *Super Cantica*, “qui scire volunt eo fine ut sciant, et turpis curiositas est. Et sunt quidam qui scire volunt ut sciantur, et turpis vanitas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut suam scientiam vendant, et turpis
470 questus est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut hedificent, et caritas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut hedificetur, et prudentia est.”

Patet ergo quod fluxus Sacre Scripture ad animam eo fine, ut scilicet homo hedificet et in reflexu ad alios ut hedificentur consistit motus regularis de quo potest exponi quod scribitur Cant. 4[:16]: *Surge, aquilo, et veni auster: perfla ortum meum, et fluent aromata eius*. Ubi patet
475 motus celestium Scripturarum qui est:

animorum purgativus
afflictorum linitivus
exemplorum diffusivus.

480 [4.1] Est enim Sacra Scriptura **animorum purgativa**, quia ipsa habet adiunctam patientiam: *Quaecumque scripta sunt ad nostram doctrinam*

465–466 Dominus – operetur: Cf. Mt. 25:14–30. **467** Super Cantica: BERNARDUS CLARAEVALLENSIS, *Sermones super Cantica canticorum*, sermo 36, 3 (SBO 2, J. LECLERCQ et al., pp. 5–6, ll. 25–29, 1–4); *Manipulus florum*: Sapiencia vel sciencia ab.

scripta sunt, ut per patientiam et consolationem Scripturarum spem habeamus, Ro. 15[:4]. Et ideo dicitur *surge aquilo*, id est status adversitatis a quo nos Sacra Scriptura purgat per adiunctam patientiam. Et ideo dicitur, Exo 26[:35]: *Mensa stabit in parte aquilonis*. Mensa ista que tota cooperta est auro, Sacram Scripturam designat que tota cooperta est et respersa amore casto, “ille habet quidquid patet et quidquid latet in divinis sermonibus qui caritatem tenet in moribus”, Augustinus *De laude caritatis*. Nam, sicut supra mensam ponebantur panes propositionis, sic in Sacra Scriptura sensus multiplices exponis, quibus anime vivunt et nutriuntur. *Non enim in solo pane vivit homo, set in omni verbo quod procedit de ore Dei*. Ista mensa ponitur in parte aquilonari, quia Sacra Scriptura protegit nos contra omnem adversitatem. Posside ergo sapientiam, posside prudentiam. *Ne dimittas eam, et custodiet te; dilige eam et conservabit te*.

[4.2] Est secundo Sacra Scriptura **afflictorum linitiva**. *Veni inquit auster et perfla ortum meum*. Per austrum, qui est pars celi fecundior, clarior et calidior, intelligitur status prosperitatis. Tunc igitur auster perflat ortum quando Scriptura demulcet animum afflictum, quod facit: quandoque verbis consolatoriis: *scientes inquit quod sicut socii passionum estis, ita et resurrectionis eritis sive consolationis*. *Sicut enim habundant passionem Christi in nobis, ita et per Christum habundat consolatio nostra* I Cor. [=II Cor. 1:7, 1:5].

quandoque verbis exortatoriis: *Fili accedens ad servitutem Dei sta in iustitia et timore et prepara animam tuam ad temptationem*, Ecclus. 2[:1].

quandoque verbis repromissoriis: *Beati inquit qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum celorum* Mt. 5[:10].

[4.3] Est ultimo Sacra Scriptura **exemplorum diffusiva**. Facit enim homines vivere in quibus habitat et exemplariter conversari. Ipsa enim *sobrietatem et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus*. Et hoc est quod dicitur: *fluent aromata illius*. Ista aromata suaviter fragrantia sunt verba facta et exempla ad bonum moventia.

486 cooperta¹] aperta *corr. cod.* 486–487 auro – est] *iter. cod.*

488–489 De laude caritatis: AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, sermo 350 (PL 39, col. 1534): “Illa itaque tenet et quod patet et quod latet in divinis sermonibus, qui caritatem tenet in moribus.” 489–490 propositionis: Cf. Exod. 25:30. 491–492 non enim – Dei: Mt. 4:4. 494–495 ne dimittas – conservabit te: Prov. 4:6. 512–513 sobrietatem – hominibus: Sap. 8:7.

Hec ergo cogitans apud me et commemorans in corde meo, quoniam immortalis est in cogitatione sapientia, et in amicicia illius delectatio bona et in operibus manuum eius honestas sine deffectione circuiui querens ut illam mihi assumerem Sap. <8>[:17–18] et de tali cum admiratione
 520 *dicitur: Que est ista que ascendit per desertum sicut virgula fumi ex aromatibus, quia “ascendit ut videat”, ubi et nos ascendere possimus, et Deum intueri facie ad faciem mediante Christo Filio eius.*
 Amen.

518 deffectione] termini *add. sed del. cod.* **519** 8] *spat. vac. cod.*

520–521 Que est – aromatibus: Cant. 3:6. **521** ascendit ut videat: HILARIUS PICTAVIENSIS, *Tractatus super psalmos*, ps. 118 (CCSL 61A, par. 7, pag. 75, l. 13).

Appendix H:
Franciscus de Marchia OFM,
Reportatio in IV Sententiarum,
q. 23.

**Utrum accidentia in sacramento altaris possint in
generationem vel corruptionem substantiae.**

MSS: Città del Vaticano, BAV, Chigi lat. B VII 113 (=C)
Praha, Metropolitni Kapituli C 99 (=P)

[C 204rb] [P 209va] Utrum accidentia separata in sacramento altaris
possint in generationem vel corruptionem substantie, vel etiam in alte-
rationem totam previam generationi vel corruptioni substantie.

⟨**Quod sic**⟩

[1] Videtur primo quod sic, quia que habent eandem virtutem separata,
et coniuncta possunt in eosdem effectus. Sed accidentia separata habent 5
eandem virtutem quam habent coniuncta; habent enim easdem qualita-
tes et activas quascumque proprietates, et coniuncta poterant attingere
ad substantiam. Ergo etc.

[2] Secundo arguitur quod possint in corruptionem substantie, quia illud
quod potest in dispositionem aliquam impossibilem forme substan- 10
tiali potest in eius corruptionem. Accidens est huiusmodi; calor enim
summus est impossibilis forme aque; in ipsum autem potest calor
ignis. Ergo etc.

2 etiam] esse C

- 15 [3] Tertio arguitur quod possint in totam alterationem previam, quia illa que possunt in terminum proprium alterationis possunt in totam alterationem. Sed accidentia sunt huiusmodi; qualitas enim secundum Philosophum V *Physicorum* est terminus alterationis; in ipsam autem potest qualitas. Ergo etc.

⟨Quod non⟩

- 20 [4] Contra. Primo, quod [P 209vb] non possint in generationem substantie, quia imperfectius non potest naturaliter attingere perfectius; sed substantia est perfectior accidente; ergo etc.
- [5] Secundo, quod non in corruptionem, quia corruptio unius est generatio alterius.
- 25 [6] Tertio, quod non in totam alterationem, quia illud quod non potest in terminum, nec in totum illud quod est via ad ipsum; sed accidens non potest in substantiam; ergo nec in totam alterationem que est via ad ipsam.

⟨Responsio⟩

- 30 [7] Respondeo. Et primo videndum est de accidentibus coniunctis, quam virtutem habeant per se sine subiecto sive causalitatem. Secundo, ex hoc patebit quam habeant separata; sicut enim separata retinent eandem naturam quam prius virtute Dei suppletis vicem subiecti, ita et eandem causalitatem et non aliam, et ideo in omnem effectum et precise in illum in quem poterant coniuncta, sive per se sive virtute subiecti, possunt separata; in illum enim effectum in quem coniuncta poterant per se,
- 35 sine subiecto communicante, possunt nunc per se, et in illum in quem poterant virtute subiecti concausantis possunt separata in virtute Dei ut vicem subiecti suppletis, et non in aliquem alium effectum, quia Deus non facit nisi quod supplet vicem subiecti, [C 204va] et ideo tantum concausat sive concurrat ad concausandum cum eis effective illa ad que
- 40 causanda subiectum cum eis natum erat concurrere effective.
- [8] Quantum ad primum, duo sunt que hic faciunt difficultatem ex utraque parte. Illud propter quod videtur accidens esse totalis causa

32 precise] imprecise C 36 ut] om. P 40 cum – erat] natum erat cum eis C
42 illud] id C totalis causa] totalem causa C

17 *Physicorum*: ARISTOTELES, *Physica* V, c. 2 (226a26–27), AL 7.1, p. 198: “Motus quidem igitur secundum quale alteratio sit.”

substantie est quia videmus quasdam substantias generari – ut ignis per motum et animal per putrefactionem, vel etiam per propagationem –, et nullam generationum videtur posse reduci in aliquam substantiam, sed tantum in accidens; non enim potest dici quod ignis ex collisione aliquorum corporum generatus sit effective ab alio igne, nec animal ab animali, cum non sit, nec a celo, cum sit ignobilius eo; ergo etc. Illud autem quod facit difficultatem pro alia parte est quia accidens secundum totum suum genus est imperfectius substantia; imperfectius autem non videtur posse ponere in esse effective aliquid perfectius.

[9] Circa istam ergo materiam sic procedam: primo enim excludam quattuor modos [P 210ra] dicendi; secundo dicam aliter.

⟨Articulus Primus⟩

⟨Primus modus dicendi (Petri Aureoli)⟩

[10] Quantum ad primum, est unus modus dicendi quod duplex est principium generationis: quoddam determinativum tantum determinans et coexigens sibi formam ad determinatum effectum determinatam, aliud transmutativum passi de potentia ad actum. Tunc dicunt quod substantia est principium generationis primo modo. Determinat enim sibi non effective, sed tantum coexigitive, determinata accidentia determinatam virtutem habentia; ipsa autem accidentia sunt totale principium generationis secundo modo, videlicet transmutativum, ita quod substantia secundum istos non facit aliquid effective, sed tantum coexigit accidentia determinata et secundum determinatum gradum et proportionem, que quidem in quocumque subiecto posita et secundum eandem proportionem essent causa eiusdem substantie. Tunc ergo dicunt quod accidens per se et directe generat accidens, ut calor calorem, secundo autem et indirecte sicut per modum sequele generat quasi per quandam concomitantiam substantiam.

[11] Pro ista opinione arguitur primo sic: quodcumque sunt aliquae due mutationes necessario se concomitantes quoddam ordine, quod potest in primam, et in secundam, alias non concomitarentur se necessario. Sed generatio et alteratio sunt due mutationes se necessario concomitantes;

45 nullam] talium *add.* P generationum] non *add. sed del.* P 55 quoddam] *mg.* P 56 ad] non C aliud] ad P 59–60 determinatam virtutem] determinata virtute C 62 coexigit] coexigat C 66 et] *om.* P 67–68 per – substantiam] substantiam per quandam concomitantiam P 69 ista] vero *add.* P

54 modus dicendi: PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 1, pars 1, q. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 15a. 69 arguitur primo sic: PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 3, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 117a–b.

generatio enim concomitatur necessario alterationem; ergo agens potens
 in alterationem potest in generationem, et in eius terminum. Sed acci-
 75 dens virtute propria potest in alterationem totam generationi previam.
 Ergo in terminum generationis per modum sequele.

[12] Preterea secundo arguitur sic: eadem substantia non producit
 simul bis; si substantia producit ab accidente per concomitantiam,
 ergo non potest produci per se sive ab alia substantia, quia tunc bis
 80 produceretur, semel per concomitantiam ab accidente, et semel per se
 ab alia substantia.

[13] Confirmatur, quia quod potest in aliquem effectum per se et direc-
 te potest in omne illud consequenter quod necessario concomitatur il-
 lum effectum; sed forma substantialis necessario concomitatur terminum
 85 alterationis in quem potest per se et directe accidens; ergo etc.

[14] Et si quaeratur ab istis quomodo accidens potest propria virtute
 in substantiam, cum substantia sit perfectior accidente, respondent [P
 210rb] quod, licet aliquid non possit per se et directe in aliquid per-
 perfectius se, tamen potest per accidens et indirecte per modum sequele,
 90 ut videlicet perfectius sequitur necessario aliquid imperfectius, quod est
 per se et directe effectus illius. Sic est in proposito, quia substantia sive
 eius generatio est sequela alterationis in quam potest per se et directe
 accidens, quare, etc.

(Contra primum modum dicendi)

[15] Contra istam opinionem arguo primo sic: prius essentiali ordine
 95 non est sequela posterioris nisi virtute alicuius prioris illo posteriori; sed
 substantia est prior essentialiter accidente; ergo non potest esse sequela
 accidentis [C 204vb] nisi virtute alicuius prioris accidente. Sed prius ac-
 cidente non est nisi substantia; ergo etc. Sed non potest esse sequela ac-
 cidentis virtute substantie, ut substantia habet precise rationem subiecti
 100 accidentis; quia subiectum non dat sequelam per modum efficientis; er-
 go substantia que sequitur alterationem sequitur virtute substantie ut
 efficientis, quod est propositum.

[16] Preterea secundo, nullus terminus per accidens potest esse perfectior
 termino per se in ordine ad idem agens, licet bene respectu diversorum;
 105 tunc enim ens per accidens esset perfectius ente per se. Sed substantia

78 si] sed P 88 et] in *add.* C 93 accidens] *mg.* P 100 quia] ergo C per
 modum] *om.* C

que est terminus per accidens alterationis est perfectior qualitate que est terminus per se eius. Ergo ipsa substantia est ab alio principio quod agit necessario ad alterationem previam; hoc autem non potest poni nisi substantia; ergo etc.

[17] Preterea, nullum agens potest in terminum perfectiorem suo termino per se et sibi adequato; sed substantia est perfectior quocumque accidente; ergo non potest esse terminus per accidens actionis alicuius accidentis. 110

[18] Preterea, illud quod virtute propria non potest in aliquem terminum, non potest in illum nisi virtute alicuius alterius perfectioris se; sed accidens non potest propria virtute in substantiam, cum sit ea imperfectius; ergo non nisi virtute substantie. Non per modum subiecti, ergo etc. 115

[19] Preterea, illud quod continet aliquid prius ordine nature non continet illud ratione alicuius posterioris; nulla enim causa continet effectum aliquem priorem ratione alicuius posterioris; sed generans prius ordine nature continet substantiam quam qualitatem; ergo non continet substantiam propter qualitatem. Probatio minoris: omne agens prius ordine nature intendit finem quam ea que sunt ad ipsum; sed substantia est per se finis alterationis; [P 210va] ergo agens naturale prius intendit producere substantiam quam intendit alterare materiam. Quero tunc in illo priori, per quid continet virtualiter substantiam quam intendit producere: non potest dici quod per accidens, quia prius eam, videlicet generationem substantie, respicit quam alterationem. Ideo enim intendit alterare, quia intendit generare; et ideo alterat quia vult generare, non econverso; ergo et ideo continet terminum alterationis, quia continet terminum generationis; quare etc. 120 125 130

[20] Preterea, illa que possunt absque contradictione esse sine seipsis ad invicem non habent necessariam connexionem ex se nisi tantum virtute alicuius connectentis; que enim possunt separari non habent necessariam connexionem nisi virtute alicuius tertii ipsa connectentis. Sed substantia et accidens possunt absque contradictione ab invicem separari; accidens enim de facto separatur a substantia, et ita multo magis potest fieri econverso, ut videlicet separetur substantia ab accidente. Ergo substantia que est terminus alterationis non habet necessariam connexionem ad ipsas qualitates nisi virtute alicuius tertii connectentis; huiusmodi autem non potest esse accidens; ergo substantia, que est prior. 135 140

110–111 termino per se] per se termino P 111–112 quocumque accidente] *inv.*
P 116 substantiam] substantia P 122–123 ergo – qualitatem] *om. (hom.)* C
124 nature] *mg.* P 126 intendit] intendat C 127 quid] *mg.* P virtualiter
substantiam] *inv.* C

[21] Preterea, aut substantia generatur per se, aut per accidens: si per
 145 accidens, ergo quomodo est ens per se? Si per se, quero modum quo
 perfectius possit esse effective ab imperfectiori.

⟨Secundus modus dicendi⟩

[22] Secundus modus dicendi est quod duplex est agens: quoddam pro-
 ducens effectum – et tale agens impossibile est quod sit ignobilius effectum
 producto –, aliud est quod tantum est transmutans et extrahens formam
 de potentia materie ad actum – et tale potest esse respectu nobilioris
 150 se. Et ita, cum actio agentis naturalis non sit nisi extractio forme de
 potentia materie, per consequens accidens, licet sit ignobilius substantia,
 potest extrahere formam substantialem de potentia materie.

⟨Contra secundam opinionem⟩

[23] Contra istud arguo primo sic: illud quod excedit aliud secundum
 genus magis excedit ipsum quam illud quod excedit aliud secundum spe-
 155 ciem excedat illud, et illud etiam quod excedit aliud secundum speciem
 magis excedit quam excedens [C 205ra] secundum gradum individua-
 lem. Sed illud quod excedit aliud tantum secundum gradum individua-
 lem nullo modo potest in ipsum; nec enim calidum remissum potest de potentia
 materie extrahere calidum intensum, licet e converso. Sed accidens [P
 160 210vb] est imperfectius secundum genus substantia. Ergo etc.

[24] Unde magis videtur esse inconueniens accidens posse extrahere de
 potentia materie formam substantialem quam quod calidum remissum
 possit in calidum intensum, quod tamen apparet ad sensum non posse
 fieri.

165 [25] Preterea, non-ens non potest extrahere de potentia alicuius aliquod
 ens; sed illud quod deficit in perfectione respectu alicuius respectu illius
 in quo deficit est non-ens, sicut remissum respectu illius gradus in quo
 ab intenso exceditur est non-ens; ergo etc.

[26] Preterea, nullum agens propria virtute potest extrahere terminum
 170 aliquem de aliquo perfectiorem suo proprio termino et adequato; sed
 accidens est adequatus et proprius terminus accidentis; ergo etc.

144 quomodo] non P 145 ab imperfectiori] a perfectiori C 151 substantia] sub-
 iecto P 152 substantialem] *om.* P 155 etiam] esse C 156 excedens secundum]
 existens *sed corr. mg.* P 161 esse] *om.* P 167 gradus] *mg.* P

146 modus dicendi: PETRUS AUREOLI, *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 3, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605,
 p. 118a.

[27] Confirmatur, quia istud extrahere non est secundum locum, quia tunc esset formarum latitatio, ut posuerunt antiqui; est ergo simpliciter producere de nonesse ad esse; sed impossibile est quod imperfectius det esse simpliciter alicui perfectiori se, sive quod aliquid det esse perfectius quam habeat; ergo etc. 175

[28] Preterea, sicut se habet productio ad productionem, ita extractio ad extractionem; sed impossibile est quod aliquid possit producere perfectius se ipso; ergo nec extrahere, cum huiusmodi extractio sit simpliciter productio. 180

⟨Tertius modus dicendi (Gualteri Burleii)⟩

[29] Tertius modus est apparentior predictis, quod aliquid esse nobilius alio potest esse dupliciter, quia vel eminentia entitatis, vel eminentia activitatis. Iste enim sunt due preeminentie separabiles et alterius rationis. In numeris enim est ordo preeminentie secundum entitatem, non tamen secundum activitatem; licet enim species superior contineat speciem inferiorem quantum ad entitatem, non tamen est eius effectiva causa. Similiter, quantitas est perfectior qualitate in entitate, non tamen secundum activitatem, immo ut sic est imperfectior. 185

[30] Nunc autem constat quod agens non agit nisi ut est activum. Ex quo sequitur quod aliquis effectus non requirit causam perfectiorem nec eque perfectam quantum ad entitatem, sed tantum secundum activitatem. Ex quo sequitur quod imperfectius secundum entitatem potest esse causa alicuius perfectioris secundum entitatem, dum tamen sit eo perfectius secundum activitatem. Et ita, licet accidens sit imperfectius substantia secundum entitatem, quia tamen est perfectius ea secundum activitatem, ideo etc. 190 195

[31] Pro ista opinione arguitur primo sic: illud quod potest in dispositionem necessitantem ad formam substantialem potest in ipsam, quia [P 211ra] quod potest in antecedens potest in consequens quod sequitur necessario ad antecedens; sed accidens in virtute propria quocumque alio circumscripto potest in formam sive dispositionem necessitantem ad substantialem formam; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia dispositio necessitans ad formam ignis est calor in tali gradu, puta summus; sed calor 200

172 non – locum] secundum locum non est *sed corr. cum signis transp.* P **182** eminentia²] preeminentia P **186–187** causa] *om.* C **193** sit] fit C **201** dispositionem] definitionem C **202** substantialem formam] *inv.* P dispositio] distinctio C

181 Tertius modus: GUALTERUS BURLEUS, *Tractatus primus*, conclusio prima, ed. Sylla, forthcoming.

potest in talem, quoniam, si tantus calor potest in tantum, et summus
 205 potest in summum; ergo etc.

[32] Preterea, illud quod potest virtute propria in totam alterationem,
 et in formam substantialem que est terminus eius; sed accidens pro-
 pria virtute potest in totam alterationem generationi previam; ergo etc.
 Probatio maioris: quoniam, si potest in totam alterationem, et non in
 210 substantiam, que est eius terminus, sequuntur duo inconvenientia: pri-
 mum, quod, cum Deus possit suspendere actionem cuiuscumque cause
 secunde efficientis, per consequens poterit alteratione facta ab accidente
 suspendere actionem illius a quo est effective substantia, et tunc altera-
 tio precedens erit infinita, cum careat termino; secundum est quia tunc
 215 agens naturale posset in terminum infinitum, cum posset in alterationem
 infinitam. [C 205rb]

[33] Preterea, Commentator super V *Physicorum*, commento 32, dicit
 quod duplex est alteratio: quedam cuius terminus est alterius generis ab
 ipsa, alia cuius terminus est eiusdem generis cum ipsa. Tunc arguitur ex
 220 hoc sic: illud quod potest in totam alterationem compositam ex muta-
 tione cuius terminus est secum eiusdem generis et ex alia cuius terminus
 est alterius generis potest in qualitatem et in substantiam; sed accidens
 potest in talem alterationem, secundum Commentatorem ibidem; ergo
 etc. Probatio minoris: quia, si non in totam alterationem sed in ali-
 225 quam partem, accipio ultimum instans illius partis alterationis in quam
 potest, quam ultimo inducit, et primum alterius partis, in quam non
 potest. Cum enim inter quolibet duo instantia sit tempus medium, per
 consequens sequitur quod in aliquo tempore intermedio non alteratur,
 quod est inconveniens. Preterea, tota alteratio est eiusdem rationis cum
 230 qualibet eius parte; ergo potens in aliquam partem, potest in totam.

[34] Preterea, illud quod in quocumque subiecto positum producit sub-
 stantiam eandem sive eiusdem rationis producit illam virtute propria,
 non virtute subiecti; nam, si virtute subiecti produceret, produceret non
 eandem sed diversas, cum subiecta ponantur diversa; sed calor ignis, et
 235 sic de aliis accidentibus, est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor [P 211rb] pro-
 batur dupliciter, primo sic: illud quod uniformiter disponit materiam
 uniformiter perficit eam; sed calor et quodcumque accidens uniformiter
 disponit materiam, sed non perficit nec disponit eam immediate, sed tan-
 tum forma substantiali ab eo inducta; ergo etc. Secundo etiam probatur

215 posset²] possit P 217 V] VI C 219 arguitur] arguo P 220 potest] *mg.*
 P 225 in quam] in quantum C 232 virtute] virtutem C 233 non – subiecti¹]
mg. P nam si] si enim in C 237–238 uniformiter² – materiam] *mg.* P

217 *Physicorum*: AVERROES, *Physica* V, comm. 31, ed. Venetiis 1562, f. 227raA–B.

experimento. Ex ovo enim anseris per fomentum galline et calorem eius extrinsecum proportionatum generatur anser; ergo sequitur quod calor iste – et sic de alio accidente quocumque in quocumque subiecto ponatur – secundum eandem proportionem est causa eiusdem substantie, ut patet de isto calore extrinseco anseris et galline. Preterea tertio, hoc idem patet de motu qui semper causat ignem a quocumque fiat.

[35] Preterea, illud quod in virtute propria potest in corruptionem substantie, et in generationem; generatio enim unius est corruptio alterius, et econverso. Sed accidens potest in corruptionem substantie. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris, quia quod potest in dispositionem impossibilem forme aque potest corrumpere ipsam; sed accidens potest, quia dispositio impossibilis est summus calor in quem potest alius calor summus; ergo etc.

[36] Sic ergo ponit ista opinio quod substantia est causa substantie non effectiva et transmutativa, sed tantum determinans sibi accidentia que sunt causa eius effectiva transmutativa. Dicunt enim quod, licet imperfectius non possit esse causa determinativa perfectioris, potest tamen esse causa transmutativa. Sic ergo ista opinio ponit tria in summa. Primum est quod ignobilius alio secundum entitatem, dum tamen sit nobilius ipso secundum activitatem, potest esse eius causa. Secundum est quod determinatum subiectum determinat sibi accidentia determinata, non per modum efficientis, sed per modum coexistentis. Tertium est quod accidens in virtute propria potest in dispositionem impossibilem forme substantiali. Ex quibus tribus sequitur conclusio principalis, videlicet quod accidens potest virtute propria in terminum generationis, scilicet in formam substantialem.

⟨Contra tertium modum dicendi⟩

[37] Contra ista arguo, et primo contra primum sic: primo, licet effectus possit esse perfectior secundum quid sua causa totali, non tamen simpliciter, sed secundum istum modum dicendi non vitatur quin effectus sit simpliciter nobilior, non tantum secundum quid, sed etiam simpliciter, sua causa totali, ergo etc. Minorem declaro primo sic: illud quod est ignobilius alio, tantum secundum quid, sed simpliciter nobilius, simpliciter est nobilius eo, licet sit ignobilius eo secundum quid; sed illud

242 alio] *sup. lin.* P 254 et] *om.* C 257 ponit] *iter.* C 264 potest] in *add. sed del.* C 266–267 effectus – sua] *om.* P 268 dicendi non vitatur] non vitatur dicendi *inv. cum signis* P 270 minorem] (*spat. vac.*) + -orem C 271–273 quid – activitatem] *mg.* P 271 quid] activitatem *sed corr. mg.* P

quod est ignobilius alio tantum secundum activitatem et nobilius secundum entitatem est simpliciter eo nobilius, licet sit secundum quid [C 275 205va] ignobilius; sed per te substantia est nobilior [P 211va] accidente secundum entitatem, licet sit ignobilior secundum activitatem; ergo est simpliciter nobilior ipso, et per consequens non potest esse effective sicut a causa totali ab eo. Probatio minoris: illud quod est nobilius secundum rationem absolutam est nobilius eo quod est nobilius secundum rationem 280 respectivam; sed illud quod est nobilius secundum suam entitatem est nobilius secundum rationem absolutam, illud autem quod est nobilius secundum activitatem est nobilius secundum rationem respectivam, in ordine scilicet ad effectum extrinsecum; ergo quod est nobilius secundum entitatem est simpliciter perfectius eo quod est nobilius secundum 285 activitatem, et per consequens non potest esse ab eo.

[38] Preterea, aut preeminentia secundum activitatem est nobilior alia que est secundum entitatem, aut ignobilior, aut sibi equalis; si est simpliciter nobilior, et accidens secundum istam preeminentiam excedit substantiam; ergo est simpliciter nobilius substantia, quod est falsum. Si 290 est simpliciter ignobilior, ergo cum substantia sit simpliciter nobilior accidente, licet sit secundum quid ignobilior ipso, non poterit esse effective ab eo.

[39] Preterea, accidens inquantum tale ens est ignobilius substantia, cum sit ea ignobilius secundum entitatem; sed accidens ut activum est ignobilius se ipso ut tale ens; ergo etiam ut activum est ignobilius substantia, 295 quare etc. Probatio minoris: causa totalis equivoca nobilior est eo cuius est causa; sed accidens ut tale ens est causa sui ut activum. Quia enim calor est tale ens, ideo est sic activus, non econverso; ergo si accidens ut tale ens est imperfectius substantia, multo magis ut activum, quare etc.

[40] Confirmatur, quia (quod) est nobilius causa, et causato eius; substantia nobilior accidente inquantum ens; ergo et inquantum activum, 300 cum ipsum ut ens sit causa sui ipsius ut activum; ergo etc.

[41] Preterea, licet in ordine ad diversos terminos idem possit esse nobilius secundum entitatem et ignobilius secundum activitatem alio, sicut 305 quantitas est nobilior qualitate secundum entitatem respectu proprie entitatis et ignobilior ea secundum activitatem respectu alicuius alterius qualitatis, non tamen idem respectu eiusdem potest esse perfectius secundum entitatem et imperfectius secundum activitatem; ergo etc.

273 ignobilius] nobilius C **278** nobilius] ignobilius C **280** respectivam] relativam in ordine *add.* C **282** respectivam] relativam C **291** esse effective] effective etiam C esse] *mg.* P **295** etiam] esse C ignobilius] ignobilior C **297–299** ens – ens] *mg.* P **298** activus] activa C **302** cum – activum] *mg.* P **303–304** nobilius] ignobilius C **304** ignobilius] nobilius C **307** idem] enim *add.* C **308** et] erit C

[42] Secundo arguo contra secundum, quod videlicet substantia determinat sibi accidentia non effective, sed tantum coexigitive. Et est hic primo advertendum quod aliquid potest sibi determinare aliud dupliciter, quia vel in actu, vel tantum in aptitudine. Sicut materia determinat sibi formam determinatam, non in actu, quia tunc non oporteret agens; agens autem ipsum determinat formam in actu in materia. Tunc arguo sic: [P 211vb] illud quod non determinat sibi actu aliquid – aliquem effectum – sine agente, circumscripta causalitate agentis, non determinat sibi aliquid actu; sed subiectum in ratione subiecti non determinat sibi aliquid in actu; ergo si determinat sibi aliquod accidens in actu, sicut facit ut ignis calorem, aqua frigiditatem etc., hoc non erit nisi virtute aliquius agentis, et tunc vel huiusmodi agens est ipsummet subiectum, quod est propositum, quod tu negas, vel aliquid aliud a subiecto, et hoc est falsum. Unde substantia naturalis non determinat sibi in actu aliquod accidens nisi cuius ipsa est causa effectiva, et hinc est quod ipsa est causa effectiva qualitatum naturalium et quorumcumque accidentium que sibi in actu determinat, ut aqua frigiditatis, et ignis caliditatis; respectu autem accidentium violentorum est tantum causa materialis sive subiectiva non effectiva; aqua enim respectu caliditatis tantum habet rationem subiecti, non autem efficientis, et ideo aqua non determinat sibi calorem, quia non est eius causa effectiva.

[43] Contra tertium, quod est quod accidens potest virtute propria in dispositionem forme substantiali impossibilem, arguo primo sic: illud quod necessario requirit formam substantialem non est dispositio impossibilis sibi, nec necessitans ad eius corruptionem; sed omnis qualitas quam potest introducere quodcumque accidens sive quodcumque aliud naturale agens presupponit formam substantialem, [C 205vb] cum presupponat compositum ex ipsa et materia in quo recipitur; ergo non necessitat ad corruptionem eius nisi concomitanter tantum, videlicet quia illa introducta, introducitur aliquid aliud sibi impossibile, et hoc non ab accidente, sed a substantia generante.

[44] Confirmatur, quia quero huiusmodi dispositio necessitans, in quo subiecto introducitur: non in materia prima – constat –, sed in composito ex ipsa et substantiali forma, ergo etc.

313 non oporteret] oporteret ponere P **315** non] *supplevi* aliquid] *om.* C **317–318** sibi² – determinat] *mg.* P **320** est] et *sed corr. sup. lin.* P ipsummet] ipsammet C **330** potest] in *add.* C **333** sed] si C **338** quia] quod C **339** hoc] hec P

⟨**Quartus modus dicendi (Thomae de Aquino)**⟩

[45] Quartus modus dicendi est quod accidens attingit substantiam tantum instrumentaliter, quia non virtute propria, sed in virtute substantie
 345 ut principalis agentis.

⟨**Contra quantum modum dicendi**⟩

[46] Sed nec istum modum intelligo. Bene enim concedo quod accidens agat ad substantiam virtute propria, alterando, sed non attingit ipsam immediate, nec propria virtute, nec alterius. Unde arguo primo sic: illud quod sufficienter continet aliquem terminum causaliter sive effective
 350 non requirit ad eius productionem aliquod aliud agens secum; sed substantia concurrens cum accidente ad generationem substantie [P 212ra] sufficienter continet ipsam effective sine accidente dispositione requisita presupposita; ergo potest sine accidente in ipsam. Non ergo accidens attingit eam. Probatio minoris: quia omne agens univocum continens
 355 aliquem terminum univocum sufficienter continet ipsum et potest in ipsum; quod enim aliqua causa non possit per se in aliquem terminum, hoc est vel quia non continet illum vel quia, si continet aliquo modo, non tamen sicut causa univoca, et ita non continet perfecte. Omnis enim causa univoca continet perfecte suum effectum, cum non excedat ipsam;
 360 sed ignis, si continet virtualiter aliquo modo ignem, continet ipsum sicut causa eius univoca; ergo non oportet ponere accidens ad ipsum concurrere effective, cum perfecte ipsum contineat effective ignis generans. Nisi enim causa univoca perfecte suum contineret effectum, nulla alia causa posset continere suum; ergo etc.

365 [47] Preterea, substantia est perfectior accidente; sed accidens virtute propria potest in effectum sibi univocum sine substantia, ut calor in calorem; ergo multo magis substantia poterit per se, sine quocumque alio, attingere substantiam, cum ipsum accidens non sit perfectius in continendo effectum proprium quam substantia in continendo suum.

370 [48] Preterea, illud quod agit mediante alio, sive in virtute alterius, sic quod non habet causalitatem nisi virtute illius primi, non habet in se aliquam causalitatem, sed tota causalitas est in primo, videlicet propria

343 quod] quia C **347** agat] agit P **352** sine] sive P **352–353** dispositio-
 ne – accidente] *mg.* P **355** aliquem] ad quem C **356** quod] quia C **357** illum]
mg. P **361–362** concurrere] concurrat C **363** contineret] *mg.* P **368** perfec-
 tius] perfectior C **369** continendo¹ – in] *mg.* P **372** causalitatem] totalitatem
 C

343 Quartus modus dicendi: THOMAS DE AQUINO, *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 in corp., ed. Moos, p. 509.

et illius quod agit tantum in virtute eius; sed accidens per te non agit ad generationem nisi virtute substantie; ergo etc.

⟨**Secundus articulus: solutio**⟩

[49] Quantum ad secundum, dico aliter, videlicet quod substantia est 375
totale principium generationis substantie totaliter, eam immediate attingens, non autem aliquod accidens.

⟨**Sex regulae**⟩

[50] Ad cuius declarationem et evidentiam pono sex regulas, quarum prima est talis: quandocumque sunt aliqua duo inconvenientia quorum 380
unum est universale et aliud particulare, tantum in aliqua materia, magis vitandum est inconveniens universale quam particulare, si non possit vitari utrumque.

[51] Secunda est quod, quandocumque sunt aliqua duo inconvenientia quorum unum est contra sensum et aliud contra rationem, magis vitandum est illud quod est tantum contra rationem quam illud quod est 385
tantum contra sensum, cum ratio sit certior ipso sensu.

[52] Tertia est quod, quando sunt duo inconvenientia quorum unum est inconveniens impossibilitatis et aliud tantum est inconveniens cuiusdam improbabilitatis, magis est illud vitandum [P 212rb] quod est impossibile 390
quam illud quod est aliquo modo, saltem apparet, improbabile.

[53] Quarta est quod, quandocumque sunt aliqua duo inconvenientia quorum unum nullo modo potest vitari et aliud potest aliquo modo vitari, magis vitandum [C 206ra] est illud et negandum quod nullo modo potest vitari quam aliud.

[54] Quinta est quod, quandocumque aliquis effectus sic se habet quod 395
est superior essentiali ordine aliqua causa et inferior similiter essentiali ordine alia, si non appareat causa propria in quam talis effectus debeat vel possit reduci, tunc convenientius huiusmodi effectus reducitur in causam superiorem quam in causam inferiorem ipso. Istud patet, quoniam ex hoc quod aliquis effectus reducitur in causam eo inferiorem, sequitur 400
magnum inconveniens, puta quod imperfectius sit causa perfectioris se;

374 nisi] ubi *add. sed del.* P 384 sensum] et rationem *add.* C et] *sup. lin.*
P 384-385 rationem – quam] *om.* C vitandum] *mg.* P 387 sunt] aliqua
add. sed del. P 388 tantum est] *inv.* P 389 vitandum] illud *add.* P 391 sunt]
sequitur C 392 potest²] *om.* C 397 causa propria] *inv.* P 400 eo inferiorem]
inv. P 401 magnum] *iter. sed del.* C

nullum autem inconueniens sequitur ex hoc quod reducitur in causam superiorem sive perfectiorem; igitur etc.

[55] Sexta et ultima regula est quod, quandocumque est aliqua perfectio
 405 quam oportet attribuere alicui cause, que quidem perfectio repugnat cause secunde, non autem prime, oportet illam attribuere cause prime, non autem cause secunde.

⟨Applicatio regularum⟩

[56] Tunc ad propositum istas sex regulas applicando, accipio aliquam substantiam generatam cuius causa propria in quam possit reduci non
 410 apparet, puta ignem generatum per motum, quia sicut de ipso, ita de animali generato per putrefactionem sive etiam per propagationem, et de quacumque alia substantia cuius causa effectiva propria non apparet, reducendo inquam huiusmodi ignem sic per motum localem generatum in motum localem ut in causam eius propriam, sequitur universale in-
 415 conueniens in omni materia, videlicet quod inferius possit esse causa superioris et perfectioris; non reducendo autem in ipsum ut in causam sequitur aliquod inconueniens tantum particulare in ista materia, videlicet quod istius effectus determinati non sit aliqua causa propria seu particularis; nulla enim potest poni talis alia a motu; hoc autem non est
 420 simpliciter inconueniens, cum possit reduci in causam universalem; ergo secundum primam regulam huiusmodi substantia non est reducenda in accidens, puta in motum huiusmodi ut in causam eius effectivam.

[57] Preterea secundo, si istam substantiam reducis in motum ut in causam eius effectivam, incidis in inconueniens contra rationem. [P 212va]
 425 Contra rationem enim est ignobilius esse totale causam nobilioris se; non reducendo autem in ipsum, sequitur inconueniens precise contra sensum; sensui enim apparet motum huiusmodi esse causam istius substantie; ergo ex secunda regula non est reducenda huiusmodi substantia in motum ut in causam.

430 [58] Preterea tertio, reducendo ipsam in motum sequitur inconueniens impossibilitatis, puta quod accidens contineat virtualiter substantiam, que est ipso perfectius secundum genus suum; non reducendo autem in ipsum sed in aliquam aliam substantiam sequitur tantum inconueniens

404 sexta] sed *praem.* C 405 cause] *mg.* P 406 illam] illa C 408 istas] predictas *add.* C accipio] accipiendo C 419 a] *om.* C 420 in] ad *exp.* C 422 huiusmodi] *mg.* P eius effectivam] *om.* C 423 reducis in motum] *mg.* P 424 eius effectivam] *mg.* P in] *om.* C 425 nobilioris se] nobilitatis sequitur C 427 sensui] sensum C causam – substantie] istius substantie causam C 430 tertio] secundo C

saltem apparenter cuiusdam improbabilitatis. Etsi enim sit aliquo modo improbabile aliquam substantiam esse illius causam, non tamen est impossibile. Ergo secundum tertiam regulam convenientius reducitur in aliam substantiam ut in causam quam in aliquod accidens. 435

[59] Preterea, quarto ponendo motum esse causam istius sequitur predictum inconueniens quod nullo modo vitari potest; non ponendo autem non sequitur aliquod inconueniens quod vitari non possit, cum possit in aliquam aliam causam reduci, saltem in universalem; igitur etc., ex quarta regula. 440

[60] Preterea quinto, ponendo motum esse causam istius substantie, que quidem substantia est effectus superior et perfectior motu et quocumque alio accidente et inferior et imperfectior essentiali ordine substantia prima, sequitur inconueniens, quod dictum est. Inconueniens enim est ex utraque parte aliquod superius et perfectius reduci in inferius ut in causam; non autem sequitur inconueniens reducendo in causam superiorem. Ergo ex quinta regula oportet istum effectum essentiali ordine intermedium inter accidens et substantiam primam, [C 206rb] cum non appareat eius causa proxima, reducere in causam superiorem ipso, et non inferiorem seu imperfectiorem. 445

[61] Preterea sexto, ex quo non est istius effectus causa particularis nata producere ipsum, puta ignis, sed aliquid supplens vicem eius, cum supplere causalitatem alicuius cause particularis sit alicuius perfectionis, per consequens magis hoc ex sexta regula debes attribuere prime cause, cui talis perfectio non repugnat, cum ipsa sufficienter possit supplere causalitatem cuiuscumque cause secunde quam cause secunde, maxime accidenti cui huiusmodi [P 212vb] perfectio simpliciter repugnat. Dico ergo quod Deus, cum sit causa perfectissima et primaria, plus influit in quemcumque effectum quam quecumque alia causa secunda iuxta illam propositionem *De causis*. Unde secunda causa deserente effectum, non deserit prima, etiam secundum philosophos et multo magis secundum fidem, cum secundum fidem Deus immediate possit in omnem effectum, quod tamen non concesserunt philosophi. 450 455 460 465

438 sequitur] consequitur *sed corr.* C 440 aliquod] aliquid C 441 reduci] produci C 444 perfectior] imperfectior C 446 quod – est] ut dictum C 447 superius et perfectius] *inv.* P 455 perfectionis] perfectioris P 458 cause secunde] *inv.* C 461 quemcumque effectum] *inv.* P

462 De causis: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 1: “Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda.” 462–463 secunda – prima: Cf. *Liber de Causis*, prop. 2: “Cum ergo removet causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea.”

[62] Tunc dico ad propositum quod hec est universalis regula secundum ordinem a Deo institutum, qui ordo latuit philosophos sed non nos, quod causa secunda deserente causatum propter impotentiam, prima causa non deserit; et ideo, quandocumque natura disponit materiam aliquam
 470 ad aliquam formam in quam non potest tota natura, primum agens introducit illam; hoc patet de anima intellectiva, in quam, quia tota natura non potest, licet possit materiam disponere ad eam, Deus eam introducit in materia disposita a quocumque. Tunc dico quod, sicut est de ista forma suprema, ita est de omni alia forma. Materia enim dispo-
 475 sita ad quamcumque formam et a quocumque agente in quam formam non potest – illud agens disponens, Deus statuit introducere in materia disposita illam formam supplens vicem cause secunde; si etiam aliquod agens, materia ab eo disposita, non possit pro illo tunc illam formam inducere ad quam materiam ipsam disposuit, ex quacumque causa hoc
 480 contingat, Deus pro illo tunc formam illam ad quam precessit dispositio introducit in materia, licet agens a quo est illa dispositio posset ex se illam formam alias inducere, licet non pro illo tunc ex aliquo acciden- ti. Tunc ex predictis patet quid dicendum est secundo de accidentibus separatis.

⟨Ad argumenta⟩

⟨Ad argumenta primae opinionis⟩

485 [63-11] Ad argumenta illarum opinionum. Ad primum primo, quando arguitur ‘quando sunt due mutationes se concomitantes necessario’, etc., dico quod verum est quando ille mutationes ex natura propria ipsarum, non ratione alicuius extrinseci connectentis eas, se necessario concomitantur; quando autem sunt concomitantes se non ex natura mutationum
 490 sed tantum ex ratione principiorum extrinsecorum quorum unum, videlicet principium actionis posterioris coniunctum principio actionis sive mutationis prioris, est necessario principium actionis sue, prima* actione a primo principio precedente, tunc est maior falsa, quia tunc non oportet quod potens in primam mutationem sive [P 213ra] actionem
 495 possit in secundam que ad illam concomitatur necessario precise ratione principii eius coniuncti principio actionis prioris. Tunc ad minorem, quando dicitur quod generatio et alteratio se necessario concomitantur, dico quod non est verum ex natura mutationum, cum possit una poni

466 propositum] propositionem P 485 primo] prime P 486 etc.] *om.* P 488 connectentis] connectentes C 490 ex] natura *add. sed del.* P quorum] quo C 494 sive] vel C 496 actionis] distinctionis P 498 una poni] ponit una P

sine alia absolute. Potest enim alteratio a generatione absolvi, sed concomitantur se tantum ratione principiorum, quoniam principium alterationis est accidens; principium vero generationis est substantialis forma. Que quidem substantia, quia agit necessario in materia sufficienter disposita, cum agat naturaliter, ideo dispositione precedente per alterationem factam ab accidente, sequitur necessario generatio non ab accidente alterante, sed a substantia sibi coniuncta.

[64-12] Ad secundum, quando dicitur quod tunc substantia eadem bis produceretur, dico quod non sequitur, quia substantia non producitur concomitanter per se, sed per accidens; per se autem producitur a substantia [C 206va] sine concomitantia; concomitanter autem non nisi per accidens pro quanto substantia producens est coniuncta principio alteranti.

[65-13] Ad tertium, quando arguitur potens in aliquid, etc., patet per idem.

⟨Ad argumenta tertie opinionis⟩

[66-31] Ad argumenta tertie opinionis. Ad primum, quando arguitur ‘potens in dispositionem aliquam necessitantem ad formam’, etc, dico quod dispositio necessitans ad aliquam formam potest esse dupliciter, quia vel quod ex natura sua sit dispositio necessitans, vel tantum actione alicuius extrinseci. Tunc concedo quod omne illud quod potest in aliquid quod ex natura sua est dispositio necessitans ad aliquam formam potest in illam formam, et ad hoc vadunt probationes. Quando enim primo probatur ‘quia potens in antecedens potest in consequens quod sequitur necessario antecedens’, verum est, si consequens sequitur ad antecedens ex natura antecedentis, non autem si sequatur ex aliquo extrinseco. Tunc enim non oportet quod ponens antecedens ponat consequens; licet enim posito antecedente ponatur consequens, non tamen a ponente antecedens, sed ab alio. Sic autem est in proposito de dispositione quacumque inducta ab accidente respectu forme substantialis, quia natura talis est ex natura sua necessitans ad formam substantialem, sed tantum ratione alicuius, puta ratione substantie coniuncte accidenti necessario agentis dispositione [P 213rb] inducta, ut dictum est. Et ita minor, ut accipitur sub sensu in quo maior est vera, est falsa; calor enim summus non potest absolute in dispositionem impossibilem forme aque, sed tantum ex

accidente¹] agente C necessario generatio] *inv.* C substantia – produceretur] eadem substantia produceretur bis C produceretur] ponitur C arguitur] dicitur C ad primum] *om.* P aliquam] a *add. sed exp.* C vadunt] rationes *add. sed del.* P substantialis] substantiali P maior] minor C

suppositione, puta ratione forme ignis cui coniungitur. Numquam enim imperfectius est absolute dispositio necessaria respectu perfectioris nisi
535 ex suppositione alicuius perfectioris.
[67] Vel potest dici aliter ad minorem. Quando enim dicitur ‘quando accidens potest in dispositionem’, etc., dico quod falsum est, tam absolute quam ex suppositione. Et quando probatur quod dispositio necessitans ad formam ignis est summus calor in quem potest summus calor, etc.,
540 dico quod summus calor a summo calore producendus aut introducit in aliquo subiecto repugnanti, ut in aqua, aut in subiecto non repugnanti. Si in repugnanti, dico quod, licet summus calor possit quantum est ex se in summum calorem, non tamen in tali subiecto quod repugnat effectui, quoniam subiectum repugnans recusat effectum, et ideo nisi calori
545 assistat aliquod aliud agens fortius subiecto resistente, non potest calor in subiecto repugnante inducere calorem sibi equalem, propter quod calor ignis non posset per se inducere in aqua calorem summum sive forme aque impossibilem nisi virtute ignis aque resistantiam superantis. Et si dicas quod saltem poterit hoc facere in subiecto non repugnanti,
550 puta in palea, que non videtur repugnare calori, dico quod non est aliquod subiectum quod non repugnet aliquo modo, licet secundum magis et minus; licet enim palea non sit frigida et ideo non repugnet sibi per modum quo extremum repugnat extremo, habens tamen qualitatem mediam inter calorem et frigiditatem repugnat ei per modum quo medium
555 repugnat utrique extremo. Et hoc patet; si enim in palea esset nuda privatio caloris absque quocumque positivo resistente, tunc palea non moveretur, sed in instanti mutaretur ad calorem et ita ignis causaret in ipsa calorem huiusmodi in instanti, quod falsum est; ergo est in ea aliqua repugnantia et resistantia.
560 [68] Secundo etiam forte posset dici quod, licet [P 213va] non esset in subiecto aliqua dispositio repugnans, quod adhuc summus calor non posset in summum calorem. Cuius ratio est quoniam causa univoca, licet possit habere effectum univocum sibi secundum perfectionem specificam equalem, non tamen secundum gradum individualement; immo secundum
565 gradum individualement effectus etiam univocus videtur deficere a perfectione sue cause. Et hoc patet; ignis enim vel quodcumque calidum calefacit istam partem medii sibi propinquiorem [C 206vb] et, ista calefacta, calefacit aliam et sic ulterius procedendo. Nunc autem constat quod nec pars propinqua igni est ita perfecte calida sicut ignis, nec remota sicut
536 dici] *om.* P 536-537 accidens] accidentis *sed corr.* P 538 quod] quia P 539 quem] quam C etc.] ibi C 542 possit] posset *codd.* 549 quod] *om.* P 551 repugnet] repugnat C 557 ignis] in ipsa *add.* P 558 ipsa] ipsum C 566 hoc] habet P

propinqua, et tamen, si calor ignis produceret in parte sibi propinqua
calorem sibi equalem et eque perfectum, et illa pars similiter in alia
parte, tunc ita esset perfecte calida, pars distans sicut propinqua, cuius
oppositum patet ad sensum. Hoc idem patet de illuminatione medii. 570

[69] Et quando dicitur quod ‘tantus calor potest in tantum, ergo summus
potest in summum’, dico quod tantus potest in tantum, non tamen sibi
equalem, et ita etiam concedo quod summus potest in summum a calore
possibile, non tamen sibi equale secundum gradum individualement, sicut
nec tantus in tantum. Sed quidquid sit de hoc, saltem prima solutio
sufficit. 575

[70-32] Ad secundum, quando dicitur ‘illud quod potest in totam alte-
rationem’, etc., respondeo. Dico quod tota alteratio potest sumi tripli-
citer, quia vel precise pro ipso fluxu sive via ad terminum alterationis,
vel secundo simul pro via et termino, et sic dupliciter, secundum quod
terminus alterationis est duplex: unus qui est eiusdem generis cum ipsa,
ut qualitas, alius qui est alterius generis, et iste est forma substantialis. 580
Potest ergo accipi tota alteratio vel pro tota via cum termino sui generis
vel pro via cum termino alterius generis. Tunc dico quod illud quod po-
test in totam alterationem, accipiendo totam alterationem pro via simul
cum termino intrinseco, sive sui generis, et cum termino alterius gene-
ris, potest in formam substantialem, quia ipsa est ille terminus alterius
generis. Sed quod potest in totam alterationem, accipiendo totam alte-
rationem vel precise pro ipsa via successiva, vel etiam pro ipsa [P 213vb]
simul cum termino sui generis, non oportet quod possit in formam sub-
stantialem. Ex quo patet quod maior propositio est vera tantum in uno
sensu et falsa in duobus. 585 590

[71] Ad probationes eius. Quando primo dicitur quod Deo suspenden-
te actionem alterationis principii, alteratio esset infinita, quia careret
termino, dico quod non sequitur, quia et si careret termino extrinseco
et alterius generis, haberet tamen terminum sui generis, puta quali-
tatem. Unde non esset aliter infinita alteratio sine forma substantiali
quam corpus sine loco existens; ita enim forma substantialis est ter-
minus alterationis extrinsecus sicut locus locati, et ita tantum dicitur
infinita negativa infinitate extrinseca carens termino extrinseco, sicut
locatum existens sine loco et non aliter. Dico etiam quod, esto quod
esset alteratio sine qualitate terminante ipsam, adhuc non esset positive 600 605

570 produceret] producitur C 572 calida] causanda P 577 sibi] om. C se-
cundum] sed P 580 illud] om. C 581 dico] om. C 582 vel] om. P ipso]
illo P 583 et¹] om. C 591 sed] secundum C 596 quod] tunc add. C 597
alterationis] scripsi alterius codd. careret] carent C 598 careret] caret C

- infinita, sed finita; motus enim habet proprium terminum intrinsecum, qui est mutatum esse, sicut punctus est terminus lineae, et ideo, sicut linea terminatur per puncta, ita motus factus sine quocumque termino extrinseco per divinam potentiam terminaretur per mutatum esse. Et
- 610 ideo semper alteratio facta sine generatione et generationis termino esset finita et haberet terminum tam intrinsecum, qui est mutatum esse, quam extrinsecum, qui est qualitas, licet etiam ipsa qualitas dicatur terminus intrinsecus alterationis per comparisonem ad formam substantialem. Per idem patet ad secundum inconueniens.
- 615 [72-33] Ad tertium, quando dicitur 'illud quod potest in totam alterationem compositam', etc., patet per idem, quia, ut dictum est, posse in totam alterationem est tripliciter, et uno modo, ut ista maior sumitur in proposito, est vera; sed tunc minor subassumpta est falsa et petit principium. Nec probatio valet, quoniam bene concedo quod potest in
- 620 totam alterationem, et in eius terminum eiusdem generis cum ipsa, puta in qualitatem; et ita non oportet dare tempus medium in quo subiectum non alteretur ut assumit.
- [73-34] Ad quartum, quando arguitur 'illud quod in quocumque subiecto positum', etc., concedo, si in quocumque subiecto positum producat
- 625 idem et eiusdem speciei effective. [C 207ra] Si etiam in quocumque subiecto positum sit causa substantie eiusdem rationis non effective, sed tantum dispositiva, concedo [P 214ra] quod isto modo est causa illius propria virtute, non virtute subiecti, causa inquam dispositiva, non effective; sed tunc nego minorem, quia, licet accidens in quolibet
- 630 subiecto positum sit causa eiusdem substantie dispositiva, non tamen est causa alicuius substantie effective.
- [74] Ad primam probationem, 'illud quod uniformiter disponit materiam', etc., dico quod verum est, si sit causa effective; si autem non, sed tantum dispositive, tunc uniformiter disponit materiam et virtute
- 635 propria, non tamen effective.
- [75] Ad secundam probationem, que est de illa experientia de gallina et ansere, etc., dico quod ubi deficeret omnis causa in quam talis effectus posset reduci, ita quod non posset reduci in celum nec in intelligentiam, nec in aliquid aliud, convenientius reducitur in substantiam galline quam
- 640 in eius calorem vel quodcumque aliud accidens galline vel alicuius alterius. Nec est inconueniens eundem effectum sive eiusdem rationis fieri a duobus, ab uno univoce et ab alio equivoce.
- [76] Et si arguas quod causa equivoca est nobilior suo effectui; nunc
- 612 qui] quia P 616 patet] prima C 622 assumit] assumis P 638 in²] om. C 640 vel] *scripsi* nec *codd.*

autem gallina videtur esse imperfectior anseri; quare etc., respondeo. Concedo maiorem, sed nego minorem. Nobilior enim est forma substantialis galline forma substantiali anseris, quicquid sit de corpore. Quanto enim animal magis participat de prudentia, tanto nobilior est secundum speciem; unde animalia disciplinabilia sunt nobiliora non disciplinabilibus, et prudentia non prudentibus, pro quanto magis appropinquant ad speciem hominis, que est simpliciter perfectior omnibus, secundum quandam similitudinem; gallina autem et non anser est de numero animalium disciplinabilium et prudentium iuxta illud verbum Christi: *quotiens volui congregare filios tuos quemadmodum gallina*, etc. et de gallo in Iob [38:36]: *quis dedit gallo intelligentiam*. Habet enim gallus quemdam quasi rationis instinctum quo scit discernere horas diei; hoc autem non habet auca, cum sit animal valde silvestre.

[77] Si tamen dicatur quod anima sensitiva quecumque introducitur solum per creationem sicut anima intellectiva, quod bene videtur in # Genesis 1[:21], ubi de opere quinti diei [P 214rb] dicitur *creavit Deus cete grandia* etc.; de luce autem dicitur ibi [1:3] *fiat lux*, non autem creetur lux, et [1:11] *germinet terra*, etc., ibi. Tunc argumentum sumptum ab huiusmodi experientia non habet difficultatem. Ex quo enim quecumque anima sensitiva per creationem introducitur, frustra alia eius principia queruntur; si autem huiusmodi forme sensitive non ponantur creari sed ab aliquo naturali agente induci, non sunt reducende in aliquod corpus, nec celeste sive aliud quodcumque ut in causas ipsarum; quodcumque enim corpus comparatur ad animam sensitivam ut mobile ad motorem, et ideo corpus quodcumque respectu anime sensitive magis habet rationem materie quam efficientis; efficiens autem et materia non coincidunt in idem.

[78] Ex quo videtur quod, si huiusmodi forme sensitive continentur virtualiter in aliqua causa secunda dispositione precedente in materia ad ipsas, quod talis causa secunda eas virtualiter continens et in materia disposita sufficienter introducens, sicut angeli sive boni sive etiam maligni, sicut habetur in Exodo de illis magis Pharaonis qui fecerunt per artem magicam ranas, que erant animalia; talium enim animalium sensitive forme videntur introducte fuisse in materia ab illis magis disposita a malignis spiritibus effective.

645 nego minorem] *inv.* P 645-646 forma substantialis] *inv.* P 647 est] *om.* P 654 in] *sup. lin.* P 657 anima] intellectiva *add. sed del.* P 658 #] iiii CP vangelia *Redactio IVb* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 3071, f. 153rb) 659 dicitur] dicit C 666 ut] nec *codd.* ipsarum] ipsas C 674 introducens sicut] introducit sive C 676 ranas] *om.* C 677 fuisse] *om.* P

652 verbum Christi: Mt. 23:37, Lc. 13:34

[79] Quid autem horum sit verius videri poterit diffusius in II. Sed quid
 680 de igne generato per motum vehementem a quocumque factum? Non
 enim videtur quod possit poni causa eius ignis, cum non sit ibi nec lapis
 vel aliud corpus ex cuius motu causatur, cum sit frigidus, nec celum
 vel aliquod corpus celeste, cum [C 207rb] tempore hyemali huiusmo-
 di corpora magis sint causa humidorum et frigidorum quam aliorum;
 685 celum etiam vel alia corpora celestia non experimur quod generent infe-
 rius calorem in hyeme, sed magis frigus; ergo multo minus nec formam
 substantialem ignis ad quam disponit calor.

[80] Dico quod triplex est causa: quedam simpliciter prima, que Deus
 est; alia simpliciter infima, quecumque sit illa, alie sunt intermedie inter
 690 istas. Tunc dico quod quando est aliquis effectus alicuius cause [P 214va]
 intermedie qui non potest reduci in causam mediam convenientius, redu-
 citur in causam primam et superiorem quam in inferiorem ipso effectu.
 Effectus enim inferior medius non est impossibilis prime cause, est
 autem impossibilis cuicumque cause inferiori. Per hoc ad proposi-
 695 tum. Causa proxima est ignis, prima et superior est Deus, inferior est
 motus et accidens quodcumque; tunc ergo dico quod, si huiusmodi effec-
 tus potest reduci in aliquam causam intermediam citra primam et supra
 infimam, debet reduci in illam, alias, si non potest in aliquam talem
 reduci convenientius, reducitur in causam primam supremam quam in
 700 causam infimam, et eo inferiorem ut in motum vel in quodcumque aliud
 accidens, secundum illas sex regulas superius positas.

[81] Et si queras utrum sit aliqua causa citra primam in quam possit
 reduci, posset dici forte quod sic, videlicet ipsa substantia mixti mota,
 per cuius motum, mediante ipse, ignis generatur; numquam enim motus
 705 est sine substantia mota. Tunc ergo posset dici quod quedam substantia
 est nata generare sive causare ignem immediate, non mota ab alio, sicut
 ignis; alia est nata causare ignem nonnisi mota, ut lapis vel quecumque
 alia substantia mixti, que mota causat ignem et non aliter. Nec videtur
 inconueniens huiusmodi substantiam ponere eius causam, cum substan-
 710 tia mixti sit perfectior secundum speciem substantia cuiuslibet elementi,
 et ita videtur posse ignem ut eius effectum equivocum virtualiter con-
 tinere; non est enim inconueniens eundem effectum secundum speciem
 generari univoce et equivoce a diversis, ut patet de calore producto a

684 sint] sit C **686** magis] minus *add.* C **689** infima] in fine C sunt] *om.*
 P **700** quodcumque aliud] *inv.* C **701** sex] *om.* P **702-703** possit reduci]
inv. C **704** cuius] eius P **706** sive] si C **710** secundum speciem] *inv.* C **712**
 est] *om.* P

679 diffusius in II: FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA, *Reportatio IIA*, q. 22 (ed. Suarez-Nani
 et al., pp. 197–212).

calore ignis et a sole. Motus autem nullo modo potest poni causa istius, 715
 tum quia imperfectior simpliciter, tum etiam secundo quia effectus in
 actu requirit causam in actu; nunc motus ipse non est pro illo instanti
 pro quo ignis generatur, quia iam pertransit; ergo etc.

[82] Sic ergo quicquid sit de causa in quam sit effectus reducendus, saltem
 ista negativa videtur mihi certa, videlicet quod nullo modo potest in
 motum nec in aliquid aliud inferius se reduci. 720

⟨**Ad rationes in principio**⟩

[83] Ad rationes in principio, patet ex superius dictis.

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Figure 1: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 1r, GUILMUS DE BRENA, *Principium in I*




Figure 2: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 105r, GUILMUS DE BRENA, *Principium in II* (P2a)



Figure 3: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 154v, *Sphaera vitae et mortis*



Figure 4: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 124r, end of *lectio* 96, beginning of *lectio* 97




Figure 5a: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 16r detail, *lectio* 10, beginning




Figure 5b: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 16v detail, *lectio* 10, beginning of q. 2-3



Figure 5c: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, 17v detail, *lectio* 10, end of q. 2-3, q. 4




Figure 6a: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 79v detail: *quod d cottidie*




Figure 6b: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 83r detail: *sed de et sic de illo*




Figure 6c: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 102b^{isr} detail: *ad primam questionem questionem quartam heri*




Figure 7: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 60r detail, *lectio 40*, beginning




Figure 8: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 61v detail, marking on bottom of page



Figure 9: Praha, NKCR VIII.F.14, f. 118v, *Principium Iib* (end), *lectio* 92 (apograph)



Figure 10: Watermark A, Pear



Figure 11: Watermark B, Arbalest



Figure 12: Watermark C, Bell with Clapper



Figure 13: Watermark D, Person?

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